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With the outbreak of widespread strikes and demonstrations in East Berlin and 
throughout East Germany on June 16-17, 1953, the country’s communist leaders — as 
well as the Soviet leadership — believed that “Day X,” the day of the long-expected 
Western-instigated coup d’etat against the socialist order in the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) had arrived. Internal GDR estimates and outward propaganda had long 
warned of the culmination of Western efforts to undermine the peasant-and worker state. 
The ruling Socialist Unity Party (best known by its German acronym SED) quickly 
charged that the uprising had been a “fascist provocation” hatched by American and West 
German “imperialist agents.” Captives of their ideological prism and predictions, Moscow 
quickly sought to suppress the unrest militarily and stabilize the faltering regime of East 
German communist party leader Walter Ulbricht.  
Before long, the events of 1953 would become the subject of propaganda, legends, 
and identity on both sides of the Cold War in Germany.1 The spontaneous strikes and 
demonstrations of workers, farmers, and youth against the SED regime was the first major 
uprising within the Soviet empire since the Kronstadt unrest in 1921. To many in the 
West, in particular the new administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, it seemed 
to demonstrate to the world that the “captive peoples” within the Soviet empire could and 
would oppose Stalinist rule when the opportunity arose—and that the Moscow-backed 
Central European communist regimes could be upheld only by military force.  It seemed 
that the “proletariat” had risen against the “dictatorship of the proletariat;” workers and 
                                                 
1 See Ilse Spittmann, “Der 17. Juni im Wandel der Legenden,” Ilse Spittmann/Karl-Wilhelm Fricke, eds., 
Der 17 Juni 1953 (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1988), pp. 121-132; Dietmar Schiller, 
“Politische Gedenktage in Deutschland: Zum Verhältnis von öffentlicher Erinnerung und politischer 
Kultur,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B25/93 (June 1993), pp. 32-39.  17. Juni 1953: Streit um sein Wesen, 
ed. by Kurt Frotscher and Wolfgang Krug (Schkeuditz: GNN, 2004). 
5 
peasants were throwing stones at the organs of a state that had been proclaimed in their 
name. Politically, ideologically and diplomatically, East Germans had dealt their 
communist rulers and their Soviet “masters” a heavy, near mortal blow. Eisenhower would 
note that “I am quite certain that future historians, in their analysis of the causes which 
will have brought about the disintegration of the Communist Empire, will single out those 
brave East Germans who dared to rise against the cannons of tyranny with nothing but 
their bare hands and their stout hearts, as a root cause.”2 For Eisenhower, as for many of 
his contemporaries in East and West, the widespread rebellion against the oppressive 
communist government in East Germany in the summer of 1953, suppressed only by a 
Soviet military crackdown, was a pivotal moment in the Cold War—anticipating perhaps 
the beginning of the end of the Soviet empire and the dawn of the post-Cold War world.  
In West Germany, the unanimous condemnation of the Soviet military action 
resulted in the adoption of an annual “Day of German Unity.” In the German Bundestag, 
June 17 was hailed as “the most important event in the recent history of German 
democracy.”3 But even as early as the summer of 1953, the events in the East were 
manipulated for the political purposes of the day: for Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, the 
uprising bolstered support for his policy of integrating the Federal Republic (FRG) with 
the West in the hopes of negotiating with the East some day from a position of strength.4 
By contrast, for many within the Social Democratic opposition in the FRG, the revolt 
prompted calls for further immediate steps towards German reunification. Though its 
                                                 
2 Draft letter from the President to Chancellor Adenauer, 20 July 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library 
(Abilene, KS), C.D. Jackson Records, Box 3; The New York Times, 26 July 1953. 
3 Deutscher Bundestag delegate Stefan Meier on 3 July 1953 in the parliamentary debate on the law; 
Deutscher Bundestag, ed., Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Stenographische Berichte, First 
Legislative Period, 280th Session, p. 14070, quoted in Edgar Wolfrum, “Kein Sedantag gloreicher 
Erinnerung: Der Tag der Deutschen Einheit in der alten Bundesrepublik,” Deutschland Archiv (1998), p. 
434. See also Matthias Fritton, Die Rhetorik der Deutschlandpolitik: Eine Untersuchung 
deutschlandpolitischer Rhetorik der Regierungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung von Reden anlässlich des gedenkens an den 17. Juni 1953 (Stuttgart: M&P, 1998).    
4 “The Eisenhower Administration, the Adenauer Government, and the Political Uses of  East German 
Uprising in 1953,” Diplomatic History (1996), pp. 381-409. 
6 
emotional appeal would deflate over time, the interpretation of the June 17 events as a 
popular uprising became part of the legitimizing raison d’etre of the young Federal 
Republic.5 
Though the events of June 1953 had nearly swept away his regime, SED leader and 
GDR deputy premier Walter Ulbricht, too, soon managed to turn the crisis into an 
advantage: Blaming the unrest on Western machinations served as an extraordinarily 
useful pretext for eliminating the challenge that had arisen to his own rule within the 
communist party leadership and any oppositional elements within East German society. In 
the wake of his regime’s gravest crisis, Ulbricht instrumentalized his version of the events 
to expand dramatically the very means of repression that had helped, in part, to generate 
the crisis and to stage what has been called “the second founding” of the GDR.6 Public 
discussion and historical research into the deeper causes of the unrest remained a taboo in 
East Germany for years to come.7 After Ulbricht’s death in 1973, and increasingly in the 
1980s, some East German historians tried to give a more differentiated, less grossly 
distorted picture of what had happened. Nonetheless, the idea that “Day X” had been a 
U.S.-instigated plot remained the predominant interpretation. Former Soviet and SED 
                                                 
5 Over the years, official statements and public commemorations in West Germany on the “Day of German 
Unity” became a rather precise barometer of the dominant strain of Deutschlandpolitik of the day. 
Progressively, the memory of June 17 faded and lost its emotional appeal. Against the backdrop of détente, 
Ostpolitik, and the seeming permanence of Germany’s division in late 1960s and 1970s, many West 
Germans increasingly wondered whether to commemorate June 17 at all. At the same time, curiously, the 
student movement and German Left began to discover 1953 and interpret it according to their own 
conceptions--as a failed attempt at class struggle by East German workers against the all-German state-
capitalist (East) and bourgeois (West) elites. Rudi Dutschke, “Der Kommunismus, die despotische 
Verfremdung desselben und der Weg der DDR zum Arbeiteraufstand vom 17. Juni 1953,” Die Sowjetunion, 
Solschenizyn und die westliche Linke, ed. Rudi Dutschke and Manfred Wilke, (Reinbeck: Rowohlt, 1975); 
see also Alexander Gallus, “Der 17. Juni im Deutschen Bundestag von 1954 bis 1990,” Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte B25/93 (June 1993), pp. 12-21.  
6 This is the main thesis maintained in Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, Armin Mitter and Stefan Wolle, eds., Der 
Tag X -17:  Juni 1953. Die „Innere Staatsgründung" der DDR als Ergebnis der Krise 1952/54. (Berlin: 
Links, 21996). 
7 Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, “Die Historiker der DDR und der 17. Juni 1953,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und 
Unterricht 44 (1993), pp. 704-724; Ilko- Sascha Kowalczuk, Legitimation eines neuen Staates. 
Parteiarbeiter an der historischen Front: Geschichtswissenschaft in der SBZ/DDR 1945 bis 1961 (Berlin: 
Links, 1997); Alexander Fischer and Günther Heydemann, eds., Geschichtswissenschaft in der DDR, 2 vols. 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1988-1990). 
7 
officials stubbornly adhere to this view even years after the implosion of the GDR and the 
end of the Cold War. The idea of a secretively engineered Western provocation, 
popularized in such books as Stefan Heym’s Der Tag X (later published in the West as 
Fünf Tage im Juni) and taught for years in high schools and universities throughout the 
GDR, may still have its hold on many.8  
 The following study seeks to put the events of 1953—and particular the role of 
American policy – into its larger international and historical context. It projects  
backwards from the fateful days of June 1953 to retrace the origins of American policy 
towards East Germany in the early postwar years. The following chapters demonstrate that 
the June 1953 uprising took the West, in particular the U.S. government, with as much 
surprise as the Kremlin and the East German leadership, but  it also shows that American 
policy in Germany since 1945 was far more assertive and aggressive vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Union and the emerging East German regime than previously acknowledged.  
In fact, officials in the administration of Harry S. Truman were themselves worried 
about a reverse, Soviet-inspired “Day X”—the outbreak of general warfare in Europe 
triggered by a massive Soviet attack.  American strategic planners did not generally 
believe that Moscow had any intentions of launching World War III in the immediate 
aftermath of a war that had nearly devastated the Soviet Union in human and material 
terms, but such a possibility could nonetheless not be entirely discounted.  But as it 
watched events unfold in Eastern Europe in the early postwar years, the Truman 
administration grew anxious that a hostile bloc under Soviet domination was emerging 
that would lead to economic chaos and global war. Despite financial and military support 
for the beleaguered Greek and Turkish governments, Marshall Plan aid to the UK, France, 
                                                 
8 See for example the memoirs of the SED chief ideologue, Kurt Hager Erinnerungen (Leipzig: Faber & 
Faber, 1996), pp.193-195; Wladimir S. Semjonov, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow. Ein halbes Jahrhundert in 
diplomatischer Mission, 1939-1991 (Berlin: Nikolai, 1995), pp. 291-299. See also: Herbert Krämer, Ein 
Dreissigjähriger Krieg gegen ein Buh: Zur Publikations- und Rezeptionsgeschichte von Stefan Heyms 
Roman über den 17. Juni 1953 (Tübingen: Stauffenburg, 1999). 
8 
the western zones of Germany and other West European countries, and massive efforts to 
assure the defeat of the communists in Italy’s April 1948 elections, the communist forces 
seemed on the offensive throughout Europe in the late 1940s. Communists seized power in 
Czechoslovakia in February 1948, and that very spring Moscow notched up its pressure on 
the Western powers in Berlin. Continued occupation of Germany and labor unrest in 
France highlighted the fragility of Western Europe’s halting rehabilitation. Despite what in 
retrospect appear as early Western “victories,” such as the Berlin airlift and the 
stabilization of Western Germany—the successful testing of a Soviet atom bomb in 
August 1949 and the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War that fall reinforced the 
pervasive feeling in Washington that time and initiative was on Moscow’s side.  
In the political discourse in Washington, reactive, defensive notions of 
“containing” this new Soviet threat mixed with more activist and offensively conceived 
notions of “liberation” and of “rollback” of Soviet power. The latter concepts were 
popularized by the Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, in the 1952 
campaign as they criticized the “passive” and “stagnant” foreign policy of the Truman 
administration. They struck a chord because they related to traditional American political 
paradigms of liberty and “manifest destiny,” linked to the religiously infused ideology of 
American exceptionalism and America’s moral superiority that had motivated U.S. 
interventionism from the 19th century to the world wars of the 20th.9  Faced with the yet 
another “totalitarian challenge” to its very concept of modernity in the wake of the 
German Reich’s defeat, the United States saw itself assisting the “natural” or “divine” 
trends of world history and defending its own security at the same time as it sought to 
expand the domains of freedom abroad.10 The United States, therefore, could not limit 
                                                 
9 Bernd Stőver, Die Befreiung vom Kommunismus: Amerikanische Liberation Policy im Kalten Krieg 1947-
1991 (Köln: Böhlau, 2002), pp. 35-60.  
10 On the Cold War as a struggle of for competing visions of modernity, see Odd Are Westad, The Global 
Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005). 
9 
itself to the “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive 
tendencies” alone, as U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan had—now famously—demanded in 
his “X-Article” (1947) in Foreign Affairs.11 Led by Kennan himself, American officials 
set out in 1947-1948 to destabilize the Soviet regime and its East European “satellites” 
through a concerted “psychological warfare” effort—termed “counteroffensive”—that 
sought to further and exploit “vulnerabilities” of the Soviet system, particularly its 
pervasive distrust and suspicion, and “rollback” Soviet domination from Central Europe. 
The following study seeks to demonstrate that East Germany played an important role in 
this “counteroffensive” strategy.  
A case study in American policy towards the Soviet orbit, the following chapters 
show that even General Lucius B. Clay, the American military occupation chief in the 
early postwar period, known largely for his efforts to continue the U.S.-Soviet alliance in 
running postwar Germany in the face of growing estrangement, pursued what might be 
called a first attempt at “rollback”—one by integrating the Soviets into a joint occupation 
system that would ensure—that is, compel—the expansion of American influence right 
into the Soviet occupation zone. Evidence from the Russian and former East German 
archives shows both the impact of this strategy on Moscow’s and the East German 
communists’ threat perceptions – and their reactions.  
Frustrated by the lack of Soviet cooperation and outraged by Stalin’s effort to 
capitalize on the Germans’ yearning for preserving their national unity as the occupation 
zones increasingly drifted apart, Clay turned from rollback by integration to rollback by 
destabilization. Efforts to destabilize communist rule in eastern Germany expanded after 
the establishment of the GDR in October 1949, now seen by Clay’s successor, U.S. High 
Commissioner John J. McCloy, as Moscow’s main “bridgehead” into Western Europe. To 
                                                 
11 “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25 (1946/47), pp. 566-582.  
10 
be sure, this Western counteroffensive in Germany would have to eshew the risk of 
triggering general war; instead American policymakers imagined turning East Germany 
into so great a liability that the Kremlin would consider negotiating its detachment from its 
sphere of control. That day would see the end of the West’s own security liability in 
Europe: its tenuous position in Berlin, and it promised the unification of Germany on 
Western terms, the solid integration of a united Germany with the West and, more than 
likely, a significant weakening, if not collapse of Moscow’s European empire.  
The American counteroffensive entailed a massive program overt and covert 
measures that went well beyond inoculating the Federal Republic politically against 
similar measures from the East. Only the outlines of this “psychological warfare” program 
are known even today as much of the U.S. operational documentation remains 
declassified. Nonetheless, hundreds of pages of materials declassified via the U.S. 
“Freedom of Information Act” for this project make clear that the program was not 
confined to planning papers in Washington and Berlin. Soviet and East German archival 
materials also help to demonstrate the extent to which this program affected the “hearts 
and minds” of the SED leadership and the East German population. This is particularly 
true for the events of June 17, 1953 that nearly turned the regime crisis in the GDR in the 
wake of Stalin’s death into an international conflict. Only in the aftermath of the June 
1953 uprising did the newly elected Eisenhower administration begin to rethink its pursuit 
of rollback, which, in Europe, saw its denouement in the tragedy of the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution. 
The extent to which rollback in Germany could be pursued was severely 
circumscribed by the overall American strategy in Europe. That strategy centered on the 
integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into Western European economic, 
political and military structures, believed to be critical to prevent the resurgence of 
11 
German nationalism and militarism and assure the rehabilitation of war-torn Western 
Europe. The limits on an aggressive rollback approach to East Germany were defined 
largely by the American priorities in West Germany and requirements of building an 
increasingly sovereign and assertive Federal Republic. West German officials were 
reticent to push as far as some ‘cold warriors’ in Washington envisioned, in particular in 
the trade area. Similarly, maintaining Western allied unity in Germany in face of the threat 
from the East, particularly with regard to the exposed Allied position in Berlin, often, but 
not always, constrained American efforts towards East Germany.  
By adopting an “international history” approach, this study seeks to go beyond the 
examination of one side’s perceptions12 to a more complex narrative of interactions 
between actors on all, or at least a number, of sides in the Cold War in Germany.13 Having 
said that, his study does focus on the U.S. and (given the access to sources) to some degree 
less, on the Soviet and East German perspective. Despite some new research, in-depth 
British and French perspectives on this issue remain a task for future research.14 
 
2.  Historiographical Context and Sources 
                                                 
12 The classic study for the perceptions approach is Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in 
International Politics (Princeton: UP, 1976); for the US-German relationship, see Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase 
and Ursula Lehmkuhl, eds., Enemy Images in American History (Providence, RI, and Oxford: Berghahn, 
1997); Willi Paul Adams and Knud Krakau, Deutschland und Amerika - Perzeption und Historische Realität 
(Berlin: Colloquium, 1985); Angermann, Erich and M.-L. Frings, eds., Oceans Apart? Comparing Germany 
and the United States (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981). 
13 See in particular, Odd Arne Westad, “Reviewing the Cold War,” in., Reviewing the Cold War: 
Approaches, Interpretations, and Theory ed. by Odd Arne Westad (London; Portland, OR: F. Cass, 2000), 
pp. 1-23; and Melvyn P. Leffler, “Bringing it Together: the Parts and the Whole,” ibid., pp. 43-63. See also  
Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen : Erneuerung und Erweiterung einer historischen Disziplin / ed. 
by Eckart Conze, Ulrich Lappenküper and Guido Müller (Köln: Böhlau, 2004); and Internationale 
Geschichte : Themen, Ergebnisse, Aussichten, ed. by Wilfried Loth and Jürgen Osterhammel (München : 
Oldenbourg, 2000). 
14 Heinrich Maetzke, , Der Union Jack in Berlin. Das britische Foreign Office, die SBZ und die 
Formulierung britischer Deutschlandpolitik 1945/47 (Konstanz: UVK, 1996); Adolf M. Birke and Günther 
Heydemann, Grossbritannien und Ostdeutschland seit 1918 (München: KG Saur, 1992); Bert Becker, Die 
DDR und Großbritannien 1945/49 bis 1973: Politische, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Kontakte im Zeichen 
der Nichtanerkennungspolitik (Bochum: Brockmeyer, 1991). 
12 
This study interfaces the history of postwar U.S. policy towards Germany and 
Eastern Europe with the history of East Germany within the emerging communist bloc. Its 
place therefore is at the intersection of two larger historiographic projects: the 
internationalization of the history of U.S. foreign relations, and the historicization of the 
GDR. Only recently have historians come to to appreciate that U.S. foreign policy in the 
early phase of the Cold War was far more assertive in nature than the defensive posture 
implied by the notion of “containment.” This view of American policy differed sharply 
from the initial assessments of the U.S. approach to the rising Cold War: In the 1950s, 
scholars and former administration officials emphasized the defensive nature of American 
policy and laid blame for the post-World War II confrontation at Stalin’s door step.15 New 
Left revisionism in the 1960s–reflecting the contemporaneous political debate more so 
than new facts—argued that the United States was motivated in its approach to the Soviet 
Union primarily by its desire for global economic dominance.16 While revisionist writings 
overplayed the importance of economic and more narrow business motivation behind 
American foreign policy relative to other factors, they did break with the 1950s 
historiographic consensus and create a real debate—and sharpen the sense for the more 
offensive nature of American policy.  
Spearheaded by John Lewis Gaddis, the “post-revisionism” of the 1970s further 
legitimized the idea that Americans bore some responsibility for the rise of the Cold War 
confrontation.17 Benefiting from increased declassification of formerly secret documents 
in the 1980s, Melvyn Leffler’s Preponderance of Power (1991) finally documented 
persuasively that U.S. objectives had been far more aggressive than previously 
                                                 
15 The classic study of this “school,” often labeled the “orthodox” or “traditional” interpretation, is Louis J. 
Halle, The Cold War as History (New York: Harper & Row, 1967). 
16 See, e.g., Joyce Kolko und Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power. The World and U.S. Foreign Policy,  
1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). 
17 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1972). 
13 
acknowledged.18 American planners, Leffler argued, wanted to redraw Russia’s borders to 
its pre-1939 status, destroy the Cominform, retract influence of the Soviet Union and 
eventually cause the Soviet system to weaken and decay. Given time and strength, 
containment could evolve into a “rollback” of Soviet power.  Based on newly declassified 
top-level US planning papers, Gregory Mitrovich recently pushed this notion even further: 
rollback did not await successful containment: the Truman administration embarked on a 
strategy to “compel” the Soviet Union to abandon its international ambitions in sync with 
its containment policy.19  
With the end of the Cold War, the implosion of the communist regimes in East-
Central Europe, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the ensuing opening of the 
former communist-world archives, historians have also sought to internationalize the 
history of the Cold War beyond what was possible until then. Against the backdrop of an 
era of unprecedented openness and declassification of U.S. government records (during 
the 1990s), access to the innermost chambers of secrets of the formerly ruling communist 
parties from Moscow to Berlin has allowed historians to recast the Cold War in ways 
unthinkable beforehand: the narrative could now be reconstructed from an international 
perspective, on a multi-archival basis, overcoming the one-sided perspectives that had 
predominated scholarship in East and West.20 The sudden end of the Cold War 
confrontation posed the challenge to historians to write its history knowing the outcome, 
yet it also allowed them to escape the ideological and political parameters that the Cold 
War seemed to have set while it was ongoing. After all, in the Soviet bloc much of the 
                                                 
18 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the 
Cold War (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1992); see also his The Specter of Communism: The United States and the 
Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994). 
19 Gregory Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin: America’s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956 
(Ithaca, NJ: Cornell UP, 2000). See also Peter Grose, Operation Rollback: America's Secret War Behind the 
Iron Curtain (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 2000); and Stőver, Die Befreiung vom Kommunismus. 
20 John Lewis Gaddis, “On Starting All Over Again: A Naïve Approach to the Study of the Cold War,” Odd 
Arne Westad, ed., Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, and Theory (London; Portland, 
OR: F. Cass, 2000), pp. 27-42; and Melvyn P. Leffler, “New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and 
Prospective Reconfigurations,” Diplomatic History 19:2 (Spring 1995),  pp.172-197. 
14 
political history was in the lip service of the party state, and the scholarly debate in the 
United States was all too often a mere continuation of the political and politicized debate 
over American foreign policy by historiographic means. The “New Cold War History” 
(Gaddis) shifted the old debate centered on the question of who was to blame for the rise 
of the Cold War to rethinking some of the fundamental dynamics of the international 
history of the second half of the twentieth century: Aside from recasting the Cold War 
with greater complexity, the “New Cold War History” emphasized, for example, the role 
of ideas and ideology and the importance of “junior allies” (a phenomenon commonly 
referred to as the “tail wagging the dog.”)21 
The German battleground of the Cold War has always formed an important sub-
narrative. Reflecting the larger debate on the origins of the Cold War, during the Cold War 
(and beyond) historians fought and re-fought the battle over who was to blame for the 
division of Germany. During the height of the Cold War, most Western accounts laid the 
blame squarely at Stalin’s doorstep. Much of the late Cold War era scholarship had firmly 
grounded American policy towards postwar Germany in the containment paradigm. To be 
sure, the notion of a “double” or “dual” containment developed by Wolfgang Hanrieder 
and Thomas Schwartz added subtlety to the notion that Washington was solely 
                                                 
21 The most recent statement is: John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 
2005); a first synthesis was attempted in John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History 
(New York: Oxford UP, 1997), in particular his final chapter; Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Cold War: Inside 
Enemy Archives,” Foreign Affairs 75:4 (July/August 1996), pp. 120-135; Leffler, “What do `We now 
know'? American Historical Review, 104: 2 (April 1999), pp. 501-525, and Leffler, “Bringing it Together,” 
Reviewing the Cold War, pp. 47-58. For a critical view, see Geir Lundestad, “How (Not) to Study the 
Origins for the Cold War,” Reviewing the Cold War, pp. 64-80. Among the most prominent publications are 
Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), Hope M. Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 2003). See also the work of Kathryn Weathersby on the Soviet role in the Korean 
War, “The Soviet Role in the Korean War, The State of Historical Knowledge,” in William Stueck, ed., The 
Korean War in World History (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press: 2004), pp. 61-92; “’Should We 
Fear This?’ Stalin and the Danger of War with America. Working Paper No. 39 (Washington, D.C.: Cold 
War International History Project-Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, July 2002); “Stalin, 
Mao and the End of the Korean War,” in Odd Arne Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the 
Sino-Soviet Alliance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998);  “To Attack or Not to Attack? Stalin, 
Kim Il Sung and the Prelude to War,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5 (1995), pp. 1-9.  
See also other publications by the Woodrow Wilson Int'l Center for Scholars’ Cold War International 
History Project. 
15 
preoccupied with countering Soviet expansionism into Europe.22 The effects of World 
War II – and President Roosevelt’s singular focus on defeating, punishing and 
emasculating German military might -- lingered on in the almost irretrievable political 
atmosphere of the postwar period. Fear of a reemerging Germany coexisted with the 
emerging fears of the Russian “Grand Alliance” partner. General Lucius Clay personified 
this layered, incongruous and yet very real and actionable sense in dealing with the 
German and Russian problems – one that has at times led biographers and historians 
astray.23   With the U.S. and British sources well exploited by the last 1980s, the study of 
American policy in Germany during the first postwar decade took a cultural turn. 
Reflecting similar trends in other fields, major works emphasize the significance of 
ideological or cultural agendas and discourse as well as the importance of non-state, non-
governmental actors in the international arena of the postwar period.24  
Though over time historians came to question this consensus, only Carolyn 
Eisenberg’s Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949, 
published in 1996, finally turned the historiographic tables: The United States along with 
Britain, not the Soviet Union, Eisenberg argued in what over the last decade has become 
the standard account of the subject, was the architect of Germany’s partition. Lacking 
access to archival sources in Germany and Russia, Eisenberg’s account, however, 
                                                 
22 Wolfram Hanrieder, Deutschland, Europa, Amerika. Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
1949-1994 (Paderborn: Schöningh, sec. ed., 1995); Thomas A. Schwartz, America's Germany. John J. 
McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard UP, 1991); see also Die 
doppelte Eindämmung: Europäische Sicherheit und deutsche Frage in den Fünfzigern, ed. by Rolf 
Steininger (München: v. Hase & Koehler, 1993). 
23 See John. H. Backer, Die deutschen Jahre des Generals Clay. Der Weg zur Bundesrepublik 1945-1949 
(München: C.H. Beck, 1983); Wolfgang Krieger, General Lucius D. Clay und die amerikanische 
Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1949 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987); Jean Edward Smith, Lucius D. Clay: An 
American Biography (New York: Henry Holt, 1990). 
24 For a good overview see Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher, eds., Culture and 
International History, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003); .Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, “Academics, 
Cultural Transfer, and the Cold War - A Critical Review,” Diplomatic History  24:3 (Summer 2000), pp. 
465-395; Frank Schumacher, Kalter Krieg und Propaganda: Die USA, der Kampf um die Weltmeinung und 
die ideelle Westbindung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1945-1955 (Trier: WVT, 2000); and  Jessica C.E. 
Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar 
Germany, 1945-1955 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, c1999). 
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remained as one-sided as those she had revised. In dispensing historical judgment, 
Drawing the Line reduced a complex dynamic to a powerfully suggestive but far from 
complete historical construct. As the following study shows, in some sense Eisenberg 
overdrew her analysis of U.S. responsibility; in other ways she did not go far enough.25 
What these new important contributions, including Hermann Josef Rupieper’s, Der 
besetzte Verbündete: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1949-1955 (1991) and his Die 
Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie Der amerikanische Beitrag 1945-
1952(1993) as well as  Frank Schumacher’s  Kalter Krieg  und Propaganda (2000), had in 
common – and indeed united them with landmark earlier studies such John Lewis Gaddis’ 
The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (1987) and Melvyn Leffler’s 
Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold 
War (1992) -- was the fact that they paid little attention to East Germany, both as an object 
and actor in the story that unfolded. Scholarship seemingly still mirrored the American 
political vantage point that had focused on Western Germany and, in line with the 
longtime denial of diplomatic recognition, ignored the eastern part of the country and 
treated it as a negligible appendage. Alternatively, many studies subsumed the GDR as a 
Soviet “satellite,” as part of the political Eastern Europe, famously written off to Soviet 
domination by American “non-policy.”26 Even in works on German-American relations, 
including classics such as John H. Backer’s The Decision to Divide Germany: American 
Foreign Policy in Transition (1978), Die USA und Deutschland, 1918-1975: Deutsch-
amerikanische Beziehungen zwischen Rivalität und Partnerschaft (1978), Frank 
Ninkovich’s Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question 
since 1945 (1987),  Wolfgang Krieger’s General Lucius D. Clay und die amerikanische 
                                                 
25 Carolyn Eisenberg, Drawing the Line. The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949 
(Cambridge: UP, 1996). 
26 Geir Lundestad, The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe 1943-1947 (Tromsö: Universitets-
forlaget, ²1978). 
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Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1949 (1987) and Schwartz’ America’s Germany, developments 
in eastern Germany found scant mention, if at all.27 Only recently have a number of new 
publications, such as Anjana Buckow’s Zwischen Propaganda und Realpolitik (2003); 
Schanett Riller’s Funken für die Freiheit (2004) and Burton C.Gaida’s USA - DDR. 
Politische, kulturelle und wirtschaftliche Beziehungen seit 1974 (1989) focused greater 
attention on certain aspects of the American approach to the “other” Germany.28 
The historiograhic deficit on the GDR changed when the doors of the archives of 
the SED and the government it ran flung far open in the wake of the fall of the wall.29 To 
be sure, the GDR had been a subject of serious study in West Germany prior to 
reunification, particularly by the Mannheimer Arbeitskreis “Geschichte und Politik der 
DDR” around Hermann Weber and Dietrich Staritz, as well as other experts, such as Karl 
Wilhelm Fricke, Gisela Helwig, Peter Christian Ludz, Ilse Spittmann and Carola Stern.30 
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DSF-Archiv als Quelle zur Geschichte der DDR - Der Volksaufstand vom 17. Juni 1953,” Deutschland 
Archiv 25:8 (1992), 837-45; Hermann Weber, “Die Wissenschaft benötigt die Unterlagen der Archive. 
Einige Überlegungen zur Archivsituation in Berlin,” Deutschland Archiv 24:5 (1991), pp. 452-57. 
 Christian Ostermann, „New Research on the GDR,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 4 (Fall 
1994), pp. 34, 39-44; Ulrich Mählert, ed., Vademekum DDR-Forschung. Ein Leitfaden zu Archiven, 
Forschungseinrichtungen, Bibliotheken, Einrichtungen der politischen Bildung, Vereinen, Museen und 
Gedenkstätten (Opladen: Leske & Buderich, 1999). 
30 Hermann Weber,. DDR. Grundriß der Geschichte 1945-1990 (Hannover: Fackelträger, 1991); Ders., Die 
DDR 1945-1986  (München: Oldenbourg, 1988); Ders., ed. Parteiensystem zwischen Demokratie und 
Volksdemokratie. Dokumente und Materialien zum Funktionswandel der Parteien und 
Massenorganisationen in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1950. (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1982); ders. 
‚‚‚Weiße Flecken’ in der DDR-Geschichtsschreibung,“Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte  11 (1990), pp. 3-15; 
Dietrich Staritz,, ed., Einheitsfront, Einheitspartei: Kommunisten und Sozialdemokraten in Ost- und 
Westeuropa 1944-1948 (Köln: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1989); Staritz, Geschichte der DDR 1945-1985 
(Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1985); Staritz, Die Gründung der DDR. Von der sowjetischen 
Besatzungsherrschaft l zum sozialistischen Staat. (München: dtv, 2nd. ed., 1987); Karl Wilhelm Fricke,. Die 
DDR-Staatssicherheit. (Köln: Wissenschaft und Politik, 3rd ed.,1989); Fricke, MfS intern. Macht, Strukturen, 
Auflösung der DDR-Staatssicherheit. Analyse und Dokumentation (Köln: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1991); 
18 
But it remained handicapped by the dearth of sources and – much like the broader debate 
about the Cold War in the United States – the study of the GDR reflected the political 
debate and exigencies in the Federal Republic about Deutschlandpolitik, from the early 
totalitarian critique of the 1950s to the “systemic” understanding of the GDR as a 
modernizing society in the Détente years. Only access to the archives in Eastern Germany 
(and Russia) after 1989/90 allowed historians in East and West to begin a critical 
reconstruction of the political and social history, the “historicization” of the “second 
German state.”31  
Since the early 1990s, the history of East Germany (and the relations between both 
German states) has witnessed an explosion of new research. In this process, former East 
German historians – in particular members of a new generation, including Armin Mitter, 
Stefan Wolle and Andreas Malycha, liberated from the prerequisites of Marxist-Leninist 
ideological framework, have played a leading role in reassessing GDR history.32 
International historians have joined this proliferation of research on postwar eastern 
Germany, with such landmark studies as Norman Naimark’s The Russian in Germany: A 
History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation and Catherine Epstein’s The Last 
Revolutionaries: German Communists and their Century (2003).33 The following study 
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Mitter „Die Ereignisse im Juni und Juli 1953 in der  DDR, " Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 5 (1991) , pp. 
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builds on this rich archival corpus of documents and analytical literature to show how 
American policy impacted events in East Germany; and it has allowed this study to give 
historical agency to the East German leaders and “masses” as they faced the West.  
While the events of June 1953 and the Soviet occupation period drew much public 
and scholarly attention, research on international history based on the former East German 
records preoccupied itself with German-German relations, with an emphasis on the period 
after 1960. 34 Studies of GDR foreign policy generally suffered from two circumstances: 
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First, despite the setting up of a foreign ministry in the GDR in 1949, international affairs 
remained a tightly guarded prerogative of the Soviet occupation power, particularly in the 
immediate postwar period but to a great degree into the 1950s as well. Thus the German 
record, exemplified by the important but fragmentary and often cryptic Pieck diary notes 
has been fragmentary at best.35 Secondly, until very recently, Russian records for the early 
postwar period in Germany remained inaccessible in the Presidential Archive and the 
Russian Foreign Ministry Archive in Moscow.36 Thanks to patient effort by Jochen 
Laufer, Jan Foitzik and others at the Zentrum für zeithistorische Forschung in Potsdam, 
Russian records on occupied Germany have begun to be published in cooperation with the 
MID. Though far from complete, these records, supplemented with Russian records 
relating to Germany from other collections and archives, have informed this study to the 
extent that they allow for the first time in a fairly systematic fashion for insights into 
Soviet (and German) intentions and actions vis-à-vis the United States and its allies.37  
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“An Iron Curtain of Our Own”?38 
The United States, the Soviet Zone, and the Division of Germany, 1945-1948 
 
1. “Toward a Line Down the Center of Germany:”39 Dividing Germany 
Berlin and the Soviet Occupation Zone (SBZ) was a desolate place when President 
Truman’s entourage arrived there in late July 1945 to discuss the future of Germany with 
the leaders of Russia and Great Britain. The capital of the defeated German Reich lay 
largely in ruins. “For mile after mile through Berlin and its suburbs,” one member of 
Truman’s party remembered, “every building was shattered beyond habitation. Some were 
still smoldering (…) The stench of death was everywhere.”40 A desolate atmosphere 
pervaded the place to which the victors had come to decide on the spoils of the war. The 
city’s skyline of ruins was powerfully suggestive of the awesome challenge of ruling the 
country over which the Allies had just assumed “supreme authority.” And it reinforced the 
frustrations that emerged in the discussion between the wartime allies—and the depressing 
reality of a new confrontation. “ This is an unhealthy place—Berlin,” U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of War John J. McCloy, who was accompanying Truman, noted in his diary 
upon arrival, “The misery of the place and the conflict between the East and the West 
hangs over you all the time.”41 
By mid-1945, these two realities in the heart of Europe, the problem of Germany 
and emerging tensions with Soviet Union, were weighing heavily on the new Truman 
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administration. Truman’s predecessor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, had focused his 
energies on winning the war and avoided being drawn into postwar planning.42 On key 
issues of a German settlement, such as dismemberment, the president felt that “our attitude 
should be one of study and postponement of the final decision.” FDR was privately 
disposed toward a draconian peace with Germany, convinced that it needed to be “driven 
home to the German people” that “their nation had engaged in a lawless conspiracy 
against the decencies of modern civilization.”43 In late 1944, he gave his ad hoc 
endorsement to a pastorialization plan for Germany championed by his Treasury Secretary 
Henry Morgenthau, who suggested to “take every mine, every mill and factory and wreck 
it.”44 Yet the president’s commitment to Morgenthau’s idea of a drastic economic 
disarmament of Germany was short-lived. In absence of more specific presidential 
determination, the discussion and development of how to treat the defeated adversary was 
left to officials at the State and War Department. By war’s end, only minimal allied 
agreements on Germany’s surrender and occupation were in place. 
State and War Department officials charged with postwar planning understood the 
elementary problem of security from Germany largely in economic terms, in this respect 
not without affinity to Roosevelt’s mode of thinking.  Imbued with the belief that restoring 
a multilateral world trade system was a key element in sustaining peace after the war’s 
end, U.S. postwar planners considered integrating German economic potential with the 
economies of its neighboring countries the best way to undercut German nationalistic 
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propensities for autarchy and hegemony.45 Preventing future German aggression, in their 
view, was less a matter of emasculating German industrial might than creating inextricable 
interdependencies with other economies. Reparations were widely considered “one of the 
most fundamental sources of disturbance in international relations after 1919;” many 
believed that the United States ended up financing them through interwar loans to 
Germany. Now postwar planners at Foggy Bottom wanted reparations to become a tool for 
economic integration: “Reparations have their economic justification to the degree that 
they are forward—not backward – looking, that is, to the degree that they contribute to 
reconstruction.” Rather than drastic intervention into the German economy, officials were 
even willing to provide Germany with trade incentives to reinforce its re-incorporation 
into the world economy.46  
This approach toward the German problem reflected not only the corporate 
background of these State and War Department officials but also their conservative 
political outlook quite distinct from FDR’s New Dealers.47  Concerns about the resurgence 
of German nationalism mixed with a basic anti-communism and suspicions about the 
ultimate designs of America’s Soviet ally. In fact, to many, Soviet moves in Eastern 
Europe, northern Scandinavia, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Far East looked 
increasingly as if Moscow was pursuing an expansionist policy, extending, as Molotov 
would later recall, “the frontier of our Fatherland to the maximum.” Social upheaval, 
moral debilitation and economic desolation throughout much of war-torn Europe also held 
the potential exploitation by local communist forces and the Soviet Union, now the most 
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powerful power on the continent. U.S.  planners therefore favored resuscitating Germany’s 
coal and steel industry in the Rhein-Ruhr area as a critical catalyst to the rehabilitation of 
Western Europe’s war-torn economies -- and ultimately the survival of free enterprise and 
market economy. Though most planners looked at the former Reich as a whole, 
intrinsically, this economic-structural approach focused largely on the more industrialized 
western part of Germany. By early 1945, the idea of the centrality of western Germany’s 
coal and steel industrial complex to the revival of the European economy thoroughly 
pervaded American postwar planning.48 
Political and military realities in the waning months of the war reinforced concerns 
about Germany’s western industrial complex. By the time of the Potsdam Conference, 
U.S. authorities were confronted with shortages in food and coal in the American zone and 
quickly preoccupied with allocating foodstuffs. The Red Army occupation of Germany’s 
agricultural hinterland that, as the country’s “bread basket,” had traditionally supplied the 
Western industrial base, created increasing doubts that prewar trade patterns could be 
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resumed speedily. In the short run, Allied financed imports were the only recourse, and the 
only way to justify imports to their tax-payers, Truman administration officials felt, was as 
interim financing which the Germans would pay back as “first charge” on exports 
proceeds. This decision reinforced the need for reviving coal and other industrial 
production, based largely in the Rhein-Ruhr valley, as the top occupation priority. It 
rendered the idea of reparations as tools of economic disarmament largely obsolete.  
The thrust of American policy thus ran counter to Moscow’s approach to the 
German problem. Soviet concerns focused on the potential for a future German aggression 
against the Soviet Union, and expectations that Germany would quickly recover from its 
wartime losses and defeat only heightened these fears. In August 1944, Stalin told the 
Polish Premier Stanisław Mikolajczyk that after World War I, it had taken Germany only 
20 to 25 years to recover. Obviously trying to win the confidence of the Polish leader 
whose country had equally suffered at German hands, he predicted that “Germany will rise 
again ... Who knows now if they won’t be ready to fight again after 20 or 25 years. Yes, 
Germany is a powerful country, even though Hitler is weakening it. We are convinced that 
the danger from Germany will repeat itself.”49  By April 1945, he had revised his estimate 
downward: Receiving a Yugoslav leadership delegation, he stated that the Germans “will 
recover, and indeed very quickly. They are a highly-industrialized nation with an 
extraordinarily educated and large working class and technical intelligenzia. Give them 12 
or 15 years, and they will be on their feet again.”50 Stalin’s statements reflected a 
widespread fear of the “vitality” of the Germany economy and its capacity to recover 
within a few years from the war. The opinio communis among the upper echelon of the 
Soviet foreign policy bureaucracy was that Germany had to be rendered harmless through 
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a combination of dismemberment, “military, industrial and ideological disarmament,” 
reparations and re-education.51  
 To prevent another German aggression, Ivan Maisky, Soviet ambassador in 
London and a top foreign policy adviser to Stalin and Soviet Foreign minister Vyacheslav 
Molotov, noted in his diary which has recently become accessible, the Soviet Union could 
seek “internal or external guarantees”—the establishment of a Soviet regime or industrial 
disarmament.52  The establishment of Communist rule in Germany certainly seemed the 
ideal solution to the Soviet security dilemma. But while Soviet officials never abandoned 
the idea completely, they discounted its likelihood: The Soviet planning effort was based 
on the assumption that the war would not lead to a truly proletarian revolution in 
Germany.53 A Communist take-over would, of course, as Maisky informed Molotov in the 
fall of 1943, call for a change of postwar planning. “We would be forced to reassess the 
situation and draw conclusions accordingly.”54  With the development of a socialist 
Germany affined to the Soviet Union “a pie in the sky,” continued allied cooperation was 
critical to preventing the resurgence of German power.55  
American calls for disarming and democratizing Germany and rooting out Nazism 
made some Soviet officials like Maisky optimistic that the Western powers could be 
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counted on in “creat[ing] real democracies”56 that would pose no threat to the USSR. But 
long-standing mistrust vis-à-vis the Western powers and uncertainty about their ultimate 
intentions remained a powerful sentiment within the Soviet foreign policy apparatus, 
casting doubts about the sincerity and efficacy of Western disarmament and reparation 
efforts. Many Soviet officials expected that “contradictions” between the USSR and the 
Western powers would arise again after the end of the war. Internal Soviet foreign 
ministry discussions in early 1944 as Soviet postwar planning entered its formative stage 
assumed that Germany, or its western parts if dismembered, would align itself with 
France, England and the U.S. Given the possibility of disagreements between the allies, 
Soviet ambassador to Washington Maxim Litvinov, another leading foreign policy expert 
soon to take a leading role in Soviet postwar planning efforts in Moscow, reflected the 
general feeling, that “the danger arises of a conscious weakening of controls by certain 
powers, yes, even the active promotion of arming and reindustrializing Germany.”57  
Moscow remained fundamentally skeptical about the ability and interest of its 
wartime allies to implement a reparations regime. To be sure, Stalin and his advisers 
looked at reparations from Germany in restitution of the enormous damage suffered at the 
hands of the Germans a natural right of the victorious powers and crucial to the 
reconstruction of the devastated homeland. Soviet officials considered reparations as a tool 
for the economic disarmament of Germany, for an elimination of the German industry and 
the pastoralization of Germany. But Marxist-Leninist ideology and the post- World War I 
experience let Soviet leadership doubt that the Western powers would execute a harsh 
reparation regime. Reparations “among capitalist countries ― as the example of the First 
World War shows ― cannot be implemented,” argued the influential Soviet economist 
and Stalin adviser Eugene Varga, given “the insuperable contradiction between the efforts 
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to take reparations from the vanquished while destroying their economic power and 
moreover protecting the capitalist social order.”58 Such ideologically and historically 
derived doubts about the Western allies willingness to see through harsh reparations 
scheme that would effectively disarm Germany’s military industrial complex had to 
reinforce a focus on gaining and maintaining direct control over occupied territory.  
Stalin himself seems to have had less interest in reparations than many of the 
Soviet officials involved in postwar planning – and many in the West --  had assumed.  
“40,000 machine tools—this is all we want in reparations from Germany,” Stalin is 
reported to have exclaimed early in the war, according to veteran Soviet diplomat 
Maisky’s recently declassified diary.59 Not until after the November 1943 Tehran 
Conference did a USSR government commission, led by Maisky, take on the task of 
developing a reparations program. When that commission produced a report eight months 
later, recommending total reparations from Germany at $75 billion, the predicted 
maximum of German capabilities, Stalin failed to react to it at all, despite repeated 
requests by Maisky. The issue came to the fore when Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav 
Molotov, on behalf of Stalin, surprised Maisky in December 1944 with the question of 
whether $5 billion, stretched out over 10 years, would suffice. Against the advice of his 
experts, who pleaded for demanding at minimum a $10-15 billion share of a projected 
reparations total of $23 billion, Stalin clung to the $5 billion total. Not until the second 
session of the heads of state at the Yalta Conference on 5 February 1945 did Stalin, 
seemingly impromptu, put forth the $10 billion figure as the official Soviet request. But it 
was Maisky who was tasked to present its rationale: “economic disarmament” of 
Germany. Stalin’s apparent equivocation on the issue contributed to the failure of the 
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allies to reach agreement on the overall amount. The Yalta conferees shelved further  
discussion to the Allied Reparations Commission slated to meet in Moscow.60  
In Soviet calculations, interest in reparations was outweighed by other factors: 
Expecting disagreements with the allies over Germany as a whole, Soviet officials favored 
establishing near exclusive control over the territory the Red Army came to occupy at the 
end of the war. Wartime precedents suggested that Washington would go along with 
Soviet predilections for predominant influence in East-Central Europe. As early as the 
Tehran Conference in October 1943, Roosevelt had signaled his willingness to accept 
Soviet demands for control over the Baltic republics and the eastern part of prewar Poland. 
A year later, Roosevelt acquiesced to the “percentage agreement” between Churchill and 
Stalin that had secured the Soviet Union predominant influence in Bulgaria and Romania 
(while given Britain predominance in Greece). Poland (west of the Curzon line) had a 
tougher case: Germany’s invasion of the country had been the casus belli for Britain, and 
the weight of the Polish-American community in the United States was an important 
consideration for the Roosevelt administration. Recognizing Soviet security concerns, the 
president and many within the administration envisioned Central Europe as a zone of 
democratic governments autonomous in their domestic politics but “friendly” in their 
foreign policy towards the USSR – a concept encapsulated in the February 1945 Yalta 
Declaration on Liberated Europe.61  Yet despite growing concerns on Roosevelt’s part 
about Stalin’s reticence to follow through on the Declaration, efforts in the aftermath of 
the Yalta Conference to create a more broadly based Polish government were half-hearted 
at best. In May, Truman sent FDR confidante Harry Hopkins to Moscow to make it clear 
to “Uncle Joe Stalin” that “Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czeckosovakia [sic] Austria, 
Yugo-Slavia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia et al made no difference to U.S. interests only so 
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far as World Peace is concerned.”62 As a result of Hopkins’ meeting with Stalin, the 
administration recognized a Polish government dominated by the communists (a slightly 
reconstructed version of the “Lublin Committee” installed at Soviet behest the previous 
year).63   Despite lip service to democratic governance in Eastern Europe, much of the 
region was slowly accepted as a sphere in which the Russians would run the show.64   
In remarkable symmetry to American thinking, such sphere of influence thinking 
spilled over into occupation planning. As they pondered the occupation of Germany, 
Soviet planning documents had insisted as early as 1943 on exclusive responsibility of the 
supreme commanders for their zones. Three days before the British government tabled a 
draft for a zonal division of Germany in the EAC on 15 January 1944, which anticipated 
much of the allied protocol later that year, the Moscow officials had arrived separately at a 
very similar plan for a zone-by-zone occupation of Germany. In its demarcation of the 
zonal borderline along the Elbe, one version in the Soviet plan came phenomenally close 
to the British draft, leaving parts of Mecklenburg, Saxony-Anhalt and all of Thuringia 
outside the Soviet zone. An alternative version sought to assure Soviet zone access to the 
North Sea by claiming all of the territory north of the North-East Sea Canal and east of the 
Elbe.65 Two-thirds of the later Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg, Kiel and Lübeck would 
in this case have become part of the Soviet zone. Strikingly, the draft did not concern itself 
with the delineation of all three zones, simply a demarcation line between the Soviet and 
Western zones. Over the next few weeks, the Soviet foreign ministry officials adjusted 
their draft, initially extending the demarcation line through much of Central Europe, 
eventually limiting their demands to call for a joint occupation of Hamburg, Berlin and 
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Schleswig-Holstein. Stalin signed off on the draft on February 8, after eliminating claims 
to mixed occupation of Hamburg and its surrounding area, perhaps eager not to set 
precedents for mixed occupation areas other than the capital of the defeated Reich. 66    
Moscow’s emphasis on exclusive occupation by one allied power meshed well 
with American predilections for retaining a “free hand” in their zone. In the course the 
European Advisory Commission negotiations in London, Washington reverted from the 
initial idea of a centralized and omnipotent Allied Control Council to advocating a military 
government which operated at the zonal level and acted through a three-power organ in 
Berlin at the orders of the three governments. The tendency towards zonal control and 
decentralization was reinforced by the 26 August 1944 Soviet draft which explicitly 
denied even the most rudimentary executive and administrative functions to the Control 
Council. The final Zonal Protocol of 12 September 1944 clearly reflected the American 
and Russian preference for zonal autonomy. Allied control in postwar Germany would be 
divided between joint central authority vested in the Allied Control Council and the 
authority of the individual zonal commanders for administration in their zone, with the 
weight of power gravitating towards the latter.67  In May 1945, moreover, American 
negotiators in the EAC proposed to their Allied colleagues that, whereas the Allied 
Control Council’s authority would be supreme in all of Germany, in cases where 
agreement on policies was lacking, each military commandant would be free to proceed 
unilaterally in his zone.68    
The division of Germany in potentially autonomously run zones took the place of 
dismemberment of country which Roosevelt had entertained notionally until late in the 
war. At Yalta he had agreed with Churchill and Stalin to dismemberment in principle, but 
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the idea was soon abandoned. Formal partition at the mercy of the victorious allies ran 
counter to the widespread conviction and experience that penalizing and crippling 
Germany permanently that way would fail; division would lead to a resurgence of German 
irredentism and nationalism. Equally important, neither side wanted to forsake a remaining 
measure of influence throughout all of Germany; noone wanted to shoulder the blame for 
partition. But it was quite clear to officials at all levels that, unless joint policies could be 
found, zonal division could de facto result in partition as each occupation powers put its 
stamp on the political and economic landscape of its zone. 
Admitting that “we have no idea yet what they had in mind,” Roosevelt certainly 
expected in the final months of the war that the Russians would “in their occupied territory 
(…) do more or less as they wish” in their zone,69  and by spring 1945 it was becoming 
evident that Stalin was intent on just that. Moscow interpreted its “free hand” in the Soviet 
occupation zone to allow extensive looting and dismantling, which became first priority 
the Soviet occupation forces. In the wake of the combat units that entered Germany, so-
called “trophy brigades” plundered German cities and villages. Soviet soldiers engaged in 
a veritable hunt for military machinery, scientific laboratories, communication equipment, 
gold, watches and furniture, cattle, cars and bicycles, even cultural objects. Without any 
consideration of discussing joint reparations policy at the forthcoming “Big Three” 
meeting in Potsdam, Stalin authorized a “Special Committee” headed by Georgy 
Malenkov to coordinate trophy removals in order to carry away industrial plants and 
equipment in large quantities, as fast and as secretly as possible.70 Requisitions by the 
occupations troops and reparations in some areas aggravated food shortages and 
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epidemics.71 Long before the allies settled on a zonal reparations solution the Soviet 
Union was in fact following such a policy.72  
Unilateral reparation removals began in May 1945 when about 70,000 Soviet 
reparation agents from the various ministries, scientific and academic institutions in 
Moscow “swept” the zone, often competing with each other and the Soviet occupation 
authorities. The first wave focused on the Greater Berlin area. Following the motto “ship 
off everything,” (“alles auf die Räder”), Soviet agents dismantled or destroyed large 
quantities of industrial equipment, particularly in Berlin’s western sectors, in preemption 
of the anticipated Western control. Not only did western Berlin lose half of its industrial 
capacity in these first few months of occupation, but nearly 50 percent of the total number 
of plants to be dismantled by the USSR in the aftermath of the war had been approved for 
removal by the time the Potsdam Conference convened in July.73   
In stark contrast to the looting frenzy, Stalin seemed in little rush to come to an 
agreement on the central issue before the allied powers: reparations. There is, in fact, no 
evidence to suggest that the Soviet leaders ever showed an interest in an allied reparations 
plan that the Yalta Conference had called for. Not until March 14 did he appoint Maisky 
as Soviet representative to the reparations commission established in Yalta. Western 
efforts to have the French included in the negotiations served as a pretext to delay its work 
for several months, allowing Soviet unrestricted removals in the meantime. When the 
commission finally convened on June 21, discussions quickly stalled over the “first 
charge” principle demanded by the Americans and British. In addition, the head of the 
U.S. delegation to the Reparations Commission, Edwin Pauley, suggested that the group 
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jointly inspect industrial sites throughout Germany. Though Maisky himself seems to have 
favored that a reparations mechanism “be extended to our zone,” he rejected the proposal 
at Molotov’s behest. 74 Pauley now backed away from discussing any number total for 
reparations, conceding at most a percentage key that would leave the USSR with half of 
the total, and suspended discussions on forced labor after Truman instructed him to avoid 
any impression of sanctioning “slave labor.” 75   
In turn, the Soviet delegation dragged its feet on agreeing on defining such crucial 
terms as trophies, reparations and restitution. Without instructions from Moscow, Soviet 
officials were hedging on specifics on a reparations plan, increasingly putting them in a 
position “awkward to the highest degree.”76   As the Potsdam summit approached, Maisky 
pleaded with Molotov to throw Pauley a bone: to agree to a percentage key and joint 
mechanism for early removal of certain plants and goods prior to finalizing an overall 
reparations agreement. “Why not take everything of possible importance out of our zone 
during, let’s say, the next month and a half and simultaneously maneuver so that the 
mechanism which Pauley is proposing actually begins functioning no earlier than the 
middle of August?”77  Moscow had little interest in restricting the massive removals from 
their zone as long as possible, and by mid-July refused to discuss the issue at all.78  
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Truman administration officials had figured that the USSR was “determined to get 
rapidly all it can out of Germany;”79 intelligence reports confirmed the massive removals 
in Soviet occupied territory. The inability to agree to a reparations plan and the growing 
depletion of the Soviet zone reinforced Anglo-American anxieties about the economic 
viability of their zones and the feasibility of an overall reparations framework. But it was 
hence not until Truman’s entourage descended upon Potsdam for the meeting of the “Big 
Three” that the extent of the removals became shockingly evident to the president and his 
advisers. “When I saw how completely the Russians had stripped every factory they could 
get their hands on,” Averell Harriman, who had arrived for the Potsdam Conference from 
Moscow recalled, “I realized that their conception of surplus tools and machinery which 
could be taken from Germany was far tougher than we could ever agree. The Reparations 
Commission had been meeting in Moscow before Potsdam, talking endlessly about 
percentages, and all this time the Russians had been helping themselves to everything of 
any value in the Eastern Zone and in Berlin. I decided after seeing the situation for myself 
that while there was nothing we could do to stop the Russians from taking whatever they 
wanted out of their own zone, we ought to give them nothing from the Western Zones.”80  
President Truman noted in his diary that “the Russians are natural looters,” though in light 
of Germany’s wartime atrocities, one could “hardly blame them for their attitude.”81  
In Potsdam, Moscow confronted its wartime allies with the demand to consider all 
its removals thus far as war booty rather than reparations. Ignoring far more limited 
proposals for reparations developed internally by Varga by mid-July, official Soviet 
conference documents presumed an expansive definition of trophy removals to include all 
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of Germany’s armaments industry, already removed or still standing.82 Exasperated by the 
Soviet fait accompli, Pauley warned of the dire consequences of Soviet (and French) 
policies: “After they have looted their own zone, they will come around and ask for ‘their 
share’ of our zones. Is the horse being stolen?” American officials were determined not to 
finance imports into the Soviet zone necessitated by the rapid depletion of the zone. If 
Germany were treated as an economic unit, American and British taxpayers essentially 
paid for Soviet removals in the east; the Soviets would “simply milk the cow which the 
US and British are feeding,” as a British official later put it.83   Soviet behavior in eastern 
Germany, moreover, reinforced a growing feeling among Truman’s advisers that Stalin’s 
hands ought to be kept out of the Ruhr, whose strategic economic importance grew with 
every removal from the SBZ to the East. Frustrated by Soviet unilateralism ― and 
meanwhile just as eager to keep a free hand on the Ruhr ― Pauley conceived of the idea 
to let the Soviet Union satisfy its need for reparations exclusively from its own zone. 
Prewar statistics dug up by the Reparations Commission could be interpreted to suggest 
that the economic value of the Soviet Zone roughly equaled the percentage of the 
reparations total (however controversial that number was). Rather than endlessly 
quarreling over the removals, whether “war booty” should be counted as reparations, 
about how much Germany should pay and what forms these payments would take, each 
side would take whatever it wanted from the areas it controlled.84  As Pauley told his 
Soviet counterpart, the reparations program could “best be conducted on a zonal basis” 
and “not by treating Germany as a single economic unit.” Unwilling to foot the bill for 
Germany’s reparations as it had done after the World War I, the United States would “deal 
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with [its] reparations along the same line.” The zonal approach was the “regrettable but 
inescapable” result of the Soviet unilateralism in its zone. 85  On July 23, Byrnes proposed 
the zonal solution as the core principle of a deal on reparations.  
In the conception of Byrnes and Pauley, this zonal approach was not limited to 
reparations alone; it would also govern Germany’s foreign trade, would allow each zonal 
authority to control ex- and imports – and not just with other countries, but even with other 
zones. The Soviet Union, Byrnes assured Molotov in Potsdam, would not have to worry 
about financing imports into western zones and be hamstrung by the first-charge principle. 
Moscow would have no interest in imports or exports from the Western “zone.”   The 
entire scheme implied giving up on treating the German economy as one unit: it was 
instead based on the premise that each of the three western zones would constitute “a 
virtually self-contained economic area.”86    
Soviet officials were aware that the zonal solution bore considerable risks for the 
Soviet side, particularly shutting the door to the industrial riches of the Ruhr. Experts from 
the renown Institute of the World Economy in Moscow had estimated that as much as one-
third of the total German military-industrial potential was located in the Ruhr area alone. 
Internal Soviet reports suggested that the Ruhr district suffered comparatively little from 
Allied military operations.  Soviet analysts figured that about 35% of the buildings and 
structures of the enterprises were damaged or destroyed but only about 5-15% of the 
equipment was put out of operation. They presumed that the Ruhr’s production capacity 
had been reduced only by about 20%. From American members of the reparations 
commission who recently visited western Germany Soviet officials learned that they 
expected the Rhein-Ruhr industry to be completely restored within a year. Though unsure 
about the Western allies’ intentions with regard to the Ruhr, Litvinov warned that it was 
                                                 
85 Pauley to Maisky, 27 July 1945, FRUS Potsdam II, pp. 894-6. 
86 Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, p. 177n. 
38 
absolutely clear that “there is a tendency in the West not to destroy the industry of the 
Ruhr district but to put it under international administration or control, intending to 
concentrate this control in the hands of the Western countries.”87 The strongest objections 
to the zonal solution came from Varga. Based on Varga’s estimates, Georgy P. Arkadeev, 
deputy head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s economic department, told Molotov that only 
30% of all removable goods were located in the zone and that the USSR was entitled to 
some $3 billion worth of deliveries from the Western “zone.”88   
Despite these misgivings, Molotov signaled his readiness to negotiate based on the 
zonal principle that very same day. In fact, the foreign minister instructed his staff to 
suggest a Soviet counteroffer that applied the separate regime not just to one time 
removals, but even reparations from current production. Over the objections of his 
economic advisers, Molotov agreed to the zonal principle when Byrnes, on July 29, 
offered a package deal that tied the reparations scheme to American recognition of the 
western borders of Poland.89 The Potsdam reparations formula played to Molotov’s and 
Stalin’s strong predilections for a free hand in their zone.  Despite the “relative poverty of 
our zone,” Molotov agreed to the “Pauley Principles.”  Once further negotiations assured 
the Soviet Union 25 percent of all reparations extracted from the Western zones (15 
percent in exchange for foods, coal, potash, timber and other products from Eastern 
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Germany),  Stalin dropped his insistence on shares in stocks of those enterprises to remain 
in the Western zones and German gold and foreign assets, removing the last obstacle to 
the deal.90  
Publicly the Potsdam agreements emphasized the unified economic treatment of 
Germany, but the reparations formula adopted on August 1, conceptualized by Byrnes and 
his advisers in response to the developments in the Soviet Zone, split Germany into two 
economic zones. Playing to the predilections on both sides for a “free hand” in occupation 
policy, it set eastern and western Germany on very different economic and trajectories that 
would make quadripartite governance difficult at best. It reflected and reinforced the 
binary thinking increasingly pervading the discourse in allied capitals. “Eastern and 
Western Germany are two separate economic units, run by Russia and the three Western 
powers respectively,” noted a British official later that year; Soviet officials more 
frequently spoke of the “western zone” (rather than “zones”). 91 Such thinking was not 
limited to the economic sphere alone; diverging political futures for both parts of Germany 
seems in the offing. “There will be two Germanies,” Stalin told German communist 
leaders as early as June 1945.92 One American Potsdam witness, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense John J. McCloy, confessed to his diary that “[w]e are drifting towards a line down 
the center of Germany.”93   
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2. “Western Democracy on the Elbe:” Conceptualizing ‘Roll-back’ in Germany 
 Byrnes’ efforts at Potsdam to work out a modus vivendi with the Russians had been 
based on his belief that real cooperation was not possible. There is too much difference in 
the ideologies of the U.S. and Russia,” Byrnes noted in the midst of the Big Three summit, 
“to work out a long-term program of cooperation.”94  Mistrusting Stalin’s intentions, he 
sought to keep Soviet influence in Germany at bay, containing its devastating economic 
impact to the territories the Red Army had occupied. For all intents and purposes Byrnes 
was writing off eastern Germany as a Soviet sphere of influence in Germany. By mid-
1945, Byrnes’s views of the relationship with the Russians – and his conclusions for 
quadripartite control of Germany – were, however, not widely shared within the 
administration and the American public. Truman himself seemed to condone the feelings 
of his secretary of state at times, while at others seemed convinced that he could work out 
a deal with the Soviet leader. One of Truman’s aides aptly captured this ambivalent 
feeling, noting that Stalin was considered by most on the delegation as “the most likable 
horse thief I have ever seen.”95  Neither Molotov nor the new British foreign minister 
Ernest Bevin seemed to want to publicly acknowledge the division of Germany along 
zonal lines.  Most importantly for a politician so attuned to Congressional and published 
opinion as Byrnes, much of the American public was not yet ready to abandon hopes for 
Soviet-American amity in running Germany. After all, the Potsdam Conference 
declaration buried the essential Byrnes-Molotov deal on reparations in a thicket of calls for 
a unitary treatment of Germany. The “Big Three” had called for the unified treatment of 
Germany by the Allies in matters of de-nazification, democratization, de-cartellization, de-
militarization and economic policy and envisaged the establishment of central German 
administrations in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and 
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industry, headed by German state secretaries under the control of the Allied Control 
Council. 
Few seemed to have inculcated the “spirit of Potsdam” as much as General Dwight 
D. Eisenhower’s deputy military governor and soon-to-be U.S. occupation chief, General 
Lucius B. Clay. 96  The Potsdam accords became “Clay’s bible.” Not only were they 
jointly arrived allied policy pronouncements; he essentially took them as a directive by his 
commander-in-chief. With regard to suspicions about Soviet intentions to fulfill the 
Potsdam program, voiced by State Department experts who briefed him on the 
negotiations after the conference, Clay apparently responded that not abiding by the 
Potsdam declaration “would mean that I should deviate from what the President 
determined at the conference.”97 Still imbued with the spirit of the wartime alliance with 
Moscow, Clay was “optimistic” that the Russians would join allied control mechanisms 
and “we will be able to forge a national administration over those things which should be 
administered nationally.”  Cognizant of the enormous losses at which the Soviet Union 
had defeated the German Reich, Clay possessed an enormous patience and understanding 
for Russian behavior, such as their actions in their occupation zone. He was confident is 
his ability to deal personally with his Russian counterparts in Berlin, many of them recent 
brothers-in-arms. As his numerous biographers have suggested, Clay was determined to 
make the experiment of cooperation with the Russians work.98 Conscious of domestic 
pressure on Byrnes and administration for a quick fix on the dire economic situation in the 
U.S. occupation zone, Clay felt “just as apprehensive over possible impatience and lack of 
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understanding at home of our failure to obtain rapid progress” as he did about “our ability 
in the long run to work out many mutual problems in the Allied Control Council.”99  
What has been less well understood is that Clay did not seek cooperation with the 
Russians as an end in and of itself as he energetically pressed for the establishment of 
central administrations in Germany. In fact, he probably agreed to a large extent with 
Byrnes’s skepticism (and that of many of his State Department colleagues) about the 
chances for longer-term cooperation with the Russians. Yet unlike many Washington 
officials, Clay combined brother-in-arms empathy for Russian hardships and security 
interests with a self-confident belief in the superiority of the American soldier and the 
American occupation system.100 Where Byrnes and State Department analysts emphasized 
ideological differences with the Russians as impediments to longer-term cooperation, Clay 
was inclined to believe that the ideological competition would work out to the advantage 
of the West – if such competition could take place throughout Germany. Where 
Washington officials fretted over the USSR’s expansionist agenda, Clay and his advisers 
saw Russian policy as largely defensive, contradictory and ultimately self-defeating, 
certainly in Germany. As administration and Congress anxiously watched the Soviet 
Union rise to unprecedented power on the European continent, Clay effused a sense of 
American preponderance in his dealings with the Russians. Clay did not naively believe 
that quadripartite solutions would come easily: He expected that they would be reached 
“gradually through long drawn out negotiations.” Hence zonal military government would 
operate “on almost an independent basis for many months.” There was a chance that the 
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Allied Control Council, set up for allied government of Germany, would “become only a 
negotiating agency,” not an overall government for Germany. And if the allies could not 
run Germany as a unit, the Western allies had to consider running western Germany by 
themselves.”101 But if solutions could be reached across the four occupation zones; if 
quadripartite agencies could be established throughout Germany; if therefore the Soviet-
controlled zone it retained a degree of openness and ties with the western parts, then, Clay 
believed, the zone would eventually gravitate “west” – and so might other parts of Soviet-
controlled Central Europe. Cooperation with the Soviets was for Clay the key to a roll-
back of Soviet power.  
Clay felt encouraged by the personal relationships he struck up with his Russian 
counterparts as the Allied Control Council assumed its work. This is evident even from the 
Russian transcripts of his conversations with Sokolovsky and other Soviet officials. But 
with Moscow in need for reparations from the Western zones, Clay also felt certain he 
could coerce a deal with the Soviets. Levers of pressure on Moscow had been built into the 
Potsdam system, such as the linkage between Russia’s 25% percent of western German 
reparations and the to-be-determined level of industry throughout Germany. Clay and 
Murphy were convinced that the Soviet Union was desperately in need of reparation 
deliveries, that in fact reparations were a “principal weakness in the application of [the 
USSR’s] political policies in Germany.”102  Time and again Clay displayed his readiness 
to power-play Moscow into working out agreements on such critical issues as level of 
industry, all-German central administrations and handling Germany’s foreign trade. 
Equally important was his view from the Berlin vantage point that the situation in the 
Eastern zone was far more complex and fluid than perceived in Washington. No one 
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reflected this view more succinctly than the State Department’s top man in Berlin, Clay’s 
Political Adviser Robert Murphy. Like Clay, he had little patience and respect for 
communism and its protagonists, but he brought to his job equanimity and poise and 
quickly developed a sense for the complexity of occupation politics in Germany. 
Fundamental to Murphy’s outlook was that communism held little attraction for Germans 
and that Soviet policies quickly had dissipated any remaining goodwill among the German 
population. Along with the Allied Control Council in Berlin, the Soviet occupation zone 
was for Murphy a laboratory for probing Soviet intentions and capabilities.103 
Clay and Murphy were keenly aware that reliable information on the Russian zone 
was hard to come by. Soon after their arrival in Germany, American occupation authorities 
had began to receive a swelling stream of reports on the conditions in the Russian-
occupied territories of Germany from U.S. sources, German civilians, German soldiers and 
displaced other nationals. The Army’s and the U.S. Military Government’s intelligence 
branches started collecting intercepted letters commenting on the Soviet Zone in an effort 
to gain further insights into the conditions in the SBZ and the attitudes of the Germans 
living there.104  It quickly became clear to the OMGUS leadership that definite 
generalizations about Soviet behavior and German reactions were difficult to make. It 
difficult to establish the validity of the reports. If anything, the reports were striking for 
their cacophony of opinion and for apparent contradictions: some of them described 
conditions in the rosiest, some in the bleakest colors; others painted a more neutral picture. 
Murphy suspected that much of what U.S. officials were hearing was aimed at “playing 
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the Russians off against the Americans and the British.”105 Much seemed to depend on 
what segments of the Russian military the informants had encountered, whether, as one 
U.S. intelligence report stated, had come into contact with the frontline “‘Asiatic troops or 
with the more ‘civilized’ troops who usually relieve the shock troops.”106 One impression 
stood out: that Russian military government officers did not “appear to act under uniform 
instructions” and that conditions and policies differed widely. 107 From the beginning, Clay 
and Murphy could therefore see little evidence of a Soviet “master plan” for Germany. 
Nor did Clay and Murphy echo the dire assessments of diplomats and analysts, like 
Harriman, who starkly warned Truman of the impending barbaric invasion of Europe. 
Deep mistrust of the just defeated enemy initially made many American observers in the 
zones disinclined to put much stock into disconcerting reports about the situation in East 
Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania, or the SBZ, summarized by one US Military Intelligence 
Service Center report as painting a picture of “utter hopelessness and near-
extermination.”108 Reports about atrocities and the barbarian behavior of the second wave 
of Red Army troops often came across as exaggerations by Germans eager to exonerate 
themselves from the terrible pains and horrors inflicted by the Nazi onslaught and the 
ensuing war on the Russian population. Subjected to scrutiny, U.S. officials noted, 
evidence of Russian misbehavior “usually becomes less breathtaking.”109 Americans 
understood that many Russian soldiers had deep feelings of hate and revenge against the 
Germans, and as long as the war went on, such feelings had been officially encouraged. 
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Fanaticized by anti-German propaganda such as Ilya Ehrenburg’s tirades of hatred, Red 
Army soldiers occupied Germany’s eastern provinces, looting, threatening and killing the 
local German population which, despite the Nazi propaganda, was caught unaware of the 
intense terror it faced. Such acts, OMGUS noted, “should be considered as accidents of 
war – similar in many ways to the shelling and bombing of residential areas.”110 
Reflecting the widespread view of the situation, one OMGUS official commented that 
“[a]ll war is rough. People who dislike being treated rough should not commence wars of 
aggression.”111 
Perhaps no single dimension of the Red Army terror would engrave itself into the 
memory of the German population as much as the rape of women and children undertaken 
on a massive scale in the wake of the Red Army’s East Prussian campaign. In East Prussia 
where the initial encounter between the Red Army and the German population took place, 
rape was indiscriminate and almost systematic: “It was not untypical for Soviet troops,” 
writes historian Norman Naimark, “to rape every female over the age of twelve or thirteen 
in a village, killing many in the process.”112 Red Army continued its practices as it moved 
into Silesia and Pomerania, what was to become Western Poland. Since these territories 
were assigned to Polish administration, Germans, in addition, faced retribution by the 
Poles. Berlin suffered the brunt of rape and abuse. The taking of the city, in prolonged and 
fierce battle, was accompanied by “an unrestrained explosion of sexual violence by Soviet 
soldiers.”113 Innumerable cases of indiscriminate rape (sometimes gang-rape) occurred on 
a daily basis, first in the bunkers, then in apartments and houses. For much of the last year 
of the war, Stalin and the Soviet military leadership remained insensitive to the issue and 
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indifferent to complaints about the behavior of Red Army soldiers by Communist leaders 
throughout Soviet-occupied Europe. But by mid-1945, Moscow was becoming aware of 
the political damage done to its cause in Germany. Reports from the field emphasized the 
propaganda advantage opponents derived from the behavior of Soviet soldiers in 
Germany, and increasingly called on Soviet authorities to eliminate “this evil which 
carries such a huge cost for our political prestige in Germany.”114 American occupation 
officials initially tended to take reports on rape with a grain of salt. True, rape and its less 
violent sister acts were “common,” one OMGUS intelligence official noted, but German 
reports were prone to emphasize the rape issue “because of its erotic appeal to some 
Americans and British.” 115 But how deeply the issue had ingrained itself into German 
memory and would complicate Soviet-German relations was not lost on American 
observers: “most Germans,” one report in late 1945 noted, “still associate all Russians 
with rape and looting.”116   
The rape issue reinforced the darker German stereotypes towards the Russians. 
While Germans, American observed, at times referred to Russians as individually 
generous, good-natured and childishly amazed at the most ordinary gadgets of household 
fixtures, “somewhere in the German estimate, it is almost always mentioned that the 
Russians are ‘barbaric’ and ‘enslaved by a system worse than ours was.’”117 Many 
Germans considered the establishment of communist rule in the Soviet occupied areas as 
“the end of everything” and were “inclined to write off the Russian zone as lost to 
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Germany:” Russia, according to this widespread perception, “begins at the border of the 
Russian zone.” 118   
The stream of reports of atrocities, food shortages and desolation in the SBZ were 
powerful antidotes to Soviet radio broadcasts announcing increased food rations and active 
assistance to the reconstruction efforts that set in as early as May 1945.119 Yet in time 
Soviet information policy in Berlin and the Soviet Zone – in particular Radio Berlin’s 
broadcasts --  seemed to American observers to prove increasingly effective in “tending to 
modify the original attitude of fear and hostility toward everything Russian.”120 “Less 
glowing reports” of conditions in the “Russian area” were only gaining circulation slowly 
and did “not have the same widespread effect as the Russian radio propaganda from 
Berlin.”121  Samples of Soviet success in spinning a more positive atmosphere were at 
hand. “I thought that the people would wish that the Americans or English were here (in 
Thuringia) instead of the Russians,” one US zoner, whose correspondence was intercepted 
by US agencies, wrote to a friend about his recent trip to the Russian zone: “But what I 
heard was very much the opposite. They seem very content with the Russians.”122 By the 
end of 1945, American officials in fact noted a “decided decrease in emphasis on 
hardships and unpleasantness of life in the Soviet Zone,” as one report put it. To be sure, 
requisitioning and dismantling apparently remained a sore issue with many Germans, but 
noticeably many sources now pointed to the rapidity of reconstruction and reorganization 
of life in the Soviet Zone. Complaints by SBZ businessmen about shortages in materials 
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and tense relationships with the occupation authorities mixed with frequent praise for the 
help extended by the Russians to German industry and commerce; one writer from Leuna 
described that the workers at the Leuna Works were “enthusiastic about the Russian 
occupation and dread[ed] the day when the Russians might withdraw.”123 Contrasting 
favorably conditions under Soviet occupation with those in the West, numerous letters 
intercepted by U.S. occupation authorities spoke to the “rapid return to normalcy in the 
Russian zone.”124  
Not only did American observers notice signs of revitalizing cultural and civic life 
under Soviet auspices. The resurgence of political activities in the SBZ in particular 
outpaced those in western Germany, though not in ways American (and Soviet) officials 
had anticipated. In late April and early May 1945 Moscow-trained communist cadres had 
been sent to Germany.125 The mission of the German Communists, spearheaded by three 
“initiative groups” under Walter Ulbricht, Anton Ackermann and Gustav Sobottka, had 
been to cooperate with the occupation power, re-establish local administrations and take 
over key administrative positions in Berlin and elsewhere in the Soviet-controlled areas.  
Murphy and his staff were certainly aware that Communist Party members controlled the 
municipal administrations in the American sector by being placed in strategic offices.126 In 
doing so, they created few problems in the eyes of the American occupation officials. The 
U.S. district commandant in Berlin-Steglitz for one noted that those communists officials 
did not obstruct his administration and loyally executed allied orders.127 Murphy was 
confident that the communist take-over of the “command posts” in the emerging political 
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structures would be “slowly rectified with the passage of time,” particularly if local 
elections would “reveal that the Communist Party lack[ed] majority support.”128 Certainly 
Soviet and KKD actions were a far cry from the expectations of many communists and 
other antifascists, many of who hoped for the creation of a “Socialist Germany” or “Soviet 
republic.” Neither the Soviets nor the Ulbricht group, however, could control the political 
upsurge on the Left. All over the zone, antifascist committees and communist bureaus 
sprang up and called for the establishment of a People’s Republic, nationalization of 
industries and collectivization.129  
Confronted with this “ideological chaos,” Stalin decided to press ahead with the re-
establishment of the Communist Party. In May, Ulbricht and Sobottka were recalled to 
Moscow for this purpose, and on June 4, the party leadership was informed that political 
parties and unions would be allowed according to a decision of May 26. “Central 
Committee is to appear openly now,” Pieck noted in his diary.130 Anton Ackermann was 
to draft a manifesto. The “course” was set “in the direction of creating a workers’ party” to 
include workers, farmers and intelligenzia,” but what stuck out to most observers was the 
demand for a parliamentary democracy. At the same time Stalin thought “the creation of 
antifascist committees not to be expedient,” as they could become a challenge to the re-
established municipal administrations. Within days, Ulbricht disbanded over 200 such 
committees.  
Besides the KPD, which formally reconstituted itself on June 11, Moscow also 
permitted the reestablishment of the SPD, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPD) as well as 
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the former Catholic Zentrum Party, now reconstituted as the Christian Democratic Party; 
the parties would join forces with the KPD in an antifascist “unity front.”131 Ulbricht and 
the Moscow-trained KPD leadership, moreover, decried the “sectarian” and “ultraradical” 
views of those on the Left who believed that the defeat of fascism would bring about 
socialism in Germany. As a leading German communist, Hermann Matern, admonished a 
group of antifascists in Dresden: “To talk of dictatorship of the proletariat today is utterly 
absurd and anyone who comes to us with such nonsense has either not understood the 
situation or is an enemy.”132  
Clay and Murphy were fully aware of the “democratic line” espoused by the KPD, 
and like many other U.S. officials did not think the party’s line was entirely a farce. More 
often than not local communist functionaries continued to display diligence and fairness in 
their official dealings and, in the eyes of American officials, seemed to be sensitive to the 
reservations and skepticism among broad segments of the population. Brewster Morris, an 
anti-communist adviser to Murphy who took it on himself to track Soviet and Communist 
activities in the eastern zone, reassured the U.S. occupation leaders that social revolution 
was probably not immediately on the agenda of the Soviets and the German communists. 
Moscow ultimate goals remained uncertain, and for now, emphasizing moderation proved 
exceptionally advantageous for the KPD’s broader popular appeal.133  
To be true, a moderate KPD set to lead an antifascist bloc could be a key tool to 
retaining a unified Germany under communist influence.  The Soviet military government 
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had quickly sought to bring its influence to bear  on the new non-communist parties. U.S. 
Political Adviser Murphy could report that in July that the CDU “gave in to the Russian 
invitation to move party headquarters into the Russian sector of Berlin,” and it quickly 
became apparent that CDU and LDP were dependent on the Russian sector for the printing 
of their daily newspapers, “bringing them under the unpleasant control of the Russian 
censor.” 134  But while such worries were on the back of OMGUS officials’ minds, they 
soon realized that Soviet hopes quickly faltered. Not only did Stalin’s decreed moderation 
sow further disunity and disappointment within the Communist Party, but the enthusiasm 
with which many party members had greeted the arrival of Soviet troops evaporated 
within days as a result of pervasive violence and fear.135 “It is the same people for whom 
the Russian army couldn’t appear soon enough who now wish to see them far away,” 
Murphy reported based on a “highly-reliable” source. Murphy and his staff noted not only 
the weakness and confusion among many German communists, and the growing 
resentment vis-à-vis the KPD among the other political parties. Differences within the 
antifascist bloc over an ill-conceived land reform implemented in the summer of 1945 
undermined the KPD’s relationship with the other parties in the Soviet Zone. Thanks to 
their direct contacts with the CDU leadership in the SBZ, in particular Ernst Lemmer, 
OMGUS was fully aware that the CDU and LDP opposed Soviet sequestering policies and 
criticized the expropriation of personal property and the forcible shipping of former 
landowners out of their districts.136  
Similar to the havoc and confusion created by competing Soviet agencies in the 
dismantling of German industrial sites in the early days of occupation, American officials 
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noted diverging political lines that seemed to emerge among the Soviet policies in 
Germany. Officials such as Zhukov deputy Vassily Sokolovsky and Political Adviser 
Vladimir Semenov considered as favoring more moderate policies that left the door open 
to an understanding with the Western allies competed with ideologically hardline 
“Sovietizers” led by the head of the SMA’s propaganda and censorship department, Col. 
Sergey Tulpanov, who became more visibly involved in Soviet policies as the German 
communists’ appeal and strength waned in the fall of 1945. Similar to the actors on the 
American side, the “center’s” perspective on the German situation would come to diverge 
from the experiences and views of those on the ground in Germany. 
 
3. German Central Administrations: The Double-edged Sword 
With unilateral seizures from the zone sanctioned by the Western allies, Soviet 
dismantling in the eastern zone proceeded unabated in the aftermath of the Potsdam 
Conference. A second wave of removals had begun in May 1945, centering on the zone’s 
weapons production and metal processing industry which had been expanded and 
modernized considerably under wartime production patterns.137  Continued inefficiency, 
the confusion and destructiveness of the dismantling process, increasingly antagonized 
those occupation officials charged with supplying the occupation army, restarting German 
production and feeding the German population. By fall 1945, the economic dislocations 
created by unrestrained dismantling took on crisis proportions, creating “almost universal 
consternation,” as US intelligence noted. 138 Internally, the Soviet Military 
Administration’s top economic official, Konstantin Koval, warned of the danger of an 
economic vacuum and sought to save plants from removal by transferring them into Soviet 
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property.  In early 1946, Koval began developing a reparations plan to gain control over 
the numerous agencies active in the zone. Some 200 of the largest and most modern 
enterprises were turned into Soviet stock companies. Under pressure from Berlin-
Karlshorst, Malenkov’s policy of maximum removals from the occupation zone was 
finally abandoned in early 1946. The change in reparation policy became evident in the 
course of the third wave of removals, beginning in the spring of 1946. Dismantling now 
targeted specific plants in the primary, coal mining, briquette, shoe, sugar and metal-
producing industries. In early May 1946, SMA internally declared a partial halt to 
removals, and on May 21 SMA chief Marshall Sokolovsky announced that an end to 
dismantling was near (though, as it turned out, far from over). Instead of removing 
industrial equipment in large quantities, reparations shifted from removals to extractions 
from current production.139 
 Spurred by the rapid decline of the SBZ economy and the ensuing reassessment in 
the Kremlin, the shift in Soviet reparations policy made possible the first and only major 
quadripartite compromise in the spring of 1946:  an agreement on a level of industry, 
mandated by the Potsdam decisions and eagerly pursued by Clay. Agreement had proved 
evasive for much of 1945, as Moscow’s drastic dismantling policy had led it to favor 
severe limits on German industrial output to free up as many industrial plants for 
reparations as possible, well beyond what Washington and London considered necessary 
to make their zones self-sufficient. As late as December 1945, Soviet representatives on 
the Allied Control Council insisted on turning Germany into an agrarian nation. Soviet 
draft plans called for a reduction of Germany’s industrial output to 40% of the prewar 
level. Allied disagreement turned on the level of steel production, viewed by the Russians 
as an indicator of economic disarmament and the level of reparations. Compromise 
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proposals developed internally by Soviet experts in Berlin failed to win approval by Stalin. 
Only after the change in Soviet reparation policy took effect in January 1946 did  Molotov 
authorize Sokolovsky to accommodate to the higher levels acceptable to Clay and the 
British. Clay too insisted on a link between the level of industry and reparations. On 
March 23, Stalin signaled his agreement, freeing a way for the adoption of the “Plan for 
Reparations and the Level of the Postwar German Economy” three days later.140   
Though it is now clear that internal Soviet dynamics – both in Moscow and in the 
zone -- rather than American pressure led to the allied agreement, to Clay, the industry 
plan was proof that quadripartite government would work, especially if backed up by the 
lure of reparations. As a step closer to unified economic treatment of Germany, allied 
agreement on the nationwide industry level implied a measure of quadripartite restraint on 
Soviet exploitation of its zone. But Clay overestimated the significance of reparations as a 
leverage to force all-German solutions – and in turned failed to fully understand the 
consistent preoccupation of the Soviets with maintaining exclusive control of their zone 
and preserving the “gains” that had been made in occupying and transforming the eastern 
Germany. Far more effective in influencing the Soviet zone, both Clay and Moscow 
sensed, would be central German administrations envisioned at Potsdam – if they could be 
established nationwide. 
Anticipating the establishment of all-German agencies, the Soviet government had 
established central administrations for the Soviet zone even before Potsdam and agreed in 
principle at the Big Three meeting to all-German agencies with limited economic tasks as 
precursors for a German government.  On July 27, SMA order No. 17 provided for the 
establishment of some eleven central administrations responsible for traffic, 
communications, health and education in the Soviet occupation zone; German communists 
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filled the leadership posts. During the discussions in Potsdam, Molotov raised the issue of 
central administrations, which, among other tasks would implement an allied reparations 
agreement and thus administer the Ruhr area, only to be rebuffed by Byrnes with a view to 
the emerging zonal reparations scheme.  Rather than an attempt to expand Soviet influence 
into the critical Ruhr area, Molotov’s proposal seems to have been a tactical negotiation 
move rather than a genuine offer.141 It was commonly held in the Russian capital that 
industrial disarmament, denazification and the strengthening of the “democratic bloc” 
were prerequisites for the creation of all-German institution. 
By the summer of 1945 it was the French government, in particular the Foreign 
Ministry under Henry Bidault, not Moscow, that appeared as the stumbling block towards 
setting up central administrations.142 Fearful of a resurgence of German nationalism, the 
French government objected on principle to effective central German agencies and instead 
argued for a western settlement centering around separation and internationalization of the 
Rhein-Ruhr area. On September 13, France had made its agreement to central 
administrations contingent on separating Nordrhein-Westphalia from the rest of Germany; 
a week later French Deputy Military Governor, Lt. General Louis Marie Koeltz privately 
repeated his governments refusal to sanction any central agencies to his American 
counterparts. Two days later Koeltz vetoed the establishment of a central transport 
administration in the Control Council, and on October 1 France withdrew its 
representatives from all deliberations of central administrations.143 
Clay reminded Washington that the “Russians and British are in full agreement 
with us as to the desirability of establishing this machinery.” Fearing that the lack of 
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central administrations would lead to “practical if not actual dismemberment” of 
Germany, he pleaded with Washington to put pressure on the French and to be allowed to 
proceed on a trilateral, U.S.-Russian-British basis, a suggestion to which the State and War 
Department, somewhat hesitantly, agreed to in late October.144 At the London Council of 
Foreign Ministers meeting in mid-November 1945, Byrnes threatened French Foreign 
Minister Couve de Murville with the possibility of establishing tripartite central 
administrations at the exclusion of France, but to no avail. Frustrated by French 
opposition, Clay argued that “the USSR had gone further than the French in the 
introduction of democratic procedure in their zone,” and, in such matters as the land 
reform, was “acting unilaterally in the absence of quadripartite agreement.”  The “entire 
record” of the Control Council showed that the USSR was “willing to cooperate with the 
other powers in operating Germany as a single political and economic unit.”145  
In February 1946, Clay and Murphy launched a major push for the establishment 
of quadripartite central administrations. Time, they argued, was overdue for “firmer and 
more aggressive stand” should be taken for what they considered one of the basic elements 
of the Potsdam decisions. A recent speech by communist party leader Walter Ulbricht  
represented the “opening gun” in a campaign to rally German public opinion behind the 
communist movement in favor of a united Germany.  To Murphy and Clay, French 
intransigence had played into Soviet hands” Moscow had taken full advantage of French 
obstructionism “to consolidate the Soviet position in eastern Germany.” The operation of 
central agencies would have “militated against zonal boundaries and served to break down 
the exclusive Soviet control of one of the largest and most important German areas.”  It 
was time to put pressure on the French, possibly withholding cooperation in other fields. 
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146 Likely at Clay’s behest, Secretary of War Robert Patterson personally reiterated 
concerns to Byrnes that, thanks to the French refusal, Moscow and the German 
communists had be able to pose before the German people as “the hope of a restored 
Germany;” embryonic at this stage, the situation appeared to have “more future political 
significance than any other development up to this time.”147 At the heart of Clay’s and 
Murphy’s argument was their conviction, shared by  others within the American foreign 
policy establishment, that any externally imposed partition of the country along the Elbe, 
”a  river (…) not very wide or deep,” would not prove a lasting solution: such an artificial 
division “will only lead to dangerous conspiracy.”148  Division might be the necessary 
result if a cold war could not be avoided. But, as Murphy put it, whether “the gentlemen in 
the Politburo in Moscow plan to cooperate with the US and UK or to fight them – not 
necessarily with weapons but by psychological, political and economic means” remained 
very much a question. It was “not proven that the specialists of the Politburo are planning 
such a hostile campaign.” If they were not, Murphy maintained in the spring of 1946, 
“cooperation on the German problem is possible.” In that case, “we should cooperate with 
them on one German problem, not two.” But even if he and Clay were wrong in their basic 
assumption, Murphy argued, “it would be defeatists to yield to them [the Russians] 
suzerainty over all of eastern Germany without using the present agreements to organize a 
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German state embracing that territory.”149  Delays in establishing these mechanisms had 
meant that the West had to watch “from across the line without opportunity to bring 
broader democratic influence to bear” as selected Germans – “the vast majority of them 
Communists” -- were installed in provincial and local governments, trade unions and 
cooperatives. “Central German agencies, I am convinced,” Murphy cabled Washington, 
would have effected the “gradual relaxation of zonal barriers” and facilitated greater 
American influence.150  
The push by OMGUS for central administrations in early 1946 intersected with a 
heated debate within the Truman administration about policy towards the Soviet union and 
Germany, crystallizing around the February 1946 Moscow Embassy charge d’affaires 
George F. Kennan’s “Long Telegram” from Moscow.  The telegram analyzing the sources 
of Soviet conduct had been circulated widely among top administration officials, even sent 
to top military commanders and many U.S. missions abroad, and “received in the highest 
quarters here as a basic outline of future Soviet policy.”151 Concerns about Soviet 
intentions, reinforced by growing concerns over Soviet troop movements in northern Iran, 
led Washington to take “an extremely serious view of the present situation.”152 The 
reception of the “long Telegram” in German was quite different. The Supreme 
Commander of U.S. Forces in Europe, General Joseph McNarney, reportedly commented 
on the cable “with a shrug of his shoulders that after all the telegram did not offer anything 
new.”153 Clay’s reaction was “pretty violent” as he took the State Department’s sending 
the telegram to army commanders as “a sort of Pearl Harbor warning.” In addition, Clay 
believed that the cable represented the more anti-Soviet “British line” (“it is evident that 
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the British technique of needling our people over a period of months is bearing fruit”). By 
contrast to “some Americans … prone and eager to blame the Soviet representatives for 
everything that is unhappy in the situation,” he and Murphy found the record of 
quadripartite accomplishments in Germany “not too discouraging.” On the contrary, the 
Soviets could not be accused of having violated the Potsdam Agreements: “Whatever 
secret cynicisms they may maintain, it has not been manifest in their negotiation or official 
action.” Instead, they had “gone out of their way repeatedly and throughout the months to 
be friendly with the Americans.” Though “disparaged” by Kennan, personal relationships 
between Soviets and Americans, beginning with Eisenhower and Zhukov, had left a very 
definite local imprint here which has influenced in a marked degree the Soviet-American 
relationship in Berlin.”154  
In the shadow of the “Long Telegram” Kennan provided a powerful 
counterargument to Clay’s approach on Germany.155 In mid-January, he had warned from 
Moscow that Soviets demands for a harsh reparations regime for Germany pursued two 
objectives: maximum reduction of Germany’s economic military potential, and 
undermining the social classes not readily susceptible to penetration of Soviet-controlled 
political groups.156  Central administrations were a similarly dangerous tool: the Soviets 
“were happy to have several months in which to exercise a completely free hand in their 
own zone,” nevertheless they saw in central administrations “a possibly indispensable 
device for entering at an appropriate moment into [the] other three zones and facilitating 
there [the] accomplishment of [the] Soviet political program.” Recognizing that central 
administrations were a “plainly two-edged sword” for the Soviets, “depending on realities 
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of underlying political control,” Kennan maintained that the success of their authoritarian 
methods in the Soviet zone convinced them that “in the end they cannot lose.” He warned 
of “undue optimism about central agencies serving to break down exclusive Soviet control 
in their own zone.” Rather, the Russians would hold back until the time “that they are 
fairly sure that within this new framework they can contrive not only to preserve in effect 
their exclusive control in their own zone but also to advance materially their possibilities 
for influencing [the] course of events elsewhere in Germany.” With Germany territorially 
crippled, unbalanced economically and psychologically dependent on the food resources 
controlled by Russia, Kennan saw the United States left with only two alternatives: “(one) 
[to] leave the remainder of Germany nominally united but extensively vulnerable to Soviet 
political penetration and influence or (two) to carry to its logical conclusion the process of 
partition which was begun in the east and to endeavor to rescue [the] western zones of 
Germany by walling them off against eastern penetration and integrating them into [the] 
international pattern of western Europe rather than into a united Germany.”157 
Kennan’s cable reverberated widely within the Truman administration and 
OMGUS.  Byrnes that U.S. Ambassador Jefferson Caffery relayed the French 
government’s view, nor surprising in light of its steadfast resistance to central 
administrations, that such agencies would only benefit “Soviet penetration in the French, 
British and American zones” with the goal of a “Communist-dominated central German 
government which would control the Ruhr and Rhineland.” Even if they were agreed to 
establish such institutions, the Soviets would refuse to cooperate loyally.”158 Perry 
Laukhuff, political officer on Robert Murphy’s staff similarly questioned the priority 
which Clay had ascribed to the establishment of central German agencies. Echoing 
Kennan, Laukhuff argued that the deadlock on the Control Council was much to the liking 
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of the Soviets who were allowed to pose as proponents of quadripartite cooperation while 
at the same time carrying out in their zone “a sweeping social, economic and political 
revolution, now practically past recall ” and using the French as “a very convenient 
whipping boy.” To counter Soviet policy effectively, Laukhuff argued in favor of a frank 
admission that quadripartite control of Germany had failed and American withdrawal from 
the Control Council. While maintaining the American position in Berlin, Laukhuff 
proposed to remove U.S. occupation headquarters to the U.S. zone, to concentrate upon 
developing the unity of the three western zones and to reconstruct interzonal and 
international trade “so clearly necessary in Western Europe.” Such a decision, he admitted, 
“would mean writing off for the time being the Soviet Zone of Germany as a completely 
separate entity, entirely outside our control and influence,” but it only recognize “what is 
today a fact.”  Acknowledging that “Eastern Germany is wholly in Russian hands,” 
Laukhuff predicted, would allow the United States not only to pursue more constructive 
policies in Germany, but also win influence in Eastern Europe by “penetrat[ing] to the 
utmost into Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland” through trade and cultural relations.” It 
seemed “evident that we must seek by every means to outflank the ‘iron curtain’, 
meanwhile temporarily lowering an iron curtain of our own in the center of the stage.”159 
Equally skeptical of Soviet intentions, James Riddleberger, the chief of the State 
Department’s Central European Division, argued that that Russia would “only permit the 
functioning of such [central] agencies in the Soviet zone and cooperate in their operation 
throughout Germany to the extent that it believes these agencies can be used for Soviet 
purposes.” Hence central agencies were to be construed in ways that, in the case of a 
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complete break-down of quadripartite government, they could be “utilized in the western 
zones alone.”160  
By late 1945 Soviet officials were actually preparing themselves for the possibility 
that “in the near future the deadlock over the issue of the creation of national German 
departments might be broken.”161  But throughout much of 1945, Zhukov and Sokolovsky 
had dragged their feet in the Control Council on the issue of central administrations. 
Internally, Soviet officials admitted that, while the Americans and British were insisting 
on the fastest possible organization of the national German departments provided for by 
the decisions of the “Berlin Conference,” the Soviet military administration had “not in 
fact been interested in accelerating the organization of these departments.”162  The SMA 
Economic Administration had opposed the transport and postal administrations 
Sokolovsky offered up in the shadow of the French veto.163 Leading Soviet occupation 
official complained that “all the specific proposals” with regard to central administrative 
structures “had come from the Allies.” Soviet representatives had spoken “without having 
a specifically formulated and coordinated point of view, which sometimes led to disputes 
with the Allies over trivia. Instances took place when our representatives in committees, 
for one reason or another, spoke from one point of view but in the directorate, from 
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another, directly contradictory [point of view].”164  With the Control Council deadlocked 
on the issue thanks to the French veto, Zhukov in November declined Clay’s repeated 
overtures for bilateral or trilateral communication and transportation agencies.165  
Publicly, the Soviet occupation chief cited the need for unanimous Control Council 
agreement in his refusal to condone the trizonal fusion sought by Clay. Yet in their 
internal deliberations Soviet officials reasoned defensively as they considered the 
“considerable pressure” from the Americans and British. At a practical level, Soviet 
officials felt they were far behind Anglo-American preparations. Smirnov warned Molotov 
in early December that “at this time we do not yet have the necessary cadres capable of 
taking on the leadership of central administrations.” The democratic parties had not yet 
“consolidated,” in the “Allied zone” they were just being licensed.166 Equally convinced 
that the Soviet military administration was entirely unprepared should central 
administrations come about in the near future, Zhukov’s Political Adviser Semenov urged 
Moscow two weeks later to counterbalance the Western Allied “centers for the selection of 
German officials” to have “a solid reserve of German organizers at our disposal who are 
known throughout Germany and who satisfy us with their political characteristics.”  As far 
as he could tell, there was “presently no clarity in SMA departments on the issue of whom 
we will propose as candidates for major and minor posts from the Soviet zone.”167 
Semenov demanded that the SMA outline its views on the central agencies to the 
American and British in greater detail, “select our candidates for the positions of greatest 
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interest to us, develop them beforehand, and when possible, also conduct other work with 
them from the standpoint of special bodies [spetsorgany—intelligence agencies].”  By no 
means “can we and should we hand over the national German administrative departments 
to the Americans and British (…).” 168  
Central administrations were precursors for a central German government and to 
Moscow signified the end of the occupation period. With denazification and 
demilitarization at best incomplete, the specter of a reduced occupation control and an 
early end to occupation – just a few months after the end of the war with Germany -- 
evoked deep-seated anxieties among Soviet officials. Smirnov therefore insisted that the 
USSR make its approval contingent on the prior implementation of the Potsdam 
accords.169  Soviet officials also were concerned about what appeared to them as a forming 
“Western bloc.” Clay tried to impress Sokolovsky in person “very categorically (…)  that 
the U.S. government was very sharply disposed against any kind of blocs and such ideas 
as a ‘Western bloc’ would not find support in the U.S..”170  Though Zhukov, on 
instructions from Moscow, was forced to reject Clay’s fusion proposal, he and Semenov 
proceed with preparations for central administrations. A few weeks later, without apparent 
coordination with Moscow, Zhukov put Semenov in charge of developing cadres and 
plans for the day central administrations should be established.171 By the end of  February,  
1946, Semenov could report that SMA’s postal, transport, finance and foreign trade 
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administrations had developed regulations and organizational charts for respective national 
agencies.172 Moscow’s approval, however, was not forthcoming.  
Zhukov’s decision also reflected Moscow’s reluctance to lose control of their zone:  
not only was Moscow ever more sensitive to being in total command in its zone as it 
inaugurated a dramatic change in its economic policy in Germany. When the U.S. delegate 
on the Allied Control Council’s Central German Administrative Committee in May 1946 
proposed a quadripartite commission which would tour the four zones to study the 
functioning of zonal and provincial economic administrations in preparation for 
nationwide agencies. Professing at first not to be able to find time for such a tour,  then 
arguing that the Americans were “trying to do too much and trying to secure too detailed 
information,” the Soviet delegate finally argued that he had no problem with an effort to 
“approach the problem abstractly,” that as a matter of fact economic organization between 
the zones differed  “only in minor details.” In the initial phase it should be left to the zone 
commanders to assure economic unity; any quadripartite commission would be limited to 
formulating a program for central agencies.173   In the Control Council’s Economic 
Directorate discussions over a central German administrative departments for industry and 
agriculture, Soviet officials were even more direct in rejecting any interference in the 
authority of the zonal commander: Confronted with the U.S. member’s assertion that 
central administrations were “cardinal provisions” of the Potsdam Protocol, creation of 
which needed to be “begun immediately” to avoid the danger of setting up  “separate 
economies for the different Zones,” Russian officials emphatically rejoined that the final 
decision in implementing any directives from central agencies should be made by the zone 
commander, similar to the reparations regime. When the American incredulously asked 
whether this would mean that the zone commander could “for example, set aside coal 
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allocations or taxes ordered by the Allied Control Council, the Soviet Member replied in 
the affirmative.”174 To a man, Soviet officials categorically rejected any infringements on 
the total control of their zone. 
Moscow’s reticence against any inroads into its zonewide control undermined 
Clay’s efforts to develop a joint export-import plan for Germany, essential to Anglo-
American plans to deal with the faltering economy in their zones. In contrast to Byrnes’s 
Potsdam efforts to control trade on a zonal basis, Clay aimed at applying the first charge 
on proceeds to all of Germany’s exports, including those from the Soviet zone, thus 
dramatically reducing short-term German deliveries to the USSR. Soviet stock companies 
(SAGs) would have produced initially to pay for imports into Germany! Not surprisingly, 
Moscow was unwilling to forego one of its most effective tools of economic extraction. 
Even more disconcerting to Soviet officials, the unified foreign trade program held out the 
specter of far greater voice of the Western powers in Soviet zone affairs, to which Soviet 
officials from top down remained adamantly opposed. At the decisive April 5 meeting of 
the Control Councils Economic Committee, the head of the SMA Economic 
Administration emotionally declared that “primary responsibility” for maintenance of life 
and order in the zones rested with zonal commanders. Quite in line with what Byrnes had 
suggested at Potsdam, Koval argued that the zonal principle applied to foreign trade just as 
much as reparations, each occupation power being responsible for the results of its 
occupation regime. Three weeks later, Sokolovsky countered the U.S. proposal in the 
Control Council by invoking a clause in the Potsdam agreement that provided for foreign 
trade for Germany to be conducted on a zonal basis “within the net balance of each zone.” 
In reaction, Clay announced the suspension of all dismantling in the U.S. zone.  
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To a large degree Soviet concerns thus validate Clay’s thinking that the 
establishment of central German administrations in the economic field might be a crucial 
step in reasserting Western political influence to the Soviet zone. Soviet interest in 
reparations, he remained convinced, would make them amenable to a negotiated 
settlement which allowed political unification. Well aware that by 1946 the Soviets 
enjoyed little support among the German population, Clay expected that a unified German 
state would be a “gain for Western democracy” enabling it “to contest for its philosophy 
throughout Germany” and “to extend its frontiers to the borders of Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, thus encouraging any will for democracy in the peoples of these 
countries.” For Clay, the United States had “much at stake in gaining the opportunity to 
fight for democratic ideals in Eastern Germany and in Eastern Europe” ― an opportunity 
which would “result from the true political unification of Germany under quadripartite 
control.” A failure to explore these possibilities would allow the Soviets “to mine the 
industry of Eastern Germany” and create “ultimate political and economic competition 
between Western Germany under allied controls and Eastern Germany under Soviet 
controls. Obviously, this establishes the frontier of Western democracy along the Elbe.”175 
Confronted with Soviet (and French) obstruction on central administrations and 
foreign trade, Clay decided to leverage the presumed Russian interest in reparations for 
progress in greater economic unity.176 In early May 1946, a halt to all reparation deliveries 
from the U.S. zone went into effect. Clay now demanded that the issue be resolved at the 
Paris sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers. At the July ministerial, Byrnes 
increased the pressure on Moscow (as well as Paris): On July 11, he offered the fusion of 
the American zone with any of the others zones in preparation for economic unity. Faced 
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with the specter of a bizonal arrangement between Americans and British that would have 
precluded Soviet influence in western Germany, Moscow took a more conciliatory 
attitude. During the Paris negotiations, Molotov advocated an increase in the level of 
industry that would allow increased German exports as well as greater reparations, even 
signaled readiness to establish central administrations as a transitional step, if the USSR 
would be assured a voice in the Ruhr. The price for such a role,  a senior  State 
Department official sympathetic to Clay’s line of thinking argued, would have to be “real” 
quadripartite control over the whole of Germany” unless the Soviets “grab[bed] off the 
East entirely for  themselves and then horn[ed]  in on a western arrangement.” 177 
Two days after the Byrnes offer, Soviet occupation chief Sokolovsky echoed 
Molotov’s statement, demanding in the Allied Control Council improve cooperation 
among the occupation zones “as a preparatory first step towards the establishment of a 
central administration.”178 In informal talks between U.S. and Soviet officials in the 
following days and weeks, the outlines of a compromise were sketched out: The level of 
industry would be increased; plants earmarked for dismantling would remain in Germany 
for ten years to produce reparations; and all export proceeds from plants not slated for 
reparations would be used to pay for imports. Within weeks, Soviet officials proposed the 
creation of central administrations, the elimination of economic zonal borders and a 
balanced export-import program. Protracted negotiations on a draft constitution for Berlin 
suddenly turned into “most conciliatory and cooperative discussions” and quickly resulted 
in an agreement, adding to the sense on the part of American officials of a “change … in 
the attitude and tactics of the Soviets towards the US.”179 So eager did the Russians seem 
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to desire reparations from current production that by mid-October Murphy ventured that 
“we would be well advised to use the opportunity regarding the introduction of democratic 
methods in the Soviet zone.”180  
   
4. “The most significant event in Germany since the overthrow of the Nazi 
regime”?181  The U.S. and the 1946 SPD-KPD merger 
The differing assessments on how to judge and react to Soviet policies in 
Germany, in particular in the Soviet Zone, clashed over what some contemporary 
observers considered “the most significant event in Germany since the overthrow of the 
Nazi regime,”182 the forced fusion of the SPD and KPD in the Soviet zone. Intersecting 
with the American debate over all-German institutions and reparations, the merger 
signified to officials, particularly in Washington, the consolidation of Communist control 
in eastern Germany. At the end of September 1945, the KPD Central Committee’s 
secretariat had called for a “new offensive” of the party’s political-ideological work, 
focused on the unity of KPD and SPD. Despite a rapid rise in membership numbers, by the 
fall of 1945 the KPD had found itself outrun by the SPD as the leading and most popular 
party on the Left. Following the SPD’s October party conference in Hannover, SMA 
intelligence chief  I. Tugarinov warned Vyshinksy that the British government was intent 
on gaining control over the SPD in the Soviet zones in its effort to counter Soviet 
influence in Germany.183 Communist defeats at the polls in Hungary and Austria did not 
bode well for Soviet plans to turn the KPD into a party of mass appeal. The following 
month, Tiulpanov, suddenly far more visible in Soviet Zone affairs, advised the SMA 
Military Council (which in turn informed Stalin) that without a “political unification” of 
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the two parties the Communists would suffer a resounding defeat in the Soviet zone 
elections scheduled for 1946. By late fall, Soviet officials in Germany had became 
convinced that the only way to assure KPD control and to crush the SPD as an active force 
in zone politics would be a merger of both parties. U.S. G-2 intelligence officials too saw 
the KPD fighting for its existence. With a decision on the fusion yet to be made in 
Moscow, Tiulpanov and the SMA propaganda administration started to support KPD 
merger designs and began to pressure SPD members towards unification with the KPD 
with a mixture of courting and coercion.  
Relations between the Communists and Social Democrats soon grew sour as KPD 
officials, often emboldened by Soviet support, violated the principles of the antifascist 
bloc. The prospect of immediate unification had lost its attraction to many Social 
Democrats who had been appalled by the behavior of KPD functionaries, in particular 
their occupying of key administrative positions, and by the favoritism of the KPD so 
blatantly displayed by SMA. Conflict had increased sharply at the local level where 
“intolerable conditions between the SPD and the KPD had developed, as the minutes of 
the November 5 meeting of the Thuringian SPD executive board noted.184 Social 
Democrats in the western zones took a vehemently anti-communist stance under the 
leadership of Kurt Schumacher. On November 11, Soviet Zone SPD Party Chairman Otto 
Grotewohl distanced himself from the course of accelerated fusion and qualified his 
support of unity, arguing that a fusion could only be voluntary and nationwide. Reflecting 
increasing annoyance with Soviet and KPD pressure tactics, Grotewohl argued that “the 
fault lies with the deep bitterness that the Communist Party has fostered in our ranks over 
the last six months through the repeatedly uncomradely attitude toward lower officials, 
through the pressure exerted [on SPD members], and through the one-sided preferential 
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treatment of the Communist Party by the officials of the Soviet Military 
Administration.”185  
Grotewohl’s speech “caused trouble for the Soviet Government,” the chief of the 
Soviet military administration in Saxony-Anhalt, General Kotikov, warned his superiors. 
That was certainly an understatement: With the central instrument of its German policy at 
risk of becoming obliterate, SMA officials resorted to a mixture of persuasion and 
coercion in pushing the SPD towards unity, in turn only heightening the growing 
restiveness within the SPD towards the fusion project. In discussions with Max Fechner, 
Ulbricht and Franz Dahlem, Tiulpanov first raised the subject explicitly on December 5.186  
By mid-December, local SMA commandants interfered in local conflicts about fusion, 
pressuring, threatening and arresting local SPD officials. Stalin himself did not approve 
the unity campaign until his meeting with Ulbricht and other German leaders on February 
2, setting May 1 as a target date for the establishment of a “Socialist Unity Party.”  “Line 
correct,” Pieck noted after Ulbricht’s return from Moscow later that month. Regional 
SMA commanders now intensified their pressure on SPD organizations around the zone, 
suspending SPD meetings, intimidating party officials and setting ultimata for fusion.187  
The U.S. occupation administration was well aware of the “powerful Communist 
campaign” for merger which, by late 1945, was showing some effect.188 At a leadership 
meeting in December (“Conference of the Sixty”) between SPD and KPD, Social 
Democrats signed a joint resolution on organizational fusion after they had aired their 
grievances and the communists had agreed to parity, separate lists of candidates in the 
forthcoming elections, and fusion at a national level. At the SPD’s request, the date for the 
fusion was left open. The massive KPD campaign for fusion in the Länder and SMA’s 
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pressure tactics “from below” undermined the SPD Central Executive Committee’s 
dilatory strategy. At the Committee’s meeting February 10-11, 1946, the Länder 
representatives announced that, the lack of fusion at a national level notwithstanding, the 
merger would be effected at the provincial and state level in the near future. Isolated from 
the Western SPD, pressed by the SMA, the KPD and SPD state organizations, the Central 
Executive Committee resigned itself to the apparently inevitable: on February 11, a 
majority voted for holding a party convention at the zonal level, practically abandoning 
any hope to forestall fusion. At a SPD/KPD leadership meeting five days later, the date for 
the merger was set for April 20-21.189  
By late February, Grotewohl’s position was becoming increasingly tenuous. 
Throughout the U.S. documents available there is an undercurrent of empathy, almost 
admiration for the besieged party leader, with whom Americans had intimate contact.190 
OMGUS officials knew that Grotewohl and the other top SPD leaders had been repeatedly 
called to Karlshorst and urged by Bukov and Zhukov to join with the communists; that he 
was confronted with the genuine support by some SPD members for the fusion, especially 
in Saxony and Thuringia, and the persecution of others who strongly opposed it; that 
tensions between Grotewohl and the KPD and Russians were growing.191 Grotewohl 
remained forthcoming with the Americans, indicating after a recent trip in early 1946 to 
the Western zones that people there “feel no compulsion exercised over them” and that 
elections in the Russian zone were still a matter of the distant future as the Communists 
were still suffering from Red Army behavior. The Russians, Grotewohl informed his 
American interlocutors, were “aware of this and taking no chances.” They saw in a single 
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labor party the “surest guarantee against the re-emergence of such forces in Germany as 
might again attack Russia.” Asked whether he believed that the communists had become 
sincere advocates of democracy, the SPD leader wryly stated that “they are doing their 
best, by their actions from day to day, to prove the contrary.”192 Not only did Grotewohl 
remain frank in his admission of the serious problems plaguing the Soviet Zone economy. 
He in fact argued that “the SPD should be able to absorb the KPD,” if the merger, as he 
apparently hoped, would eventually take place on a nationwide scale.193 After talks with 
Kurt Schumacher and other SPD leaders in the British zone, in which Schumacher refused 
to consider a national convention and any cooperation with the Eastern Social Democrats 
(despite British efforts to avoid a complete split by reining in Schumacher’s criticism of 
his Berlin colleagues) Grotewohl opted for the merger in part due to his “feeling that he 
must stand by his comrades in the Russian Zone.”194 “Finding also that [the] Western 
powers did not give him what he regarded as sufficient political support, Grotewohl 
decided to yield.” Though in particular the British had tried to persuade him to move west, 
Grotewohl would remain in Berlin.195  
At a March 1 SPD meeting in the State Opera House in the Soviet Sector, over 
1,000 SPD functionaries from all over Berlin revolted against the Central Executive 
Committee. When Grotewohl observed that the KPD was independent because the 
Comintern had been dissolved, according to an American observer, “the whole audience 
roared with laughter.”196 The meeting resolved to hold a referendum in Berlin and the SBZ 
on the merger, “a first serious setback to KPD and Soviet plans for rapid 
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amalgamation.”197 Western support for the merger opponents now seemed to SMA 
officials only the latest political maneuver to undercut the KPD’s mass appeal and Soviet 
positions in Berlin: Allied favoritism of the “separatist” Social Democrats aimed at 
“destroying the Unity of Berlin.”198 Increasingly feeling under siege, Soviet officials 
pressed for a conclusion of the fusion process. The SMA quelled all efforts throughout the 
zone to make fusion subject to a referendum, but it could not prevent a unity referendum 
on March 31 in Berlin’s western sectors, where 82% voted against an immediate 
merger.199 In the face of broad opposition within the SPD, the fusion was ceremoniously 
staged three weeks later. 
The merger seemed to reinforce the increasingly “grim” outlook among many 
Truman administration officials in Washington, who were “following attentively” the 
events in Berlin. The State Department noted the “undemocratic methods” employed by 
the Soviet government and emphasized to Murphy the issues involved were considered 
“very important.”200 To some, the fusion now appeared “in a broad pattern of events 
occurring in all eastern and central European countries,” and as “the most significant 
political event in Germany since the overthrow of the Nazi regime.”201 Key officials 
within the State Department were increasingly convinced that the Soviet zone could be 
“written off,” reinforced in their views by West German political leaders, in particular 
within the western CDU.202 Given the momentous significance of the events, some 
officials began to criticize Clay’s and Murphy’s hands-off attitude and argued for a more 
aggressive U.S. reaction: In late March, Louis Wiesner pleaded that the United States 
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“undertake more vigorous action to combat Soviet and Communist influence.”203  Barely a 
week later Brewster Morris of Murphy’s staff demanded internally that “we must put an 
end to the new KPD line of openly criticizing the Western occupation powers,” actively 
promote “our concept of democracy,” and bring the American public up to speed on the 
German situation, “otherwise there maybe a rude and unpleasant awakening.”204 Others 
within the Department, including Eastern European Affairs Division chief Eldrige 
Durbrow, agreed.205 Kennan saw the efforts of the German communists in “penetrating, 
paralyzing and bending to their will the German Social-Democrats” as an effort “to 
prepare that zone as a spring-board for a Communist political offensive elsewhere in the 
Reich.”206  
Ostensibly Clay and Murphy pursued a “policy of political neutrality” throughout 
much of the merger crisis, despite the “entirely un-neutral attitude” of the Russians and 
much to the frustration of some Washington officials and Social Democrats.207 But in fact 
Clay did intercede with Sokolovsky in several instances during the merger process in 
which Ulbricht and Pieck openly criticized the Western occupation powers.208 Sokolovsky 
apparently promised that “he would see to it that such performances would not again be 
repeated and expressed the strongest kind of disapproval.”  The SMA chief apparently 
intimated that “the German Communists trade in the name of the Soviet Military 
Government and do not hesitate to indicate that the Soviet Military Government supports 
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actions on which, at times, it has not been consulted.”209  U.S. authorities in Berlin also 
arrested a number of Communist employees of the Berlin city administration. Bolstering 
the public voice of the anti-merger forces, OMGUS, moreover, put some paper at the 
disposal of the SPD opposition and allocated additional news print to bring up the daily 
circulation of the US-licensed “Tagesspiegel”― the leading public outlet for those 
opposed to the fusion ― from 325,000 to 500,000 copies.210 On March 23, Clay stated in 
a press conference that the U.S. administration would only recognize the proposed merger 
if demanded by the members of the party as such and not just a small group of party 
leaders -- a statement strongly endorsed by Washington. Clay made clear that the United 
States favored a democratic referendum by the party members, but that it would only 
ensure democratic procedures in the U.S. sector, not throughout the entire city.211  
When the pro-merger SPD Central Committee blasted the referendum in the Soviet 
controlled newspapers and urged Berliners not to participate, General Barker, the 
Commanding General of the American Military Government in Berlin, publicly repeated 
Clay’s demands that the merger would not be recognized unless demanded by a majority 
of party members and assured publicly that in the American sector, “measures have been 
taken so that everyone entitled to vote will be afforded the necessary protection so that he 
may cast his vote unhindered for or against the merger.”212 On the day after the 
referendum, anti-merger SPD leaders decided to break away for the SPD central 
leadership and form a new Berlin SPD Executive Committee; with permission from the 
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U.S., on April 7, delegates from all sections of Berlin arrived to elect a new leadership led 
by Neumann, Germer and Swolinsky.213 In a press conference on April 24, shortly after 
the merger was concluded, Clay quickly made clear that the newly established SED could 
only be recognized in the Western zones by a referendum or by a petition as a new party, 
effectively barring the SED from legally carrying out activities in the West.214 Unlike the 
British government, Clay, however, did not object to members of the American zone SPD 
becoming members of the newly formed SED Central Committee, as long as they ceased 
to be active within the SPD or KPD in the U.S. zone, emphasizing his desire to see the 
zonal boundaries eliminated soon.215 Nonetheless, U.S. intelligence sources reported that 
an “air resembling desperation over the lack of open American support” was besetting the 
anti-merger group which felt cut off from the fellow opposition in the west.216 In a similar 
vein, Grotewohl claimed that the independence of the SPD in the Soviet zone had “been 
lost through the unwillingness of the Western powers to give any but verbal assistance.”217 
While the merger seemed to be a textbook example of Soviet expansionism if 
viewed through the lens of the “Long Telegram” and hence became, in the eyes of 
Washington officials, a fatal crucial turning-point that called for an active stance against 
the Russians, Clay and Murphy were keen to preserve a modicum of cooperation with 
their Soviet counterparts in order that jointly arrived at all-German solutions would allow 
for Western influence  to roll-back Soviet advances. They saw the merger in line with 
Soviet strong-arm methods since the take-over of Berlin a year earlier: it had been 
“obvious” that Moscow would place its chosen people in key public offices: “I cannot,” 
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Murphy argued near the height of the unification drama, “work myself up into a lather 
about it.”   It had been more important to him and Clay all along to avoid “falling into the 
pitfall of Allied discord if we ever wanted to achieve a definitive solution to the German 
problem.” Reassurances from Sokolovsky served to reinforce Murphy’s impression that 
Germans ―Communist or non-Communist― were eager to play the occupation powers 
against each other. 218 Murphy suspected in particular that the German communists at 
times traded in the name of the Soviet MG: “In fact I feel that the thinking of some 
German Communists may well be in advance of that of their Soviet associates.”219  Taking 
issue with those who argued in favor of abandoning official policy that still classified 
Communist parties as democratic parties and instead “go[ing] all out” for the SPD, 
Murphy wondered how “our policy would differ from any other totalitarian methods. In 
other words I feel that we cannot continue to talk about democracy as we understand it and 
practice some other form.”220  
Underlying the different approaches between Washington and Berlin was the 
expectation of success and the irreversibility Soviet policies in their zone would meet—
and the potential to project American interests beyond the zonal boundaries. In the 
Washington view (and that of some OMGUS analysts), the Eastern zone was slowly but 
irreversibly transformed along the Soviet model into a people’s republic, that “a revolution 
has been accomplished in the Eastern Zone which has been brought so far that the status 
quo ante can hardly be restored.”221 Murphy, by contrast, remained skeptical that the 
merger would be successful: “The Soviet technique in all these things seems to me 
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exceedingly primitive, and in their obvious determination to impose a single party 
structure I think they will meet with failure… [T]heir efforts delude but few.”  The United 
States stood little to gain from “cheap imitation of their methods.” 222 Similarly, one State 
Department German hand, dispatched by the Department to Berlin, wrote home that “from 
the vantage point of Washington, we are all inclined, I think, to be a bit pessimistic, to 
think that Germany is inevitably lost to the great push from the East or that at any rate the 
Eastern Zone of Germany is already lost as a result of the social and economic 
reorganization put through under Soviet auspices (…). From Berlin the situation does not 
look so bad, and I must say that my short stay here has already made me feel much more 
optimistic about the general situation and its prospects in relation to fundamental 
American interests. No matter what decisions may be made with regard to a closer 
organization of the Western Zones, I am convinced that we should in no sense write off 
Eastern Germany or Berlin (…).”223 Washington officials remained unconvinced – 
Murphy was told that if one were to draw general conclusions from the Berlin experience 
one would get an “entirely distorted picture.”224 But he continued  to warn Washington 
more directly of the consequences of the fascination  of “the other side.”  As late as 
summer 1947, the head of the State Department’s Russian Unit, Nicolas Nabokoff, at 
Murphy’s behest, tried to convince Bohlen and Kennan that “the constant preoccupation 
with ‘that one problem’  definitely condition[ed] one and [made] one see the world as if it 
were a large plain with only two volcanoes on it, Washington and Moscow.”225  
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Clay and Murphy were, moreover, aware that despite the fact that the fusion had 
made the SED the largest political force in the zone, rifts within the socialist “unity” party 
persisted, in particular between former KPD and SPD members, but even within the ranks 
of the KPD. The KPD’s arrogant and forceful approach to the merger reinforced 
skepticism among former SPD members about the sudden conversion of the Communists 
to democratic principles. Instead of unity, the SED was plagued by ideological and 
personal rifts, inner-party repression and power struggle. Among the rank-and-file, 
especially the former SPD members, the reality of Communist dominance quickly led to 
defeatism and hopelessness. American officials in Germany were well aware that doubts 
lingered on at the top level of the new party: Grotewohl was “far from being pleased over 
the merger-path” and might even break away from the SED. 226  In May, SED co-chairman 
Grotewohl reestablished contact with the Americans, appeared tense and “not entirely 
happy about the new situation, though determined to make the best of it.”227 During the 
conversation Grotewohl referred several times to the “experiment of the SEPD [SED],” 
implying that he still viewed the merger as such. The party leader “seemed particularly 
glad of this opportunity to renew contact with the Americans, suggesting very definitely 
that he does not want to become isolated from the western occupation powers and 
dependent on his Soviet contacts.” 228  
Following the merger, each of the three Western allies moved quickly to prevent 
pressures on the non-Communist left in the West by assuring that no SED formed in their 
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zone. The forced merger process had raised the specter of the SED spilling over to the 
Western zones: Allied officials worried that lower levels of the SPD outside Schumacher’s 
control would follow the Soviet zones model and join with the lower KPD ranks to form a 
Socialist Unity Party in the Western zones. But no one was concerned that Western Zone 
SPD leader Kurt Schumacher would voluntarily fuse his party with the Western KPD 
headed by Max Reimann, hence OMGUS announced that it would permit parties to merge 
at the state level only. Until that had occurred, no meetings could be held in the American 
zone under the name of the SED. In flagrant violation of basic political freedoms OMGUS 
ruled that those Social Democrats eager to support the SED had to join the KPD.229  But 
Clay’s reaction was actually more forceful than is often portrayed:  Rather than worrying 
about expansion of the SED into the American zone, Clay made it clear that the SED 
would not be licensed in the western zones until the SPD and other parties in the SBZ had 
equal rights. In June, Clay pressed for simultaneous quadripartite recognition of the 
reorganized SPD (composed of the anti-merger forces) and the SED throughout all of 
Berlin. Not only would such action counter the growing division between the Eastern and 
Western sectors in Berlin, but the attraction of the SPD was certain to aggravate the 
problems within the SED, whose popular appeal continued to evaporate as Soviet tutelage 
and micro-management of the party tainted the SED’s public image as the “Russian 
party.”  
To the surprise of Western officials, Soviet and East German officials agreed to 
recognize an independent SPD in Berlin in early May 1946, denying that the Soviet Union 
“stood for a single party system in Germany.” Reminding Murphy that German 
Communist Party members were “not without personal ambitions,” Semenov complained 
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that the Soviet attitude had been “incorrectly publicized and probably intentionally so on 
the part of some German leaders who may trade in the name of the Soviet Military 
Government.” In another surprise move, SMA announced that local government elections 
would be held in the SBZ that fall, perhaps, as US officials expected, to influence Berlin 
elections scheduled for later that same fall and to avoid the effects of a sizable vote for the 
CDU and reconstituted SPD in Berlin.230   
In the run-up to the elections in the Soviet Zone, the non-communist CDU and 
LPD suffered from massive discriminatory interference by the Soviet authorities.231 While 
actual voting in the communal elections would be technically free, as almost all observers 
agreed, heavy pressure was exerted on the population during the months prior to the 
elections in order to influence the outcome of the election.232 While the SED received 
considerable assistance from the Soviet military authorities, its opponents were greatly 
disadvantaged, “drowned in the overwhelming propaganda facilities” available to the 
SED, as CDU leader Ernst Lemmer confided to U.S. officials.  A particular handicap was 
the CDU’s and LDPD’s inability  to register local party groups to set up a list of 
candidates. Altogether, OMGUS estimated that in some 9,000 communities in eastern 
Germany the SED and its associated organizations were the only parties on the ballot; 
American observers got the impression that general directives from Karlshorst prescribed 
when and where the LDP and CDU had to be curbed. In one case, a Russian officer 
apparently displayed anxiety because he had registered more groups than his orders 
permitted.233 Soviet officials directly accused CDU and LDP speakers of having furnished 
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information on the SBZ to the Americans, 234 and CDU leader Jakob Kaiser as well as 
LDP leader Lieutenant were reproached by the SMA for having quoted the September 
Stuttgart speech by U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes “but not mentioning that of Molotov.” 
235  Taken together with other measures to intimidate CDU and LDP sympathizers and 
sabotage the parties’ campaigns (as well as to tap into the reservoir of former Nazis), the 
election presented itself to many within OMGUS as “a contest between the totalitarian 
occupying power and two unsponsored political groups.”236 
As early as March 1946, CDU leaders asked for U.S. support of a party convention 
in Berlin; OMGU reports from Berlin reflected longstanding calls for greater backing of 
the non-communist parties. 237  Against the backdrop of the elections, the question of if 
and how to lend assistance to the non-communist forces sparked an intense debate 
between OMGUS and Washington. At the State Department, an increasing number of 
officials  felt that “we cannot afford the luxury of political neutrality towards German 
political parties.”238 State Department Counselor Charles Bohlen spoke for many others 
when he advised Murphy that he would soon see “indications of a more active and 
dynamic encouragement” to non-Communist forces than had previously been the case.239 
State Department officials urged OMGUS to assure “in every feasible way” that the non-
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communist parties could maintain their organizations.240 Some within the Department 
favored providing “a certain amount of quiet discreet unofficial assistance” for the SED’s 
opponents,241 some were even ready to go as far as “hinting at the possibility of forbidding 
the SED in the U.S. sector,” should there be no “marked relaxation in repressive 
practices.” Some within the State Department were already wondering whether the 
political situation in the zone had developed so far that CDU participation in the elections 
would make sense at all.242 Even within OMGUS proponents of a tougher policy vis-à-vis 
the Soviets, including reportedly Col. Glasser and Gen. Keating -- had grown impatient as 
“time is so rapidly slipping by.” Desperate to draw Clay’s attention to the situation, Perry 
Laukhuff  bemoaned “our  present passivity” and came close to accusing OMGUS of 
acting against State Department policy “to actively assist the non-Communist, democratic 
forces in Germany.” While the CDU continued “to wage as gallant as fight as it can in the 
Soviet Zone under present circumstances, it is hindered and discriminated at every turn 
and it seems impossible that it will be able to stand against the SED with any success.” 
Laukhuff argued that there were a number of actions that might alleviate the situation: 
OMGUS could protest in the Allied Control Council against the violation by the Russians 
of the Potsdam Agreement to allow and encourage political parties; emphasize through 
press conferences the suppression of democratic parties occurring in the Soviet Zone; “tell 
the truth” about the situation in the Monthly Report of the military Governor; officially 
inform Kaiser and the CDU to openly withdraw from political activity in the SBZ; and 
request permission from the Russians to send election observers. In Berlin, the United 
States could give the SPD greater support throughout the city with more cars, gasoline, 
food, furniture, meeting halls and paper.  The CDU could be supported in a similar fashion 
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– “to whatever extent is necessary.”  Though doubtful that such steps would “bring about 
free democratic political life in the Soviet Zone,” time had come, Laukhuff argued, “to put 
up an active fight in our own interest here.“243  
Clay and Murphy however, fended off any suggestions that OMGUS overtly throw 
its full weight behind the CDU and LPD in the zone (and the SPD in Berlin). In fact, at the 
very time the non-communist parties were struggling in the SBZ, Clay gave official 
permission to Ulbricht, Pieck and Grotewohl to engage in a speaking tour throughout the 
U.S. zone, allowing the SED leaders to proselytize for Socialist unity provided that the 
meetings were publicly sponsored by the KPD. To the chagrin of not just Washington but 
local military government officials and eventually even Murphy, Ulbricht, Max Fechner 
and other SED politburo members used their appearances to expound SPD/KPD unity and 
draw invidious comparison between life in the US zone and the conditions in the SBZ. 
Murphy’s staff wanted the SED speakers sanctioned and reprimanded. At that point Clay 
personally intervened telling his subordinates that they had to uphold the right of 
Communists to make strong speeches “at all costs.”244   
To be sure, after talking to Kaiser, Clay agreed to set up an afternoon paper in 
Berlin that, while not a CDU party paper, would be staffed by “people sympathetic to the 
CDU stand” and would bolster the CDU reach throughout Berlin. Other than the SPD’s 
request to start a paper -- one that OMGUS denied (“they hardly need another daily”) but 
the British approved --, however, OMGUS had apparently “no recent kicks from any of 
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the non-communist parties in Berlin that they lack any other types of facilities to reach the 
Berlin electorate” and was fairly confident that the parties had a fair chance in the Berlin 
elections. Semi-overt sponsorship of a political party by any of the occupation powers, top 
OMGUS officials remained convinced, would “put the ‘kiss of death’ on said party.”245  
More importantly, Clay and Murphy remained convinced that far more was to be 
gained by extending Western influence to the east through quadripartite solutions than 
launching into an “active fight” which effectively promised to achieve very little.  Rather 
than interference on behalf of individual political parties in the SBZ, Clay sought to 
mitigate discriminatory practices in the SBZ that kept the CDU and LDP from organizing 
and representing their own candidates by pushing through the quadripartite control 
machinery a policy guideline on political parties that provided all licensed parties with 
authority to present candidates in the voting district of that zone.246 In addition to pursuing 
quadripartite cooperation on the issue, OMGUS also used other ways of influencing the 
elections in the zone. One step was a series  of OMGUS-inspired articles in the American 
press (among others by Alsop) that focused on the discriminatory pre-election practices. 
OMGUS officials credited the fact that the elections were not made a complete mockery 
with American and British media coverage “which turned the spotlight on Soviet and 
German communist methods and aims in the elections.”247  OMGUS intelligence sources  
confirmed that Russian concerns about foreign reactions led them to moderate their 
pressure methods.  A direct result might have been the permission for a group of eight 
U.S. journalists to travel around the zone that summer.248  General Clay “may have done 
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‘something’ to cause the Russians to permit more freedom,” one intelligence source 
wondered. 249 More importantly, Clay sensed that the enormous effect Byrnes’ September 
6 speech in Stuttgart had on the Soviet Zone: Internally, OMGUS officials later credited 
the Byrnes speech as having had a “great effect” on the communal elections on September 
8 and 15. According to OMGUS estimates, the speech “increased the CDU and LDP vote 
in Mecklenburg and Vorpommern by about 25 percent.”250   
How volatile the popular strength of the SED actually was became evident when, 
despite massive Soviet support, the party achieved only meager results at a string of local 
and state elections in the fall of 1946. To the embarrassment and shock of SMA and SED 
alike, the disadvantaged bourgeois parties nearly outflanked the SED at the polls. In the 
strongly Protestant Saxony, combined votes for CDU and LDP nearly matched those cast 
for the SED in local elections on September 1.251 In communal elections in Thuringia and 
Sachsen-Anhalt [check] on September 8, the SED actually trailed the LDP in Apolda, 
Eisenach, Erfurt, Gotha, Jena and Weimar, with the CDU coming in third. Altogether, the 
SED was outvoted in 90 percent of Saxon cities!252 Paradoxically, the SED seemed to 
score impressive victories in the remaining, far more rural areas of Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern and Brandenburg on September 15, where the land reform had won over 
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many traditionally conservative farmers but where, according to OMGUS estimates, CDU 
and LDP had also been prevented from reaching some 50-60 percent of the voters. While 
the CDU had been bolstered by recent election victories in the western zones, the SED’s 
focus on the CDU had evidently allowed to LDP to gain strength.253 Most importantly, 
both parties apparently gained the votes of former SPD voters, many of whom used their 
votes to signal dissatisfaction with the forced merger. While the SED narrowly prevailed 
in the total vote due to its monopoly position on the ballots in the rural areas, Murphy 
could report to Washington that the Soviets and SED had “suffered a moral and strategic 
defeat of considerable magnitude.” Where an alternative existed, “they have flocked to 
that alternative in large numbers.”254 According to the U.S. Political Advisor, the elections 
showed that “Communism of Soviet State Party have not captured the minds of the voters 
in the Soviet zone.”255 The electoral setback for the SED was compounded in the zonal 
and Berlin elections held on October 20, in which the communists, despite increased 
efforts to frighten voters, failed to obtain any majority at the zonal level, outmatched by 
the combined votes of the non-communist parties. In Berlin, the SED suffered a 
resounding defeat to the SPD.256  
OMGUS officials speculated about the longer-term effects of the fall elections, 
which had made the Russians, as one intelligence report read by Clay indicated, 
“disappointed and quite angry.”257  Some argued the results might lead the SED, backed 
by the Soviets, to increase pressures tactics vis-à-vis the non-communist parties. By 
contrast, the Central Intelligence Group suggested that the Kremlin was intent on working 
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“through non-Communist parties.”258 Impressed by the blow to the SED, Murphy argued 
that the “moral bankruptcy” of the policy of creating and supporting the SED “might even 
lead to some complete change of attitude, such as the dissolution of the SED, 
rapprochement with the Social Democrats and greater cooperation with the bourgeois 
parties.” 259 Sensing Soviet uncertainty about the SED, Murphy recommended to 
Washington to use concessions in the reparations question to effect a political opening in 
eastern Germany.260  
OMGUS intelligence (based on conversations, among other, with the CDU’s Jacob 
Kaiser) reinforced the impression that the Soviets were preparing for a readmission of the 
SPD in the zone and that “a rather drastic change in Soviet policy in Germany”261 towards 
was imminent. OMGUS reported to Washington “persistent reports of preparatory action 
by the SMA with regard to possible reauthorization of the SPD in the Soviet zone,” based 
on the expectation that “the Moscow Conference may result in the unification of 
Germany.” The reappearance of the SPD in the SBZ, “a bitter pill for the present leaders 
of the SED to swallow,” OMGUS officials speculated, might come as early as mid-
February 1947, allowing the Soviets “to get credit for having done so at their own 
initiative.”262 By February, no readmission of the SPD in the zone had occurred, but 
“fairly reliable sources” reported that at the eighth meeting of the SED Central Committee 
was informed that the Russians “are reconsidering readmitting the SPD in their zone.”263 
At the same time, U.S. observers speculated about “a highly important change in 
the leadership of German communism.” For several weeks, rumors had it that Ulbricht, 
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recognized since the beginning of occupation as “more Russian that the Russians” the real 
leader of the KPD/SED, had fallen into disfavor with SMA, presumably as a result of the 
failure of German communism to develop mass political support. The Russians had 
allegedly instructed Ulbricht to “remain more in the background,” presumably since they 
had realized that his methods and mentality had “in fact irritated many of the Germans he 
had to contact, and also served to identify the KPD and SED too closely in the popular 
mind with the SMA.”264 SED leader Pieck indicated that after the election debacle, the 
Soviets had instructed the SED to take a more independent line and to cooperate more 
with the other parties.265 
To American observers, the “new Soviet line” of “greater conciliation and 
moderation”266 also related to apparent changes in Soviet personnel, in particular the 
replacement of Gen. Bukov, who had been “a man of mystery”267 to OMGUS, by Lt. Gen. 
Makarov, described as “responsible not only for all political questions, but for the 
coordination of all questions of Soviet policy, including economic matters.” Reputedly 
KGB chief Beria’s representative in Germany and apparently charged with sweeping 
authority, Makarov’s appointment seemed to be connected with Sokolovsky’s policy 
announcements and, together with a mysterious visit by Beria to Sokolovsky’s 
headquarters, reported by the War Department’s Strategic Services Unit (SSU)268 
suggested to some that the Soviets were preparing for allied troop withdrawal and the 
establishment of central administrations, “perhaps even a government,” as a result of the 
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Moscow CFM.269 Based on intelligence sources within the SED, SSU had reported in late 
December that the SED Executive Committee had been informed by the Soviets that they 
had decided to agree to the unification of Germany, which “allegedly took the party 
completely by surprise, as its propaganda had been busy denouncing the bizonal 
agreement.”270 Several other intelligence reports about this same time suggested that 
Karlshorst was making similar statements to other Germans.271 
New Russian and German evidence shows that Stalin indeed entertained the idea 
of readmitting the SPD to the SBZ. The idea had not come entirely out of nowhere: In 
May 1946 Moscow had allowed for the readmission of the SPD in the Soviet sector of 
Berlin to obtain the licensing of the SED in the western part of the city, and in June Kurt 
Schumacher, the staunchly anti-communist leader of the SPD in the western zones, had 
demanded readmission of the SPD throughout the zone. Demands for a readmission of the 
SPD were popular throughout the Soviet Zone, as American intelligence officials reported; 
hopes among the population were directed at the United States and Britain.272 After the 
elections, SMA considered such a step as “undesirable,”273 yet internally the SED party 
leadership remained convinced throughout November and December 1946 that the 
readmission of the SPD in the Soviet zone was imminent. Meeting with top SED leaders 
in January 1947, Stalin in fact raised the idea of “licensing the SPD in the Soviet 
Occupation Zone” and, during a nocturnal meeting in the Kremlin, asked the Germans 
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whether the “SED feared the SPD,” suggesting that “it had to be fought politically.”274 
Chosen to present the SED’s case, Grotewohl evasively countered that the Western allies 
were demanding the readmission of the SPD despite the “fusion” of the party with the 
KPD. Stalin again stated with determination: “One had to license it [the SPD].” In a rare 
display of opposition, the shaken SED leaders tried to convince Stalin that the move was 
impracticable. Stalin himself seems to not have been certain of his “advice” to the German 
comrades: despite its repeated attempts to prepare for the day the SPD would be 
readmitted in the zone, as late as July 1947 neither the SED nor SMA could obtain a final 
word on the issue from Moscow.275  
Despite his musings about the SPD, Stalin, as well as SMA, were far from 
abandoning the SED, as U.S. officials speculated. Detailed election analyses by the 
apparatus of the political adviser and Tulpanov’s department blamed the disappointing 
results on the lack of unity of communists and former social democrats within the SED, 
which had almost broken up over the even distribution of candidates on the ballot. 
Tulpanov emphasized the need to strengthen the SED organizationally and counter the 
“chauvinist” and “nationalistic” propaganda of the bourgeois parties. In particular, 
Tulpanov wanted to intensify the confrontation against the divisive activities of the Berlin 
SPD, recognizing the impact the city’s free politics — and the SPD in particular -- had on 
the surrounding zone.276 Fedor Bokov, responsible for SMA’s political work, demanded to 
create “conditions for the SED’s greater maneuverability in domestic and foreign affairs of 
Germany” that would undercut the non-communist parties’ claims that the SED was a 
“Russian party.”  In the Kremlin talks weeks later, Stalin did indeed suggest that SED was 
right on course with its moderate program. “The position of the SED in favor of unity,” 
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the Germans were told, “is correct.” The Communist Party in the Western zones, Pieck 
jotted down, “was burdened by the old KPD program,” that people “feared dictatorship ― 
revolution.” Hence the KPD was to adopt the “new SED program for the coming period.” 
The Soviet leader wondered “whether leftist elements within the SPD” would join the 
communists in “unity front committees” which would work “against the Reaction in the 
West.”277 Far from giving up on the SED, Stalin sought to strengthen its influence 
throughout Germany and stabilize the situation in the SBZ.278 
Strengthening the SED went hand in hand with the build-up of political structures 
in the SBZ. In the spring of 1946, SMA had promised to transfer its authority in the 
economic field into German hands, and, insisting on increased German participation in 
economic decisions, Ulbricht suggested in late September the creation of a German 
administration for economic planning. Semenov endorsed Ulbricht’s proposal, arguing 
that it was “imperative” to “establish “some kind of zonal German government” in the 
Soviet zone. Semenov reasoned that the SED leadership had to learn how to run a country, 
and that it was necessary to create a state apparatus which could serve as “the core and 
basis of future German government agencies.”279 In a similar vein, that fall the SED 
pressed ahead with drafting an all-German as well as state constitutions that broke with 
German constitutional traditions, publishing their version in late November prior to 
accommodating fully concerns raised by Stalin himself. By the time of the Moscow 
ministerial in March 1947, Ulbricht had managed to secure the approval of constitutions 
throughout the provinces and states of the zone, reinforcing the SBZ’s trend towards 
autonomy—and further limiting Stalin’s options in Germany.   
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The prospect of opening up the Soviet zone and facilitating economic unity led 
Clay to argue passionately for a U.S.-Soviet deal at the ministerial level.  In November 
1946, Clay advised Byrnes that reparations were the clue to obtaining economic and 
political unity at the March 1947 Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers meeting. In 
preparation for the Moscow meeting, OMGUS again suggested a quid pro quo between 
reparations and economic and political objectives.280 Into early 1947 die OMGUS reports 
suggest that the Russians were interested in putting together a deal before the upcoming 
Moscow CFM on modest terms. As before, in their talks with Clay and Draper, they 
remained hesitant about establishing a provisional government, emphasized instead their 
own material requirements. In Moscow, Molotov again assured his Western counterparts, 
that, provided his government’s requirements for reparations from current production were 
met, the Soviet government remained interested in economic unity -- “very similar to our 
terms,” as U.S. delegation member Charles Kindleberger, head of the State Department’s 
division for German and Austrian Economic Affairs, admitted.281 A failure in Moscow,  
Walt W. Rostow warned, would mean the abandonment of the East, “crystallizing a real 
bloc there when in fact the Eastern Europeans are […] anxious to avoid it.”282 
Yet by the time the allied delegations convened in the Soviet capital in the spring 
of 1947, key officials had come to view German unity more a risk than a gain for the U.S., 
increasingly feared that the Soviets would inevitably dominate a unified Germany.   In 
September 1946, a State Department policy committee on Germany led by Riddleberger 
had recommended that in the case of “continued stalling” of the Soviets on unification, 
“we should pursue our unification of western Germany with the British and if possible the 
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French and with the revival of the economy of that area” even if that meant “the splitting 
of Germany into an eastern and a western state.”283 In November, Kennan had warned the 
Secretary of State that “time is running short on us in the German question.” With 
prospects for progressing to a peaceful united Germany “slender indeed,” the foreign 
policy adviser warned Byrnes that the United States could only reach an understanding 
with the Russians from a position of strength, and that “the only way in which we can 
create that strength in our bargaining position vis-à-vis the Russians in Germany is to 
undertake immediately an energetic and incisive program of economic development and of 
restoration of public hope and confidence in our own zone.”284 From Moscow, U.S. 
Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith reinforced the skepticism about Soviet intentions 
gripping Washington: Intent on dominating a unified Germany, the USSR would 
inevitably tighten control of the eastern zone as it sought to exploit opportunities to 
destabilize the west: Having “once gotten their teeth into Germany,” the Kremlin would 
pursue “power-political and ideological considerations” at the upcoming Moscow 
meeting. To Smith it seemed inevitable “that we must be prepared if necessary to accept 
further separation of eastern and western zones of Germany.” The United States had to 
“promote and support in word and deed all true democratic  and progressive forces in our 
zone and at the same time we must defend them from infiltration and subversion by 
totalitarian machinations from the east.”285  
Many of the key policymakers in Washington were now tilting towards the 
Kennan-Smith line, including those charged with formulating the administration’s 
approach to the Moscow conference.286 Concerns over Soviet intentions mixed with 
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growing anxiety over the economic stagnation in the westerns zones. A Council of 
Relations task force headed by Allen Dulles and staffed with leading Germany experts 
from politics and business recommended scrapping the Potsdam apparatus and turning the 
Ruhr in the powerhouse for rehabilitating Western Europe. Similar recommendations 
resulted from a mission by former President Herbert Hoover, who declared that “the world 
was involved in the most dangerous economic crisis in all history.” Allen Dulles’ brother 
John Foster Dulles, quickly emerging as a top Republican foreign policy adviser, similarly 
argued for the necessity of Western European integration and giving up on the “Potsdam 
dictum that Germany shall be a single economic unit.”  What was needed was a free hand 
in combating western Germany’s economic stagnation – and even more consciously and 
overtly than two years earlier were important voices inside and outside the administration 
willing to risk tensions with Russia and partition of Germany along the central zonal line. 
As the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers convened Truman went before Congress to 
announce U.S. emergency aid for the Greek and Turkish government. His declaration that 
the United States had to be prepared to “support free peoples who are resisting subjugation 
by armed minorities or by outside pressures,” which would soon become known as the 
“Truman Doctrine,” pledged American assistance to countries around the world threatened 
by Soviet aggression or indigenous Communist insurgency backed by Moscow. 
Crystallizing certain basic assumptions that underlay the American approach to the 
problem of Germany, the Truman Doctrine led to preparations for a European recovery 
program, to be announced by Marshall in early June. The “Marshall Plan” placed priority 
on economic rehabilitation in Western Europe, including the westerns zones, over the 
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recovery of Germany as an economic unit, further stimulating the build-up of bizonal 
administrations.287   
These assumptions clashed with Clay’s and Murphy’s arguments that concessions 
to the Soviets on reparations from current production could be leveraged for extending 
Western style democracy to eastern Germany and ultimately eastern Europe. If Truman 
Doctrine marked the support of governments threatened by Soviet aggression or 
Communist insurgencies in countries outside the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern 
Europe, Clay believed that Soviet influence could eventually be rolled back from Eastern 
Europe itself by keeping the door open for American influence in eastern Germany and 
satisfying Russian economic and security needs. Truman’s new Secretary of State, George 
C. Marshall was in fact equally wary of an open break with the Russians at the Moscow, 
and his initial argument called for the immediate implementation of central economic 
agencies. Not just that: Marshall also demanded the creation of a provisional German 
government composed of the heads of democratically elected state governments. The 
provisional government would act as a constituent assembly, writing a new constitution. 
Even greater was its authority in economic matters, drastically curtailing the autonomy of 
zonal commanders. But unlike General Clay, Marshall and his advisers were unwilling to 
test a quid pro quo in the form of reparations from current production would for the loss of 
zonal control: reparations would have to wait until the German economy was in balance. 
With Germany expected to be the engine of West European recovery, that “balance” 
implied a substantial raise in the level of industry well beyond what was necessary to 
guarantee the subsistence envisioned in the Potsdam accords.288 A revised version of the 
security treaty initially proposed by Byrnes was tabled, without expectation that Stalin 
would be any more ready now to accept the proposal than he was 15 months earlier. It 
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quickly became clear to Clay that the conditions for cooperation with the Russians were 
almost prohibitive, without any realistic chance for agreement by the Soviet leadership. 
Clay thus saw his more expansive vision of American influence throughout Germany and 
Eastern Europe undercut by the mounting anxieties over Western European economic 
disintegration and deepening distrust of Soviet intentions.289   
Was Stalin open to a deal that could have entailed greater political pluralism in the 
Soviet zone and political unity throughout Germany, as Clay and Murphy had argued? 
Based on the evidence available thus far, no definite answer is possible.  However, two 
findings stand out: by mid-1947, Soviet policy in Germany, and politics in the Soviet 
zone, were far more complex than the increasingly binary world view in Washington 
seemed to imply. At the same time, the Soviets never explored and followed through 
seriously those initiatives that might have offered the possibility of a political compromise 
with the West (just like those in the economic arena), even at the highest levels, leaving 
measures to consolidate control and autonomy of the zone to create realities on the ground. 
As the dynamics in the Soviet zone (as well as in the western zones, not considered here) 
created a reality of growing separation, Soviet officials were continually unwilling to go 
beyond “feelers” and (like their American counterparts) preferred not to run the risks that 
that cooperation implied. As both sides grew concerned over the sustainability of their 
zone, they also became increasingly averse to risking loosing control in their zone. 
Whether or not Clay’s and Murphy’s sense that in the fall of 1946 and spring of 
1947 Moscow was open to a deal that would have extended Western influence beyond the 
Elbe had been realistic, in the aftermath of the Moscow meeting OMGUS noted that 
Soviet goodwill, moderation and flexibility seemed to dissipate. OMGUS intelligence 
reported that “regular visitors in Karlshorst” reported a sudden somberness on the part of 
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Soviet officials.290 Pressure on the CDU increased once again, and rumors had it that 
Moscow looked to create a zonal CDU organization without Kaiser as chairman, though 
eschewing a final break with Kaiser prior to the next meeting of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers in London.291 Tulpanov, seen by many as a hard-line ideologue, became more 
prominent in zonal affairs, and his speeches and instructions, ODI noted, were more 
“demonstratively communist and aggressive than ever.” During a zonal conference of the 
SED held in September in Berlin, Tulpanov spoke as a passionate Sovietizer, “as 
communist to communists.”292   
Following the Moscow CFM and the establishment of the Unified Economic 
Council for the Bizone, the Soviets began to establish zonal administrative structures more 
openly. In June, Sokolovsky signed SMA Order No. 138, ratifying arrangements between 
the central administration and the state governments that had been negotiated earlier in the 
year and finalized in mid-April. Almost in passing did the order create a permanent 
economic commission which would become the core of a government for the Soviet 
occupation zone eight months later.293 The commission, soon referred to as “German 
Economic Commission” (DWK) within the following months, met nine times before the 
end of the year, yet initially failed to constitute any kind of central control mechanism for 
the SBZ economy due not only to the stubbornness of state governments, but, more 
importantly, competing interests among various Moscow-based agencies involved in the 
zone. To resolve the institutional dispute, Molotov ordered Sokolovsky and Semenov for 
consultations to Moscow at the end of the year. As a result of meetings with Stalin on 3 
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January 1948, the DWK was elevated to the status of a provisional government for the 
SBZ.294 
 
5. “Trojan Horse” or “Dead Duck”? Countering the People’s Congress Movement 
Clay had essentially argued that partition would create greater opportunities for 
increased Soviet influence, not unification. With the failure of the Moscow Council of 
Foreign Ministers’ meeting, the declaration of the Marshall Plan and the establishment of 
the Cominform, chances for settling Germany’s future though the quadripartite 
mechanisms set up at Yalta and Potsdam seemed to have vastly diminished. The Western 
powers on the one hand and the Soviets on the other were increasingly resolved to proceed 
unilaterally in their occupation sphere; as they pressed ahead, Germany became the stage 
for a global system confrontation. It was widely expected throughout Germany that the 
November/December Council of Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in London would fail to 
reach an accord on Germany, yet both sides eschewed the formal, open break-up of the 
final remnants of quadripartite rule: blaming the other side for its destruction in the pursuit 
of aggressive designs was central to the long-term legitimacy of each side’s German 
project.  
In the aftermath of the Moscow Conference OMGUS noticed how Russian and 
East German officials began to notch up their appeals to German nationalism. This was 
not a new line:  In June 1946, Kaiser and Lemmer reported to OMGUS officials that 
Tulpanov had conveyed to CDU leaders “with great earnestness the thesis that Russia’s 
prime policy” was to “build a strong Germany and a united Germany.” Though the 
presentation, Kaiser admitted, might have been a tactical ploy, it “made a deep impression 
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on the assembled [CDU] delegates.”295 The effort was particularly evident on the sore 
question of the German eastern territories, de facto assigned to Poland as a result of the 
Potsdam Conference. In late March 1946, Grotewohl had reminded the Germans that 
Moscow might consider a revision of the unpopular Oder-Neiße borderline, that the 
decision on the issue rested with Moscow.296  Ulbricht seemed to suggest that not all of the 
eastern territories might be lost except for Silesia, “[C]ertainly,’ a State Department 
analyst concluded, “he would not have so described his exception with Soviet approval.” 
297 Later that month, Kaiser and Lemmer were assured by the Russians that a definitive 
border settlement depended entirely on the Germans. 298  Molotov himself had elevated the 
competition for championing German unity with his 10 July 1946 speech “On the Fate of 
Germany and on the Peace Treaty with Germany” during the Paris CFM.299 But while 
appealing to the Germans’ desire for unity, Moscow was not yet ready to give in to 
repeated SED calls for a nationwide plebiscite on the nature of a future German state and 
other all-German initiatives. During the Kremlin discussions with the German communist 
leaders in January 1947, Stalin still evaded an endorsement of the plebiscite idea, despite 
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assurances from the SED leadership that a vast majority of Germans would favor a 
centralized state.300 
This changed by the summer of 1947, subtly at first. U.S. observers noted for 
example frequent references to former German Reich Chancellor Otto Bismarck by high-
ranking Soviet officers, allusions to the possibilities for Russian-German cooperation in 
the era of the first German nation state.301 In July, OMGUS reported that General Paulus, 
one of the leaders of the Free Germany Committee based in Moscow during the war, was 
slated in a prominent position in a new central government.302 Of particular significance 
was the conference of Länder minister presidents to which the Bavarian minister president 
invited his colleagues in May 1947. This initiative for a national German meeting, the first 
of its kind, immediately found widespread support even within the SED, where many 
former social democrats and communists were willing to risk the pursuit of national unity. 
A few functionaries around Ulbricht opposed any national initiatives not controlled 
entirely by the SED. When the minister presidents agreed to send word of their joining 
their western counterparts, Molotov instructed SMA to let them know that “SMA would 
under no circumstances permit the participation of the Soviet zone in the meeting planned 
by the Americans,” only to reverse his position the same day, as it might “damage our 
interests” in Germany. With Moscow uncertain how to handle the situation, Ulbricht 
committed the minister presidents to demand revisions in the agenda for the meeting upon 
arrival in Munich, a demand that was certain to sabotage the conference even before it 
began.303 
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The entire episode brought Moscow’s hedging and uncertainty in handling the all-
German initiative not controlled by the SED into sharp focus. Moscow reacted even more 
strongly to a far less significant initiative by Ferdinand Friedensburg, a CDU mayor in 
Berlin, who in November 1947, just before the London CFM, called for the creation of a 
“Forum of National Representation.” In a November 17 telegram worded in stark and 
principled terms that probably reflected Stalin’s imprimatur, Molotov reminded the SED 
that it had to be in decisive control of all-German initiatives.304 Molotov’s November 17 
cable indeed constituted a turning point in Soviet policy: abandoning its reservations, 
Stalin now made the SED seek front and center in all-German initiatives, even if that, as 
Kaiser anticipated, would undermine the support of the western zone parties. Having been 
held back repeatedly since the summer, the SED suddenly received the green light for its 
plebiscite initiative and rushed to call for a “People’s Congress for Unity and Just Peace” 
to be held in Berlin on 6-7 December 1947. Rather than a genuine effort to expand 
Moscow’s influence to all of Germany, Moscow viewed the people’s congress movement 
as a means to assert and solidify the leading role of the SED in the eastern zone. 
The SED’s people’s congress initiative led to the final break with the CDU under 
the leadership of Kaiser and Lemmer. For Kaiser, the national question was inextricably 
linked to the survival and independence of the party in the SBZ. Following Byrnes 
September 1946 Stuttgart speech, Kaiser had proposed in early 1947 to convene a 
“national representation.” The proposal had met with widespread approval in the western 
and eastern Germany; the western SPD alone had withheld support, even the Russians had 
resisted from voicing opposition publicly. But after the Moscow CFM, Kaiser’s open 
support of the Marshall Plan and overt criticism of SMA, relations between the Soviets 
and Kaiser quickly deteriorated. In early August, SMA disseminated a strong anti-Kaiser 
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article in Berlin and throughout the zone and increased pressure on the Land organizations 
of the CDU in the zone.305 In a heated exchange with Tulpanov at Karshorst on August 18, 
related by OMGUS to Washington, Kaiser candidly complained about Soviet actions and 
stated that measures such as the Marshall Plan were necessary for reconstruction. Sharp 
verbal exchanges on the issues of border, reparations and SAG’s followed.306 In 
November, Kaiser warned that the SED’s hastily arranged call for a SED-run people’s 
congress in November 1947 would be dead on arrival in western Germany, and for that 
reason would not give his support to the congress movement. The decision sealed Kaiser’s 
fate: Tulpanov realized the opportunity presented by the issue, stating on the eve of the 
first people’s congress in early December that it could “serve us in the effort to juxtapose 
Kaiser and his policies with the [CDU] state organizations.” When Kaiser remained dead-
set against participating in the people’s congress, SMA engineered his ouster from the 
party leadership.307 With Kaiser’s departure, Moscow had rid itself of the person most 
passionately fighting against the separation of the Soviet occupation zone.     
   
Though publicly still committed to German unification, the American delegation 
arrived in London “determined to have a split.”308  Neither the Truman administration nor 
the Attlee governments were any longer sanguine about the chances of success in 
resolving the German issue.309  Without objections by the other allies, Washington had 
postponed the deputy foreign minister meeting just before its scheduled gathering in early 
October 1947. The postponement virtually eliminated any chances for agreements on such 
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issues as reparations and currency reform, then still under negotiation in Berlin.310 There 
were certain indications that Moscow was considering major change: in November CIA 
reported that the Soviets had ordered the SBZ railway administration to deliver 315 
passenger coaches to transport of Russian military families, leading top State Department 
officials to wonder whether Moscow was entertaining “radical plans to get out of 
Germany” or “expect[ing] trouble.”311 For Washington, the paramount goal was to make 
the Soviets appear responsible for the failure, thus clearing the road towards a separate 
West German government. “The difficulty under which we labor,” Ambassador Walter 
Bedell Smith wrote to Eisenhower during the London discussions, was “that in spite of our 
announced position, we really do not want nor intend to accept German unification in any 
terms that the Russians might agree to, even though they seemed to meet most of our 
requirements.” The negotiations in London would require “delicate maneuvering to avoid 
the appearance of inconsistency if not hypocrisy.”312  
In Moscow policymakers did not seem to have expected any progress from the 
CFM meeting either. As early as November 1, Soviet foreign ministry officials predicted 
failure. The Politburo did decide to put a German peace treaty and the formation of a 
German government at the center of its negotiation strategy. Yet the Soviet foreign 
ministry did not develop any new initiatives or ideas.313 Directives for the preparatory 
meeting of the deputies precluded any initiatives to reach agreement on controversial 
questions; guidelines for dealing with issues that had remained unresolved in Moscow in 
fact hardened the Soviet position and lessened chances of a compromise with the Western 
powers. Preparations for the CFM were simply limited to updating the public declarations 
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from the Moscow meeting, and drafting press releases. Molotov himself was forced to 
clear every step along the way with Stalin. The draft for a new declaration by Molotov on 
Germany presented spectacular information of the positive economic developments in the 
zone but mainly polemicized against a Western German state. As expected, the 
discussions in London quickly stalemated in mutual recriminations. Instead of 
diplomatically exploiting continuing French reservations about Anglo-American plans, 
Molotov quickly became isolated at the conference and allowed Marshall to call into 
question the usefulness of further negotiations altogether. Without even agreement to hold 
another meeting, the negotiations were broken off. 
The Anglo-Americans and Soviets had their sights set well beyond the London 
meeting. Resolved that there would be two Germanies, they sought to stabilize their own 
zone – and prevent the other side from consolidating its own. Alarmed that the Soviets 
were bent on communizing the western zones and frustrating European Recovery Plan, 
Marshall and his advisers wanted to bolt the door on further talks and preparations for a 
separate state.  Molotov’s deputy Fedor Gusev, in turn had surmised internally weeks 
before the London meeting that “the ruling reactionary circles of the USA have entered the 
path of active propaganda and the preparation of a new war against the Soviet Union and 
the countries of the new democracy in Europe.”314  Moscow should not await the final 
outcome but prepare for measures after quadripartite melt-down.  Cognizant of the 
implications for the political unity of the country, Western and Soviet occupation chiefs 
had pressed ahead with plans for separate currency reforms in the Soviet and the Bizone 
with renewed fervor since the Moscow conference debacle. While the foreign ministers 
were still deliberating in London in December 1947, the Politburo gave green light for the 
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production of new money by the USSR state mint, to be introduced in the eastern zone 
should the currency reform in the bizone be carried out.  
American and British officials too set out to create a separate state out of the 
westerns zones, following the London failed meeting -- without acknowledging such 
publicly. To be sure, Clay remained convinced that an agreement could be worked out 
with the Russians. Meeting with Bevin and Marshall after the Council of Foreign 
Ministers, Clay warned that there was “still no final break with the Soviet Union,” that “he 
hoped it could be avoided” and that they should make one more attempt to proceed on a 
quadripartite basis, “however many practical difficulties this might raise.” Nor did he 
think it absolutely impossible to secure Soviet agreement to a currency reform when he 
would propose it at the Control Council. Clay counted on the effects of the break-down of 
the London CFM,  the unwillingness of the Russians to appear responsible for the division 
of Germany, and the fact that the Soviets would be confronted with a fait accompli in that 
the West had the new currency in hand. Marshall agreed to give the quadripartite approach 
one more try:  He was “most anxious in regard to the general international situation to 
avoid a “frozen front” which was tragic to contemplate.” But even Clay favored “surely 
but not dramatically” expanding the political responsibilities of the Bizone Economic 
Council, “unless of course they had to react rapidly to some fait accompli by the Russians 
in the Eastern Zone.” 315  In January, Clay and Robertson reorganized the bizone, giving 
its structures greater resemblance of governmental organs. In the “Frankfurt Documents,” 
handed to the assembled German minister-presidents and Bizone Economic Council 
leaders, the occupation chiefs recommended the expansion of the Council, the creation of 
a Länder council, the formation of an executive committee and a central bank. In 
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February, the Americans pushed Britain, France and the Benelux states to agree on the 
future of the western zones, including the status of the Ruhr industry, the zones’ role in the 
Marshall Plan and European reconstruction, and a constituent assembly 
(“Parlamentarischer Rat”). As Moscow finalized its own version of a currency reform for 
the Soviet Zone that spring, the State Department instructed Clay that it was no longer the 
policy of the U.S. government to reach an agreement on a quadripartite currency reform. 
Clay was to bring about an end to the negotiations by June 1.  
 
The decision to include the western zones in the Marshall Plan aid and the London 
Program for a West German state freed the Truman administration from the immediate 
restraints involved in negotiating with the Soviets. No one now pressed harder for a West 
German state than Clay. But American officials were careful to avoid having the decision 
for a Western solution be seen as writing off German unity and the Soviet zone altogether, 
as much as some internally acknowledged that such was for now the case.  Developments 
in the Soviet zone underscored the critical importance of this issue:  While further shutting 
off its zone from western influence and quelling dissent in the SBZ, the SED seemed to 
count increasingly on mass mobilization throughout Germany, to force German unity 
through a “people’s movement from below.”  As efforts to bring together representatives 
from state parliaments or parties from eastern and western Germany, such as the May 
1947 Interzonal Conference of Unions or the June 1947 Munich conference, had failed, 
the SED leadership sought to appeal to wide strata of the German population for its 
national objectives. To what extent this actually was coordinated with Moscow remains a 
matter of controversy. Two weeks before the December 1947 London Council of Foreign 
Ministers meeting, the SED party leadership published its “Manifesto to the German 
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People on the Occasion of the London Conference,”316 denouncing the Marshall Plan, and 
demanding a democratic and united Germany based on denazification and expropriation 
modeled after the SBZ. In a SED-run “people’s referendum” in mid-November 93.8% of 
those polled by the SED affirmed “the desire for national unity is a desire of the entire 
German people.”317  
In spite of the Western powers’ refusal to recognize the SED petition to the CFM, 
on November 24, 1947, the SED called on all parties, mass organizations and leading 
individuals to convene an all-German “People’s Congress for Unity and a Just Peace” on 
December 6-7. Assembling an impressive 2,215 delegates from eastern and western 
Germany, the first People’s Congress took place in Berlin, highlighting the symbolic 
importance of the former Reich capital. The Congress set up a national weekly, the 
“German voice,” designed for interzonal circulation on a large scale. Western observers 
fretted that the congress had “tremendous potential propaganda value” and quickly 
suspected that Moscow intended to try to turn it into a de fact parliament for all of 
Germany, “a coup, if successful, could have untold possibilities for influencing votes and 
direct action in the Western zones.”318   
In the shadow of the February 1948 Prague Putsch, the SED’s machinations and 
widening war scare could not be taken lightly. On the even of a second People’s Congress, 
convened on March 17-18, 1948, ranking German communists talked openly about armed 
sabotage, resistance and even a “war of independence” against the Western occupation 
powers, drawing parallels to the tactics employed by Gen. Markos Vafiades, the leader of 
the Greek communist insurgents. Timed for explicit appeal to the historical traditions of 
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1848, the Congress blamed the Western allies for Germany’s growing division and 
motioned to dethrone the Allied Control Council. Aside from demanding all-German 
central administrations in Berlin and dissolution of the bizonal Economic Council, the 
Second People’s Congress created a 400 delegates-strong “German People’s Council” 
(and a smaller presidium), charged with drafting a constitution for Germany and 
conducting a massive drive for a people’s initiative petitioning the allied commanders to 
hold “people’s referendum” on a law that declared Germany an “indivisible republic.” 
Throughout the country, some 11,000 “People’s Committees for Unity and a Just Peace” 
were established in plants, residential areas, universities and local governments. Between 
May 23 and June 13, 1948, the People’s Council collected some 13 million signatures in 
favor of the referendum, 1 million of which came from the British zone.319 At its third 
session on July 2, the People’s Council appealed to the Allied Control Council to order a 
referendum on the people’s initiative resolution as basic law for all of Germany.320  
OMGUS officials watched the people’s initiative and people’s congress movement 
with growing apprehension. U.S. intelligence sources reached deep into the People’s 
Congress movement, including one former member of the Weimar-era Democratic 
People’s Party, probably former Reichstag Deputy Dr. and Liberal Democratic Party 
leader Wilhelm Kűlz, who ostensibly was collaborating with the SED but actually serving 
as a CIC agent “instructed to play along,” even being nominated to the People’s Council 
presidium.321  Intelligence reports confirmed the apparently great emphasis which Soviet 
and SED officials placed on the people’s referendum. OMGUS learned that at a March 22 
meeting with top SED officials shortly after the People’s Congress, Pieck emphasized that 
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the nationwide referendum was the “decisive task” for the party. The “non-Communist 
atmosphere” of the People’s Congress did not escape US observers (“no red flags were in 
evidence”),322 and speakers included non-communist party leaders including Külz.323 
Most disconcerting, one fourth of the 2,000 participants at the second congress had come 
from the western zones.324 
People’s Congress leaders were apparently certain that the Western powers would 
not forbid the collection of signatures for people’s referendum (as they would otherwise 
create the impression of opposing German unity), and that if sufficient number of 
signatures had been obtained, the Länder governments could not ignore the issue.325 
Meanwhile OMGUS received numerous reports of SED pressure methods to effect a large 
turn-out; the drive for signatures promised to be “the most farcical ‘vote’ thus far carried 
out under Soviet-Communist auspices in postwar Germany.”326  In Berlin, the Soviets 
apparently went so far as to use their exclusive control of the subway system to equip 
stations in all four sectors with voting booths, and overruled the non-Communist 
municipal government’s decision not to make public facilities available for the people’s 
initiative. Throughout the SBZ, voting was recorded by local residential and occupational 
people’s initiative committees. Those who failed to vote would be entered on a public list 
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of “saboteurs of democracy.327 With “totalitarian control already established in the Soviet 
zone” and the “war of nerves which the communists have been carrying on throughout 
Germany,” Brewster Morris, an analyst on Murphy’s staff, argued, “countless people” had 
signed the petition.328 U.S. intelligence expected 100 percent approval.329 
Reports from the western zones indicated that the signature collection was well 
under way there too, and American officials emphasized “the natural appeal of such 
propaganda to the German public today.”330 While it quickly became evident that the 
people’s referendum initiative failed to attract real attention in the western zones, OMGUS 
officials expected “many ignorant and naïve Germans” to be taken in by the “nationalist 
appeal” of the referendum.331 Just how effective the campaign might be was illustrated by 
an open-air meeting in Berlin-Wilmersdorf in the British sector: Though the crowd of 500-
600 people, U.S. observers noted, must have come as a disappointment to the organizers, 
the SED speakers managed to turn “an initially rather unresponsive audience into an 
enthusiastic demonstration against the United States,” and the meeting occasioned “heated 
group discussions in the streets for a full hour after the meeting had ended.”332 The 
initiative was, U.S. officials admitted, “one of [the] cleverest Soviet-Communist 
propaganda moves to date.”333  
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Even before the people’s congress movement got on the way, Clay had announced, 
much to the surprise by many on his staff, a public anti-communist campaign in the 
western zones, “Operation Talkback.” Soon after the first People’s Congress Clay decided 
(along with the British Military Governor) to prohibit any meetings of the movement at 
the state or zonal level. One meeting took place in Vegesack near Bremen, featuring 
speeches by SED leader Grotewohl and East-CDU leader Nuschke and deemed an instant 
success by the SED, but others planned for North Rhine-Westphalia, Schleswig–Holstein, 
Hamburg, Hessia, Bavaria and Rhineland-Palatine had to be cancelled in light of the US 
and British prohibition.334 The referendum in the spring of 1948 presented OMGUS with a 
somewhat more difficult decision--after all, the drive for signatures was a basically 
democratic practice. Ousted CDU leader Jacob Kaiser proposed a competitive referendum, 
but Washington was uneasy with linking the procedure with the one planned by the 
SED.335 Once the referendum went into full swing, Clay decided to allow the circulation 
of petitions while both ridiculing and banning the collection of signatures on behalf of the 
people’s congress, forcing the SED to carry out the count largely on an “underground 
basis.”336  
Internal records from the SED archives now show that the East German communist 
leadership felt that OMGUS actions were a measure of their success. At their meeting with 
Stalin in Moscow at the end of March 1948, SED leaders hailed the success of the 
people’s congress movement. Pieck told Stalin that the SED was winning the confidence 
of the masses in its fight against the reactionary forces and for German unity, citing the 
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people’s congress movement as proof. The SED managed, the Soviet leader learned, to 
include broad segments of the bourgeoisie in the movement, “to uncover the 
Schumacher’s policies and to counter the reactionary efforts within the bourgeois parties.” 
The Second People’s Congress in particular, Pieck noted, had made a “strong impression 
on the masses, in the West too.” The Congress needed to be more “impulsive” and better 
organized, but its “success was confirmed by the countermeasures and propaganda of the 
Western powers.”337 Others within the SED drew a more sober assessment: The people’s 
congress movement, one leading official conceded, was only making meager progress 
“thanks to the malicious propaganda of the western press,” to some extent none at all.338 
According to one source, Franz Dahlem, the SED’s top official charged with the campaign 
in western Germany told a friend that the SED “had lost hope for the success of the 
referendum in western Germany,” adding that the prohibition by the western powers was 
perhaps a “blessing in disguise,” affording an excuse for the expected failure of the 
campaign and an opportunity for propaganda in the form of protests.339 Yet Stalin seemed 
to have been convinced of the success of the all-German project. In June 1948 he decided 
to broaden the appeal of the people’s congress movement, signaling the Germans to create 
a new nationwide organization, the “National Front.” 
 
6. “Action Point Berlin” 
Much like contemporary American observers later historians have generally 
portrayed Stalin’s decision in early March to shut down the Control Council by 
Sokolovsky’s dramatic departure on March 23 and to institute at first a small (April 1) and 
then a near full (June) blockade of the Western ground access to Berlin as a forceful 
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reaction to the London program and Western currency reform plans; an aggressive 
showdown designed as a blow to the prestige of the Western powers in his efforts to 
prevent a West German state; and a last desperate measure to extricate himself from the 
dilemma over Germany. Some have argued that Stalin was cajoled into the crisis by the 
East German communist leaders who had had come to Moscow for discussions with the 
vozhd. While none of these explanations can be entirely dismissed, in the context of this 
study – and in the light of new sources – a different factor played a more significant and, 
perhaps, the central role. In the spring of 1948, barely three years after the end of World 
War II, serious worries about Germany’s role in Western “preparation of a new war” 
against the Soviet Union and its new allies combined with a growing sense that the Soviet 
Zone was on the brink of collapse -- and with it Stalin’s main stake in Germany. 340 
Contrary to Western perceptions of the eastern zone’s increasing isolation from the 
West, many Soviet officials felt that exactly the opposite was true: they blamed the zone’s 
alarming decline on destabilizing Western influence, in particular from Berlin, located in 
the heart of the zone. Alarming reports from East Germany were mounting in early 1948. 
In January, the head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s Third European Department Smirnov 
told Vyshinsky that, according to conversations with leading SED officials, “the current 
situation in the country was very tense.” In most major cities there were great difficulties 
in providing the population with potatoes, which had in turn strongly affected the prestige 
of the SED within the population. “Would elections be held today, the SED could lose up 
to one third of the votes it received in the last elections.”341  The sense of 
“indetermination” of the economic situation, of a “lack of any economic perspective” for 
the zone combined with resentment over the new Polish borders and “unequivocally 
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negative” attitudes towards the Soviet stock companies.342  Depression and dissatisfaction 
was also gripping SED leadership.343  Many were unsure that the Eastern Zone could 
compete with the West and saw it getting further isolated. One could frequently hear the 
opinion, Moscow was told, that “the West would have everything, but what would happen 
to the Soviet Zone [?]”344    
Matching contemporary Western perceptions that their zone remained vulnerable 
to Soviet machinations, Russian officials genuinely felt the very same in reverse: The 
“fascist underground,” Molotov learned in early March, was considerably expanding its 
activities against the backdrop of “contradictions” between the occupation powers. The 
center of the fascist underground was the American occupation zone, in particular 
Bavaria.345  Two weeks later “reactionary propaganda” was still “increasing.” Western 
press was increasingly reaching the zone, “while our print runs were low. Possibilities for 
an increased influence of the reactionary forces were growing.”346  Not surprisingly then, 
proposals with the top ranks of the Soviet foreign ministry for “countermeasures” against 
the formation of an anti-Soviet Western bloc in Germany included efforts to seal off the 
SBZ further: The USSR would see itself forced, Smirnov told Molotov, “to eliminate the 
disparity of our zone in Germany which [by contrast to the other zones] is de facto open.” 
Smirnov recommended that Moscow “close its zone” to put it in the same situation as 
existed in the West.347   
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By the time the German Communist leaders arrived in Moscow in late March 1948 
for discussions with Stalin, Moscow had decided for an action plan aimed at shutting off 
Western influence from the zone. Pieck’s and Grotewohl’s suggestions merely reinforced 
what had been decided on already.  They warned Stalin in a late night session at the 
Kremlin that “the exacerbation of the conflicts between the Allies on the issues of an 
imperialistic or democratic peace with Germany, the unity or dismemberment of Germany, 
and its democratic development or colonialization by means of the Marshall Plan are 
influencing the mood of the German people. These conflicts are not so clear to the broad 
masses but they are influencing the mood of the masses, especially in Berlin. The Western 
powers are trying to influence the population and direct it against the USSR, arousing 
hostility against communism which supposedly wants to crush the people, take the 
Germans’ private property away from them …” Some improvement of the economic 
situation had been achieved in the Soviet zone, Pieck told the Soviet leader, but all the 
same it remained difficult. SED counter-agitation against Western ERP propaganda had 
not been as active as on the issue of German unity as a consequence of the illusions spread 
among the population about the Marshall Plan. The Party has not yet managed to involve 
the broad masses in fighting the Marshall Plan.” Sharp differences had arisen with the 
Western powers which had taken “terrorist measures” against the SED. Finally, there was 
“the powerful propaganda apparatus which the western occupation authorities have in 
Berlin which the SED cannot even match.” In the western sectors the occupation 
authorities were interfering with the Party’s work at enterprises, prohibiting the hanging of 
signs and the convening of meetings, and creating “Trotskyite groups.” Elections 
scheduled for October would, in the estimates of the SED leaders, not be better for the 
SED than in 1946. Apparently sensing (or possibly already informed) that a set measures 
was in planning, Pieck ventured that “they would be happy if the Allies were forced out of 
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Berlin.” To this, Stalin commented, far less ad hoc than often portrayed, “let’s try with 
[our] common efforts; maybe we’ll force [them] out.” 348 
Truman and his advisers believed that a western withdrawal from Berlin under 
Soviet pressure would constitute a “political defeat of the first magnitude” with 
repercussions not just in Germany but throughout the world.349 American credibility was 
perceived to be at stake. Reports from Berlin suggested that in “Soviet-Communist 
circles” Berlin was referred to as a “political Stalingrad.”  Top SED officials were 
reportedly convinced that the Western Powers would leave Berlin  in the spring of 1948, 
with the Soviets moving into all of the city. The Western evacuation of the city, 
Washington was told, “was seen as “the first phase in the liberation of Germany.”350    
The former Reich capital had, American officials were quite aware, an immense 
“drawing power” and could have a “magnetic effect” upon Western Germany.351 The 
presence of Western forces in Berlin, in turn, provided perhaps the largest impediment to 
unqualified control by the Soviet occupiers over their zone. When OMGUS personnel 
appeared in the Soviet sector, news of their presence often “spread like wild-fire though 
the crowd,” “pleased and cheered them,” boosted morale, as U.S. officials saw themselves 
in an atmosphere increasingly charged by the East-West confrontation over access to the 
city.352 Abandoning the Western island in the heart of the Soviet zone would have meant, 
administration officials figured, the “final concession of Eastern Germany to 
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Communism.”353 While the Berlin airlift, inaugurated in the summer of 1948, symbolized 
continued U.S. commitment to Western European and Berlin’s security, it was also an 
offensive gesture: Withdrawal from Berlin would have allowed the Soviets to consolidate 
control over their zone at the very moment U.S. intelligence agents were reporting 
“serious and growing food and raw materials shortages” in the SBZ.354 The city offered, 
America’s top diplomat in Germany, Robert Murphy observed, “an action point far inside 
Soviet-held territory from which to observe developments and to support and influence 
resistance to Communism in a vital area.” The degree to which Allied presence in Berlin 
kept the Soviets from consolidating their hold on 21,000,000 eastern Germans, Murphy 
surmised, “may be measured by [the] intensity of Soviet efforts to force us out of 
Berlin.”355 
American officials used their continued presence in Berlin to counter Soviet efforts 
to stabilize their zone by subduing the non-communist forces and to use the capital 
vantage point for all-German appeals, especially with a view to winning over “recalcitrant 
bourgeois elements.”356 The Soviet Military Administration’s newly cooperative approach 
towards the CDU and LDP in early 1948, the U.S. mission in Berlin suspected, was driven 
by the desire to “lull” the non-communist forces within the population into a sense of 
security. It also rewarded compliant CDU and LDP leaders but also reflected the 
realization that “real support for the SED and the people’s congress was “less widespread 
than was hoped.”357 Since 1946 the Truman administration had wrestled with the question 
of how far the non-communist parties presented resistance potential within the SBZ and 
should be supported to that effect. The Western sectors of Berlin provided safe havens for 
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those non-communist party leaders increasingly under pressure by the people’s congress 
and bloc movement. The CDU’s success in the elections in the American zone in early 
1946 seemed to have provided Kaiser with additional force against Pieck in the unity front 
discussions, and may have helped moderate the SED’s attitude towards the nationalization 
measure carried out by referendum in Saxony in June 1946. 358 In fact, throughout 1946, 
the CDU was growing in membership numbers, due to an influx of former Social 
Democrats, adding to its force.359 American observers in Berlin had sensed that the Soviet 
Military Administration was initially trying to avoid a complete breach with the CDU and 
particularly with Kaiser, cognizant of the fact that he and the party had resisted Soviet 
pressures to abandon its opposition to Soviet policies with considerable determination and 
reticence.360 But in December 1947 the Soviets ousted CDU leaders Kaiser and Lemmer 
over their refusal to join the people’s congress movement, yet Kaiser and Lemmer 
remained powerful voices operating from Western Berlin. While many Germans in the 
Western zone felt that the East Zone CDU was henceforth “completely under Tulpanov’s 
thumb” incapable of resisting the communization of the zone, Lemmer tried to counter the 
inclination to write off the Soviet zone CDU in repeated conversations with Murphy’s 
staff. Lemmer tried to convince U.S. officials that the party’s rank-and-file (as opposed to 
its leadership under Otto Nuschke) “still represented a considerable opposition and would 
do so as long as they believed that they were not totally cut-off from the West.” That 
opposition, Murphy noted, did indeed “occasionally drop to the surface,”361 as in the case 
of the tumultuous protest against the party’s new “strong man” Georg Dertinger at a CDU 
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meeting in Brandenburg.362 But like Murphy many within the administration remained 
skeptical if this opposition could have “substantially any more effect on the progress of the 
“communization of the Zone than did the protests of the former opposition parties in 
Eastern European countries.”363 The CIA, in fact, concluded as early as the spring of 1948 
that Moscow had virtually completed its “campaign to eliminate all overt opposition in the 
Soviet Zone.”364 
Truman administration officials carefully followed Soviet efforts to set up what it 
termed “Quisling political parties” in Berlin to undermine the powerful Western-oriented 
Berlin Land organizations.365 Following the death of the Liberal Democratic Party leader 
Wilhelm Külz in early April 1948, the Soviets engineered the split of the LDP Land 
organization in Berlin, led by the anti-Soviet Schwennicke. They set up a LDP 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft, the “real aim” of which American observers estimated was “a new 
Sovietized Land organization” in Berlin that could align itself with the zonal LDP, and 
groomed Prof. Hermann Kastner as “potential head of an Eastern German government.”366  
In July 1948, Alfons Gaertner, the president of the Landesbank of Thuringia and second 
chairman of the LDP Land organization slated by the Soviets to head the LDP in the zone, 
fled to the West. The defection was seen as a “heavy blow to the Soviet Zone LDP” 
precisely at a moment when the party “had gathered its courage to attack the SED in a 
surprisingly uninhibited manner.”367   Yet much of the party leadership throughout the 
zone remained intact at the local level, American officials learned, and under pressure had 
resolved many of their differences with the CDU leaders. People throughout the zone, one 
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defecting LDP leader reported, were “only waiting” in the hope that the Eastern zone 
would decline to such a “wretched state” that it was no longer of use to the Russians and 
expecting the Western allies not to make any compromises with Moscow.368 
The Truman administration also sought to heighten dissension within the German 
administration in the Soviet zone and the SED, which, OMGUS was well aware, was 
suffering from poor morale as well as widespread lethargy and dissatisfaction.369 The 
SED’s performance had created increasing concern on the part of the Soviets as to the 
effectiveness of the party.370 By mid-1948, the party started to undergo a series of changes 
and purges designed to strengthen it as a Marxist-Leninist striking force.371 In May, U.S. 
intelligence reported the creation of a SED “Parteiaktiv” at a secret meeting.372 Former 
social democrats in particular came under increased pressure. Defections from the SED 
rank-and-file increased. Ulbricht’s call at the thirteenth meeting of the SED executive 
committee on 15-16 September 1948 to abandon any “peculiar German ways to socialism” 
had to be considered, according to  Murphy, as “the funeral ovation over any nationalistic 
deviations in SED policy.”373  The SED’s internal assessments picked up by OMGUS 
offered a “remarkable confession of failure.”374 Aggressive posturing by SED leaders – 
such as Saxony’s Prime Minister’s Seydewitz’s statement that “All we need when the time 
comes are sufficient weapons and ammunition. We have the fanatics to fight when the 
                                                 
368 Memorandum, USPOLAD Frankfurt to USPOLAD Berlin, 25 January 1949, NARA, RG 59, 740.00119 
Control (Germany)/1-2549, EUCOM Intelligence Report on LDP, enclosed in POLAD Heidelberg to 
Department of State, 12 August 1949, NARA, RG 59, 862.00/8-1249. 
369 Murphy to Secretary of State, 8 June 1948, NARA, RG 59, 862.00/6-848. 
370 Robert F. Corrigan (POLAD Heidelberg) to Secretary of State, 21 December 1948, NARA, RG 59, 
862.00/12-2148. 
371 “Eastern Germany,” Douglas (American Embassy London) to Secretary of State, 13 July 1948, NARA, 
RG 59, 862.00B/7-1348; Robert F. Corrigan (POLAD Heidelberg) to Secretary of State, 29 October 1948, 
NARA, RG 59, 862.00/102948;  A-946, POLAD Berlin to Secretary of State, 11 December 1948, NARA, 
RG 59, 862.00/12-1148; “SMA Order Directing Screening of German Socialist Unity Party (SED),” Robert 
F. Corrigan (POLAD Heidelberg) to Secretary of State,  21 December 1948, NARA, RG 59, 862.00/21-
2148;  
372 EST Report No. MGB-6519, cited in Murphy to Secretary of State, 8 June 1948, NARA, RG 59, 
862.00/6-848. 
373 Murphy to Secretary of State, 21 September 1948, NARA, RG 59, 9-2048. 
374 Riddleberger to Secretary of State, 19 October 1948, NARA, RG 59, 862.00/10-1948. 
124 
occasion arises.” --   only seemed to evidence the “desperation” which the SED had fallen 
into “in the face of the hostility of all except a small minority in the Soviet Zone.”375  U.S. 
observers, the SED’s “even more slavish acceptance of the Marxist-Leninist line” pitted it 
against the great majority of German public opinion, which were presumed to be 
“intensely anti-Soviet and anti-Communist.”376 
The defection of former SPD functionary Erich Gniffke from the ranks of the SED 
leadership underlined the difficulties of the SED.377 Truman administration officials held 
hopes that they could induce other prominent SED leaders from the party’s Central 
Committee to bolt from their positions in the SBZ, such as Max Fechner, Friedrich Ebert, 
son of the former Reich president, and, most prized of all, Otto Grotewohl, the co-
chairman of the party and former SPD leader. At the end of 1948, Friedrich Ebert Jr., son 
of the Weimar Reichspräsident, contacted Western intelligence officers expressing his 
desire “to quit and flee Berlin,” prompting OMGUS officials to advocate that he be given 
sanctuary in the U.S. zone.378  Western intelligence  sources included Heinrich Graf von 
Einsiedel, a member of the Von Seidlitz Group of the National Committee for a Free 
Germany, who was taken into custody by the Army’s Counterintelligence Corps on 25 
May 1948 while visiting Wiesbaden. 379  The goal was made more difficult by the 
unremitting position of western SPD leader Kurt Schumacher who argued that potential 
high-ranking SED deserters had “burned their bridges” and would make “absolutely no 
commitment” to get them back into the SPD.380 To be sure Grotewohl’s more recent 
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statements and actions left, in the view of one U.S. diplomat, “little reason to doubt that he 
has been completely won over to the Communist viewpoint.”381  
 
7. The Soviet Zone as a “Springboard for Penetration”? 
As it shifted from trying to maintain the grand alliance to engaging the Soviet 
Union in a cold war, American policy took on a new, more aggressive nature. Financial 
and military aid for the beleaguered Greek and Turkish governments as a result of the 
Truman doctrine represented only the beginning of America’s efforts. The National 
Security Act of 1947 created a new bureaucracy to oversee U.S. security policies; in one 
of its first policy directives, the newly created National Security Council (NSC) authorized 
tighter coordination of U.S. information activities, by covert means if necessary, to 
counter Soviet efforts. Massive covert intervention in the April 1948 elections in Italy, the 
first test case for new psychological warfare tactics, sought to prevent a Communist take-
over in the wake of the “Czech coup.” The United States provided scarce items to ease the 
constant food shortages in postwar Italy; Italian-Americans engaged in a massive letter-
writing campaign in support of the non-communist parties. Meanwhile the CIA distributed 
anti-communist propaganda materials, supplied anti-communist forces with scarce 
newsprint and spearheaded a massive disinformation campaign.  
The success of the non-communist Christian Democrats convinced many within 
the administration that psychological warfare would be an effective instrument in 
defeating the communist threat. American policy moved from a more defensively 
conceptualized “containment” to become a more aggressive, dynamic effort to subvert the 
emerging Soviet empire – an empire seen as being in a condition of “uneasy stability.” 382  
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In November 1948, President Truman formally approved a new national security 
statement – NSC 20/4 – which aimed at reducing Soviet power, restoring the 
independence of the Eastern European states.383 CIA, in particular its deceptively named 
“Office of Policy Coordination” (OPC) established in September 1948 under the 
leadership of Frank Wisner, along with the State Department and the Defense Department, 
initiated a campaign to weaken Soviet control over Eastern Europe and undermine 
Communist control within the USSR. Most famously, the administration inspired the 
creation of the private Free Europe Committee and covertly help to develop, fund and 
programmatically guide two new radio stations, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. 
The radios would carry psychological warfare beyond what official “Voice of America” 
was able to do, including intelligence gathering and paramilitary functions.  Truman’s 
advisers, most prominently Kennan, were confident that the military balance favored the 
United States and that America’s “preponderant power” could be brought to bear without 
having to fear a Soviet military counterstroke.384  
The apparent success of the Berlin airlift and counter-blockade, along with 
effective countering the all-German reach of the People’s Congress movement, certainly 
reinforced such emboldened thinking. To be sure, Berlin remained a strategic liability as 
much as it was an asset, and though the People’s Congress movement had been effectively 
undermined, the unity issue had not lost its powerful appeal to Germans across all zones. 
With the People’s Congress falling short, Stalin sought to tap into the support for unity 
through a new organization, the “National Front.”385  These efforts came at a time when 
Western allied-German relations had in fact reached a new low over Allied criticism of the 
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draft constitution developed by the Parliamentary Council in Bonn.386  By early 1949 there 
was a widespread sense throughout Germany that the allies had reached a stalemate on the 
unity issue; in the eyes of the Truman administration the situation was vulnerable to 
exploitation by the Soviets and the German communist leaders. 387 As a matter of fact, in 
early 1949 the Soviet Zone turned to renewed emphasis on German unity, and hard-line 
“Sovietizers,” such as Col. Tulpanov, seemed to recede into the background.388  At the 
SED Party Conference in January 1949 Pieck and Ulbricht renounced any suggestion that 
the SBZ was identical to the “people’s democracies” to its east.389 A new SED politburo 
directive also placed new emphasis on the People’s Congress Movement, which, 
Americans noted, “had been dormant until quite recently.”390 Ulbricht reversed earlier 
claims that Berlin was an integral part of the zone, instead declared it the capital of all 
Germany.391 U.S. officials in Berlin warned that it would be “extremely unwise to dismiss 
the present Soviet line lightly on the ground that the Germans are basically anti-Soviet.”392 
American officials worried about increased nationalism and general dissatisfaction 
in Western Germany fed by Western Allied measures, such as the Ruhr agreement, the 
installment of the Military Security Board and western boundary changes.393  East-CDU 
leader Nuschke, widely characterized by U.S. officials as a “handy tool of the Soviet 
Military Administration,”394 visited the West for talks with his western counterparts in 
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early March 1949.395 Although he seemed to have only limited success at first, U.S. 
observers noted that “he may have sowed his seeds in miracle soil.”396 Nuschke met with 
Konrad Adenauer, the president of the constituent Parliamentary Council who was rapidly 
emerging as the leading political figure in the Western zones, to convince the West 
Germans that “the bourgeois parties have a real part to play in Germany’s future,” and that 
such was the case in the Soviet Zone where Nuschke expected the CDU to come off as the 
strongest party in elections in the “near future.”397 Former CDU leader Hermes, who had 
been among the first to be deposed by the Soviets in 1945 (over the land reform issue), 
and former German ambassador Rudolf Nadolny organized a meeting in Bad Godesberg 
which included leading German personalities such as Adenauer and Prittwitz-Gaffron who 
“did not wish to close [the] door completely.”398 Much to the dismay of American 
observers even a generally pro-Western Prittwitz-Gaffron reportedly attacked the 
emerging “Bonn State” as “leading to nationalism and totalitarianism.399 
Moreover, at its sixth session in March 1949, the Volksrat initiated what it called 
“the hand-stretched-out-to-the-west:” in a letter to the Parliamentary Council in Bonn and 
the Economic Council in Frankfurt inviting both bodies to select a delegation to meet in 
the British Zone city Braunschweig with members of the People’s Council for discussion 
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of German issues.400 The meeting between representatives of the People’s Council and 
West Germans took place on May 20 in Hanover but was broken up soon after it opened 
by the British Military Government. While a meeting with a Volksrat delegation was 
unacceptable to many “responsible” West German leaders, the idea of a rapprochement 
between Eastern and Western Germany, American observers surmised, would be welcome 
by various elements in West Germany. West Germans seemed increasingly responsive to 
overtures from the East –“more than could have been imagined a few months ago” -- and 
in growing number appeared eager to revive relations with the SED-controlled authorities 
in the SBZ. 401 A Soviet proposal for unification at the CFM meeting in Paris later that 
month could take advantage of this groundswell of national emotions – and possibly derail 
the establishment of a West German state.  Once again, it was the top U.S. diplomat in 
Germany who alerted Washington that the situation was “sufficiently serious to warrant a 
careful re-evaluation of our present course in Germany.” 402 
How the United States would respond depended to a large degree on how one saw 
the “correlation of forces” in Germany.  The Truman administration was of two minds. In 
August 1948, George Kennan, the driving force behind the new covert action program and 
then head of the Policy Planning Staff, began outlining a “Program A” for Germany which 
envisioned allied troop withdrawals to limited enclaves on the fringes of the country, 
opening up the possibility for free elections and a German administration in charge across 
the four occupation zones. In sharp contrast to his views in 1946-1947 -- but in striking 
similarity to Clay’s views at the time, Kennan now argued that “time is on our side,” and 
that the Berlin crisis had improved the U.S. position to the extent that “we could go much 
further in risking the immediate establishment of a German authority than would have 
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been the case six months or a year ago.” Central to this view was that the airlift and 
counter-blockade had weakened the Soviet hold on eastern Germany, bringing it 
economically to near collapse.403 The Russian opposition to the organization of a western 
German state, Kennan argued, stemmed “from their realization that in the long run a 
communist regime in eastern Germany will not be able to compete successfully with the 
non-Communist regime in western Germany, particularly if the political development of 
the eastern zone along communist lines continues to be disrupted by the presence of 
western forces in Berlin.”404 Hence Kennan suggested a mutual troop withdrawal as a key 
to an all-German solution: “If our troops remain, Russia’s troops remain. If Russia’s 
troops remain, zonal boundaries remain. If zonal boundaries remain, there can be no 
serious talk of a solution of the German problem as a whole.”405 Kennan thus sensed that 
Moscow was acting less from strength than from insecurity, that the blockade was turning 
out to be a decisive failure, and that Western option for a unified Germany provided a 
unique, perhaps final chance to roll back Soviet influence throughout the entire country. 
CIA estimates seemed to support his view: the blockade had resulted in “growing anti-
Soviet sentiments” among eastern Germans, and presented “the basis of a political 
problem” for Moscow, policymakers were told. Soviet-satellite relations were “not 
entirely healthy.” All might have brought about an “exaggerated sense of insecurity to 
Soviet calculations.”406 Other intelligence reports suggested that the SED was becoming 
uneasy with the prospect of the lifting of the blockade: Soviet zones leaders were 
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concerned that the end of the blockade might lead to the elimination of the zonal 
borders.407 
Kennan’s proposals, in particular his call for partial military withdrawal, met 
strong criticism by many within the administration who felt that “it was too late for the 
U.S. to change its position regarding the establishment of a West German government.”408  
Officials in the War and State Departments feared that without a strong U.S. military 
presence in the country, Soviet interference in German internal affairs might bring a pro-
Soviet government in Germany to power, which would make it “probably impossible to 
maintain governments in France and Italy and possibly throughout Europe, oriented 
toward the West.”409 Others felt it was unrealistic to expect the USSR to tolerate a free and 
likely Western-oriented Germany to come into being, and, even if it did, the Soviets would 
likely try “by every device of sabotage and terror to over throw it.”410 Recent tightening of 
control in the SBZ suggested to some that free institutions could only be restored in the 
eastern part of the country “at cost of a civil war.”411 Others yet pointed to the economic 
degradation of eastern Germany which would “make it difficult to achieve an integrated 
sound economy.”412 These officials pressed for continued efforts towards a separate West 
German state did so in the belief that the Western powers first needed to build a position 
of strength by recognizing France’s and Britain’s security interests and securing the 
volatile position in Germany within a Western European framework, if necessary at the 
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expense of preserving German unity. Rather than pursuing an “ideal” program for German 
unity such as “Program A,” they argued that in any future discussions with the USSR, a 
modus vivendi on Germany could be limited to the resumption of normal trade allowing 
the Soviets “at least to stabilize the deteriorating economic conditions in their zone.”413 
Clay, who had so adamantly opposed Kennan’s views in 1946 but since 1948 had 
became the main proponent of the London decisions, now reacted sharply to Kennan’s 
proposals, warning that any all-German solution had to include continued U.S. economic 
assistance and the U.S. security screen had to remain in place, the withdrawal of which 
would “discourage the resistance movements” in the satellite countries.414  Yet Clay 
shared with Kennan the sense that Western support for German unity offered an 
opportunity he had held out since first taking charge in Germany: “Obviously,” Clay 
argued, a unified Germany could be an advantage to the West, and be used as a “spring 
board for penetration into the Satellite countries.”415 Other key foreign policy figures, such 
as Philip Jessup and Republican foreign policy expert John Foster Dulles, agreed with the 
longer-term potential of a unified Germany: Contrary to the “hypercautious” attitudes by 
the French and British (“somewhat unreal in the light of our present strength”), they 
agreed that U.S. policy should, “not rest on our laurels but exert unremitting pressure to 
reduce Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.” In this view, “the Soviets and their German 
stooges have far more to fear from the partial opening of Eastern Germany to Western 
influences than we have from a slightly increased exposure of free Germany to 
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Communist associations.” Germany and Austria might “offer the most favorable fields in 
which to press forward now.”416  
The new Secretary of State Dean Acheson resolved the debate within the 
administration in March 1949 by setting American policy on a double-track that placed 
emphasis on consolidating the West German arrangements while leaving open the 
possibility for quadripartite agreement.417 After a trip to Germany by Kennan that 
convinced him to throw U.S. support behind pro-Western German leaders, Acheson 
signed off on NSC recommendations for the creation of a West German state.418 On 
March 31, he suggested to Truman that the United States push for simplified occupation 
statute, a stronger central government in western Germany and the transfer of authority 
from a military governor to a civilian high commissioner.419 At the Washington talks in 
April, Acheson reassured the British and French foreign ministers of U.S. commitment to 
Western European security. At the same time, the Truman administration began to 
negotiate secretly for an end to the blockade. Discussions at the UN in early May resulted 
in agreement to lift the blockade and convene another Council of Foreign Ministers 
meeting on Germany. 420 
Some within the Truman administration expected that, faced with the imminent 
prospect of the complete exclusion from the heart of Germany and with the “Soviet zone 
milked dry,” the USSR would make a “drastic and dramatic shift” at the CFM. 421 Signs of 
such a shift could be seen in indications, by SED leaders that, in order to achieve an all-
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German solution, they would be willing to give up the “anti-Fascist democratic order,” and 
reach an understanding with “big industrialists and former Nazis.” Suspecting that the 
impending Council of Foreign Ministers session in Paris and the rapid progress in Bonn 
caused the SED to accept “strange bedfellows,” James Riddleberger, Murphy’s successor 
as political adviser, argued, the statements might imply a “radical change in SED 
policy.”422  But the foreign ministers’ meeting failed to produce a break-through. 
Vyshinsky advocated a return to the system of four-power control, an anathema to the 
Western ministers. Instead of an all-German government, he demanded only a council 
composed of representatives of the economic councils in the eastern and western zones. 
The Soviet leaders, Truman was told, “feel that their political position in Germany, and the 
position of their German friends and partisans, to be so weak that they do not dare take a 
chance at this time on the establishment of a real all-German government.” Could it be, 
Kennan wondered, that “the fortunes in the cold war have shifted so fundamentally in the 
past two years that it is now the Russians who are trying to follow with regard to us, a 
policy of firmness and patience and unprovocative containment?”423  But Washington 
shied away from exploiting the “fortunes in the cold war” by a bold offer on German unity 
as Kennan had advocated. All the foreign ministers could agree on in the end was the 
resumption of interzonal trade, to be negotiated by German authorities. Following their 
agreement to the  Basic Law for a Federal Republic, the Western allies proceeded with 
elections to a “Deutscher Bundestag” throughout the western zones in August.424 In 
September, a West German federal government under Adenauer took office, restrained by 
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the reserve powers held by the Three Powers as represented in their newly installed High 
Commissioners. Within weeks, Stalin followed suit. 
 
8. Conclusions 
Contrary to recent scholarship which emphasized early American (and British) 
determination to divide Germany along East-West zonal lines in an effort to assure the 
inclusion of the Western occupation zones (an in particular the heavy-industrial Rhein-
Ruhr complex) in the economic rehabilitation of Western Europe, important forces within 
the Truman administration – led by the U.S. occupation chief, General Lucius Clay, were 
far from “writing off” the Soviet zone. They remained intent on a rollback of Soviet 
powers and control from eastern Germany. To this end, Clay and his Political Adviser, 
Robert Murphy until late 1947 consistently sought quadripartite solutions, in particular on 
establishing central administrative agencies and export-import trade systems that would 
mitigated the trend towards zonal autonomy.  Along with its dogged determination to turn 
western Germany into the motor of West European recovery,  American policy also 
sought to put Moscow on the defensive by all-German solutions that would have 
diminished Soviet control and potentially expanded U.S. influence in the Soviet zone. As 
the Cold War confrontation set in, American strategy of political fait accompli towards a 




From Diplomatic Blockade to Psychological Warfare: 
The United States and East Germany, 1948-1952 
 
1.  Moscow’s “Major Satellite”? The U.S. and the Establishment of the GDR 
The establishment of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) within weeks of the 
founding of the Federal Republic did not take the Truman administration by surprise.425  
Since the KPD-SPD merger in April 1946 U.S. officials had expected – and to a certain 
degree even hoped for – Moscow’s moving ahead with the creation of a separate 
government in the Soviet occupation zone.  The question for American policymakers was 
no whether the USSR would launch its “own” government in Germany, but when, how, 
and most importantly why this would be done. The answers to these questions would no 
doubt have significant implications for the status and security of Berlin and the Western 
zones as they were being merged in a separate government in the West. The developments 
in the Soviet zone, the Truman administration continued to assume, would thus allow for a 
further “reading” of Soviet intentions on the German problem. Would Moscow forego its 
all-German aspirations and turn the Soviet zone into a people’s democracy modeled after 
its eastern neighbors? Or would the eastern government simply offer new, possibly more 
dangerous opportunities for expanding Soviet influence throughout the country, peacefully 
or militarily?  
Initially the impetus behind setting up a centralized German administration in the 
Soviet zones had, in the eyes of U.S. Military Government observers, been to offset the 
“particularist” tendencies in the Länder and provinces in the Soviet Zones and the 
administrative difficulties created by overlapping responsibilities of local and Länder 
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governments.426 Zone-wide administrative bodies would not only resolve administrative 
confusion; it would also allow the SED to assert its authority more effectively over local 
opposition forces. Since the launch of the People’s Congress movement just before the 
inconclusive London Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in December 1947, however, 
Americans suspected that Stalin would use the Congress “as the basis for a possible 
eventual Communist-dominated German government.”427  Given the SED-dominated 
composition of the People’s Council, the Congress movement’s executive committee, 
Truman administration officials figured that such a Soviet creation would be easily 
“recognized as a patent fraud.”428 U.S. intelligence reports noted that “certain top SED-
KPD leaders expect the Volksrat and/or its successor with governmental pretensions may 
eventually be given complete authority in Northeastern Germany.” 429   
To others within OMGUS, however, the German Economic Commission (DWK), 
set up in mid-1947, was a far more likely option.430  In March 1948, U.S. intelligence 
noted that the SBZ administration was stepping up controls at the zonal border, 
purportedly to clamp down on illegal border crossings, and building up para-military units, 
and in May DWK decisions were announced as quasi-governmental ordinances.431 A few 
months later, following similar changes in the western zones, Sokolovsky expanded the 
DWK from 36 to 101 members, leading American officials to wonder whether the Soviet 
Military Government would promote “the oft-rumored East Zone government through the 
instrumentality of the DWK rather than through the Volkskongress.”432  
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But it was the People’s Council’s Constitutional Committee which was authorized 
in May 1948 by the SMA to draft a constitution for a German Democratic Republic. 
Whether and how soon the People’s Congress movement would develop into a 
government remained even to OMGUS specialists “as much of a riddle as ever.”433 In July 
1948, the People’s Council’s Constitutional Committee published a draft of basic 
principles for a German constitution, then was instructed by the People’s Council at its 
August 3 session to have a final formulation ready by mid-September, presumably to be 
adopted at the next meeting of the People’s Congress. Despite public denials by leading 
People’s Council members that the body “planned east German government as answer to 
west German regime,” the fifth session of the People’s Council in late October 1948 
adopted a “German constitution.”434 To many U.S. observers, the activities of the 
committees of the People’s Council already gave that body “all aspects of [an] embryo 
parliament.”435 
What was the reason for these confusing assessments? There was no question for 
Stalin that there would have to be a government in the zone if the West proceeded with is 
plans. “If a separate West German government is created in the west then a government 
will have to be created in Berlin,” the Soviet leader told the SED leaders ordered to 
Moscow in December 1948. If American analysts were getting conflicting signals, it was 
due to the fact that the Kremlin and the SED, in fact, had not resolved how and when to 
establish such a government in the zone. The Soviet government tended to favor the 
People’s Congress with its all-German appeal; Walter Ulbricht argued for an expansion of 
the DWK where SED-dominated parties and mass organizations held a slim majority. The 
discussions culminated during the secret summit in Moscow in December 1948.  
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Countering the Germans’ arguments for a zonal parliament (people’s chamber) based on 
an expanded DWK, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov pointed to the German People’s 
Council “which for some reason the SED leaders never talk about in their proposals.” 
When Pieck replied that the People’s Council was an all-German body, Molotov asked 
whether it was “possible to tie the government to the People’s Council so that the zonal 
nature was not stressed” – something that Stalin himself confirmed was very important: 
“Why couldn’t it be done so that the People’s Council elects the government[?]”436    
Uncertainty about the procedure notwithstanding, to American observers it was 
clear that any eastern government would be set up in Berlin “in view of its great 
psychological implications” as the former Reich capital. They suspected that such a 
government would “definitely have national pretensions,” not be limited to the zone alone. 
437 Such an assumption reflected the near common belief among Western observers that 
Soviet and German communist objectives encompassed all of Germany. Vying for popular 
support throughout Germany, neither the Truman administration nor Moscow and the SED 
were eager to take the blame for openly dividing the country. As the Truman 
administration sought British and French agreement to a West German state in early 1948, 
U.S. officials would have considered an early Soviet announcement of the establishment 
of a German republic an “advantage,” inasmuch as it would force the “Soviets [to] take 
[the] onus of [a] split and destruction [of the] ACC [Allied Control Council].” A Soviet 
move prior to a final Western decision was seen to “clearly shift responsibility to Soviets 
for splitting Germany.” 438 American officials were careful to avoid having the decision 
for a Western solution be seen as writing off German unity and the Soviet zone altogether, 
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even if some internally acknowledged that such was for now the case. After receiving 
instructions to form a West German government in June 1948, the western zone minister 
presidents had impressed Murphy with the fact that their principal concern was not 
provoking the Soviets but the fear that the German population in the Soviet zone of 
occupation might “misunderstand” their actions in that direction.439   
Stalin was eager not to take the blame either: “You don’t want to be the initiators 
of the division of Germany,” Stalin told the SED leadership in late 1948.440 In fact, the 
Soviet leadership held out hopes for appealing to the concerns by Germans on either side 
of the demarcation line: as early as June 1948 Semjonov had urged the SED leaders to 
think about such a manifesto for a “National Front” that would appeal to all Germans, -- 
even, as SED leader Pieck noted, to “for[mer] Nazi” and “for[mer] military” in order to 
serve as a “combat formation” for the “strengthening of the nat[ional] liberation 
struggle.”441 Shortly before the Third People’s Congress Semyonov pressed on the 
German comrades: Stalin wished more than the kind of rhetoric at display at unity and 
peace events:  the SED leaders were asked to go “a step further than the People’s 
Congress.” The SED leaders were unsure where this would lead: “Creation of a Nat[ional] 
Front,” Pieck noted, but “what is this supposed to be?” It had not been “prepared,” the 
suggested propaganda slogans seemed “precarious – Nazi slogan to the outside -- 
poss[ibly] nat[ional] unity front – in inward direction.”442 The Third People’s Congress 
convened in Berlin on May 29, 1949. The following day, the Congress ratified the draft 
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constitution and adopted the “Manifesto to the German People,” calling for a “National 
Front for Unity and a Just Peace.”443  
Nonetheless, further Soviet actions would, the Truman administration 
acknowledged, “to a great extent  […] determined by the further measures which the 
occupation powers take in western Germany.”444 Stalin in fact seems not to have made the 
final decision on setting up the GDR until after the September 15 election of Konrad 
Adenauer as federal chancellor. The following day, a SED leadership delegation -- Pieck, 
Ulbricht, Grotewohl, Oelßner -- arrived in Moscow for yet another meeting to receive 
instructions on the set-up of a Eastern German regime. In their meetings with Soviet 
officials -- Politburo members Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, Molotov, Mikoyan and 
Kaganovich, SMA chief Chuikov and his political adviser Semenov -- Pieck argued that 
the establishment of the GDR had become unavoidable since the “Western occupation 
powers under American leadership [were working] towards a colonization of the West” 
and were — “by integration into the North Atlantic Pact and by the occupation statute” — 
establishing “their absolute rule over the Western population.” In this situation, it was 
necessary to “proceed now in the Soviet occupation zone with the creation of a German 
government.” The new government would be “based on the Potsdam Accords and call for 
the German unity, a peace treaty and national independence.” According to Pieck, the new 
regime would receive additional legitimacy through a “campaign for the uncovering of the 
Western government as organ of the Western powers” which would create a “call by the 
people for a German government.”445   Yet it took another eight days before Stalin gave 
                                                 
443 Riddleberger to Secretary of State, 20 May 1949, NARA, RG 59, 740.00119 Control (Germany)/5-2049; 
Riddleberger to Secretary of State, 30 May 1949, NARA, RG 59, 740.00119 Control (Germany)/5-3049;  
444 Riddleberger to Secretary of State, 7 April 1949, NARA, RG 59, 862.00/3-3149. American officials 
understood this quite well, nearly universally sharing the belief that “much will presumably depend upon 
bizonal and/or trizonal developments.” Memorandum by Brewster Morris,  29 May 1948, enclosed in 
Murphy to Secretary of State, 29 May 1948, NARA, RG 59, 862.00/5-2948. 
445Dietrich Staritz, “Die SED, Stalin und der ‘Aufbau des Sozialismus’ in der DDR. Aus den Akten des Zen-
tralen Parteiarchivs“  Deutschland Archiv, (1991), pp. 685-700. 
142 
the green light on the foundation of the GDR and assured economic support (though to a 
lesser degree than the Germans had asked for). Stalin agreed to the postponement of 
election to the fall of 1950, and advised the SED to facilitate its transformation to a “party 
of a new type” by a purge of its membership. A joint meeting of the Volksrat presidium 
and the Democratic bloc on October 5 demanded unanimously that the Volksrat in an “act 
of national self-defense” reconstitute itself as the Provisional GDR parliament 
(Volkskammer) and elect a “constitutional” government – which it did in a session on 
October 7. Three days later, Moscow endorsed the action, reconstituting the Soviet 
military government as the Soviet Control Commission (SCC) and overtly ceding 
authority to the new government in Berlin, including the establishment of a foreign 
ministry. On October 11, the Volkskammer and the Länderkammer elected Pieck 
president, and the following day, Grotewohl presented his cabinet, with SED functionaries 
occupying key ministries. With the new regime installed, Stalin cabled his blessings, 
hailing the GDR as the “foundation for a united, democratic and peace-loving Germany” 
and a “turning point in European history.”446  
It is important to understand that the division of the country and the establishment 
of the GDR did not give the Truman administration the sense of “advantage” that it had 
hoped for. To be sure, with Konrad Adenauer the West had a thoroughly anti-communist 
leader in place who was committed to Germany’s place in the West, and as the Marshall 
Plan aid took hold growing economic prosperity could be expected to further foster 
political stability of the fledgling Federal Republic. The Communist Party (KPD) 
remained a marginal force in West Germany politically. But as the process of setting up 
the German Democratic Republic had unfolded under their eyes, American observers were 
left to conclude that ehe USSR’s chief aim in Germany remained “the conquest of the 
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whole nation,” HICOG Soviet affairs specialist David Mark reiterated the prevailing view 
in terms heavily connoting the warlike intentions ascribed to Moscow.447 Discounting the 
idea that the Soviet Union would ever accept a neutralized Germany prevented from 
threatening Soviet security or a non-militarized Germany along Western democratic lines, 
Mark strongly suggested that the Soviets would be “satisfied with nothing less than a 
Bolshevized Germany, within the Soviet satellite orbit, and serving as a springboard for 
the communization of the rest of Western Europe.”448  From Moscow, Ambassador 
Alexander Kirk, in equally martial terms, endorsed the view that the Kremlin regarded the 
eastern zone primarily as a strategic base for conquest, “not only of Berlin, but also [of 
the] far-more important western zones, including [the] key Ruhr area” and the “eventual 
domination of all of Europe.”449 To Kirk, the set-up of the GDR with its claim for all-
German representation revealed the manner in which the Kremlin had endeavored “to ride 
two horses at once: the rapid communization of the Soviet zone; and the capture of all [of] 
Germany.”450 The latter objective had prevented the Soviets from proceeding as rapidly 
and radically in their own zone as “they would undoubtedly liked to have done.”451  The 
new High Commissioner John J. McCloy warned Washington that division had not settled 
the situation in Germany: they were in fact only witnessing the next phase in the “struggle 
for the soul of Faust.” The creation of the GDR, said McCloy, had injected a “new threat” 
into postwar German politics, and at a minimum the Soviets had acquired important new 
propaganda tools. They could exploit the appeal of Berlin as the capital of the new 
Germany in the East, and the potential for trade with Germany’s eastern neighbors, the 
country’s traditional trade outlet, compared favorably with the problems the Federal 
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Republic was facing in regaining markets in the West. East Germany would not be just 
another Soviet “vassal state:” the Soviets, McCloy surmised, might “be planning to make 
East Germany their major satellite.”452 
Within weeks the new East German government indeed renewed earlier all-
German unity campaigns with added vigor. In February 1950, the new GDR Foreign 
Minister Georg Dertinger publicly demanded the immediate conclusion of a peace treaty 
with a united Germany and described the GDR as the “trustee of the entire German 
people.”  The same month, the People’s Congress movement formally reconstituted itself 
as the “National Front,” proclaiming the “Program of the National Front of the Democratic 
Germany.” Denouncing the West, the National Front platform demanded the reunification 
of Germany through a “national plebiscite,” the termination of the occupation statute in 
West Germany, and the expansion of trade with the Soviet Union and the other people’s 
democracies. The SED also decided to have the Free German Youth (FDJ) stage a mass 
youth rally in Berlin, the Deutschlandtreffen, in late May. 
These activities notwithstanding, Stalin demanded even greater focus on all-
German unity from the SED. During a trip to Moscow in early May 1950, he scolded SED 
leaders Pieck, Grotewohl and Ulbricht for their lack of emphasis on all-German activities. 
The Soviet leadership ordered the SED regime to strengthen its activities in the West. On 
its return to the SED Politburo adopted a self-critical resolution, admitting that the party 
was “insufficiently oriented towards all-German tasks.” Given that “the main task is the 
development of an all-German policy, the leading organs of the party must not limit 
themselves to their duties in the GDR.”453  Increased efforts to mobilize the West Germans 
against rearmament and for unity became the focal point of the SED’s Third Party Plenum 
in July 1950. A telegram from the convention to Stalin called upon the SED to “develop 
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even more strongly that heretofore an all-German policy of struggle for the preservation 
and support of peace, for the united, and independent democratic German Republic.”  
Echoing the Soviet leader, Pieck asked his party to oppose “certain circles within our 
Party” that “limited their policy and work merely to the territory of our Republic and 
neglected the all-German tasks.” In the same vein, Grotewohl proclaimed that “we cannot 
be content with the successes of the German Democratic Republic alone: it has to be all of 
Germany.”454 
 
2. “Ideological Rollback:” Defining the Cold War Discourse in Germany 
For McCloy, the establishment of two competing German regimes had, if anything, 
heightened the sense of confrontation in Germany – and a sense of vulnerability on the 
part of the West. The way the founding of the GDR had been staged was only one reason 
for the profound sense of uncertainty engulfing McCloy and his colleagues at the U.S. 
High Commission. Fears that with the Communist-run state in Germany Stalin had 
acquired a new instrument for pursuing his larger goals in this most important of Cold War 
battlegrounds fed into increasingly gloomy assessments of the “worldwide correlation of 
forces” that to many seemed to have shifted in favor of the USSR. 1950 The Soviet 
Union’s first successful nuclear bomb test and the victory of the Chinese Communists in 
the Chinese civil war in 1949 heightened anxieties about the Soviet Union’s next moves in 
Europe, culminating in the near apocalyptic thinking about World War III that infused 
much of the discussion in Washington in early 1950.  
American officials in Berlin quickly became preoccupied with trying to anticipate 
the Soviet “master plan” for using the GDR as a “geographic base and its organized 
political, economic and military resources as instruments to dislodge the Western Allies 
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and their sponsored German governments from Western Germany and Berlin.”455 
Mirroring the pervasive fears of Soviet plans for launching the war with the West – 
notions that crystallized in “NSC-68” drafted in April, U.S. analysts increasingly assumed 
that the Soviets were operating according to a specific timetable. This timetable was 
presumably determined by Marxist preconceptions (such as the inevitable economic crisis 
in the West), internal developments in the GDR, and the worldwide “correlation of 
forces.” 1950 then would be a decisive year: All events in the GDR and Berlin, High 
Commission officials argued, as well as all temporary and permanent programs would be 
“exploited, designed and adapted” to serve National Front objectives.  
HICOG’s GDR watchers warned that “if the opportunity is ever judged ripe, 
organized mobs will be directed against Western Allied installations.”456  This was 
particularly true for Berlin: Soviet plans, they pointed out, called “for the elimination of 
the ‘imperialistic bridgehead,’ and all SED and mass organization members [were] to give 
priority to this task.” The planned May Day Rally in East Berlin was predicted to be ‘a 
rehearsal and pre-test for the Youth Rally on May 28, probing the degree of West Sector 
support and resistance.” The Youth Rally was regarded “as the first of a series of attempts 
(…) to organize [the] Germans [for] so-called ‘direct action,’” i.e. the use of force against 
the Western Allies and the Western sector city government to “dislodge them from 
Berlin.” The SED might “possibly send or permit organized or mob action against West 
Berlin installations” and “permit, encourage or direct provocation to street fighting in 
West Berlin in order to precipitate repressive police action, which would be used as an 
excuse for further attack.”  The National Front Congress, the SED Party Congress in July, 
the announcement of the completion of the Two-Year Economic Plan on Activists’ Day 
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(October 13), and the general elections on October 15 would provide additional stages in a 
timetable for increased propaganda and agitation for the National Front. In view of 
Dertinger’s demands for peace treaty as well as the impact of formal GDR independence 
and Soviet troop withdrawal on the West German public, HICOG officials, finally, 
considered a separate peace treaty between the USSR and the East German regime a 
serious possibility during 1950.457 
Long-term developments too seemed to favor the GDR: HICOG officials predicted 
that the Soviets would, during 1950, expand the “alert police,” estimated then at some 
50,000 troops. Though they remained unsure whether the ultimate purpose of these forces 
would be the GDR counterpart to the Soviet state security or the nucleus for a future army, 
these units “might conceivably (probably in disguise) play some part in the planned 
conquest of all Berlin.”458 Perhaps most disconcerting were the long-term effects of the 
communization of the East German schooling system, “operating on the most vulnerable 
portion of the population.” With continued Soviet control, “a generation of youth will be 
bred which will in large majority sympathize with communist objectives and policies, and 
which will supply willing manpower for army, police, industry and agriculture.” The 
existence of a “great mass of indoctrinated youth in the East” would provide “exceptional 
opportunities” for Communist penetration of a future united Germany.459  
Such dire prediction suggested that it more would required than the economic and 
political stabilization and integration of Western Germany set in motion with the Marshall 
Plan and the establishment of the Bonn Republic. The United States could not simply rely 
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on the notion that East Germany would one day succumb to the “magnet effect” of a free 
and prospering Federal Republic. West Germany’s very ideological identification with the 
West, McCloy sensed, was at stake in view of the powerful national yearning for national 
unity and the professed willingness from the East to instrumentalize these deep-seated 
sentiments throughout Germany to its advantage. For the Truman administration, the 
perceived threat in Germany was thus as much ideological as military in nature; military 
security was intrinsically linked to the ideological challenge posed by the East: security 
concerns fed into German anxieties about the country’s division and future. 
The Soviet offensive, American policymakers hence recognized, required more 
than a military response. Countering the Soviet/East German challenge resulted in a 
massive effort to inoculate the Federal Republic ideologically.460 But even that would not 
suffice: U.S. officials in Germany were convinced that it would take nothing short of a 
Western counteroffensive, one that would seek to directly influence the “hearts and 
minds” of the Germans in East (and West) and undermine Moscow’s hold on its “base” in 
the heart of Europe. In their thinking, U.S. officials in Germany mirrored broader concerns 
within the Truman administration over Moscow’s global ideological offensive heralded in 
with the establishment of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in September 
1947. And just as the administration in Washington sought to marshal new resources and 
instruments as it came to understand the emerging confrontation with the Soviet Union to 
be ideological as much as military-strategic in nature, McCloy sought to expand his “Cold 
War apparatus.”  
In Washington, the “National Security Act” had led to the creation in 1947-1948 a 
new top decision-making body for national security policy, the National Security Council: 
it would coordinate among the various national security departments (including the newly 
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created Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency). With one of its first 
policy guidelines, NSC-4 , the National Security Council had acknowledged the need for a 
more aggressive and integrated approach to influencing public opinion abroad, both in the 
West as beyond the Iron Curtain. NSC-4 demanded the “immediate strengthening and 
coordination of all foreign information measures of the US government designed to 
influence attitudes in a direction favorable to the attainment of its objectives and to 
counteract effects of anti-US propaganda.”461 While the State Department was responsible 
for these overt propaganda measures, the new CIA was given charge of a broad array of 
covert measures “to counteract Soviet or Soviet inspired activities which constitute a 
threat to world peace and security, or are designed to discredit and defeat the United States 
in its endeavors to promote world peace and security.”462  Within months, NSC directive 
20/4 would further expand the CIA’s authority to undermine the Kremlin through a broad 
psychological warfare strategy. 
McCloy had been involved in the process in Washington before being appointed 
by Truman to head the U.S. High Commission in Germany. He now set out to create a 
“NSC” for HICOG’s sprawling activities. In February 1950, McCloy set-up a “Political 
and Economic Projects Committee” (PEPCO). Composed of officials from the political, 
economic, public affairs and intelligence branches of HICOG, the committee oversaw the 
coordination of HICOG operations. PEPCO was to advise him on Soviet and East German 
activities with the aim of anticipating, countering and frustrating potential and actual 
moves by the East.463 In effect, PEPCO became the operational and intelligence 
headquarters for a more aggressive approach towards the GDR. A few weeks later, a 
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“Soviet Zone Reporting and Programming Office” was established in Berlin. Headed by 
Foreign Service officer George Morgan and drawing its personnel from the HICOG Berlin 
Element’s Political Affairs Division and the economic and intelligence offices of HICOG 
in Frankfurt, the “Eastern Affairs Division,” or Eastern Element, as it was eventually 
called, bore primary responsibility for political and economic reporting and studies on the 
Soviet Zone and the preparation of policy and programs vis-à-vis the USSR in Germany 
designed by PEPCO.464 
The United States also cooperated with—and in part funded—a number of 
anticommunist organizations in West Germany and the Western sectors in Berlin, such as 
the Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit (KGU), the Untersuchungsausschuss 
freiheitlicher Juristen (UfF), and the east bureaus of the West German political parties, in 
particular the SPD Ostbureau.465 RIAS took on increasing significance in tangibly 
reaching many East Germans. Controlled by HICOG but staffed mainly with German 
personnel, RIAS grew ever more popular in the GDR:  U.S. intelligence agents estimated 
that more than 70 percent of East Germans listened on a regular basis.466  Widely regarded 
as “the only source of objective news available to the [GDR] population,”467 RIAS, as 
McCloy, put it, constituted “the spiritual and psychological center of resistance in a 
Communist-dominated, blacked-out area” and “poison to the Communists.”468 
But much to the frustration of the administration, the West German political class, 
while eager to claim its right as a sole representative of the German people, was far less 
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interested in actively opposing the threat from the East. The Federal Republic appeared to 
HICOG officials “too much on the defensive” against the Eastern unity propaganda.” The 
State Department tried to impress West German officials with the need for a more active 
policy on the reunification issue. McCloy himself repeatedly insisted that “we must get the 
western Germans more on the offensive against the eastern Germans,” but had to admit 
that Adenauer was “not interested in this question.”469  Headed by former Soviet Zone 
CDU chief Josef Kaiser, the newly created “Ministry of All-German Affairs” seemed to 
lack authority, funding and ambition. Even SPD leader Kurt Schumacher, whose party still 
had extensive ties to former Social Democrats in the East, had little to suggest other than 
that policy towards the GDR had to be planned on a long-term basis. Towards HICOG, 
Schumacher argued that is was essential to keep up the courage of the masses and “make 
them feel that they had something to hope for.”  But HICOG officials found it difficult to 
“keep him on p[oin]t, esp[ecially] as to what actually might be done re[garding the] 
E[astern] Zone.”470 Internally, HICOG officials had to admit that in the months following 
the founding of the GDR, U.S. efforts had themselves been “almost exclusively of a 
defensive character.”471  
McCloy hoped that the new organizational set-up within HICOG would allow him 
to take a more integrated and aggressive approach that would address the Germans in the 
east and challenge the SED regime on its territory. Early deliberations within the U.S. 
High Commissioner’s office in late 1949 had brought out potential elements of a more 
active policy that appealed directly to the East German population. A first plan, aptly 
named “Touchback,” had called for a variety of measures that would impede Sovietization 
efforts in the GDR by “maintaining the morale and will to passive resistance among the 
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great majority of anti-Soviet East Germans.”  Through radio and “coordinated clandestine 
printed material distribution” Western information media were to aim at keeping the East 
German population informed of conditions in the West, “hammering at Soviet propaganda 
myths” and repeating the West’s desire for German unification through free elections. In 
addition to ensuring Berlin’s role as a “model and prosperous Western pocket deep within 
the Soviet Zone,” U.S. presence in Berlin would “facilitate all Western Allied operations 
behind the Iron Curtain.”472 Yet the plan had lacked effective coordination and 
implementation.  
Far more concerted had been the initial effort to assure the global non-recognition 
of the new Communist regime in Eastern Germany. On October 10, 1949, the Allied High 
Commission called the “so-called government of the People’s Republic of Germany” an 
“artificial creation” of an assembly that had “no mandate for this purpose.” Pointing to the 
postponement of the elections for a constituent assembly “to insure that the elections when 
they are held shall follow the pattern already set in other satellite states,” the AHC 
declared that “this so-called government which is devoid of any legal basis and has 
determined to evade an appeal to the electorate has no title to present Eastern Germany.” It 
had an “even smaller claim to speak in the name of Germany as a whole.”473 Meeting in 
Paris in the next month, the Western allies firmed up the common line toward the GDR: 
they would neither recognize the GDR diplomatically nor take any actions that would 
imply recognition: they would be “opposed, in present circumstances, to de jure or de 
facto recognition of ‘The German Democratic Republic’” --  called on other governments 
to adopt a similar attitude.474 
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The unison Western response to the set up of the GDR was a remarkable 
achievement, and it reflected the extent to which the second German state was perceived 
as threatening Western efforts in Europe. After all, despite grandiose declarations about 
the “liberated” Europe, in particular the fate of Poland’s and its neighbors only a few years 
earlier, Washington had quickly resigned itself to communist-led governments in Warsaw 
and other Central European capitals. While scaling back diplomatic representation, the 
Truman administration had not denied the other emerging Soviet “satellites” -- the 
fledgling Polish government nor its allies in Prague, Budapest or Bucharest -- their 
legitimacy as an actor in the international arena.  The joint diplomatic blockade of East 
Germany also contrasted with the divided Western response towards the other new 
communist state established in 1949 -- the People’s Republic of China. The Truman 
administration had chosen to back the claim by Chiang-kai Shek’s Nationalists, banished 
to the island of Formosa following their defeat at the hands Mao Zedong’s communist 
forces, that the Kuomindang represented the only legal government of China. But 
unwilling to negate the political reality of the “new China” and forgo a major market, the 
British government had recognized the PRC on January 5, 1950.  
On East German recognition, however, Washington and its European allies saw 
eye to eye. While Washington alerted Western hemisphere and Marshall Plan partner 
governments in Europe to U.S. interests in this matter, the Attlee government pressed its 
Commonwealth to adopt a similar attitude. U.S. diplomats assiduously sought to undercut 
an East German trade mission headed for Latin America in December 1949, and actively 
shored up support for non-recognition among the European neutrals, all of whom had 
stakes in East Germany – the existence of 5,000 Swiss residents in the GDR in the case of 
Switzerland, the dependence on East German rail lines in the case of Sweden and close 
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trade ties to the Baltic coast in the case of Finland. They were helped by the often 
dilettantish steps of the new East German government, which in categorical terms 
demanded recognition as a prerequisite to doing business.475 
The American-led “diplomatic blockade” denied the GDR international legitimacy, 
and would do so for well over two decades. Yet non-recognition alone, such the 
widespread feeling among HICOG’s cold warriors, would not suffice to regain the 
initiative in Germany. Critical to seizing that initiative was the West’s ability to define the 
public discourse on the very central issue of the day: German unity. The formula HICOG 
planners came up with was a simple as it was genial: demanding free elections as the basis 
for German reunification. Not only was the call for free elections firmly grounded in 
historical tradition and consistent with the American policy since the end of World War II: 
Free all-German elections, so the assumption was, would assure the defeat of  communism 
at the polls and hence be central to effect unification on Western terms. Calling for such 
elections would  “place the United States clearly on record as being in favor of German 
unification” and – presuming Soviet opposition to the idea -- “expose the insincerity of the 
Soviet and East German ‘National Front’ program” for German unity. More than any other 
measure, free elections, HICOG planners calculated, would capture the imagination of the 
East German population (the West Germans had, after all, gone though a series of 
democratic elections), counter the East German “elections” scheduled for October 1950, 
and put the SED on the defensive. Eager to assure that the project appealed to the Germans 
in the Soviet zone, PEPCO insisted that the proposal indicate that the all-German elections 
pave the way towards an all-German constituent assembly in which the East Germans 
could participate in the framing of a new German constitution.  
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McCloy’s call for free elections and German unity, initially formulated at a press 
conference on January 3 and later substantiated at a press conference on February 28, 
came off with apparent success. While there is little evidence of how the proposal was 
received in Eastern Germany, HICOG analysts felt that it had “tapped a mainspring of 
German feeling” which, “if properly directed,” could “delay and possibly disrupt Soviet 
plans and timetable for East Germany.”476  Much of the West German public indeed 
reacted enthusiastically to the proposal, and on March 22, the Bundestag seconded  
McCloy’s initiative by adopting a resolution that called for all-German elections to a 
National Constitutional Assembly under the control of the Four Powers or the UN.  
Two days after the Bundestag proposal, PEPCO began to consider, as part of the 
campaign for all-German elections, the “systematic barrage via all U.S. media of 
propaganda at the Soviet Zone.” In early April, moreover, HICOG’s Eastern Element 
embarked upon developing an “all-inclusive propaganda outline for the next six months,” 
up to the October elections in the GDR. The major part of this effort would be carried out 
through RIAS, though clandestine distribution to the GDR was envisioned as well. In 
contrast the preceding months when West German and Berlin media had given 
considerable play to the “free elections” theme for one or two days and then allowed the 
story to be dropped, Eastern Element officials now argued that “this line must be 
hammered until it comes as naturally to every German’s mind as eating.” At least one five 
minute daily radio broadcast on RIAS and other West German radio stations was to 
feature “a new angle of this subject,” in addition to “spot announcements of suitable 
slogans during the station breaks throughout the broadcasting period. Similarly, with the 
U.S.-controlled Neue Zeitung taking the lead, all West Berlin and some West German 
newspapers “must at least print  some election, unification, or anti-Communist slogan near 
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the masthead” on a daily basis. Topping off the propaganda scheme, David Mark of 
Eastern Element recommended that signs (some of them flashing electric signs) with 
election and unification slogans be set up along the inner-German demarcation line, 
highway exits and sector entries, along with other slogans such as “You can relax now; 
you are in an area of freedom and democracy.”477  PEPCO approved the proposals in mid-
April; by early May, a special branch within HICOG Berlin’s Office of Public Affairs was 
set up to coordinate these propaganda efforts.478 
Yet the project had raised fundamental concerns about the basic goals of American 
policy – and about the appropriate relationship between policy and propaganda.  Surprised 
by the initiative, Federal Chancellor Adenauer, for one, was keenly sensitive to any 
unilateral actions on the part of the Allies, fearful that a deal might be struck over the 
heads of the Germans. In Washington, the new Secretary of State Dean Acheson warned 
McCloy that it might be dangerous to proceed “too far along [the] road of Ger[man] unity 
based on free elections alone.”479  State Department officials were worried that other 
conditions, such as the elimination of the GDR alert forces, would have to be attached to 
the reunification procedure to assure an outcome compatible with Western security 
interests. Even some of McCloy’s close advisors were uncertain about the ultima ratio of 
American policy: “Is it firm U.S. policy to favor and now press for a unified Germany? 
(...)  Is it now time to arouse the hopes of the East Germans? Should we take steps to 
encourage East Germans to resist Sovietization?”480  
McCloy faced yet another dilemma: if the U.S. failed to follow up his statement 
with a concrete plan for unification, German opinion in East and West would likely  
conclude that the initial move had lacked sincerity on the part of the United States. Yet the 
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U.S. proposals were unlikely to force any change in Soviet policy in Germany, and would 
hence be “essentially a propaganda move on our part.” The predicament of any further 
move on German unification was that “to be successful it must not appear as such.”481     
HICOG did endorse a practical follow-up measure that did not smack of 
propaganda: the Allied High Commission should negotiate a nationwide electoral law with 
the Soviet Control Commission. This proposal, however, elicited little enthusiasm from 
either London nor Paris. Suspecting that particularly the French would drag their feet on 
any issue that would raise the specter of unification, HICOG officials were prepared to 
engage in “a unilateral propaganda campaign which would keep the issue alive.”482 They 
agreed that even a joint psychological warfare campaign with the British was out of 
question for now: any “joint program might handicap our freedom of action without 
according substantial reward.”483  In the end, the Western foreign ministers did endorse 
McCloy’s initiative in late May, supporting the Bundestag’s call for holding elections to a 
national assembly, though not without important stipulations: German unity was to be 
based on the principles of free elections, freedom of movement and parties, as well as 
economic unity, and the foreign ministers agreed that the elimination of all paramilitary 
troops had to be a precondition for free elections. On May 25, the three Western High 
Commissioners proposed to their Soviet counterpart to start with the preparations of an 
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3. Preventing “Roll up:” The United States and the 1950 FDJ Deutschlandtreffen in 
Berlin 
McCloy’s free elections initiative was soon overshadowed by East German preparations 
for the Deutschlandtreffen, a mass youth rally in Berlin planned by the SED-dominated 
Free German Youth for Whitsuntide. The Soviet-licensed press had given the rally 
considerable prominence since December 1949, and by early 1950 a major propaganda 
build-up was under way.  The Deutschlandtreffen would provide an impressive 
soundboard for SED propaganda, demonstrate the “superiority” of the GDR and 
dramatically underscore the GDR’s all-German appeal.484  The FDJ’s ambitious young 
leader, Erich Honecker, was eager to demonstrate the fighting force his organization could 
bring to bear in the East-West confrontation. Under the slogan “The Free German Youth 
invades Berlin,” Honecker envisioned thousands of FDJ members --dressed in the widely 
recognized blue FDJ uniforms -- crossing the sector border and marching in several 
columns into the West.485  
Within weeks American officials – as well as their British and French co-
occupants –  grew suspicious that the GDR planned to use the Deutschlandtreffen as a 
major part in the Soviet-East German campaign “to roll up the Western imperialist 
bridgehead in Berlin.”486 Western intelligence agencies soon confirmed that the rally 
might escalate into a major military crisis: In January, the U.S. European Command 
(EUCOM) reported that the FDJ rally was “specifically directed [against the] west[ern] 
sectors,” which tied in “with continuing Soviet efforts [to] make [the] allied position [in] 
Berlin untenable and consistent with Communist practice [of] provoking riots for political 
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advantage.”487 The planned demonstration, according to a further EUCOM report, would 
include the Western sectors of Berlin, “with or without the permission of the Western 
Sector authorities.”488  “Reliable” sources reported that the FDJ Central Council was 
planning to send large groups of 10-12,000 well-trained FDJ members to the West as 
“blitz groups” for agitation and demonstration purposes. The agitation supposedly 
included “throwing of stones at shop windows containing American goods.” One member 
at the Council meeting allegedly remarked that a “certain number of dead must be 
expected.”489 Other sources indicated that the Whitsuntide Rally would be used to 
“instruct and train the youth in East Germany and Berlin in the art of cold revolution,” 
which would produce “what the blockade failed to achieve, namely a unified Berlin under 
a communist hegemony.”490 Further aggravating the potential for armed conflict was the 
news that the GDR’s para-military police would participate in the rally, “confirmed” by 
well-placed U.S. sources within the FDJ’s leadership in late February.”491 By mid-March, 
HICOG’s Office of Intelligence even predicted that alert police units would participate on 
a large scale.492 Most everyone within HICOG suspected that Moscow was behind the 
move, and an intelligence report on the proceedings of the January 31 FDJ Central Council 
meeting seemed to confirm that assumption: Honecker apparently stated that he already 
had received instructions from Moscow that the Deutschlandtreffen would be carried out 
in a military manner.”493  
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To be sure, reports on communist strong-arm tactics were “often conflicting,” and 
HICOG officials suspected that that “may well be intentional.”494 But even if the SED was 
not planning for organized large-scale violence during the mass rally, visions of thousands 
of FDJ youth streaming into the western sectors took their toll on the morale of West 
Berliners. Reflecting the increasing hysteria among West Berlin public opinion, SPD 
leader Kurt Schumacher demanded in March that U.S. tanks should be readied to defend 
the city against a potential mass invasion by the Free German Youth.495 Rather than giving 
the FSJ efforts greater credence, the Western commandants initially resolved  to “play 
down this subject at the present time and for as long as possible” in order to avoid further 
deterioration of morale.496 A nine-member “Standing Action Committee,” appointed by 
the commandants, took charge of coordinating information and developing 
countermeasures. One of the first issues the committee saw itself confronted with was a 
letter from the FDJ leadership asking for permission to use the Olympic Stadium in the 
Western sectors for the rally.497  Not until March 2 did the Commandants decide to 
prohibit publicly all organized marches and all demonstrations in the Western sectors on 
the part of the FDJ and to turn down the FDJ request. Individual FDJ members would still 
be allowed to enter the Western sectors; “no Chinese wall” would be set up along the 
Western Sector boundaries. Eager to avoid escalating the siege mentality in Berlin, 
HICOG also decided early on that the first line of defense in the western sectors would be 
the West Berlin police and that life there should be “as normal as possible during 
Whitsuntide.” 498  
But as the rally drew closer, preparations for a violent invasion were set in 
motion.The Western city commandants agreed in mid-March to increase the West Berlin 
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police force permanently by 2,000 men (to overall 12,000 men) and authorize the use of 
tear gas, smoke bombs, gas masks and water throwers. Auxiliary units made up out of 
deputized and uniformed members of the anti-communist Independent Union Organization 
(UGO) would reinforce regular West Berlin Berlin police in sensitive spots.499  
Occupation troops were readied as the “second line of law and order,” in case the German 
police would be overwhelmed. Plans anticipated having 6,000-7,000 Allied military 
effectives in Berlin during the event. Additionally, three battalions would be readied to 
reinforce the Allied forces in Berlin by air, and joint Allied maneuvers in the Hanover area 
would allow for a “road march over the autobahn to Berlin.” 75,000 rounds of canister 
were available in the Western zones for use in Berlin. Plans also called for a unified 
command and communications system covering West Berlin.500  The State Department, 
moreover, instructed the Allied Combined Travel Board, in charge of authorizing travel to 
East Germany, to “make [a] special effort” to deny entry permits to some 20,000 West 
German youths expected to attend, promising that it would take “all possible steps to 
prevent American youths from participating” in the meeting.501  Propaganda efforts were 
primarily aimed at fortifying West Berlin and German opinion; attracting and subverting 
FDJ contingents was deemed too risky.502 
The problem, Western officials realized, was as much psychological as military in 
nature. Top echelons of the British High Commission blamed the purported East German 
plans on the West’s abandonment of the German Railway Administrative Building after 
East German forces had seized it the preceding January. The West’s reaction had 
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“undoubtedly been interpreted as a sign of weakness and may correspondingly encourage 
the belief that violent action might not be met with firmness.”503 Offering a glimpse of 
what might be expected on a much larger scale, 3,000 FDJ functionaries met in East Berlin 
on March 1 under the slogan “Berlin must be ours.”504  On the night of March 2, three 
torchlight parades took place in the Soviet sector, and the following night, about 500 FDJ 
youth, accompanied by Volkspolizei and loudspeakers, held speeches along the border 
with the U.S. sector, without, however, crossing the borderline. Worried that the FDJ 
meeting would further undercut West Berlin morale, McCloy increasingly became “very 
keen on the propaganda side being properly organized,” even considered flying in a 
propaganda or psychological warfare expert to assist HICOG and contemplated the 
necessity of a “fairly substantial Deutschmark fund for use in this way.”505  
McCloy was not the only one within the Truman administration increasingly 
alarmed by the prospect of the FDJ rally. Secretary Acheson expressed himself “deeply 
concerned” over the Deutschlandtreffen during McCloy’s visit to Washington later that 
month.506 Acheson’s concerns prompted a HICOG — State Department planning meeting 
to agree on further military as well as propaganda measures that would demonstrate to the 
West Berlin public that the West was determined to withstand the blue-shirt onslaught. 
Throwing aside earlier cautions, the United States would seek to  undermine FDJ morale 
and discourage participation in the Deutschlandtreffen by playing on the fears of parents 
of the Young Pioneers as to what might happen if things spiraled out of control. Among 
other measures, the State Department authorized covert “confusion broadcasts” (which 
would announce that the rally had been called off) and considered a number of counter-
attractions:  The Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) would furnish support up 
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to DM 1 million for sports events, air displays, automobile shows and musical attractions 
that would divert attention from the FDJ gathering. In early April, the Western Allied 
Commandants in Berlin stocked up their budget for Allied propaganda efforts, which 
involved the distribution of some 60,000 letters and 400,000 leaflets in the Soviet sector 
and the GDR.507 They also agreed to provide extra equipment such as gas masks and 
grenades as well as some DM 5,000 to West Berlin organizations “for secret intelligence 
work in obtaining information re Soviet sector preparations.”508 
By mid-April key officials within the Truman administration were wondering 
whether they had an international crisis of major proportions on their hand. Ambassador-
at-large Philip C. Jessup, who had played a central role in resolving the first Berlin Crisis, 
was now arguing for alerting the U.N. Security Council regarding the situation in 
Berlin.509  A few days later journalist Walter Lippmann called on the administration to 
appeal to the Soviets to cooperate with the United States in preventing violence and 
bloodshed, and if such an appeal proved unsuccessful, to place the U.N. Security Council 
on formal notice that there was a threat to the peace in Berlin. On April 28, Army 
Secretary Frank Pace raised the Berlin rally and the projected courses of action for 
discussion at the National Security Council, “pointing up the possibilities of international 
difficulties that might result from this action, seeking approval of the progressive 
application of military measures as planned (…).”510       
While U.S. policymakers at the highest levels of the national security apparatus in 
Washington were discussing how to react to a potential invasion of West Berlin that was 
presumed to be Soviet-inspired, Honecker’s ambitious plans deflated in the face of Soviet 
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objections to the military overtones of the event. Nor had it apparently escaped the Soviet 
government that the Western powers had reinforced their garrisons in Spandau and 
Zehlendorf. On April 6, SED party leader Wilhelm Pieck apparently was admonished by 
Soviet High Commissioner Chuikov to tone down the “exaggerated propaganda.”511 Later 
that month, Honecker saw himself in the line of fire as Moscow officials “at the highest 
levels” expressed their annoyance over the crisis created by the militant plans for the 
Deutschlandtreffen. Soviet youth officers present at the Central Council chastised 
Honecker and harshly criticized the invasion project as a “circus” and the East German 
propaganda as “primitive:” It had only fed the cause of the warmongers in the West. Plans 
for marches to the western sectors were cancelled: not a single FDJ member was to go 
west.512  Later that month Honecker proclaimed in the FDJ journal Junge Welt that the 
youth organization had “no intention of forcing [its] way into the Western sectors as high 
commissioners and their German lackeys wish.” The goal, Honecker argued, was “to win 
the hearts of the Berliners over to [the] new German youth and the national front of [a] 
democratic Germany.”513  
It is uncertain whether Stalin raised similar concerns with Ulbricht when the SED 
leader headed a SED delegation to Moscow in early May. Certainly plans for the 
Deutschlandtreffen were not on the agenda for the Germans’ nightly session with the 
vozhd,514 With fresh memories of the Berlin blockade debacle, it is unlikely that Stalin 
was intent on launching into another crisis over Berlin. More importantly, the FDJ’s 
militant approach was out of sync with Stalin’s priorities in Germany. Rather than being 
focused on consolidating SED control, the Soviet leader reproached the East Germans for 
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lacking commitment to the all-German tasks and goals.515  Stalin was convinced that the 
new German state had the potential to hold considerable sway over segments of West 
German society – a view shared by many within the Truman administration. It was 
precisely these segments – West Germany’s neutralist and progressive “bourgeois” circles 
– that Honecker’s provocative plans would deter from cooperation with the GDR.  
By early May intelligence and diplomatic channels had confirmed this turn of 
events in Washington. HICOG  informed the administration that the mass rally would be a 
propaganda effort: “barring some major change in the situation, the Commies will not 
attempt major, organized parades and demonstrations in [West] Berlin during Whitsun.” 
Rather than trying to “take over the West Sectors,” the GDR’s intention would be to 
mount the “most impressive possible mass demonstration and spectacle in the East 
Sector.”516 The Army leadership agreed: the threat posed by the rally was now “primarily 
a political one.”517 Reassured and relieved, Truman could tell the NSC on May 4 that he 
“felt the necessary precautions were being taken.”518 
In the zero-sum thinking so prevalent in the Truman administration’s foreign 
policy approach at the time, the sudden change of course in East Berlin was seen as 
holding the potential for new, unexpected problems: With the threat of violence 
considerably lessened, U.S. officials worried, West Berliners might now be attracted to the 
rally activities in East Berlin and venture in massive numbers into the Soviet sector, 
possibly providing the East Germans with a propaganda victory in turn. “Any such 
exodus” was therefore “regarded as undesirable” in the eyes of the administration. PEPCO 
now considered hastily arranging a football match in the Olympic stadium, a bicycle race 
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along the Avis, or a regatta on the Wannsee as ways to prevent the “draining off of West 
Berliners to the East sector.”519 Others, however, feared that staging counter-attractions 
“of similar entertainment value” in West Berlin would “reflect adversely upon the West by 
permitting disparaging comparisons capable of political exploitation.” PEPCO also 
worried that the Soviets might “score [a] propaganda coup by permitting Whitsuntide to 
pass peaceably,” and some within the State Department argued that any additional public 
warnings to the Soviets might “leave us looking unduly alarmed” and “frightened by a 
peaceful gathering of mere children.”520   If the demonstration developed in an essentially 
peaceful manner, “we do run the real risk of looking somewhat over-excited if not 
foolish”.521   
While the “definite change of intention” on the part of the GDR authorities meant 
that the Deutschlandtreffen no longer required preparations for the outbreak of violence, 
its potential for a major propaganda victory for the GDR spurred the Truman 
administration into the seizing the offensive.522  Under Secretary of State James Webb 
now suggested counter-attractions “designed to detract from the preparations made by the 
Communists and turn the rally into a United States propaganda advantage.”   At its 
meeting on April 19, the Standing Action Committee had already agreed on a program of 
offensive propaganda directed to various parts of the GDR population, focusing on 
refugees (April 26), parents (May 3), sportsmen and sports leaders (May 10) and the 
churches (May 17). Other measures called for the covert distribution of an abridged 
version of the George Orwell novel “1984” (“through an American agency,” probably the 
CIA), the distribution of propaganda letters to FDJ functionaries and Soviet Zone residents 
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as well as the display of 500,000 anti-rally adhesive propaganda stickers.523 By late April, 
the top U.S commander in Europe, General Handy, could inform the Department of the 
Army that “psychological warfare was “being pushed aggressively by all means ” and that 
“extensive undercover operations are being conducted in the East Zone to undermine 
support.”524      
The impact of Western efforts to undermine the Deutschlandtreffen soon became 
evident. Internal FDJ reports noted “the systematic spread of the false news by the Rias” 
had created “certain unrest” among the East Berlin population, which initially took “a 
negative attitude” towards the rally and greeted the youth in a “bit reserved” manner.525   
In its report to the NSC, the State Department noted on May 3 that efforts to “instill fear in 
Soviet Zone parents so that they may prevent their children from participating in the rally” 
had been “fairly successful.” McCloy cabled to Washington that the Soviets were 
encountering difficulty in creating the desired enthusiasm for the rally,” and intelligence 
reports indicated that RIAS broadcasts were “causing drops in FDJ and Junge Pioniere 
applications” for participation in the rally.526  
Much to the relief of American observers, the Deutschlandtreffen went by without 
major incidents. Just before the four-day meeting began on May 27, the East German 
organizers introduced slight changes in the plans for the major demonstration on May 28, 
moving the route of the march farther away from the Western sector boundaries.527 
Volkspolizei units heavily guarded all sector borders, quarters, demonstration and 
recreation areas, reflecting East German anxieties to avoid trouble. 528 It now seemed 
“obvious that Communist policy was to prevent participants in the rally from entering 
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West sectors.” Despite the efforts of the Volkspolizei, supported in some case by Russian 
troops, in prohibiting rally participants to go west, “sometimes by force” several thousand 
of them found their way across the sector lines “bent on sightseeing.”529 According to 
American intelligence sources, all in all about 440,000 youth participated in the meeting; 
internal FDJ estimates put the number of West German participants at 27,000 (of which 
35% belonged to the FDJ.)530 According to U.S. authorities, 42 FDJ members and 36 
Volkspolizei members deserted to the West.531  To many within the Truman 
administration, the outcome of the FDJ rally was, as U.S. ambassador in Moscow, 
Alexander Kirk put it, an “impressive example that firmness and determination results in 
rolling back Soviet encroachment attempts.”532 McCloy personally informed Acheson, 
that, “we have deflected another blow at Berlin.” 533  
Yet the Deutschlandtreffen also indicated “what a police state can do if it sets out 
to regiment people, particularly youth.”534  HICOG officials in Berlin agreed that the 
meeting represented a “major achievement [in] organization and indoctrination [of the] 
German youth.” The failure to carry out the originally proclaimed intention to hold mass 
demonstrations in West Berlin “should not obscure the significance [of the] actual 
achievement.”535 Observing that the Kremlin was making “substantial progress along 
well-known lines toward assimilation of East Germany,” U.S. officials considered it 
“remarkable” that a “foreign imposed totalitarian order is successfully taking hold despite 
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negative antagonisms.” Much like Ulbricht had announced, the rally had to be seen as an 
“impressive demonstration of strength,” with the FDJ “patently reactivating many Nazi 
psycho and social patterns, […] utilizing the still potent residues of the Hitler era.” East 
German youth were “in the hands of remorseless and experienced molders,” though in 
their majority still “plastic.”  Reflecting the continued pessimism that beset American 
thinking about the situation in Germany, a major after-action report by HICOG judged that 
the “pending [a] major change in the world picture, [the] commie steam roller in East 
Germany [was] unlikely [to be] halted by any local tactics.”536 All one could hope for was 
some delaying action “keeping alive some elements of plasticity until the strategic context 
was more favorable.”537 
 
4. “Hotting Up” the Cold War 
The SED’s success in staging the Deutschlandtreffen reinforced efforts within the 
Truman administration to develop a more aggressive and  coordinated program for 
countering Soviet and SED control in East Germany. Though time was perceived as 
working against the West, the East Germans were not yet considered entirely lost to 
communist indoctrination. Even the FDJ rally had shown that the “Commie digestion 
process” in Eastern Germany seemed “far from complete.”538 But the passing of time 
seemed to run in favor of the SED authorities, and HICOG warned Washington in early 
June that “time for action is now.”539 The beginning of the Korean War three weeks later 
dramatically heightened the sense of vulnerability in western Germany. Many Germans 
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were jolted by the apparent U.S. intelligence failure and early reverses in Korea.540 While 
Kim Il-Sung’s forces overran South Korean positions, the eight Soviet divisions stationed 
in the GDR churned up for extensive maneuvers near Grafenwehr on the Czech border, 
adding to the tense atmosphere in Germany.541 Meanwhile, East German para-military 
People’s Police alert units were expanding. By July McCloy estimated them to number 
50,000, adding to the 100,000-men strong regular police forces.  Later that month, 
Ulbricht and other party leaders gave speeches at the SED’s Third Party Congress 
outlining “grandiose schemes for the Sovietization of East Germany and the conquest of 
West Germany” and calling for mass resistance in West Germany against the occupation 
powers. Internally, HICOG officials warned that “the SED has never been in such 
satisfactory condition” as then, constituting an adequate Soviet tool for the attempted 
execution of current Soviet plans in Germany.”542  
Publicly McCloy sought to assure the West Germans: “I don’t think there is going 
to be any attack,” the High Commissioner could be heard. In fact McCloy argued, the 
events in Korea, “may make such attacks less likely.”543 But internally McCloy gave 
Acheson an alarming estimate of Soviet moves in Germany for the remainder of the year. 
McCloy predicted that the USSR was “prepared to go very close to precipitating world 
war in order to win the whole of Germany within the next five years” and that Soviet 
strategy would be “somewhat analogous to that employed in Korea, i.e. [a] combination of 
consolidation of power in East Germany, [the] integration of East Germany within the 
orbit, pressure vis-à-vis West Germany, subversion from within and preparation for 
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ultimate attack by GDR with East German troops.”544 McCloy expected stepped-up 
subversive activities and increased efforts to “maneuver [the] GDR into fuller diplomatic 
recognition.” He expected that the “danger period” for Berlin as the first point of attack 
would begin when the USSR granted the GDR some form of peace settlement and restored 
the GDR to full sovereignty. An elevation of the GDR to full sovereignty seemed 
“relatively certain” in connection with the October Volkskammer elections, through the 
“timing, extent of pressure acceleration of Soviet timetable” would depend closely on 
“Korean developments.”545 
McCloy’s predictions seemed to be born out by the pressure from East Germany as 
the summer wore on. Anti-allied propaganda, rumors of war and threats of the inevitable 
conquest of Germany by the USSR were sweeping the Federal Republic “like an artillery 
barrage that precedes the general attack.”546 Rallies were being held throughout Western 
Germany, preceded by weeks of nervous speculation. Special committees were set up as 
centers for the scare campaign—and, as many suspected, a future program of sabotage 
threatened by the GDR leaders. At its national congress in East Berlin, the SED leaders 
proclaimed a massive plan for subversive action in western Germany, adopting a “fighting 
program” that called for incitement of strikes, pressure against recruits for West German 
police forces and mass demonstrations. In Berlin, American officials noted a “revived 
‘cold war’” in a series of moves restricting traffic between the city and Western Germany. 
The “Communist softening-up process” was, the view of U.S. observers, taking effect, 
harassing tactics were shaking West German confidence and agitating East Germans with 
a sense of emergency. In one small town in Lower Saxony on the borderline to the GDR a 
man in Russian uniform suddenly appeared at the town hall and informed the mayor that 
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Russian troops would come the next day to straighten out the zonal boundary to include 
the town’s slate factory in the Russian zone. Only the appearance of a British officer the 
next day saved the situation, as the townspeople had prepared to evacuate by noon and had 
already dismantled the switchboard from the central telephone station.547 
McCloy was frustrated by the “fundamental handicap” of not being able “to exert 
full measure of influence on the east Germans.”  The Soviets were in a far more 
advantageous position to influence developments, and “to frustrate our objectives in West 
Germany than we are in relation to East Germany.” Nevertheless, the Soviets had not yet 
won the battle for the German minds, and McCloy argued that the “ultimate tipping of 
scales in Germany” would largely depend on each side deploying power “in sharper focus 
than either antagonist has thus far brought to bear on German scene.”548 To that end 
McCloy approved a new psychological warfare program, “Program for PEPCO.” Drafted 
and discussed within PEPCO since mid-April, “A Program for PEPCO,” formed a 
“general blueprint for action,” designed to “contain the USSR momentum” and advance 
U.S. policies by denial [of] those of [the] Soviets.”549 According to the program, U.S. 
policy sought to “contain the Soviets more firmly in their own zone,” to “stimulate a 
maximum of passive resistance to communist ideology, Soviet propaganda and the 
consolidation of totalitarian rule,” to “encourage the belief of the East Germans in values 
of Western civilization,” “assist them in overcoming a feeling of defeatism and of the 
inevitability of a Soviet triumph in Germany,” to hold up to all Germans the pattern of 
Soviet encroachments on the liberties and resources of the East Germans and to “retard the 
Sovietization of East Germany.”  The policy program recommended by McCloy called for 
maintaining the policy of non-recognition of the GDR, keeping the political and 
psychological initiative on German unification, normalizing relations between East and 
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West Germany, and for anticipating and frustrating any moves intended to consolidate the 
Soviet position in Germany. All in all, HICOG strove to place the Soviets on the 
defensive, allowing the United States to “extricate ourselves permanently from a position 
of merely seeking ways and means of parrying Soviet initiatives and moves.”550  
More specifically, HICOG planners considered a series of measures which they 
saw essential elements of an effective strategy towards the GDR. Proposals reached from 
an information campaign that would convince the Germans that the National Front was an 
impediment to unity rather than its champion and that it was a “façade for Russian 
expansionism,” to mobilizing West German and West Berlin voluntary organizations for 
programs to support anti-Communist resistance in the GDR which would entail “liaison 
with the Ost-Buros of the West German parties and underground movements and the 
extension of various types of assistance, financial and otherwise.”  Other proposals 
included using the West German Farmers’ Union to attack Soviet agricultural programs, 
penetrating the Hermes-Nadolny movement and turning it against the National Front, 
prohibiting National front activities in Western Germany, bringing East-West trade under 
closer control and supervision, exploiting opposition against the remilitarization in the 
GDR and “furnishing direct financial and other aid to trustworthy elements selected to 
advance our informational or political objectives.” To counter the effect of National Front 
propaganda, the PEPCO program even revived earlier ideas “to erect in Western Germany 
some Western-oriented mass movement” that could promote a unification modus in line 
with Western interests.551  
Most importantly, HICOG was eager to press ahead on the issue of free elections, 
an issue on which Americans believed they had gained the initiative since McCloy’s 
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February 28 statement. Indeed, thus far Chuikov had not responded to the Western High 
Commissioners’ May 25 initiative to draft an election law, and a Soviet Control 
Commission statement on all-Berlin elections, responding to West Berlin Mayor Reuter’s 
April 20 initiative reflected Soviet defensiveness on the issue. Since early April, PEPCO 
had been developing a “systematic propaganda campaign” against the October 15 unity-
list elections to the GDR Volkskammer. American officials felt strongly that intensified 
propaganda in favor of German unity would provide a “positive alternative which we 
should seek to substitute for the unity-list elections in the Soviet Zone,” convincing the 
East Germans that in voting “no” they would be voting “yes” for the concept of free 
elections. The period leading up to the October 15 elections would at the same time be “of 
critical importance” given the “psychological adjustments which the German people as a 
whole will have to make as a result of West Germany’s acceding to the Council of Europe 
and, as now seems most probable, East Germany’s being more firmly integrated within the 
Soviet orbit.”  To forestall that the impending Federal Republic’s admission to the Council 
would connote to many West and East Germans a “more permanent partition of Germany 
if not a writing-off of the East” and undercut the West all-German initiative, HICOG even 
favored a West German declaration that it was joining the Council of Europe on behalf of 
the entire German nation. It hence seemed “especially necessary to fix the responsibility 
for the more permanent partition of Germany on the Soviets.”552 
American eagerness put pressure on the GDR contrasted by British and French 
desires “not to hot-up the Cold War.”553  London and Paris had considered a propaganda 
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campaign against the October 15 elections starting in the spring as “somewhat premature,” 
and even by late June were worried that “if started now, we might run out of propaganda 
material before the event.”554  As a result, Truman administration officials favored 
pursuing a unilateral propaganda campaign for all-German unity and against the Soviet 
zone elections.555  At the end of June, PEPCO approved a massive propaganda effort in 
East Germany in favor of free all-German elections though overt and covert media.556  The 
July PEPCO program, moreover, called for efforts to induce East German leaders to resist 
and denounce the Soviet intention to proceed with the unity-list elections, to organize a 
large-scale letter writing campaign from West to East Germans, and to encourage the 
GDR population to invalidate their ballots at the elections or to vote against the unity 
list.557   
HICOG also considered ways and means to discourage and curtail collaboration by 
East Germans with the communist authorities in East Germany. Proposals called for 
stating publicly that political asylum for East German defectors was not an “unconditional 
right” and compiling a list of prominent East German collaborators who would be 
ineligible for political asylum, thus reversing a policy under which as late as June 1950 
key GDR officials, such as East-CDU leader Otto Nuschke had apparently been invited by 
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U.S. intelligence to defect.558 Consideration of such measures was, however, quickly 
abandoned since they ran counter to U.S. defector and West German defector policies, and 
would  — as a rigid formula — prove inexpedient “for tactical reasons [to] be adhered to 
in the ‘cold war’.”559  
HICOG’s efforts to intensify the campaign against the GDR resonated with 
Washington. Responding to the “Program for PEPCO,” the State Department took issue 
with the key asumption that the psychological and political initiative seemed to rest 
naturally with the Soviets, “essentially due to their intention to extend control over 
Western Germany which is not — and presumably cannot be matched by equally firm 
aggressive intention on our side regarding Eastern Germany.”  Contrary to the PEPCO 
estimate, the Department informed HICOG, the Soviet Zone was “exceedingly vulnerable 
to Western-type propaganda to an extent that our chances of interfering with Soviet 
policies inside the Soviet zone and influencing their course (e.g. elections) may be 
assumed to be considerably better than vice versa.” The State Department recommended 
to “further intensify the internal difficulties of the Soviet Zone regime “through a higher 
degree of coordination and planning, including the coordination of intelligence facilities.” 
To be sure, the questions “as to how far we should go in stimulating the East Germans 
openly to resist Soviet policies,” the Department conceded, was “a delicate one.” Careful 
consideration should be given, the Department argued, to the potential effectiveness of 
resistance and to the possibility that a violent Soviet reaction might render such resistance 
“too costly in terms of the advantages to be gained.”560 
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The State Department also bemoaned that RIAS was not in a position to draw upon 
the best Soviet Zone intelligence available and was instead forced to rely on second-rate 
sources. The Department recommended that the “total anti-Soviet Zone propaganda be 
engineered in a way “as to let the Soviets know we are stepping up this type of propaganda 
as a reply to the intensified anti-Western drive of theirs.” Western propaganda should 
constantly “strive to keep the image of Communist expansion before the Western German 
people.” Specific measures suggested by Washington included black-listing GDR officials 
for entry into the FRG and delaying, confiscating or “losing” mail from the GDR to KPD 
organizations in retaliation for Soviet interference with inter-zonal mail. Washington also 
expressed support for HICOG’s plans to encourage the East Germans to protest the unity-
list voting procedure and to demonstrate their opposition to invalidate their ballots or 
voting against the unity-list candidates.561 
By the end of August 1950, McCloy could inform Washington that HICOG was 
intensifying its present program against Soviet policy and activities, devoting major efforts 
to the heightening anti-Soviet campaign. Unilaterally, HICOG was sharpening the tone of 
its overt publications and encouraging FRG officials and groups, such as the trade unions, 
youth and women groups as well as publishers, to increase pressure on Communist 
organizations in the Western zones. HICOG was supporting Soviet Zone refugee 
organizations and the compilation of so-called White Books on conditions in the GDR. 
HICOG officials, moreover, had been discussing psychological warfare plans with the 
U.S. Army’s European command.562 
McCloy’s efforts to intensify the anti-Soviet efforts, however, were hampered by 
resources and allied considerations. Not only did HICOG need additional “money, slots 
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and experienced personnel.”563 The British and French remained reserved towards much 
of the American effort, though by mid-September they were ready to step up propaganda 
against the Soviet Zone elections. Even more difficult was to get the “active and 
wholehearted cooperation”564 from the West Germans that the Department had demanded. 
The West Germans proved resistant to the idea of following-up on the Western High 
Commissioners’ letters to Chuikov, and despite continued efforts, HICOG officials 
admitted that “great success is not suspected.” In the end, the Western High 
Commissioners sent a letter to Chuikov on October 10, reminding the Soviet High 
Commissioner of his failure to respond to the May 25 letter and pointing to the fraudulent 
character of the East German elections. 
Moreover, American plans for instructing the East Germans to stage a secret vote 
against the East Zone elections by mailing their expired ration cards to West Germany had 
to be abandoned due to SPD leader Schumacher’s opposition, despite the fact that PEPCO 
continued to consider the plans “excellent.”565 Schumacher argued that SED agents would 
go from house to house demanding old ration cards, and he felt sure that the West 
Germans had too little interest in such matters as to see to it that ballots received in the 
West were forwarded to some central tally office. Minister for All-German Affairs Kaiser 
proved hardly more enthusiastic: the Soviet Zone population, Kaiser suspected, was 
already intimidated to such an extent that it would not participate in sufficient numbers.566  
In the end, RIAS refrained from encouraging oppositional East German to invalidate their 
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ballots or otherwise expose themselves, arguing that to cast one’s ballot for the regime 
would “deceive the deceivers” on October 15.567     
In the eyes of HICOG officials, the results of the October 15 elections were 
ambiguous. Some sources indicated that the elections had only “intensified the 
determination of the Soviet zone population to resist,” and that the overwhelming poll 
results — 99% vote for the SED and Communist mass organizations — had no depressing 
effect. Reports of enthusiastic response by the East Germans to the RIAS line of  “Deceive 
the Deceivers” were, HICOG officials admitted, contradicted by others. In particular 
within Protestant church circles, there was feeling widespread that the advice was 
“tantamount to nihilism” and to the individual’s absolution from relying upon his own 
conscience as to moral issues, contrary to one of the central tenets of Protestantism. 
“Whatever the final wisdom of the matter is thought to be,” U.S. diplomats advised, RIAS 
had to reckon in giving its advice that “there are serious resistance elements in the Soviet 
Zone who wish to keep alive and strengthen the thesis that the individual must resume 
personal responsibility […] and be encouraged and sustained in this by advice from 
respected leaders and institutions, like RIAS.”568  More disconcerting to HICOG officials, 
the October election results, following the success of the Deutschlandtreffen, were seen as 
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5. Imagining Aggressive Rollback in Germany: The Carroll-Speier Report 
As HICOG analysts had speculated, the elections provided a boost to the further 
legitimatization of the GDR and Soviet-GDR unity campaign, which was increasingly 
linked to the issue of West Germany’s military integration. This issue was thrust to the 
forefront of the political agenda at the New York Foreign Ministers meeting in September 
and into the decision of the NATO foreign and defense ministers in Brussels in December 
to make use of West German forces. On October 20, the foreign ministers of the USSR, 
Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania charged the Western 
powers with violating the Potsdam Agreements by intending to rearm Western Germany 
and demanded the conclusion of a peace treaty and the withdrawal of all occupation troops 
from German soil. In Point Four of the Prague declaration they proposed the establishment 
of an all-German Constituent Council, composed of East and West German delegates on a 
parity basis to prepare the “formation of a provisional, democratic, peace-loving all-
German sovereign Government.” On November 30, GDR Premier Grotewohl repeated 
these proposals for a constituent council, popularized by the SED propaganda machine 
with the slogan “Germans at one table!” (Deutsche an einen Tisch!) Earlier that month, the 
Soviet government had sent identical notes to the Western governments suggesting a four-
power meeting that would deal with the “demilitarization” of Germany in line with the 
Potsdam Accords. 
The Soviet initiatives caught the Western powers in moments of inter-Allied 
uncertainty and disagreements over how to proceed on German rearmament and of 
military setbacks in Korea. The Soviet moves lent ever greater urgency to the need for a 
more coordinated and effective psychological warfare effort in Germany. Two days after 
the Volkskammer elections, Frank Boerner, one of HICOG’s leading ‘psywar’ specialists, 
left for consultations on the topic with the State Department. As a result, two external 
181 
consultants, Wallace Carroll who had headed the overseas branch of the Office of War 
Information during World War II, and communications specialist and OMGUS 
Information Control Divistion veteran Hans Speier, were dispatched by the Department to 
Germany to review and develop PEPCO’s program.569   
In their 38-page “top secret” report, “Psychological Warfare in Germany,”570 
Carroll and Speier argued that the objective of U.S. policy was “to integrate the whole of 
Germany into Western Europe and thus make Germany a definite partner in the building 
of a healthy international community.” [Emphasis added.] They assumed that East 
Germany was the “springboard for Soviet ambitions in the much more attractive areas to 
the West,” but that the Soviet government would shrink from a general war in pursuing its 
goals.  The United States had to get the GDR “back into a unified Germany, tied to the 
West politically, militarily, economically and culturally.” Therefore the United States had 
to “destroy Soviet power in Germany.” For this purpose “aggressive psychological 
warfare waged with a fixed purpose” would be required. Demanding to “shed the vestiges 
of our defensive mentality and combine the powerful means at our disposal in great 
psychological warfare offensive,” they argued that U.S. efforts should be directed towards 
making the GDR a liability to the Soviets and forcing the Kremlin to withdraw its forces 
from East Germany -- “Operation Exit.”  Though the offensive and defensive military 
value of the Soviet Zone to the USSR might be so great that it might accept considerable 
economic losses and deal ruthlessly with political difficulties rather than abandoning the 
GDR, Carroll and Speier argued, “these considerations should not lead us to lower our 
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sight.” In pursuit of their stated aims, Carroll and Speier proposed a catalogue of measures 
ranging from economic warfare, aimed at exploiting GDR economic vulnerabilities by 
trade restrictions and by encouraging the defection of key economic personnel, to military 
measures such as military demonstrations and political initiatives on such controversial 
issues as the Oder-Neisse line. The idea of a “Return to Europe” would give American 
efforts in the GDR and Eastern Europe an attractive ideological framework. 
German resistance in the Soviet Zone, Carroll and Speier argued, would be a most 
important pressure to be brought to bear on the Soviet authorities. Much of the 
“resistance” work had been confined to disseminating forbidden news and propaganda and 
giving valuable information to the West, and it suffered from a lack of coordination and 
cooperation, from jealousy and distrust among the organizations engaged in opposition 
work. According to the report, opposition in the GDR lacked “strategic direction;” neither 
was there “as yet an American long-range plan” that stated the goals and phases of the 
operation; nor was there a “timetable” of U.S. “political and military strategy towards 
eastern European satellites,” with which resistance work in the GDR could be coordinated. 
Given that the Soviet hold on the East German youth as well as Soviet-inspired East 
German military power were bound to increase, Carroll and Speier pointed to the “urgent 
need for long-range planning of a vigorous Resistance” in East Germany. Plans should 
provide for moving from “the present phase of operations which is predominately 
information and propaganda work, to phases of resistance proper, which would include the 
infiltration of selected Soviet zone organizations, such as the Bereitschaften and the 
Volkspolizei, sabotage, abduction, direct action against selected, highly placed 
functionaries, etc.”  
In order to be most effective, the Carroll-Speier Report recommended giving 
“unified direction,” a kind of “unified command” --though not necessarily centralized 
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leadership--to the opposition movement within the GDR. Given that the resistance 
movement’s activities would be integrated with overall U.S. strategy it would, moreover, 
be necessary “to reserve in fact, if not in law, certain planning and directive powers to 
U.S. agencies and to provide for effective U.S. liaison with the special activist groups 
which engage in the most advanced type of Resistance work.” Far from harming its 
prestige, American steering of the Resistance would be “proof of the U.S. intention to 
unify Germany.” Even before the active phase of “intensive subversive work” it would be 
necessary to have a “specific action plan” to keep the hopes of the East Germans alive. 
This was to be done by “creating the belief in the existence of a unified, strong, growing 
resistance movement within the soviet zone, which has a name, is secure and disciplined, 
acts according to plan and awaits its time.”  
Moreover, the East German population had to be convinced that interest in such 
peaceful liberation was intense in West Germany and the United States. In an effort to 
impress on them that the will to make sacrifices was there, it might “be possible to raise 
one or the other German victim of Soviet persecution to the level of legendary 
martyrdom.” Since, according to Carroll and Speier, the spirit of resistance could not be 
evoked by propaganda alone, the report recommended measures to increase defection, 
unreliability and loyalty to the West among East German leaders, along with “controlled 
efforts to compromise influential Germans (...) whom we cannot hope to win over. Finally, 
“direct actions” would help to dramatize the opposition movement: “it may be advisable to 
abduct or execute the one or the other notorious German Communist who is widely hated 
in the Soviet zone.” But not just the German communists would be targets: “Operation 
Exit” also proposed concerted efforts to increase defection among the Soviet forces in 
Germany, because it touched “sensitive nerves going back to the Kremlin.” A clandestine 
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campaign was to “magnify the effects of defection and demoralization in the minds of the 
Soviet leaders.” 
With its aggressive tone and ambitious approach to a coordinated psychological 
warfare program, the Carroll-Speier Report struck HICOG like a thunderbolt. The report 
reportedly evoked an “enthusiastic”571 response in parts of the administration and was 
hailed as a “distinct contribution.” Assistant Secretary of State Edward W. Barrett, 
chairman of the Truman administration’s newly-created interagency Psychological 
Strategy Board in Washington, cabled from Washington that “he was “especially 
interested in HICOG’s reaction to the program toward East Germany.”572 Much of the 
report indeed rang true with American officials, such as the complaint about the lack of 
effective propaganda coordination among Allies and Germans, which was compounded, as 
HICOG officials acknowledged, by the sheer “multitude of Allied and German 
organizations operating in this field,” by internal political squabbles within and rivalry 
among the German organizations, and by the poor relationship between intelligence and 
propaganda units on the American side. Propagandistically useful information from the 
intelligence agencies had been “little more than a trickle.”  Certainly Carroll and Speier’s 
emphasis on East German youth as the most susceptible audience for Soviet propaganda 
met with wide support. Reinforcing the points made by the report, HICOG officials 
strongly advocated “an all-out offensive against the FDJ and the Soviet-Zone educational 
system.”573 With regard to individual measures proposed in the Report, HICOG quickly 
asserted that many of them coincided with existing U.S. efforts in Germany. It was 
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thought that the Carroll-Speier Report actually minimized East Germany’s dependence on 
the Federal Republic and argued that the economic warfare targets should be widened to 
include technicians and skilled labor. HICOG had evidence of GDR personnel shortages in 
these areas, and these could be “aggravated by carefully planned and executed measures.” 
HICOG Intelligence was considering a plan which would deny specific key industries in 
East German specific critical materials, and Eastern Element was compiling a list of key 
economic personnel in preparation of a defection program. The report’s Soviet defector 
program -- “Operation Exit”-- also found “complete agreement” by HICOG planners 
though they felt it should include “East German and orbit personnel and military 
figures.”574 
But beyond individual measures, Carroll-Speier Report highlighted many of the 
profound contradictions that beset American policy vis-à-vis East Germany. First, Carroll 
and Speier had assumed that German unification and the integration of all of Germany into 
Western Europe was an overriding goal in American policy. Comments in the debate 
generated by the report reflect that HICOG officials were far from sure that this was true: 
There was a “mass of empirical evidence” indicating that the Western powers did not 
regard German reunification as an integral part of policy towards Germany.575 East 
German public opinion, officials in Berlin argued, “consistently doubted the sincerity and 
determination of both the Allies and the Federal Republic in respect to unity.” Western 
statements on unity had been “susceptible to being interpreted primarily as propaganda 
moves.” After all, the Western Foreign Ministers’ first basic statement of 26 May 1950 
had been published on the eve of the Deutschlandtreffen, the next one, on October 9, had 
been made on the eve of the October elections in the GDR. “We have done little or 
nothing,” High Commission officials argued, “to dispel the prevalent West German feeling 
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that German unification is an impossibility in the present context of East-West tensions.” 
Making it “crystal-clear that our policy not only contemplates the integration of West 
Germany into Western Europe” would go a long way “in stimulating resistance to 
Sovietization in inspiring the will to resist, in dispelling present doubts in respect to 
American aims in Europe.” 576  
In suggesting a catalogue of tactical measures, Carroll and Speier also assumed 
that the Soviet government would continue to shrink from general war—an assumption 
that the North Korean invasion – widely believed as having been engineered in Moscow – 
had called into question. Some HICOG officials argued that the report was based “on a 
too-rosy estimate of the balance of forces” in favor of the West. Reflecting the dire 
predictions of NSC-68, officials saw cumulative evidence that the USSR would “make a 
determined effort to take Eurasia within the next few years, even if such entails World 
War III.”577  With the Soviets possibly “prepared to seek certain objectives even at the risk 
of war,” the problem for psychological warfare was how to seize the offensive without 
provoking Soviet aggression.  Some of the more militant measures in the paper, such as 
military demonstrations, sabotage, abductions and assassinations it might provoke the 
USSR into unleashing a world war and hence required “extreme caution from the 
standpoint of timing and execution.” 578  Geared towards making the GDR a liability to the 
Soviet Union and increasing Soviet insecurity, the Carroll-Speier Report ignored, some 
within HICOG felt, that it might actually be in U.S. interest to “instill the Soviets with a 
false sense of security.” And it was by no means certain that the program would dislodge 
the Soviets from East Germany. After all, even Carroll and Speier had pointed out that the 
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Soviet had never withdrawn militarily from occupied territory without establishing a 
reliable satellite.579 
Finally, to what extent were the East Germans willing to resist actively? HICOG 
officials felt that Carroll and Speier had been “somewhat over-optimistic,” after all, 
opposition to the Soviets and the regime considered to be “almost entirely devoted to the 
dissemination of forbidden news and propaganda.” Efforts to coordinate resistance 
activities had thus far failed. 580 In the spring of 1951, HICOG’s “Reactions Analysis 
Staff” carried out a number of surveys on the “state of mind” of East Germans and 
resistance potential behind the Iron Curtain.  The great bulk of respondents in the surveys 
characterized the post-election mood of the GDR residents as “very depressed,” with three 
out of four East Germans feeling that they could do nothing toward improving their 
political situation. Only 18 per cent of East zone residents could be counted on as a “core 
resistance potential.” The feeling of helplessness was least widespread among the East 
German youth, suggesting to HICOG that despite the special measures taken by the SED 
“to coddle and win over the East German youth, they are still the group that the West can 
count on most heavily for resistance to the East Zone regime.”581  
At the same time, HICOG assured Washington that it was engaged in efforts 
designed to evolve a plan for “effective and coordinated Resistance in the Soviet Zone,” 
including “a more widespread infiltration of the Volkspolizei Bereitschaften.” HICOG 
officials emphasized their organizing a Resistance movement and “preparing the mood for 
resistance” and recommended developing long-range plans to increase the strength of 
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clandestine networks operating behind the ‘Iron Curtain’ from West German bases and to 
“develop partisan warfare cadres.” Reviving a proposal first raised the preceding spring, 
HICOG also proposed “Operation Debunk,” a concerted propaganda effort to counter 
Soviet propaganda myths.582 
East Berlin’s seizing of the initiative on the question of German unity reinforced a 
sense of urgency among American officials. Adenauer’s long-delayed January 15 reply to 
the Grotewohl letter -- it had reportedly gone through 29 drafts -- struck McCloy as “not 
entirely satisfactory from the psychological point of view,”583 particularly in view of the 
ground swell of public sentiment in favor of the Germans talking among themselves. 
According to HICOG polls, some 60% of Germans favored the German-German talks as 
proposed by Grotewohl in principle. It “must be conceded,” McCloy told Acheson, that 
“the Grotewohl letter, aided by an unprecedented propaganda campaign of great variety 
and flexibility, [had] made a definite impact on West Germans and proved again that 
blood is thicker than ideology” with regard to German unity.584  By the beginning of 1951, 
U.S. intelligence had learned from a “fairly reliable source” a lengthy catalogue of 
measures to exploit the Grotewohl letter adopted at a SED Central committee meeting on 
January 9. The extensive program directed various mass organizations in the GDR to 
attack specific propaganda targets in Western Germany in order to preempt an anticipated 
West German “White Book” in the unity issue.585 Even leading German officials now 
indicated their concern over the mounting “Grotewohl campaign.” Thousands of letters 
and telegrams from GDR cities and organizations were being mailed to their West German 
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counterparts. “We are not,” the High Commissioner warned, “through (the) woods on this 
issue.”586 
Indeed, at a special session of the GDR Volkskammer on 30 January 1951 
Grotewohl replied to Adenauer’s statement with a point by point contradiction, reiterating 
that the continuing need was for East and West Germans to sit down together for talks on 
German unity. At the end of the session, the Volkskammer adopted a resolution that 
repeated the call for an all-German Constituent Council.587 PEPCO was quick to conclude 
that Adenauer’s initial riposte had not countered the East Germans’ call for “Germans at 
one table!” effectively. Designed to exploit the growing neutralist sentiment in Western 
Germany and the restiveness of Germans to take things in their own hands, the 
Volkskammer resolution, with its conciliatory and non-polemic tone was a “singularly 
adroit document,” and left the impression of a genuine diplomatic move. It should hence 
“not be regarded solely as a propaganda move and is not so considered by a wide segment 
of West German opinion.”588 HICOG officials very much doubted that the Grotewohl 
initiative was a genuinely conciliatory move in view of “general Soviet history, dogma, 
inferred strategy, rational self-interest and present actions.”589 The continued trend 
towards communization of the GDR seemed to prove, some argued, that the Soviets had 
no hope of bringing about early unification; free elections in the GDR would destroy the 
SED regime, undermine Soviet prestige in the satellites, and constitute the loss of a 
“forward base” that would preclude any future “Korea-type action in Germany.590 In this 
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view the Grotewohl initiative appeared as an integral part of Soviet strategy since the 
“legitimization” of the GDR at the October elections, aimed at neutralizing Germany 
under a demilitarization pact, disrupting Allied unity, impeding Western defense plans and 
isolating the Allied position in West Germany by fostering neutralist, defeatist and 
nationalistic sentiments.591  
There was a consensus that acceptance of the Grotewohl offer would in effect 
“hand control of Germany’s future to (the) Soviets.”592   U.S. officials agreed that the 
Soviets would be “masterminding (the) GDR delegation behind the scenes” and would 
prolong East-West German talks for weeks to stall West German rearmament.593 By 
contrast, Ernst Lemmer, editor of the Berlin Kurier and the new chief of the CDU faction 
in the Berlin city assembly, suggested that the GDR drive could be throttled only by a “put 
up or shut up” counteroffer and felt it was “criminal” to let Grotewohl pose as the “unity 
apostle” whom the GDR was using with great skill and effect.594  But the majority of 
German politicians agreed that the offer was a “well-baited trap.”595  
To “extricate” itself “from the present defensive position,” the Truman 
administration reasserted four-power competence of matters relating to German 
unification, thus taking the pressure off on the Adenauer government. In December, the 
United States had agreed to exploratory talks for a Council of Foreign Ministers’ meeting 
in response to a Soviet proposal in November. HICOG doubted that the Soviets would be 
                                                                                                                                                   
not likely to make concessions to the West involving a sacrifice of Communist control on Eastern 
Germany,” David E. Mark to John Holt, 26 January 1951, NARA, RG 466, HICOG Berlin:EAD, Box 3. 
591 Embassy Moscow to Deaprtment of State, 3 January 1951, NARA, RG 59, 762.00/1-351. Others felt that 
the communization thesis ignored the Soviets’ “inevitable compulsion for remodeling the satellites in the 
Soviet image,” and suggested instead that the Kremlin was “playing this particular game by ear,” uncertain 
of what steps it would take next. 
592 Secretary of State to the Ofice of the High Commisisoner for Germany, 12 February 1951, FRUS 1951, 
III, 1757-1758; McCloy to Secretary of State, 4 Feburary 1951, FRUS 1951, III, 1755-1756. 
593 McCloy to Secretary fo State, 6 February 1951, RG 59, 762A.5/2-251. In line with this thought, HICOG 
Bonn had earlier reported that both Grotewohl letters had been “written in the Kremlin.” Bonn to Secretary 
of State, 1 February 1951, NARA, RG 59, 762A.00/1-3151. 
594 Berlin to Secretary of State 3 February 1951, NARA, RG 59, 662A.62B/2-351. 
595 McCloy to Secretary of State, 6 February 1951, NARA, RG 59, 762A.00/2-651; McCloy to Secretary of 
State, 7 February 1951, 762.00/2-751. 
191 
willing to make a major concession on the unification issue, but had agreed, particularly at 
French insistence, to test the waters for a four-power solution while moving ahead with 
regard to the West German defense contribution.596  McCloy argued that the western 
approach to the anticipated Council of Ministers meeting should emphasize that the 
German problem could not be solved in the German context alone, but only in a European 
context. At the same time, McCloy sought to discredit the Grotewohl initiative in a “non-
polemic manner” by suggesting that it was no answer to the unanswered letters that the 
Western High Commissioners had sent to Chuikov the preceding year. The difficulty 
remained that the Truman administration was not interested in getting the “unity of free 
elections ball rolling” and hence opening itself up to a Soviet counterproposal for a 
neutralized and demilitarized Germany just prior to a potential Council of Ministers’ 
meeting.597  On March 9, the West German parliament put forth a proposal for free 
elections, which Grotewohl flatly rejected on March 14, considerably undercutting his 
earlier initiative. West German political leaders and public press widely interpreted 
Grotewohl’s rejection as a “clear revelation of [the] real Sov-SED intention.”598 In 
Washington, the administration felt that the West had succeeded in keeping the unity issue 
alive and turning it into “one of our most useful propaganda themes.”599 As a result, the 
State Department argued, Germany unity had “virtually dropped out of Commie 
propaganda.”600 
HICOG officials eagerly set about implementing elements of the psychological 
warfare program which Carroll and Speier had recommended.601 With some satisfaction, 
                                                 
596 “Notes on Probable Soviet approach to a CFM and Consequences for the Western Allied Position,” 
HICOG Berlin, 26 January 1951, NARA, RG 466, HICOG Berlin, EAD, Box 3. 
597 McCloy to Secretary of State, 14 February 1951 (FOIA release to author). 
598 McCloy to Secretary of State, 16 March 1951, NARA, RG 59, 762A.00/3-1651. 
599 HICOG Frankfurt to Secretary of State, 20 August 1951, NARA, RG 59, 511.62A/8-1651.  
600 HICOG Frankfurt to Secretary of State, 20 August 1951, NARA, RG 59, 511.62A/8-1651. 
601 “PEPCO: Minutes of the Forty-fourth Meeting,” HICOG Frankfurt to Department of State, 7 March 
1951, NARA, RG 59, 762.00/3-751. 
192 
they noted that West German leaders were increasingly inclined to support 
countermeasures.602 Following Grotewohl’s initiative, officials in the Ministry of All-
German Affairs (“Kaiser Ministry”) promised to do everything to counteract the initiative 
by a “stepped-up propaganda campaign.”603  Meeting with HICOG public affairs chief 
Shepard Stone in early January, Kaiser, his state secretary Franz Thedieck, and SPD leader 
Herbert Wehner emphasized the desirability of cooperating and consulting “on as many 
anti-communist projects as possible.” The Kaiser Ministry had just completed distributing 
some 30,000 pamphlets on the GDR elections throughout East Germany, and intended to 
do the same (“in large numbers”) with the “Adenauer declaration.”  The West Germans, 
the Americans noted with some degree of satisfaction, were “becoming more conscious of 
the danger of infiltration from the East and more uneasy about the fact that little is being 
done to prevent it.”604  On January 15, the Adenauer government issued a “White Book” 
on the unity question, for distribution in East and West Germany. About the same time, 
representatives from the political parties and non-governmental groups were discussing 
plans for establishing informal anti-Communist groups throughout the Federal Republic. 
McCloy thought that the effort was “encouraging,” particularly that it had a broad political 
basis.605  
In mid-April, GDR leaders launched a campaign for a remilitarization plebiscite 
with a “crescendoing timetable tentatively fixed,” likely, HICOG thought, to climax in a 
plebiscite possibly as early as May 15. PEPCO decided to make the plebiscite a U.S. 
“intelligence target,” though at that point the committee agreed that there was no legal 
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basis for prohibiting the plebiscite as such.606 From the start, the Americans felt hampered 
in opposing the plebiscite head-on by the fact that Western defense plans had not been 
definitely settled, and initially decided to give it the “silent treatment.”607 Much to the 
surprise of PEPCO, the West Germans themselves -- “without prodding” by HICOG -- 
initiated a nation-wide “exposure campaign,” determined to discredit the plebiscite. On 
April 25 the federal government banned the plebiscite altogether on constitutional 
grounds. Washington now grew concerned that the ensuing arrests and trials of plebiscite 
proponents would be used as an opportune platform to propagate neutralism and detract 
from the Western defense program. The State Department urgently cabled HICOG to 
delicately suggest a line for the prosecution that might turn the trials to the psychological 
advantage: “identify and expose [the] real sponsors, agents and victims of the 
plebiscite.”608 Much to the relief of HICOG, the West German interior ministry indicated 
that police action against the plebiscite would be “primarily preventive in nature” and 
foresaw few arrests.609   
What advice HICOG-controlled media would give to the East Germans on how to 
handle the plebiscite, scheduled for June 3-5, 1951, proved even more divisive. Based on 
the experience of the October elections, HICOG’s Berlin Element decided that Western 
media outlets should neither advise the East Germans to vote “no” nor to vote “yes” on a 
ballot that asked “Are you against the remilitarization of Germany and for the conclusion 
of a peace treaty with Germany in 1951?” Instead, Western media would express their 
sympathy with the East Germans’ predicaments over what choice to make. While advice 
for a “no”-vote would not prevent an overwhelming proportion of East Germans to vote 
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“yes,” it might cause conscientious “resisters” to expose themselves and ultimately reduce 
resistance potential within the GDR. Endorsement of a “yes”-vote, however, as in October 
1950, had come under considerable criticism by church circles and youth leaders for 
absolving the individual from personal responsibility and for constitution a “blow at their 
will to resist.”610 By June 1 it became evident that no “united front” existed between the 
Americans, the Kaiser Ministry and the SPD. In the last days preceding the plebiscite three 
different courses of action were broadcast to the East Germans.611 Exasperated by the 
intra-German dissensions, HICOG officials let the party leaders know that “a united front 
on the Eastern question is too important to U.S. propaganda media to permit clashing 
personalities and thin skins to disrupt it.”612 
The SED regime unleashed what U.S. observers called a “terrific barrage of 
propaganda,” which reportedly was even more intense, if somewhat less overt, than in the 
fall of 1950. The SED mobilized some 150,000 agitators and, SED strong man Ulbricht 
undertook a last-minute “stomping tour” through the GDR.613 Predictably, the GDR 
government reported an affirmative vote of 95.79%. Nevertheless, the plebiscite, from 
HICOG’s point of view “clearly proved a failure.”614  Thanks to the Federal Government’s 
ban and the Allied High Commission’s suspension of papers which “propagandized” the 
plebiscite or criticized allied interference for ninety days assured that the plebiscite’s 
impact in West Germany was limited. HICOG doubted that more than 700,000 votes had 
been obtained in the Western zones, many, it suspected, obtained “under false pretenses, 
”615 Particularly noticeable was that the degree of opposition to the plebiscite had been 
                                                 
610 Eastern Element to PEPCO, 28 May 1951, NARA, RG 466, HICOG Berlin, EAD, Box 1. 
611 Maj.-Gen. G.K. Bourne/Office of the  GOC to UK High Commisioner Ivone Kirkpatrick, 14 June 1951, 
NARA, RG 466, HICOG Berlin/EAD, Box 1. 
612 McCloy to Secretary of State, 6 June 1951, NARA, RG 59, 762A.00/6-651. 
613 Maj.-Gen. G.K. Bourne/Office of the  GOC to UK High Commisioner Ivone Kirkpatrick, 14 June 1951, 
NARA, RG 466, HICOG Berlin/EAD, Box 1 
614 Eastern Element to Department of State, 18 July 1951, NARA, RG 59, 762B.00/7-1851; HICOG Bonn to 
Secretary of State, 8 June 1951, NARA, RG 59, 762A.00/6-851. 
615 HICOG Bonn to Secretary of State, 8 June 1951, NARA, RG 59, 762A.00/6-851. 
195 
higher in areas bordering on West Berlin, West Germany, Poland or Czechoslovakia. Even 
more striking was that the percentage of official “no”- votes was considerably smaller 
among the youth -- youths between the age of 16 and 18 were allowed to cast a special 
vote -- than among the rest of the population, demonstrating that the youth was among the 
most vulnerable targets to indoctrination.616 But even if it lacked immediate deep impact 
on the East German population, American officials feared events such as the plebiscite 
contributed to “chipping away at the core of the anti-regime resistance.”617   
The Carroll-Speier Report had projected psychological warfare in a long-range 
perspective but failed to address HICOG’s immediate needs in dealing with the Soviet 
anti-remilitarization campaign. In July 1951, HICOG consultant Edmond Taylor provided 
an “Interim Plan for Intensified Psychological Warfare in Germany”618 for that purpose. 
Designed as a “basic guide for increasing the effectiveness” of American psychological 
warfare efforts, the plan limited itself to the period  “up to June 1, 1952” -- hence focused 
on what was perceived as the likely critical period of negotiating the German defense 
contribution. The “Taylor Plan,” as it became known, did not propose new initiatives. Its 
purpose rather was to assure optimizing existing programs. Central to the Taylor Plan was 
the belief that “propaganda is only effective when it endlessly hammers home a few 
simple themes. These themes had to be “concentrated,” “recurrent,” “clear,” “simple” and 
“interlinked.” The plan called for a “heightened emotional tone in propaganda on 
constructive themes,” such as European unity, by “more vigorous use of mass-
participation and mass-action techniques to generate enthusiasm,” by greater reliance on 
more militant pro-Western groups in Germany, by “more aggressive and hard-hitting 
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counterpropaganda,” and by “introducing a more dramatic and spectacular flavor” to all 
American-sponsored or stimulated propaganda activities: “We must be prepared on a 24-
hour basis seven days a week to exploit instantly any propaganda opportunity created by 
spot news development.”   
Reflecting a greater optimism about the general world situation -- “operators can 
look forward to carrying out their work under the most favorable conditions since 1946” -- 
the plan demanded the reorientation and integration of all propaganda towards the 
overarching goal of European unity.  As the Carroll-Speier Report, the Taylor Plan 
demanded a greater coordination between all existing propaganda, intelligence, political 
and cultural programs.619 Taylor admitted that the Interim Plan was essentially a counter-
offensive plan aimed at defeating communist psychological warfare in Western Germany, 
as he assumed “the impossibility at this time of achieving any major positive 
psychological warfare objectives behind the Iron Curtain.” Nevertheless, the plan 
prescribed intensified psychological warfare efforts aimed at Eastern Germany, in 
particular continued vigorous attacks on Communist police state methods and slave labor 
practices behind the Iron Curtain. Propaganda towards the GDR was also to “play” the 
German unity theme “hard,” tied in with a special campaign in West Germany “to 
remember their East Zone brothers.” Following the ratification of the Schuman Plan a 
plebiscite was to be organized in East Germany via RIAS and other channels to obtain 
approval of East Germans as future citizens of United Germany and Europe entitled to be 
consulted about such a vital step.”  Taylor also argued in favor of exposing the 
“Communist Peace Aggression” to discredit Soviet propaganda.  While this term might 
appear “awkward” at first, it would “pay big dividends when the communists shift from 
peace appeals to terror-propaganda, provocation of incidents” and other more tangibly 
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violent actions. Toward the end of the period covered by his plan, Taylor advised, it would 
be time to prepare for the stepped-up psychological and economic warfare recommended 
in the Carroll-Speier Plan.620 
Taylor had warned that in the intensified propaganda efforts “we should be careful 
to avoid sounding like Goebbels”621 but that was exactly what some charged it did: The 
methods proposed by Taylor, some within HICOG’s Eastern Element commented,  
“smack entirely too much of totalitarian propaganda methods” which would “merely dull 
the senses.”622 Berlin officials criticized the plan’s emphasis on “quantity rather than 
quality,”623 and demanded that the West had to be sensitive “to the Easterner’s probable 
aversion against having only Spam [directed at them].” As to Taylor’s call for glorifying 
American democracy, Holt pointed out that the Voice of America was not popular in the 
East thanks to its “too much idealizing of America, too smugly superiority-conscious.”624 
HICOG Eastern Element chief George A. Morgan told Taylor that the “high voltage 
propaganda” advocated by the Interim Plan would likely arouse old European prejudices 
against American “super-salesmanship” and Americans as “Russen mit Bügelfalten.”625   
Nevertheless, the plan was discussed in the course of the summer, along with an expose on 
the “Exploitation of the Return to Europe Concept,” written by Ramsey. Ramsey argued 
that as a positive adjunct to U.S. policy in Western Europe, the concept would counter the 
increasing “psychological fatigue” among Soviet orbit population: “Hope and a mood of 
resistance, especially among the youth, will not persevere indefinitely in the absence of a 
clearer enunciation of United States and Western policy objectives vis-à-vis Eastern 
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Europe.” Stripped of any connotations of a return to prewar Europe, the “Return to 
Europe” concept was thought to become “predominantly popular” in the satellite 
countries, where it could counteract that the growing belief that the West had written off 
the East.  
In addition continuing resistance and defector programs, Ramsey suggested several 
projects, such renewed demands for German unity and invitations to Eastern European 
countries that paralleled to each Western step towards European integration. One such step 
would be the creation of an International Freedom Legion of Soviet orbit dissidents, a 
precursor to the later Volunteer Freedom Corps. Ramsey also proposed the establishment 
of East-West institutes to study the problems “entailed in integrating a semi-Sovietized 
nation into a European union.” Within such institutes, “the more intelligent defectors” 
could be subsidized and “certain notorious nationalist communists, such as Gomulka of 
Poland, might be induced to defect for purposes of serving in such institutes.”626   
HICOG approved both papers in principle in early August and by late September 
merged the Taylor Plan with the Ramsey paper.627 In its final form, the “Interim Plan” 
maintained much of the tone and themes of the original draft, but significantly, the 
strengthening and increase in resistance to the East German Communist regime “in 
preparation for more active and organized forms of resistance after June 1952” had 
become the leading objective.  Among the themes to be exploited was “The Five-Year 
Plan for Liberation:” indirectly it was to be suggested to the East Germans that “the 
liberation of East Germans is confidently expected within a period from three to five years 
hence.” Generally, the Interim Plan called for a “substantial shift from overt to covert and 
gray activities,” due to a large degree to the limits which the envisaged contractual 
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agreement with the Federal Republic would place on U.S. overt propaganda. In seven, still 
largely classified annexes, the Interim Plan outlined specific programs which would 
implement its general approach. Annex “E,” “Special and Semi-Covert Activities,” 
envisaged among other things, the “creation of permanent German agencies” that would 
allow for implementation of psychological warfare activities following the contractual 
agreements. Annex E also provided for clandestine support for a permanent European 
youth camp, a strong, militant youth organization, an inter-European radio agency, 
speakers’ bureaus, study centers and research institutes of various kind, available to 
produce gray films, pamphlets, posters, and stage rallies, spots festivals and plebiscites as 
well as large-scale polls. As envisaged, for example, the projected youth organization 
would agitate militantly for a united Europe, that is, “within the broad letter of the law,” 
engage in “the crashing of borders, the publishing of ‘black books,’ ‘raids,’ and 
‘invasions,’” as well as more “orthodox activities” such as parades and wall writing. The 
Taylor Plan also suggested that such an organization have clandestine cells in Eastern 
Europe.628  In November, Washington approved most of the aforementioned projects.629    
 
6. Target: East German Youth 
East German youth remained central to American psychological warfare efforts, 
reinforced by the SED’s plans, announced in January 1951, to host the World Youth 
Festival (WYF) in Berlin in August of that year. The decision by the communist controlled 
World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) in November 1950 to hold its third 
convention in Berlin (flowing meetings in Prague in 1947 and Budapest in 1949) 
underlined the importance of Berlin and Germany as central staging grounds for the 
globalizing Cold War: with nearly one and a half million expected participants from all 
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over the world expected to come to Berlin for a 14-day display of international solidarity, 
the festival was designed to make a powerful statement on behalf of the world’s youth for 
the new German state and against West German rearmament. 630 The program would 
include mass singing of fighting songs for peace, performances of national dances and 
international sports contests. It also was a recognition of East Germany’s successful 
orchestration of the May 1950 Deutschlandtreffen and the FDJ’s growing importance in 
the socialist worlds youth movement. Having survived the debacle over the militant 
posturing of the Whitsuntide rally, FDJ chairman Erich Honecker headed the prestigious 
preparatory committee alongside WFDY president Enrico Berlinguer and International 
Union of Students chairman Joza Grohman.  
Given the sheer difference in size, Communist world preparations for the World 
Youth Festival quickly outdid those for the Deutschlandtreffen. No efforts seemed to have 
been spared to provide the more than a million young people with transport, food and 
lodging in a city still reeling from the devastation that the war had brought about. At the 
beginning of February 1951, the site of the old Hohenzollern Palace was leveled to create 
a vast assembly area, which on May Day that year was given the name “Marx-Engels-
Platz.”  To give the city a prosperous air, the East Germans set about renovating some of 
the monuments in downtown area (such as the Arsenal Museum and the Brandenburg 
Gate), and several new luxury stores opened in the main streets. “Socialist Sundays” saw 
FDJ members constructing and renovating stadiums, pools and camp sites. The some 
120,000 foreign participants were to be accommodated in hotels, boarding houses and 
private rooms; most of the East German visitors would sleep in huge group tents. The 
organizers set up some 542 kitchens to feed the delegates and recruited some 6,000 
doctors, 20,000 nurses and 50,000 medicals assistants to provide free care for the rally 
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participants. All in all, the costs of hosting the festival amounted, according to official 
GDR sources, to some 160 million East German marks ($48 million at the official 
exchange rate), which bore heavily on the GDR economy.631  
American officials quickly came to realize that the World Youth Festival would 
differ from the May 1950 Deutschlandtreffen in its larger international appeal, and, more 
importantly, its lack of overt threats for an invasion of West Berlin. To be sure, East Berlin 
police was reinforced and a 920-strong youth battalion was recruited to reinforce the 
Volkspolizei. Some Western officials fretted over the potential for a violent crisis.632 Yet 
the festival preparations bore none of the militancy that had beset the run-up to the 
Deutschlandtreffen; threats on West Berlin ran counter to stated purpose of the gathering 
as a peace demonstration against the anticipated rearming of the Federal Republic. East 
German measures that aimed at keeping the assembled youth from visiting the West 
seemed to confirm that an “invasion” of the West Berlin was not on the agenda.   
The Truman administration took the event seriously nonetheless. Contrary to 
British nervousness over the unprecedented influx of youth into the GDR capital, the 
administration now saw the event as an opportunity for a massive counteroffensive. In 
striking difference to Deutschlandtreffen, the emphasis within HICOG planning turned 
almost exclusively on exploiting to the maximum this chance for contact with youth from 
behind the “Iron Curtain.” In February, the Western Berlin commandants formed the so-
called “August Committee” that would coordinate Western preparations. At first HICOG 
planners agreed that they should avoid “trying to beat the Communists at their own game” 
by staging a Western youth rally. Last minute counterattractions might also play into the 
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hands of the communists by showing undue concern, defensiveness, on top of further 
highlighting the festival. The West would do best by displaying “normalcy” in Berlin.633  
That things were not left to “being normal” was evident in the systematic efforts 
the allies took to undermine the participation of Western youth in the perceived 
communist-front event: Throughout the spring, American and Allied authorities in 
Germany tightened border controls along the inner-German borderline to forestall illegal 
departures of Western German youth to Berlin. Carefully transit permits were screened to 
deny potential foreign participants access to Berlin via West Germany. Key communist 
youth leaders, such as Joliot Curie, were blacklisted for visa refusal. U.S. 
counterintelligence officials also suggested deterrence by “dealing out a number of 
exemplary sentences” to FDJ agitators apprehended in West Berlin. With the 
Deutschlandtreffen in mind, HICOG launched a scare campaign to scare parents of  FDJ 
members into keeping their kids at home. American officials in West Germany even 
encouraged the right-wing Bund Deutscher Jugend (BDJ) to conduct “harassing 
operations” against the FDJ, despite the fact that the extremist BDJ’s principles were “not 
considered completely compatible with U.S. interests.”634 In Washington, the State 
Department took the 65 American citizens slated to join the WYF under surveillance; lists 
of purported “subversives” headed for Berlin, including eight southern Australians and 
five Ceylonese, poured in from embassies and consulates around the world.635   
As the World Youth Festival drew closer, intelligence reports confirmed that the 
SED was discouraging any thought of violence. With a sense of vulnerability waning 
further, the Americans in Berlin increasingly favored the kind of countermeasures which 
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they initially had sought to avoid. As early as February, Deputy High Commissioner 
Samuel Reber and HICOG Public Affairs director Shepard Stone had argued in favor of 
staging “political and psychological demonstration on the part of the West European 
countries (...) to offset the effect of the Communist festival.”  West Berlin was to be “in a 
very normal way, full of very desirable attractions such as good films, music programs etc. 
at the time of the Communist festival.”636  In March, Stone and his colleagues suggested 
holding a European Youth Festival -- with the U.S. role in the program to be kept 
secret.637 U. S. authorities in Berlin requested four mobile motion picture units complete 
with projection facilities to broaden East-West sector border showings “to facilitate 
contacts with and influence upon Communist youth brought to Berlin for political 
purposes.” They would provide an “invaluable border attraction,” especially “since we’re 
not attempting competitive sideshows per se.” 638  HICOG officials later advanced the idea 
holding a major plebiscite on the subject of European union as a major counter-attraction 
and discussed the idea with Reuter, who responded enthusiastically. Given that other 
German leaders responded more ambiguously and that the British and French were 
“dragging their heels” in using allied funds for the project, this idea was finally 
abandoned.639 
Nonetheless, compared to the efforts in May 1950 to contain the East Germans to 
the Soviet sector, by the spring 1951 U.S. policy had come full circle. By the end of May, 
State Department cabled McCloy that plans were on the way for “coordinated global 
campaign to counteract and discredit (the) Communist World Youth Congress.”640 Earlier 
that month, the “August Committee” had finalized various countermeasures such as a 
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Marshall Plan exhibit, a Europazug display and a television exhibit. Some two million 
pamphlets and satirical booklets were to be distributed to the visiting youth; Radio Free 
Europe would feature broadcasts by prominent iron curtain refugees on the World Youth 
Festival.641  By July, intelligence reports indicated that the Soviets were intent on 
imposing stricter bans against visits to Berlin than had been the case during the 
Deutschlandtreffen. Reflecting the more aggressive stance outlined in the Carroll-Speier 
and Taylor Plans, High Commission officials abandoned the normalcy concept in their 
approach to the World Youth Festival altogether. Discarding the “ostrich attitude,” U.S. 
policy was to be “more positive and aggressive that heretofore contemplated” and take full 
advantage of the “an unusual opportunity to propagandize [the] Eastern youth. With no 
barrels held, HICOG now appropriated additional $200,000 in funding for counter-
attractions, though it was agreed that the dramatic increase needed to “be handled very 
delicately” vis-à-vis the British, French and West Germans.642 PEPCO now favored 
issuing a public invitation to the East German youth to come to visit West-Berlin; a 
targeted hospitality program at some 50 youth centers would be awaiting the 200,000 
WYC participants that were expected to visit the Western sectors.643 Leaving nothing to 
chance, the Western youth officials would “receive preparatory courses [in] history 
politics, international events enabling them to converse intelligently with the visitors to the 
West.”644 Arguing that the risk of a mass defection was minimal, the Americans rather 
expected that an open invitation would cause the Soviets to tighten the ban against visits to 
the West. This in turn would allow a “prison psychology” to develop among many of the 
                                                 
641 McCloy to Acheson, 28 May 1951, FRUS 1951, III, p. 2005-2006. 
642 “PEPCO: Minutes of the Fifty-Second Meeting (Held July 9, 1951), HICOG Frankfurt to Department of 
State, 10 July 1951, RG 466, HICOG Berlin, Box 3. 
643 Ibid. 
644 Page to Shepard Stone, 17 July 1951, FRUS 1951, III, pp. 2008-2010, here p. 2010.  
205 
East German youth, a result that would be “one of the more tangible propaganda 
advantages which the West might hope to obtain from the World Youth Festival.”645 
The 14-day World Youth Festival, which culminated in what an evidently 
impressed American observer called a “monster parade”646 by the FDJ through the Soviet 
sector, did provide Americans with the unprecedented opportunity to influence “the largest 
group of East German youth ever to come into contact with the West.” 647 Of the 
approximately 1.4 million East Germans and 35,000 youth from abroad participating in 
the festival, over half a million (according to some estimates more than 680,000) turned 
their backs on sports, cultural events and speeches in the eastern sector and visited West 
Berlin “to taste the forbidden fruits of capitalism.”648 (The Americans counted 1.004,206 
crossings into West Berlin, though this number probably included repeat visitors.) So 
crowded were the Zoo Station area or the Kurfürstendamm with blue-shirted and blue-
skirted youth that, as one American observer noted, one could have the impression that the 
festival was being held in the Western sectors.649  Among the chief attractions was RIAS; 
by August 16 nearly 7,000 crowded into the station’s facilities.650 Kurt Schumacher and 
Jacob Kaiser were on hand to assure them that “under Soviet domination they could never 
hope to become free and equal,” and eleven teenage World Youth Festival delegates found 
themselves surprise luncheon guests of McCloy, though it remained an open question 
whether they were “awed more by their proximity to the top-ranking United States official 
in Germany than by the quantity of the food served to them.” McCloy, who apparently got 
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so wrapped up in the discussion that he lost two hours in his schedule, pledged to the 
young visitors that “we will do everything we can to help you,” and sent them on their 
way with the assurance that “the Lady of Liberty still holds aloft her torch in New York 
harbor, and one day freedom and peace will come not only for Western but also for 
Eastern Germany.”651  
Free meals, free theater tickets and free sightseeing was particularly enticing in 
light of massive organizational shortcomings of the festival:652 “We get worse food than at 
home, and that is pretty bad, and sleep likes pigs in straw in cellars,” one young participant 
was quoted.653 East German participants were especially outraged by the far larger food 
rations and better accommodations received by the few West German and foreign 
participants. Numerous participants “defected,” including young Traude Eisenkold, who 
East German propaganda had reportedly built up as the “ideal progressive woman” and as 
such was to be the “queen” of the proceedings. “I’d rather pound a typewriter, even scrub 
floors, in the West than be a Communist glamour girl in the east…” she apparently told 
AP.654  In a last-ditch dramatic effort to halt the flow of East German youth to the West by 
exposing the alleged brutality of West Berlin police (and perhaps to re-establish his 
credibility in the wake of severe criticism for some of the logistical deficiencies at the 
World Youth Festival), FDJ leader Erich Honecker led some 8,000 FDJ members, 
organized in 50-men groups, for an “invasion” into the Western sectors on August 15. The 
“disturbance mission,” however, proved ineffective, and by the next day, West Berlin 
police reported “all quiet on the eastern front.”655  
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The World Youth Festival therefore turned out to be, in HICOG’s opinion, “a gain 
for the West.” American officials expected the East German youth who had “tasted a non-
Communist atmosphere” to be long affected by the experience. The rally was considered 
to have contributed to “the strengthening of East German anti-regime and pro-Western 
sentiment, a factor which should not be underestimated for its effect upon future attitudes 
in East Germany.”656 According to some accounts, a million pieces of literature had been 
distributed, and “many youngsters planned to smuggle them back.”657 But while the West 
had shown the young East Germans that it was determined not to “write them off,” many 
of them, officials suspected, would likely be disappointed that no “immediate radical 
alleviation” of their situation was in store. Over-optimistic assumptions about the 
resistance potential of young East Germans were therefore misplaced. Aside from the 
“generally submissive nature of the East German population,” HICOG argued, it had to be 
recognized that the motives of many festival attendees had  non-political. Rather, left to 
their own devices, many had been impelled to go West by curiosity, by free snacks and the 
desire to buy Western goods. Many were “not necessarily pro-West” and revealed a lack 
of information, a misunderstanding and skepticism about Western policies. Though they 
might not subscribe to the communist program, the HICOG analysts noted, “many East 
German youth reflected in their reactions to certain ideas, in their modes of expression, 
and in their mental images the effects of Communist propaganda.” Once again, the large 
mass demonstration had illustrated the “ability of a totalitarian regime to carry along the 
masses via a small proportion of hard core fanatics.”658 
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7. Mobilizing East German Resistance Spirit: The U.S. Reaction to the 1952 Stalin 
Note in New Light  
Negotiations on the European Defense Community (Paris Treaty) and the 
contractuals terminating the occupation statute (Bonn Treaty) entered their final stages in 
late 1951. In March, the so-called “Stalin note” raised the stakes by new bold proposals on 
German unification. Delivered by Soviet deputy foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, the 
measures suggested in the note differed significantly from earlier Soviet proposals. The 
Soviet government proposed to conclude a peace treaty with a unified but neutral German 
state, which would be permitted to build-up national armed forces. After initial hesitation, 
Washington and its allies concluded that the note had to be taken seriously. From 
Moscow’s perspective it would optimally create a German state that could be drawn into 
Moscow’s orbit, minimally it would threaten to impede the imminent conclusion of the 
contractuals and EDC. The note had, as Acheson’s advisers admitted, the “ring of 
considered policy,”659 omitted demands for four-power control long dismissed by the 
Western allies, and reversed the previous Soviet position on German armed forces. But 
only an actual relaxation of controls in East Germany, it was felt at Foggy Bottom, would 
impact West German and Western European opinion enough to delay or block the 
conclusion on the EDC.660 U.S. intelligence agencies estimated that the Soviets would not 
pay such a price. Administration officials were far more concerned that actual Russian 
measures, such as speaking invitations by the GDR to prominent West Germans, re-
licensing of the SPD in the GDR, or a proposal for all-Berlin elections under quadripartite 
supervision might in fact succeed in undermining West German support for the EDC while 
not really endangering the Soviet position in the GDR.661  
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Historians have focused on the question of whether the Western reaction to the 
Stalin note was too defensive; too wedded to containment rather than a roll-back of Soviet 
power beyond the Oder-Neiße, possibly missing an opportunity to achieve the unity of the 
country. That debate has ignored the fact that the American response to the Stalin note fit 
into a larger offensive strategy to counter Soviet moves in Germany. Since the previous 
December, the Psychological Strategy Board had set out, at the suggestion of CIA director 
Walter Bedell Smith, to develop a national psychological strategy plan to strengthen pro-
integration sentiment in the Western Germany and to make East Germany a strategic 
liability to Moscow.662 Over a period of several months, the PSB’s “Panel F,” which 
included officials from State, defense and the CIA and relied on outside consultants such 
as Carroll, Speier, Philip Davidson, Walt Rostow and Henry Kissinger, developed a plan 
codenamed “Plutonic” (later renamed “Pocketbook”) which built on the Carroll-Speier-
Report and the “Interim Plan” (“Taylor Plan”).663 In their discussions, panel members 
envisioned “blasting the [West] Germans out of their political apathy”664 and emphasized 
the need for “the most definite, vigorous, ambitious, psychological offensive against the 
Soviet position in Eastern Europe.” Nowhere did Soviet vulnerabilities seem more 
pronounced than in East Germany where “extensive, sharply offensive and effective 
psychological operations, both overt and covert” were already under way, supported by 
German resistance organizations. East Germany offered a “particularly favorable and 
perhaps decisive terrain.”665  
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There was growing evidence that the East German populace seemed to favor West 
Germany’s inclusion into Western defense arrangements. Letters and visitors received by 
RIAS in early 1952 suggested that many believed that only a (West) European army could 
bring enough pressure on the East to bring about a peaceful solution of the German 
question.666 Further research by HICOG into popular attitudes behind the iron curtain 
revealed that the defense debate in the Bundestag in February 1952 in particular 
contributed to crystallizing East Zone opinion, convincing many that only through a 
militarily strong Western Europe would it be possible to force Moscow to negotiate a 
peaceful and lasting solution of the German problem. Following the World Youth Festival 
and the 1951 Kirchentag in Berlin, the Bundestag defense debate had become the “third 
miracle for the West.”667 On 10 March 1952, the very day Stalin sent his note on German 
unification, Berlin officials informed Washington that the Western policy of integration 
was regarded by the majority of East Germans not as precluding but rather furthering 
unification.  
But U.S. officials in Berlin also cautioned that the remarkable degree of 
“immunity” the East Germans had maintained vis-à-vis their government’s unity 
campaign depended to a large extent on the actions of the Western powers. East Germans 
saw free, internationally supervised all-German elections as a corollary to integration and 
wanted constant and concrete reassurances to that effect.668 The Stalin note offered an 
opportunity to do just that. Throughout the note exchange, the State Department continued 
to emphasize the importance of free elections as central to any Western response. 
Increasingly convinced that the West had more to gain by a careful proposal for 
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negotiations, Acheson at the end March of even signaled his willingness to enter into 
negotiations with the Russians. Unwilling to run the risk of such an offensive 
counterstrategy, the British and French governments, with Adenauer’s support, added 
conditions to the Western counterproposal, such as settling the issue if Germany’s eastern 
border (Oder-Neisse line). Most importantly, the Western notes sent to Moscow on March 
25 insisted that a unified Germany would be free to enter any alliance it saw fit to chose, a 
demand Moscow was expected to resist at all cost. 
Maintaining a sense of insecurity on the part of the Soviet occupiers and the 
Grotewohl regime was essential, Truman administration officials believed, in order to 
create conditions under which Moscow would in the long run agree the unification of 
Germany, and in order to counter, more immediately, the SED regime’s mounting scare 
campaign against West Berlin and Western Germany and to slow its efforts to consolidate 
its hold on power in the eastern zone.669 While State and Defense Department officials 
referred to East Germany’s “liberation from communist control” as the ultimate goal of 
U.S. policy vis-à-vis the GDR in their discussions in early 1952, the immediate focus was 
on Berlin.670 McCloy was concerned about new threats to drive home to the West 
Germans the perils of rejecting the Kremlin offer: Berlin was the “obvious point of 
exploitation.” Moscow and East Berlin would attempt to unsettle West German confidence 
by launching a “creeping blockade” of the city, creating East German armed forces, 
staging border incidents and setting off  “rumblings” of Soviet military power. 671 
Following the Western rejection of the Stalin note, McCloy expected a “scare campaign” 
to parallel the fizzling diplomatic exchange, climaxing possibly in a full-fledged war scare 
as ratification of the contractuals grew nearer. Border incidents, plane incidents and troop 
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concentrations or maneuvers could all be “part of the game,” as could be a closing of the 
GDR border and a proclamation of GDR sovereignty.672 Incidents of military police 
stoppage between Berlin and Western Germany indeed increased, as did the militancy of 
the SED leaders towards the West. In early May, Ulbricht threatened West Berlin security, 
while communist riots in Essen underlined the potential for disturbances in the Western 
Germany. While the Germans had come to regard threats from the GDR as “cries of wolf 
wolf,” the “crust of West German courage,” McCloy warned, was “understandably 
thin.”673 The High Commissioner suggested using police and military measures to deter 
the Soviets from actions that might trigger a real war scare and called for a propaganda 
offensive which particularly should “stress Ger[man] unity as [a] goal basic to tri[partite] 
policy on Germany.”674 In Washington, Acheson approved McCloy’s request and asked 
for speedier build-up of the Berlin stockpile.675 West Germans and Berliners took the “war 
of nerves” in strides, and American officials concluded that the Soviet and East German 
pressure campaign was actually stiffening the resolution of many Germans.676  
The administration, however, soon realized that the most significant thrust of 
Soviet and SED policy was in the direction of further isolating the East German 
population. In early April 1952, Stalin had in fact told the East German leaders, in an 
apparent reaction to the Western rejection of his March offer, to “organize an independent 
state.” The Soviet leader demanded that they turn the relatively open demarcation line 
between East and West Germany into a “border,” and that everything needed to be done to 
“strengthen the defense of this border.” Stalin also decreed the creation of an East German 
army--“without making much noise”--announcing that the “pacifist period” was over--
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"[pacifism] was needed in the past but not any more.”677 Finally, he also sanctioned the 
piecemeal socialization of GDR agriculture and industry, but “even now they should not 
shout about socialism.”678 Within weeks, HICOG Berlin noted GDR efforts to reorganize 
the East German border police and the construction shacks being erected near the Elbe 
autobahn bridge.679 Intelligence reports also detailed alleged Soviet plans discussed in 
Chuikov’s office in late March to establish a 30 km restricted zone around Greater Berlin 
to cut off the East Zone “masses” from easy access to the city. The construction of a by-
pass rail and by-pass canal that would have obviated the need to cross the western sectors 
reinforced the increasing conviction on the part of many in HICOG that short of risking 
war by forcing an end to Western allied presence in Berlin, Soviet and SED leaders sought 
to “to insulate the East zone population from it.”680   
That was precisely what the cold warriors on the Psychological Strategy Board 
sought to avoid. By summer, the Plutonic team had overcome initial bureaucratic 
infighting and agreed to a program that called for exploiting a free West Berlin as a “show 
window of democracy” (as well as a base for psywar operations), holding out hope for a 
unified and democratic Germany and encouraging the continued “disaffection” of East 
Germans towards the SED and defection from the ranks of the Soviet and GDR military 
and para-military forces. The final plan, PSB D-21, drafted largely by a working group 
within the Department of State and considerably “watered down from earlier drafts” which 
had also called for substantive economic and military measures, approved non-attributable 
psychological, political and economic “harassment activities in the Soviet Zone” and 
preparation “under controlled conditions for such more active forms of resistance as may 
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later be authorized.”  RIAS, Voice of America and other official information media were 
to “create a climate conducive to disaffection,” and publications disseminated in the GDR 
were to discredit communist personalities and “stimulate resistance attitudes.”681 In 
particular, the CIA was charged to develop “controlled resistance nuclei capable of 
expansion and deployment for the purpose, when authorized, of conducting sabotage and 
other activities”682 and to encourage East Germans to work with “controlled resistance 
networks” in passive harassment measures such as work slow downs, faulty workmanship, 
misrouting of shipments to reduce the GDR’s economic contribution to Soviet military-
industrial complex. Similarly, East Germans were to cause administrative inefficiency 
through non-compliance with governmental regulations. U.S. media would make sure that 
the growing resistance attitudes as a result of these activities would not be lost on 
Moscow. At the same time, PSB D-21 called for informing the Soviet Zone of world 
events and demonstrating U.S. willingness to negotiate German unity provided that a 
“reasonable basis” for such negotiations existed.683 Concurrent to the development of PSB 
D-21, a  plan for “Day X” was developed for the coordination of psychological warfare 
between civilian and military agencies in time of war, including planning for more active 
resistance and sabotage.684   
PSB D-21 provided for the continuation of the two most significant information 
outlets, RIAS and the pony edition of the Neue Zeitung, both designed in particular to 
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reach audiences in eastern Germany.685 Given the lack of access to operational sources by 
the CIA (which was charged with much of the covert operations), only an incomplete 
account of covert and semi-covert psychological warfare activities authorized under PSB 
D-21 exists.686 But it seems clear that PSB D-21 continued earlier practices by the 
administration to “stimulate” German organizations “to increase their independent 
propaganda activities” in Germany and seeking “German sponsorship for American 
produced or inspired information.”687 Much of HICOG’s support continued to fund anti-
communist books, pamphlets and posters for distribution by German parties and groups to 
East Germans. Thus HICOG spent DM 222,000 in September 1952 to underwrite a book-
publishing program with the publishing house Kiepenheuer and Witsch which over the 
following six months would produce titles such as “Nationalismus und Kommunismus” 
(by Lothar von Ballusek, in 20,000 copies), “Die Satellisiserung der Sowjetzone” (by Gerd 
Frieddenrich, in 20,000 copies) and French author Anton Ciliga’s “Sibirien (in 5,000 
copies), to be distributed at no charge through “special channels” to the GDR.688 Other 
activities included efforts to exploit the forced evacuation of the GDR border population 
and the GDR “celebration” of the anniversary of the bombing of Dresden.689  
The PSB’s blueprint for pursuing a Cold War vis-à-vis East Germany remained 
controversial within the Truman administration. State Department officials initially took 
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exception to any suggestions of “increasing our potential aggressiveness,”690 and some 
within HICOG wondered aloud whether encouragement of resistance groups would not 
imply support of violent actions that would raise the very “same objections which are the 
West’s most justified complaints against Communism.” To these “front-line observers” 
these were not abstract questions: members of a West Berlin resistance organization were 
being tried for trying to “impede the flow of strategic materials” by means of dynamite. 
There was growing opposition among West German and Berlin circles, especially church 
circles involved in humanitarian aid activities, to the extreme measures of various Berlin-
based resistance organizations, especially the Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit  
which threatened the last remaining links with counterparts in the East.691  With its 
calculated risk of violence, people in West and East were “beginning to feel that the West 
after all may be willing to sacrifice human beings in the East for its ends—sacrifice them 
when it cannot protect them, sacrifice them without hope of immediate change of 
conditions.”692 Less controversial at the time but no less significant in the long run was the 
questionable notion that ground swell of resistance in the GDR could be inspired and 
“controlled” by the United States.  Internally, top HICOG officials acknowledged that 
“some of the means used, particularly by [the] Kampfgruppe,” were “questionable” and 
needed to be coordinated more effectively “in the future to insure activities are confined 
within generally approved framework.”693  
PSB D-21’s sweeping call for disaffection and defection came under similar 
criticism. Indiscriminate defection, HICOG officials argued, would lead to a break-up of 
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“resistant Soviet Zone society:” it would be “a disaster” if those involved in resistance 
work in the GDR were “to defect and exchange their vital jobs in the East for 
unemployment in the West.” RIAS had therefore “long and consciously leaned over 
backward in avoiding any implication that we encourage defection.” Even more targeted 
defections of military and para-military forces were considered highly questionable by 
some in the field, as they might exacerbate unemployment in Western Germany and in the 
long-run “boomerang” to the detriment of U.S. interests given insufficient reception 
programs in the West.694 More fundamentally, the psychological strategy plans suffered 
from an integrated overall statement of U.S. policy on Germany. Internally, State 
Department officials insisted that they could not give any “definite assurance” to the 
Germans that integration would achieve unification, rather that integration was a 
conditions of unification “on your terms.”695 But that link was precisely what American 
officials in Germany felt would provide the justification for any action program of the sort 
suggested in “Pocketbook.”  The United States, they advised, had to state “(a) how 
integration of the Federal Republic will promote unification, (b) how the Soviet zone fits 
into this, (c) what positive contribution the East Germans can make as part of the joint 
effort to attain the goal of unity.” If the East Germans were made to feel they were 
“contributing partners and not just objects of U.S. and Western Allied policy,” U.S. 
officials in Berlin argued, they would “respond to a passive resistance program, even if it 
entaile[ed] personal risks.”696 
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8. Conclusion 
After the establishment of the GDR, the Truman administration developed – and to 
a certain extent implemented -- an increasingly aggressive psychological warfare strategy 
that aimed at denying legitimacy to the new German state, seizing the initiative in the 
East-West German discourse over the national question, mobilizing the resistance 
potential in East German and turning the SED regime into a strategic liability for Moscow. 
In the wake of the Deutschlandtreffen, the Truman administration became increasingly 
convinced that – rather than “containing” the GDR behind the increasingly tighter Iron 
Curtain – maintaining contact with the East German population was critical to keeping 
alive the “spirit of resistance,” particularly among the East German youth, and to keeping 
the SED regime off balance. West Berlin still offered manifold opportunities for such 
efforts, but intensified pressure on the GDR suffered from lack of West German and 
Western allied support for a more aggressive policy and, more importantly, from the 
incongruence of  American policy goals in Germany – in particular American ambivalence 
on the effecting German unification in the short term. Credibly serious peaceful pursuit of 
German unification was essential to keeping alive the spirit of resistance in the East, yet 
from Berlin to Washington American officials were doubtful that German unity could be 
restored in the foreseeable future – and that it was in United States national interest. Given 
these doubts, how far was the United States willing to go should resistance in East 
Germany take on a more active character?  
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IV 
Economic Cold War Against the GDR 
 
1. Beyond the Counter-Blockade: U.S. Economic Warfare  
As Walter Ulbricht and his colleagues in the SED politburo were staring down the 
abyss of a popular revolt in June 1953 that seemed to engulf the Communist authorities in 
their demise, its most ardent adversary held out a helping hand.697  At the very height of 
the crisis, Konrad Adenauer’s government renewed an interzonal trade agreement that 
helped the embattled GDR regime to appease its population by ameliorating the food 
shortages its policies had produced. The incident highlighted the ambivalent attitudes in 
Germany towards using lingering economic ties between the two German states as 
political-strategic weapons in the Cold War.  
By contrast, trade restrictions and other “economic warfare” had played a central 
role in American policy since the beginning of that confrontation. With loans, reparations, 
and, most prominently, the European Recovery Program, Washington had leveraged its 
unrivaled postwar economic prowess to induce Soviet and (inter)-West European 
cooperation. Once the Soviet “totalitarianism” had replaced Nazism as the “main threat,” 
the Truman administration had sought to curtail strategic exports to the U.S.SR, and, more 
generally, to prevent East-West trade from augmenting the war potential of the Soviet 
bloc. On March 1, 1948, the United States instituted a wide-ranging catalog of export 
controls. In August, the administration instructed Averell Harriman, the Special 
Representative in Europe for the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), to 
negotiate the adoption by Western European countries of two lists of goods which should 
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either be denied to Soviet bloc countries entirely (“1A List”) or limited in quantity for 
export (“1B List”).  
Though sympathetic to American thinking, Western European Marshall Plan 
recipients dragged their feet on cutting off trade with Eastern Europe. The issue pitted the 
United States against its major Western European allies. In January 1949 Britain and 
France agreed on a list of commodities to be embargoed, but the Anglo-French list fell far 
short of the U.S. 1A list. Not until the fall of 1949 did the majority of Western European 
countries agree to put in place export controls and coordinate policy with the United States 
and other ECA countries. The issue remained a sore point in U.S.-Western European 
relations, even after the export controls accords of January 1950, which created a joint 
coordinating committee (COCOM). While American commercial interest in Eastern 
Europe and Russian was negligible, ECA recipients claimed that their recovery efforts 
depended on the expansion of trade with their traditional commercial partners in the East. 
Washington’s expansive notion of goods capable of contributing to Soviet bloc war 
potential—which included the basic economy of Communist countries—would lead in the 
eyes of many Europeans to severing all economic relations with the East and amount to 
all-out industrial warfare. The controversy reached deep into the Truman administration 
itself where those concerned with stabilizing Western Europe to prevent Communist 
exploitation of postwar socio-economic degradation and political fatigue, and  later with 
building up Western European economic and military cohesion and strength, confronted 
those primarily focused on holding down Soviet bloc strength and reconstruction.698 
Germany, under military occupation and then High Commission authority, was 
forced to implement the more comprehensive 1A and 1B lists, reinforcing the breakdown 
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of prewar trade patterns and German economic unity of the former Reich, envisioned in 
the Potsdam Accords and sought by German business. Traditionally, eastern-central 
Germany had been the country’s bread basket and heavily depended on imports of hard 
coal and steel as well as heavy-industrial products from the Ruhr (and to a lesser extent 
from Upper Silesia, which after the war came under Polish administration), which it in 
turn processed into finished goods. Wartime economy had only accelerated eastern 
Germany’s degree of specialization in processing industrial goods. By 1946, the Soviet 
zone was almost completely dependent on the West for iron and coal, for 92% of its  
pressed metal and for 84% of it concrete supplies. With the disintegration of the Control 
Council, the exchange of goods throughout Germany gave way to the exigencies of 
separate zonal economies. Drastically different reparation policies sharpened the 
disparities between the zones’ industrial complexion: Red Army looting and SMA 
dismantling weakened the SBZ economy to the brink of collapse, while Washington’s 
determination to turn the Rhein-Ruhr into the economic catalyst of European 
reconstruction propelled the western zones into the opposite direction. Evidenced in his 
sudden reparations stop in May 1946, General Clay did not hesitate to leverage the SBZ’s 
growing dependency on western zone goods for political ends.    
But West Germany’s economic superiority had one weak spot that Stalin sought to 
exploit as his access to the western zones diminished. The 1948 “blockade” of Berlin was 
Stalin’s attempt to turn the Soviet zone’s weakness into strength, leveraging in turn the 
city’s dependence on its hinterland (particularly in brown coal, electricity and chemicals) 
and to forestall the London program.699 But the Soviet leader’s attempt at blitz economic 
warfare failed to reach its main objective, not least due to a “counter-blockade” which hit 
the SBZ hard and left western officials impressed with the possibilities of economic 
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warfare. Though the Jessup-Malik agreement and the resulting Paris Council of Foreign 
Ministers’ meeting ceded the Soviet demand that interzonal trade resume at its pre-1948 
levels, plans for the imminent establishment of a separate West German state and 
Washington’s new export control offensive undercut any Soviet efforts to reestablish 
Germany’s economic unity. Much as the threat of another blockade became a recurrent 
nightmare of American officials, the SBZ’s dependence on Western Germany became an 
obsession for Moscow and its SED allies. Reducing weakness and dependence on the 
West, acutely felt by both, put a shift in trade partners and the build up heavy industries 
uppermost on the minds of GDR authorities: “Our only resort is a radical import from the 
East.”700 
Creating the GDR’s own industrial base, however, required machine tool, steel and 
iron imports from the West, where the Ruhr industrials were only all too eager to resume 
supplying their traditional outlets. In 1947, the Minden Trade Agreement, which had 
replaced the state council agreements regulating the flow of trade since late 1945, 
reinforced the traditional regional structure: two-thirds of the Soviet occupation zone’s 
imports were iron and steel, deliveries to the Western zones were made up largely of 
grains, sugar, potatoes and textiles. Under close supervision by the occupation powers, 
representatives of the new West German government and the Eastern DWK began to 
negotiate a new trade agreement. On October 8, 1949, one day after the establishment of 
the GDR, the negotiations resulted in the so-called Frankfurt Agreement. The agreement 
projected trade between the two German states through June 1950 with a total volume of 
312 million Deutsche Mark. The Frankfurt Agreement introduced regulations that would 
characterize interzonal trade until 1990: To avoid fixing exchange rates between East and 
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West mark, the West German “Bank of German States” (the later Bundesbank) and the 
East German “Deutsche Notenbank” set up clearing accounts, with “clearing units” 
(Verrechnungseinheit, VE) and a “swing.” To avoid diplomatic recognition, and to include 
Berlin, formally under Allied authority, the agreement was signed by representatives on 
behalf of the two “supreme economic authorities of the economic area of the German 
Mark” (adding DM-West and DM-East, respectively). Neither side considered trade with 
the other German state as foreign trade: A newly-created “Ministry of Foreign Trade, 
Inner-German Trade and Procurement” was put in charge of future interzonal trade 
dealings by the GDR. In the Federal Republic, the Adenauer government created a 
“Treuhandstelle fűr Interzonenhandel,” an agency under the public (but non-
governmental) entity of the Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag. Yet neither Moscow nor 
the Western allies abandoned their control right entirely: interzonal trade remained, until 
the end of the Cold War, one of the few areas for which the allies reserved their original 
occupation powers.701   
The very fact that a new interzonal trade agreement came into effect at the very 
moment Washington sought to severely limit East-West trade was a remarkable 
achievement on the part of the German authorities. It reflected the strong interest in West 
German industry to continue trading with the East—as well as the growing leverage the 
Adenauer government assumed vis-à-vis the Western Allies, particularly the United 
States.  West Germans would increasingly question their submission to tougher export 
control standards than were exercised in other Western European countries. But the new 
IZT also demonstrated in a very practical sense the continued significance of the “German 
question” for the United States: prism-like, it fractured American Cold War strategy in 
Europe.   
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2. The Western Steel Embargo, 1950-1952 
Efforts on both sides to insulate interzonal trade from the Cold War in Germany 
did not even survive the first trade cycle set in motion by the IZT.  In early 1950 the 
Soviet authorities resumed interfering with trade traffic between West Berlin and the 
Federal Republic. On January 13, the Soviets impounded eleven German trucks loaded 
with non-ferrous scrap at the Soviet check-point leaving Berlin. Six days later, the Soviets 
prohibited any furniture from being moved out of Berlin. By January 20, all trucks 
carrying non-ferrous iron scrap, furniture or any items on the Western restricted lists were 
held up at the Soviet check-point in Helmstedt. Two days later, numerous trucks from 
Berlin, seemingly picked out at random, were turned back at Helmstedt indiscriminately; 
moreover, the restrictions were expanded to interzonal trains. The crescendo of blows to 
FRG-Berlin trade, the U.S. Army’s European command headquarters warned, was a 
“deliberate Soviet plan to sabotage the economic rehabilitation of Berlin.” Other incidents 
would certainly follow, “leading up to major demonstrations next spring.” Moscow’s 
ultimate motive was “complete control in Berlin.”702  Eight months after the end of the 
first Berlin crisis, Washington pondered the prospects of a “little blockade”703 and a re-
imposition of the Western counter-blockade.704 
In weighing their options, the Truman administration soon focused its attention on 
interzonal trade. By January, West German steel deliveries to the GDR threatened to over-
obligate that clearing-account by about DM 8 million. Four-fifths of all East German 
imports fell into the iron and steel sector—far exceeding the quota of one-third originally 
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agreed to in the 1949 Frankfurt Agreement. Moreover, East German promises of potato, 
grain and sugar deliveries had not been carried out. Adding to concerns about Berlin’s 
position were concerns in Washington that West German trade with the East zone 
prolonged the FRG’s dependence on foreign aid, and more importantly, directly fed into 
the Soviet economic and military build-up through reparation payments. Declaring that it 
was “imperative” to take action to “protect the West German economy,” the Western 
Deputy High Commissioners decided on February 2 to impose an embargo on all steel 
shipments which were under order from the GDR. In the event that the steel embargo 
would not produce satisfactory results, it could be extended to other vital commodities. 
Behind the joint concern for the FRG economy, however, were divisions between the 
Americans and their European allies over instrumentalizing interzonal trade to exert 
pressure on access to Berlin. In the end, the High Commissioners agreed that the embargo 
would be taken under the provisions of the interzonal trade agreement, “and not 
necessarily connected with the interruption of traffic by [the] Soviets.”705 
Washington favored a more forceful reaction that included an increase in military 
convoys between West Germany and Berlin. Beyond an embargo on steel deliveries, the 
State Department suggested to instruct the Federal Government to establish control points 
along the GDR and Berlin sector border denying movement of commercial supplies by 
highway except through the control points. The measures were to be justified under the 
IZT, “but will in reality set up control machinery along Soviet zone border which will 
enable countermeasures that we may agree upon later.” Less inclined towards such drastic 
steps, the British and French Deputy High Commissioners continued to argue for a gradual 
application of countermeasures “under [the] guise of protection of the West German 
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economy.” All of it should be done with “minimum publicity.”706 Given British and 
French skepticism about deploying IZT as a tool for economic warfare, the Allied High 
Commission for now stuck with just the steel embargo. Professing to be “increasingly 
disturbed” at the persistent credit imbalance, the High Commissioners “requested” an 
immediate suspension of Western deliveries of valuable steel until the IZT accounts 
between the Federal Republic and the GDR would even out. Otherwise, they noted, West 
Germany “would be financing the economic recovery of the eastern zone at the expense of 
its own earnings in foreign exchange.”707 It could “not be justified to use ERP aid in this 
way to extend credits to the SBZ,” the High Commissioners told Adenauer.708 On 
February 8, the Federal Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard instructed the Länder 
economic administrations to immediately cease issuing new Warenbegleitscheine for iron 
and steel deliveries to the GDR until March 15. 
The steel embargo could not have hit the GDR at a worse time. The very day after 
the steel embargo was put in effect, the GDR government adopted the ambitious 1950 plan 
for reparations to the U.S.SR. A large part of the reparation payments were in those areas 
in which the GDR was dependent on imports from West Germany: 75 percent of the East 
German reparations in 1949 had consisted of machine and heavy machine deliveries.709 
The 1950 plan charged the Ministry for Inner-German Trade with obtaining metal and 
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ball-bearings—a task now much more difficult.710 Internally, GDR officials conceded that 
the steel embargo had effectively upset the reparation plan.711 Imports from the Federal 
Republic were also crucial to the SED’s Five-Year Plan, which had been in the works 
since September 1949 and scheduled to be announced at the SED’s Third Party Congress 
in late July 1950.712 By then, only 28,500 tons of iron of a planned total of 90,000 tons had 
been delivered from Western Germany; similarly, only 77,725 tons of a total of the needed 
195,500 tons of rolling mill products had been received. “To resolve this difficult shortage 
caused by the steel embargo,” GDR premier Grotewohl confidentially informed Soviet 
Control Commission chairman Chuikov as late as August, had “thus far not been 
possible.”713 East Berlin fully realized its dependence on inner-German trade, particularly 
West German rolling mill products. Additional imports from other capitalist countries, 
such as Belgium or the Netherlands, were impossible due to lacking trade agreements and 
valuta.  
The GDR government therefore set out to achieve a rescission of the steel 
embargo. Apparently unknown to the Western allies at first, East German interzonal trade 
negotiator Orlopp met with his West German counterpart Kaumann from 14-21 February, 
promising that the GDR would carry out the terms of the Frankfurt agreement until its 
expiration on 30 June if the West issued Warenbegleitscheine for orders placed since 8 
February.714 A few weeks later, at a meeting in Düsseldorf, GDR Inner-German Trade 
Ministry officials urged West German iron and steel producers to intervene with Bonn to 
repeal the embargo, particularly in light of the fact that the trade imbalance which had 
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occasioned the embargo had become largely rectified. West German industrials, many of 
whom had been opposed to the steel embargo from its inception, promised quick 
fulfillment of outstanding deliveries of some 16,000 tons of steel and promised to work 
“with all means towards eliminating the problems for the further fulfillment of the 
Frankfurt Agreement.”715 Nevertheless, the embargo remained in effect. 
By April, East Berlin took a more assertive position. On April 21, the GDR 
adopted a law “on the Protection of Inner-German Trade,” making Warenbegleitscheine 
compulsory for trade between the GDR and West Berlin. In May, the SED regime 
threatened to cancel existing contracts with West German companies. Hand in hand with 
threats to cut off trade with West Germany altogether went renewed efforts to increase 
efforts to import rolling mill products from Austria, Belgium, France, Britain, and Finland 
through three-way agreements and barter deals. The East German trade ministry now 
demanded thar the Soviet Control Commission not resume negotiations with the Western 
powers unless the steel question had been resolved.716 At the end of July, the Grotewohl 
government resolved to obtain critical materials preferably through imports from Eastern 
Europe to avoid the “dangers of blockades and embargos.”717 But the plan to diversify 
steel imports proved futile: Not only did alternative imports fall far short of the 
requirements, but more importantly, Moscow refused to increase its steel deliveries to the 
GDR (though it provided some 70 million DM in Valuta to for rolling mill products from 
the West) and insisted on continuing deliveries to the Federal Republic to balance East 
German imports of strategic goods. 718 The steel embargo aggravated Soviet dissatisfaction 
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with East German reparation payments. Karlshorst frequently interfered and modified the 
reparations plan, and lamented the lag in GDR deliveries. Signaling their interest in further 
West German deliveries, Soviet officials repeatedly urged East German officials to fulfill 
the Frankfurt agreement according to schedule “at all costs.”719  Eager to make the GDR 
independent of West German steel imports in the long run, the SED regime later that 
summer launched the construction of two new rolling mills, the Einsenhüttenkombinat 
West in Calbe and the Eisenhüttenkombinat Josef Stalin (later: East) near Fürstenberg at 
the Oder.720  
Meanwhile the Americans grew increasingly exasperated with ‘their’ Germans.  
With indications that the embargo was only partial and that the Ruhr industrialists were 
applying pressure to have even this limited embargo lifted by March 15, the administration 
was certain that West German efforts had fallen far short of  “quickly bringing pressure on 
the Soviets which might force them to give up their present harassing tactics [around 
Berlin].” With the IZT agreement being the “pivot on which to swing our entire plan of 
action,” and a selective embargo seemingly ineffective, the State Department called for an 
immediate “general embargo;” Western authorities would completely cease to issue 
Warenbegleitscheine. To further avoid future trade imbalances, the State Department 
suggested a new procedure that, in addition to the Warenbegleitscheine, would require 
Western shipments to show proof that adequate funds had been earmarked by the Bank 
deutscher Länder before actually letting the merchandise cross the frontier. Finally, 
HICOG and the Federal Government were to make the physical control of the movement 
of goods to the Soviet Zone more effective by setting up border check-points. Given likely 
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British and French opposition, HICOG was to “concentrate purely on the trade agreement 
and [the] necessity of living up to its terms.”721 
At American urging, the Allied High Commission also “overruled the Bonn 
Government” on the lifting of the embargo agreed upon by the Orlopp-Kaumann talks in 
February.722  HICOG felt that the agreement secretly negotiated and signed by Kaumann 
was at best “unsatisfactory,”723 but, along with the British and French, McCloy hesitated 
repudiating the agreement outright at first. Instead, the Allied High Commission would 
intervene promptly if trade did not come into reasonable balance and urge the “sacking” of 
Kaumann, a “rather notorious bad actor.”724  Kaumann, HICOG officials claimed, kept the 
Allies and even Adenauer and Erhard “ill-informed” about his negotiations with the 
Eastern authorities.725 They called on the Adenauer government to “clean house” and 
replace Kaumann “immediately with person ministerial caliber and Western-oriented 
political viewpoint.”726 Kaumann, in fact, had obtained authorization from Erhard,727 but 
rather than admitting to Allied interference, Adenauer denied that he had sanctioned the 
compromise.728 In the end, Kaumann remained in place, but so did the embargo. 
By mid-March, the GDR had made up most of the trade deficit, yet the embargo 
stayed in effect: on March 16, the state governments were instructed to continue the 
suspension of Warenbegleitscheine indefinitely.729 By the end of the month, pressure by 
West German industrialists for a resumption of Western deliveries became increasingly 
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vocal. Kaumann warned that that the East might cancel existing contracts, and Erhard 
demanded that Adenauer intervene with the Allies to allow the resumption of trade 
negotiations. On May 22, Adenauer finally requested the Allies to allow a “far-reaching 
relaxation” of the embargo.730 U.S. officials, however, continued to see the embargo as an 
exquisite tool to ensure trade balance between the Western and Eastern part of Germany 
and the enforcement of export controls. To be true, the balance on “A” account under the 
Frankfurt Agreement—the imbalance in favor of the West had been the overt reason for 
the steel embargo—had changed to the credit of the Eastern side, largely due to the 
delivery of what U.S. officials considered overpriced quantities of sugar. But out of the 
total of DM 83.7 million West German deliveries under account “A” of the Frankfurt 
Agreement, deliveries at a value of DM 66.8 million were for iron and steel, with the 
remainder going to non-ferrous metals, machines, ball-bearings, calcinated soda and 
textile raw materials—thus not to those highly manufactured commodities for which the 
FRG was seeking new markets. Among the deliveries from the GDR, only the 
commitment with regard to sugar and potatoes had been kept to the satisfaction of the 
West.731 
Moreover, after a brief period of improvement following the institution of the 
embargo on February 8, Soviet harassment of Berlin’s lifelines had started again. During 
March, non-ferrous scrap and even furniture shipments from West Berlin to West 
Germany were confiscated, on the grounds that metal from the SBZ had been included 
with the scrap.  In early April, Soviet authorities intensified the checking of barges 
containing scrap steel consigned from West Berlin to Hamburg. Tightening interzonal 
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border controls hence would help to implement the IZT agreement and East-West security 
controls, but also, as the State Department informed the U.S. High Commissioner in late 
May, “put us in readiness to take counter measures as reply to Soviet restrictions on Berlin 
transport.”732  In view of the Soviets’ and East Germans’ restricting Berlin access ever 
more “thoroughly and impudently,” the State Department was now ready to consider 
restricting “critical Western [German] deliveries to [the] East (…) as direct retaliatory 
measure,” including the maintenance and real enforcement of the steel embargo until 
Soviet and German restrictions were lifted.733 
Ever fonder of the idea of using an interzonal trade embargo as the key weapon in 
the Cold War over Berlin, the administration in Washington was ever less inclined to 
relinquish direct control over interzonal trade matters. The West Germans insisted that 
trade between the two Germanies could not be considered “foreign trade,” which fell 
within the “reserve powers” withheld by the former occupiers; after all, that would have 
undermined non-recognition policy and the very notion of German unity that underlay 
Western and West German policy. Yet that seems to have been exactly what the Truman 
administration was driving at: Authority over the control of trade and payments across the 
zonal border remained firmly in Allied hands, and in fact, was expanding.734 By late April, 
a joint tripartite Frankfurt-Berlin trade and transport committee within the Allied High 
Commission recommended that the German border controls be supervised by allied 
authorities to “provide a flexible means of exerting retaliatory measures.” The committee 
also recommended the drafting of new German custom procedures that would apply to the 
interzonal border and greater control over postal consignments.735 Based on the 
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recommendations of a newly-formed tripartite “Joint Berlin Committee” (JBC), the Allied 
High Commission instructed West German authorities in mid-June to establish check-
points in Berlin at its Western approaches as well as along the sector border, along with 
“roving controls.” The Allied High Commission also asked the Federal Government to 
establish a federal agency to implement export control programs and to install a 
communications net from checkpoints in the Western zones to Berlin.736 Any new trade 
agreement was to be contingent on new guarantees of open Berlin communications. At 
least 25 percent of the orders covered by the agreement were to be placed in Berlin, 
stipulated within a special Berlin East-West trade agreement. The city would become the 
center for the East-West trade machinery, the JBC proposed, and the Treuhandstelle would 
move from Frankfurt to Berlin.737 To demonstrate its seriousness, Washington also refused 
to grant the West Germans authority to negotiate a new interzonal trade agreement. On 
June 30, the Frankfurt Agreement therefore lapsed without extension. 
The sudden breakdown of the IZT mechanism (that is: of any legal basis for 
interzonal trade) did not have the impact the Truman administration had hoped for. Rather 
than negotiating new terms to accommodate the West, Ulbricht turned to trade 
negotiations with individual West German state governments. He had some success, in 
particular with Niedersachsen state government led by Günter Gereke. Illegal trade across 
the inner-German border spiked. An increasingly organized contraband system was 
making a virtual mockery out of the iron and steel embargo. Soviet zone firms dispatched 
large but undervalued consignments of goods to Western Germany in return for high-value 
commodities. Besides outright smuggling through West Berlin or over the “green border,” 
deliveries were declared as being carried out under old, pre-steel embargo contracts; others 
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were documented under false descriptions or had outright forged documentation.738 
According to the testimony of one trucker who, intoxicated and loose-lipped, told his 
scheme long and loudly at the crossing point Helmstedt, he and his colleagues would load 
vehicles with legitimate cargoes in West Berlin for points in West Germany and obtain 
credentials for passage through the GDR checkpoint at Marienborn. After having sold 
three-fourths of his cargoes illegally in West Berlin, the drivers would proceed to 
Marienborn where an obliging East Zone guard would for a small bribe confiscate the 
remainder of the cargo and give the driver a receipt that purported to show that the entire 
load had been taken. Upon return to Berlin, they would advise the shippers to apply for 
insurance. Others made a practice of buying metal scraps in West Berlin, adding a few 
pieces smuggled in from the eastern zone. They would then drive into the East Zone and 
sell most of their load en route, sure to have the rest confiscated at the border on account 
of the SBZ origin of some of the remaining pieces.739 According to some accounts, some 
$3 million worth of steel was smuggled from West Germany into the Soviet Zone in the 
six months following the beginning of the embargo.740 
Keen on avoiding a complete break in the legal flow of goods, West German 
officials, once again without consulting the Western Allies, issued interim regulations that 
provided for a limited continuation of trade on a barter basis.741 Rather than forcing the 
Soviets to back down, McCloy and his staff expected continued “harassing action” around 
Berlin.742 Within days, therefore, the Allied High Commission permitted the 
Treuhandstelle für Interzonenhandel to resume preliminary trade negotiations with the 
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GDR government on a month-by-month extension of the Frankfurt agreement until 
September 30, but the talks quickly deadlocked. The East Zone representative, Orlopp, 
refused to accept West German demand for a written guarantee that Eastern authorities 
would not interfere with communications and transport between Berlin and the Federal 
Republic prior to a lifting of the steel embargo. Western officials had also pointed out the 
Eastern side had to cease its interruption of the power and water supplies for West 
Berlin.743 
For two weeks, the talks stalled, and it was the West who blinked. With the onset 
of the Korean War, it was now the Americans who sought to avoid a complete break-down 
of the negotiations for fears about the dangers to Berlin’s economy and the likelihood of a 
new blockade that would parallel the crisis in the Far East. U.S. officials also expected that 
the East German regime would turn more aggressive after the October 15 Volkskammer 
elections secured its power base.744 On July 20, the High Commissioners agreed to extend 
the Frankfurt agreement until September 30 and to permit steel and iron shipments, though 
the Federal Republic was secretly instructed to limit deliveries of the critical steel roll mill 
products to 10,000 tons per months.745 At Washington’s behest, Bonn informed the GDR 
representatives now that any agreement would be “null and void” if the East did not 
remove existing or re-imposed new restrictions on access to Berlin.746 Despite such 
threats, East Berlin refused to formally recognize a link between IZT and Berlin access; all 
that Orlopp was ready to commit to was granting that no special conditions be applied to 
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trade between West Berlin and the Federal Republic.747  On August 11, Orlopp and 
Kaumann signed the interim agreement that lifted the trade embargo. Negotiations for a 
new IZT agreement that would take effect on October 1 were to start almost 
immediately.748 
As a prelude to the negotiations, Orlopp declared that East Germany’s most urgent 
steel requirements were being bolstered by shipments from Britain, France, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark and thus were immune to any pressure from the West 
through the steel embargo.749 Despite these claims, some of which were quickly denied by 
the British and French governments, U.S. officials felt that the West was in a strong 
negotiating position and urged the West German negotiators to exploit the GDR’s 
dependence upon West German commodities to their best advantage. Key West German 
officials, such as Kaumann, did not share this view, but the Truman administration was 
hopeful that “recent events”—an allusion to the North Korean invasion and ensuing 
widespread fears in Germany—would probably force the Germans into cooperating. 
“Extremely reluctant to see present agreement extended,” the State Department instructed 
HICOG; the new agreement was to achieve the “most advantageous economic exchange,” 
guarantee the participation of West Berlin and minimize the export of strategic 
commodities.” But Washington was “not now willing [to] precipitate a breakdown of the 
negotiations” if it would result in a complete break-down of trade because of the danger of 
a renewed Berlin blockade. Equally disastrous would be if all controls of interzonal trade 
would be lost.750 A September 5 agreement that assured the delivery to West Berlin of 
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some 2,600,000 tons of brown coal briquettes, followed 11 days later by an agreement 
between the power companies in West and East Berlin (which supplied an average of 
850,000 kilowatt hours daily of the 2,000,000 kilowatt hour consumption of the Western 
sectors), initially seemed to augur well for the IZT negotiations. But by late September the 
negotiations had gone nowhere. At midnight on September 20, following an intense face-
off between Russian and British soldiers near the Gatow airfield in which about 100 
British troops, supported by armored cars and machines guns, forcibly retook an area of 
150 yards of British sector territory seized earlier that day by more than a dozen Soviets 
soldiers, the East cut the power supply for the Western sectors of the city. Western 
officials professed to have been prepared for a power cut—“We simply threw our 
switches.” But when West German efforts to obtain a resumption of power proved in vain, 
the Federal government broke off the IZT negotiations. One week later, armed British 
“Tommies” occupied West Berlin canal locks and detained forty-five Soviet zone barges 
in swift retaliation for Western barges help up by the Soviets.751 Within days, the Allied 
High Commission decided that the Frankfurt agreement would not be extended again; 
Warenbegleitscheine would only be issued for unfulfilled contracts placed prior to October 
1; no barter transactions were permitted.752 Any WBS that had already been issued would 
expire on 1 January 1951. Once again, the Truman administration hoped that a lapse of the 
trade agreement would coerce the GDR into a coal and electricity agreement for West 
Berlin, and accommodating Western conditions for a trade agreement. The Western 
Commandants in Berlin were less sure of such leverage: Moscow, they argued, would only 
gain through a lapse of the agreement as illegal trade worked in the favor of the East.753   
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Frustrations over GDR harassment of Berlin meshed with concerns about Soviet-
East German designs for Berlin after the October 15 elections in the GDR. HICOG began 
drawing up countermeasures and, here too, discussions within the Allied Interzonal Trade 
Working Party as well as PEPCO and Eastern Element “clearly brought out” that the only 
effective countermeasure to Soviet restrictions on traffic and communications between 
Western Berlin and the Federal territory were the commodity deliveries from West 
Germany to the GDR. Assuming that East Germany continued to be “dependent to a 
considerable extent” on the FRG for the successful fulfillment of its Five Year Plan due to 
commence 1 January 1951, the denial of critical items was considered the most effective 
weapon against any interference with Berlin communications.754  There was general 
agreement within HICOG and tripartite agencies that the West had to “place [its] house in 
order” to be able to effectively control the flow of goods and to keep the industrialization 
program in the GDR “off balance.” The stage-by-stage retaliation program eschewed a tit-
for-tat type reprisal, as the Soviets capacity for interference in certain fields vastly 
outweighed the options open to the West. Rather than trying to match every Soviet move, 
the West would retaliate through a phased control of interzonal trade, involving not only 
commodities on the international export control lists, but also items essential for the 
fulfillment of the GDR’s Five-Year-Plan.755 
French and British officials within the IZTWP warned that if countermeasures 
would go too far, the West ran the risk of provoking a complete blockade.756 Once again 
American officials favored a more aggressive approach, arguing that Western trade 
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restrictions alone were unlikely to cause or prevent a full-fletched Soviet blockade. Should 
Moscow decide on a complete blockade, the U.S. High Commissioner suggested, the 
Western powers would have to take countermeasures beyond trade restrictions, such as 
preclusive purchases from other countries of goods that would otherwise be shipped to the 
GDR, the closing of the Panama Canal or the Suez Canal, sabotage of East German and 
Soviet industrial installations, or a coordinated campaign to drain vital manpower from the 
Soviet Zone through defection. HICOG’s Eastern Element even suggested encouraging the 
Federal government to initiate legislation “similar” to the GDR “Law in the Protection of 
Internal German Trade.”757 Once the GDR elections had passed without signs of increased 
Soviet aggressiveness towards Berlin, the State Department advocated “increased 
pressure” to use the “present breathing spell” to improve the Western position in Berlin 
and to obtain a more satisfactory trade agreement. Washington wanted to seize the 
initiative from the Soviets in the trade field, and “the time may now be more ripe than at 
any time recently for such moves.”758  
There was general agreement that far more had to be done to stop trade leaks 
across the border. The Western Commandants in Berlin urged improving custom controls 
along the zonal border to stop black trade but also transit legal shipments commensurate 
with Soviets practices.759  The State Department suggested tightening up existing trade 
procedures in the absence of a trade agreement to decrease the flow of goods and urging 
the West Germans to concede only the “very minimum.” Once again Washington 
wondered whether “pressure to remove Kaumann as too conciliatory [would] have any 
effect on the FEDREP attitude on [the] negot[iation]s.” Eager to effect a tighter guarantee 
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for Berlin’s participation in any future trade agreement, Washington officials suggested 
“linking Berlin exports in some fashion into quid pro quo system,” possibly by making 
West German deliveries contingent upon Berlin trade.”760 In line with instructions from 
Washington, HICOG got the West German government to agree that any future trade 
agreement would include formalized commodity exchange guarantees for Berlin. The 
entire interzonal trade control system would be tightened up. IZTWP had already 
recommended establishing a central Warenbegleitscheine issuing agency that would work 
in close coordination with the West German Central Licensing Agency. Once the 
negotiations were resumed, HICOG also assured Washington that it was maintaining a 
“tight rein” on interzonal trade negotiations by daily and weekly conferences with the 
West German team.761 
Yet the lapse of the trade agreement, the suspension of the negotiations, and the 
continued embargo proved far less an effective weapon than Washington and Frankfurt 
had hoped for. In the absence of a trade agreement, Western controls over the flow of 
trade were practically non-existent, resulting in, according to one HICOG official, was 
“smuggling on a grand scale” between the two Germanies.762 Iron, steel and non-ferrous 
metals, in particular fine metals sheets, high quality seamless tubes, and ball-bearings were 
smuggled from West Germany and West Berlin, in return for sugar, coffee alcohol, spirits, 
fuel and lubricating oil were illegally imports from the GDR. U.S. army intelligence had 
received information as early as August that the Soviet Control Commission had 
instructed the SED to use the unutilized capacities in the GDR’s textile industry for illegal 
sales to West Germany (directly or through Switzerland) to obtain West Marks.763 That 
same month—two months after the beginning of the Korean War—custom unit troopers 
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were stunned to see railroad flatcars rolling up to the Schirnding border cross point loaded 
with 105 United States Army two-and-a-half-ton and six-by-six trucks consigned to the 
East, the first batch of 1,050 shipped by the Frankfurt firm “Trucks and Spares.”  Though 
in perfect condition, the export license described the vehicles as “spare parts” from U.S. 
army surplus stocks that had been turned over to the Germans. Berlin, contrary to the 
American schemes to turn the city into the heart of interzonal trade control machinery, 
became the central node for the flourishing illegal exchange. Information obtained by 
HICOG set the overall amount of illegal trade through Berlin alone at some DM 800 
million. Contrary to statements by Federal economic Minister Erhard that illegal trade was 
“hardly measurable,” some German estimates ran as high as DM 1,000,000,000 
($238,000,000) for the annual total of West Germany’s illegal trade with the GDR—four 
times the amount specified in the Frankfurt agreement, with an estimated 40 percent of the 
going directly from the GDR to the Soviet Union and other bloc countries.764 In the fall of 
1950, U.S. and other allied intelligence agencies uncovered several large illegal trade 
organizations cooperating with the Russians. Based in Berlin and Vienna, the complex and 
far-flung smuggling ring extended to Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden, French North Africa 
and the Netherlands and involved some of Germany’s oldest and most respected business 
concerns, including the Rheinische Röhrenwerke in Műhlheim/Ruhr and the Berlin Iron 
and Steel Stock Company, with the Berlin concern Haselgruber as key operator. Despite 
the embargo, Moscow had received an estimated 300,000 tons of steel in 1950.765 
West German Föderalismus, or decentralization of authority to Länder 
governments, prevented efforts to effect greater central supervision and control, and 
federal authorities were reluctant to introduce political arguments aimed at changing the 
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Länder constitutions. Länder economic offices were more or less ignoring the 
implementation of federal controls because of the pressure of local business and industry, 
and American officials found the physical setup for the issuance of Warenbegleitscheine 
“appalling,” especially in Nordrhein-Westphalia, the most significant industrial area.766 
While Washington regarded the Federal Republic as the “greatest single source of 
strategic commodities for the Soviet area,” the Federal Government continued to be 
unwilling to clamp down on illegal trade and to make a strong effort to enforce trade 
controls.767 The West Germans in particular resented being held to stricter export controls 
by the Allied High Commission than the international lists of restricted strategic goods, 
the so-called 1A and 1B lists adopted by the Western Consultative Group in Paris. The 
Adenauer government intended to include some 1-A and 1-B list commodities in a new 
trade agreement, and the West German delegate to the Consultative Group, Hans Kroll, 
continued to charge the Western Powers with discrimination against West Germany, 
arguing that Germany was required to enforce export controls specifically rejected by the 
majority, and demanded that controls should be uniform and voluntary.768 The West 
German position would have “very unfortunate repercussions” in the U.S., Truman 
administration retorted, and the State Department swiftly informed HICOG that it would 
likely have to “veto” any IZT agreement that would include any 1-A or 1-B 
commodities.769  
Into the winter of 1950-51, U.S. officials continued to emphasize that the West had 
a “very advantageous position,” given the East Germans’ deficit under the old agreement 
(the GDR had a debt of approximately 11 million clearing units) and the devastating 
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economic “setbacks” they were suffering as a result of the embargo.770 A November 4 
agreement on the supply of electricity for Berlin suggested to HICOG officials that the 
East was “extremely anxious” to resume negotiations for a new trade deal.771 The West 
Germans, on the other hand, were far less sanguine about the prospects for the talks. Early 
on they expected that it might be necessary to offset the receipt of essential foodstuffs for 
Berlin through the delivery of rolling mill products, and generally viewed Berlin’s supply 
situation far more precarious than their U.S. counterparts.772 The West Germans also 
doubted that the East would agree to allow all industrial items to be listed in general 
categories “subject to specification,” a stipulation that would allow the West to apply 
export controls on particular items. Moreover, the West Germans argued (and HICOG 
agreed) that the “East delegation will never agree to deliver coal, grain, sugar, potatoes 
and gasoline to West Berlin and receive only secondary manufactured items.”773 
Without Allied approval, the Germans initialed a protocol for the liquidation of the 
Frankfurt agreement, which extended the date of liquidation to March 31. When HICOG 
threatened to veto the protocol, the GDR authorities stated that if the protocol was not 
signed, they would not be able to guarantee some 90,000 tons of coal deliveries per month 
and electricity for the Western Sectors after 1 January 1951. Though some within HICOG 
at the time were inclined to believe that a power or coal stoppage could have been 
prevented by retaliatory threat, HICOG, in the end, withdrew its veto “in view of the 
possible consequences to Berlin.”774 More importantly, while Washington was ready to 
reduce interzonal trade to a minimum as long as West Berlin obtained essential supplies, 
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German resistance to the Adenauer government efforts to enforce export controls and 
embargo policies reflected a deeper desire to do everything possible to maintain trade with 
the Eastern Zone of Germany, an “instinctive feeling,” as one U.S. official noted, that 
“Eastern Germany is really part of Germany.”775 The removal of Kaumann as chief West 
German negotiator, seen by many as too conciliatory, HICOG officials hence warned, 
would have no effect on this basic attitude towards negotiations.776 Eager to continue trade 
beyond the 31 December lapse of the IZT extensions, the West Germans, on 19 January 
1951, presented the Allies with an advance (Vorgriff) arrangement that established quotas 
for deliveries applicable against the total requirements envisaged in a new IZT 
agreements, with a total trade volume worth $80,000,000.777 Arguing that the advance 
agreement would be more practical than individual cash or barter transactions, McCloy 
agreed.778 Under the “advance agreement, trade went on between February and 30 April; a 
later extension provided for continued IZT through 2 July 1951.779 
 
 
3. Designing the Industrial Cold War 
On 1 January 1951, elaborate ceremonies took place in Fűrstenberg on the Oder, 
near the “peace border” with Poland to dedicate a new steel mill and formally launch an 
ambitious GDR’s five-year plan. Under the plan, first outlined by Ulbricht a few months 
earlier, industrial production was to be increased 190 percent, accelerating production in 
particular strategic materials, such as iron, steel and nonferrous metals where East 
Germany faced critical shortages.  The plan underscored the SED’s efforts to relieve its 
dependence on West German imports—and eliminate what American officials continued 
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to be their most effective weapon in defending access to Berlin. Concerned with the 
GDR’s drive for self-sufficiency, U.S. officials in Berlin were impressed with the “rapid 
headway” that the GDR was making. Despite the GDR’s overall lagging behind the FRG, 
“the Soviet Zone authorities and their Russian masters are eminently successful in 
achieving their economic aims (…).” The SED’s 1949-1950 economic plan, which had 
been ridiculed in the West as “utterly fantastic,” had “by and large been fulfilled,” 
particularly in the steel and mechanical engineering industries, a noteworthy achievement 
as the GDR had to reconstruct most of its production capacities that had been dismantled 
in 1945 and 1946.780  It suggested that the new plan could not be ignored.  
Against the specter of East German self-sufficiency, Truman administration 
officials demanded a far more “aggressive economic policy.” Arguing that the Frankfurt 
agreement (and illegal trade) had allowed the East to receive some DM 300 million in 
essential goods (as opposed to DM 100 million on the part of the West) and “to pick out 
the raisins from the cake,” the West should abandon their approach to IZT negotiations 
“based on the idea of maximizing trade.”  Frequent German complaints over Western 
double-standards in East-West trade had cloaked the lack of initiative and aggressiveness 
in this field; lacking an international border, strong interdependence between the two 
economies, the issue of unity and West German feelings for their brethren in the East 
meant that Germany could not be treated equally in East-West trade matters with other 
European nations. What was needed, U.S. diplomats in Berlin argued, was a more 
adequate allied organization “to implement a ‘Cold War’ in the economic field,” as well as 
efforts in West Germany to “dispel the fallacies of their irrational approach to German 
unity,” which would help overcome “German resistance and inertia.” Future trade 
agreements should include a firm contractual obligation of the GDR to carry out a certain 
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amount of trade with Berlin and a system for controls over incoming and outgoing goods 
to ascertain Soviet-East German fulfillment of these obligations, as well as  effective 
unilateral system of sanctions. If the West continued to buy Berlin’s survival by making 
concessions to the East, “we may win the battle of Berlin [only] to lose the war against the 
East.”781 
Congressional and Bundestag committee investigations in the spring of 1951 added 
to the sense of urgency in efforts to choke off the illegal flow of strategic war materials. A 
Senate-State Department fact-finding mission toured Germany and found controls lacking. 
A Congressional subcommittee under representative Laurie C. Battle, Democrat of 
Alabama, prepared legislation that would cut off aid to countries “trading with the 
enemy.” In May 1951, McCloy was forced to admit that West Germany had sent 
$103,748,000 worth of iron and steel products, machinery and chemicals eastward—with 
the blessing of the Allies. The admission followed a scathing 53-page report published by 
the Bundestag’s All-German Affairs Committee led by its fiercely anti-communist 
chairman, Social Democrat Herbert Wehner, in April 1951 that estimated illegal transfers 
at four times the legal trade. Howard Jones, one of the top U.S. diplomats in Berlin, 
publicly threatened to withhold Marshall Plan aid if the Adenauer government did not 
become serious about curbing the illicit trade with the East.782  In a demonstrative move –
probably aimed as much at the American as at the German public--McCloy deployed the 
7751st Military Police Customs Unit to the 350-mile American-Soviet frontier line “to 
plug the holes in the iron curtain.” When a Chinese communist party delegation appeared 
in East Berlin later that month to negotiate for vital materials, Jones announced a series of 
measures to prevent the Chinese from purchasing strategic goods produced in west 
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Germany, including roving military police controls along the sector border, stricter 
documentation requirements for goods moving East and the transfer of a MP customs unit 
to bolster the anti-smuggling forces in West Berlin.783  
Efforts at economic warfare against the GDR were not limited to denying East 
Germany critical materials. In late 1950, HICOG’s Eastern Element identified fifty-three 
industrial plants slated to play a crucial role in the fulfillment of the SED’s Five-Year Plan 
as targets for –unspecified—Western actions.  Even more promising for exploitation was 
East Germany’s manpower shortage. Far less favorable than that of the Federal Republic, 
Western observers predicted that the GDR’s demographic structure would become 
dangerously critical “after 1961.” 784  The exodus of young males from the GDR was 
“very harmful to the normal development of a healthy society,” but without immediate 
effect. HICOG soon focused on the shortage of technical intelligentsia, technical auxiliary 
personnel and skilled workers as major “bottlenecks” for the economic expansion in East 
Germany.785 In February 1951, HICOG’s Eastern Element proposed a covert defection 
program aimed at some 200 top scientific and technical personnel and some 25,000 key 
technical specialists, whose defection would have a “serious disruptive effect” on the 
GDR.786 
                                                 
783 “U.S. Acts to Bar Red China Buying From West Berlin,” The Washington Post,  22 May 1951, p B10.  
784 The analysis pointed in particular to the “proletarization of women employment” in East Germany—the 
SED regime’s efforts at using women in industrial jobs such as mining, steel making and heavy machine 
manufacture: One could well formulate the situation by saying that the population structure of the Soviet 
Zone as it developed  as an aftermath of the war but also in consequence of communist political and 
economic policies following the war with its strong preponderance women is in conflict with the forced 
drive of industrialization and with the special emphasis placed on the development of heavy industry. If this 
conflict can only be solved by sacrificing what according to Western standards the role of women should be 
within the social structure  then this is only another example that the economic objectives of communist 
Eastern Germany are drawn up with little regard for the economic and social benefits to the population.” 
HICOG-Eastern Element to Department of State, 20 February 1951, NARA, RG 59, 862B.06/2-2051.   
785 HICOG-Eastern Element to Department of State, 20 February 1951, NARA, RG 59, 862B.06/2-2051. 
786 Memorandum “Denial of Key Manpower to the Soviet Zone Economy,” HICOG-Eastern Element to 
PEPCO, 23 February 1951, RG 466, HICOG Berlin, Political Affairs, Box 2. 
248 
At its March 13 meeting, PEPCO approved the first phase of the project for 
implementation by HICOG’s Office of Intelligence.787 Within weeks, this program was 
under way.788 The more ambitious second part of the program, the defection of 25,000 
highly skilled personnel and their families, however, quickly ran into difficulties even 
within HICOG. HICOG’s Displaced Populations Division, the Office of Economic Affairs 
(OEA) and the Office of Labor Affairs argued that the Federal Republic would be unable 
to absorb the additional 100,000 persons or willing to finance the program, and the 
program might discriminate against the Soviet Zone refugees now in West Germany. 
Though Eastern Element continued to favor the second phase as well, maintaining that 
“the obstacles aren’t insuperable,” Labor Affairs and OEA won out, and the program was 
launched selectively and based on the principle that defections should not be encouraged 
until positions could be obtained for the defectors involved.789 By early May, a “small and 
discreet investigation” by the Office of Labor Affairs in the Ruhr for the purpose of 
estimating the capacity of the coal and steel industries to absorb key technicians from the 
GDR proved to be “discouraging.” 790 In June, PEPCO therefore agreed to a reduced but 
concentrated program limited to five or six key industries designed to attract personnel 
from the GDR that would be hard to replace.791  
As HICOG was deliberating more effective economic warfare against the GDR, 
Moscow once again tightened the economic lifelines for Berlin. After a new round in the 
“battle of the canals”792 in March, the GDR authorities started requiring West Berlin-based 
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firms in mid-May to supply “certificates of origin” to accompany the Warenbegleitscheine 
submitted to the Soviet Control Commission in order to have the Soviets stamp and 
approve of the shipments of goods from West Berlin to the Federal Republic. Purportedly 
an effort to protect against the illegal flow of materials from the Soviet Zone via Berlin to 
the West, the Soviet Control Commission refused to stamp Warenbegleitscheine for West-
bound goods from Berlin in seventeen commodity groups without detailed proof of origins 
of the raw materials in various components of manufactured goods. By the end of May, 
approximately 1,500 Warenbegleitscheine had accumulated in Karlshorst, and a further 
4,000 were held by the West Berlin Senate pending clarification of the situation. On 31 
May, the Allied High Commission met to discuss the new restrictions, and decided that the 
Germans would not yield to the new Soviet requirement since its imposition would be a 
violation of the New York Agreement of 1949. The Allied High Commission also asked 
the Berlin Allied Kommandatura to prepare for the implementation of Allied 
countermeasures if the West Berlin authorities were unable to obtain a solution by 
negotiation within ten days. On 11 June, each of the West Berlin commandants dispatched 
a letter to Soviet commandant Dengin pointing to the illegality of the Soviet demand. In 
Berlin, the Allied Kommandatura suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new interzonal 
trade agreement.793 
While the Western Allies were readying for countermeasures, the West Berliners 
were less inclined to make an issue of the proof of origin. West Berlin Deputy Mayor 
Schreiber and Economics Senator Eich told the Commandants on 10 June that in their 
view the situation was satisfactory since de facto only 40% of Berlin’s shipments were 
affected—largely non-ferrous and sugar products, and that the certificates of origins were 
an acceptable demand. In fact, the Senate returned the approximately 4,000 
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Warenbegleitscheine to the West Berlin firms, informally suggesting they provide proof of 
origin to accompany the WBS. Governing Mayor Reuter, who one week earlier had called 
on the Allied Commandants to express his concern, now told the Allies that “the time was 
not ripe for opposing the Soviets.” Displaying a caution that sharply contrasted with his 
usual demand for firm reactions to Soviet encroachments, he argued that it might be better 
to “muddle along” five or six months longer until Berlin would be in a stronger position. 
Was this the time, Reuter asked, “to rock the boat if arrangements could in fact be made to 
keep trade flowing?”794 
Washington and HICOG officials strongly opposed giving into the Eastern 
demand, warning that Berlin’s whole position would be imperiled all the more if the West 
accepted such a clear-cut violation of the New York and Paris agreements. The Allied 
Kommandantura instructed Reuter on June 10 to implement the refusal to submit the new 
documentation and let the Soviets know that this was done at allied instruction. Two days 
later, the Soviet authorities returned more than 700 WBS unstamped. McCloy and the 
State Department now urged that countermeasures were “essential.” 795 
The Allies, however, continued to postpone the institution of countermeasures. A ‘joint 
front’ of the Allies was hampered by an increasingly evident reluctance on the part of the 
French and British governments to heighten tensions over the issue. According to the 
French High Commissioner, the Soviets were “justifiably” trying to ensure that items 
fabricated in West Berlin employing raw materials which were in short supply in the 
Soviet Zone would not be shipped west, and the Western allies should not appear “as if 
they were protecting ‘some sort of black market.’” In Washington, the French officials felt 
that the West’s juridical situation on the proof of origin was “not good,” and doubted that 
the allies could assert a clear violation of the New York and Paris Agreements. What was 
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of greatest concern to the French, however, was that if “reprisal warfare” developed, West 
Berlin would suffer more than East Berlin. Hence the West should proceed very cautiously 
in this matter and “avoid an provocation which could lead to a new blockade.” To some 
degree the West had “already imposed a semi-blockade” upon itself, and in the end, the 
French predicted, the West would have to back down a lose “a terrific amount of face.” 796 
French and British officials also exhibited considerable anxiety over the possible effect of 
any public disclosure of the goods that would be embargoed by the West, which might 
provide the Soviets with an excuse for citing a violation of the 1949 Jessup-Malik 
Agreement and invoking a new blockade.797 The French government had little interest in 
provoking a crisis with national elections approaching. Hence French officials in particular 
exerted every effort to prevent or delay the dispatch of any further letters to Dengin. 
On his own, the French Commandant de Noblet sought out his Soviet counterparts 
and discussed the possibility of quadripartite discussions of the trade crisis. Without prior 
advice to U.S., moreover, the French Economic Counselor Le Fort sounded out West 
German IZT representatives on the prospects of getting Soviet agreement to a withdrawal 
of recent trade restrictions in return for a prompt conclusion of a trade agreement between 
East and West Germany.798 Privately, French officials seriously raised the question as to 
whether U.S. and British authorities really wished to achieve a settlement of the current 
crisis.799  Moreover, embarrassing information from the West Berlin Senate indicated that 
the Soviets had–apparently only in a verbal manner--required certificates of origin as early 
as September 1950, for the shipments of textiles, rubber and sugar products, though the 
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instances in which the Soviets had demanded proof of origins had supposedly not 
exceeded 5-10% of all WBS submitted. The revelation tended to undercut the hardline 
U.S. position that, with the expectation that that at least 75% of Berlin’s outgoing trade 
would come to a standstill with a week, the new restrictions threatened to result in a new 
blockade. 
Realizing that the issue was by no means clear-cut, and that “it would be difficult 
to contemplate another blockade situation without [public] support,” American 
Commandant Hayes argued “the first objective was to put [the] Western Allies in [a] more 
favorable light.” Hays suggested proposing to the Soviets that only items included in the 
legal trade agreements which cover Berlin could be shipped from the Western sectors. 
Moreover, in light of the serious repercussions that might result from the countermeasures, 
Hays also argued that the Soviets be alerted that the Western allies were serious by at once 
taking certain administrative and commercial measures which would cause disruption of 
Soviet zone and sector.800 Administration officials in Washington strongly endorsed Hays’ 
line, suggesting that if the envisioned second note would not evoke a favorable Soviet 
response, the Allies should promptly institute the retaliatory embargo.801 Internally, the 
Allied High Commission proceeded to ready itself for an immediate selective embargo on 
all iron, steel and machinery products, in line with plans laid down the previous fall. 
Federal authorities would stop issuing WBSs for shipments, and within 72 hours, shipment 
would begin to be intercepted at the zonal border.802 A second letter to Dengin, sent on 
June 15, reaffirmed the Western Commandants’ refusal to accept the certificate of origins 
requirement, but also proposed that, on a reciprocal basis, to take measures to prevent 
illegal trade and called for a 5 July meeting of quadripartite experts to discuss the matter. 
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Pending conclusion of the matter, instructions concerning the submission of certificates of 
origins would be rescinded. Meanwhile, through the East Germans, the Soviets had 
signaled interest in the outlines of a deal involving the resumption of the IZT negotiations, 
which had been advanced by the French. There were other signs that the Soviets were 
shifting to amore conciliatory approach: The Soviet Control Commission’s Transitstelle 
was not immediately  returning Warenbegleitscheine submitted without certificates of 
origin, possibly indicating that they foresaw some possibility of a settlement. And a late 
night 14 June East German news service dispatch quoted “informed sources” that “the 
matter was very simple; those who have interrupted the negotiations need merely resume 
them.”803 As early as June 16, the West German trade representatives relayed the news 
that the East German authorities, “of their own accord” had resumed the stamping of 
Warenbegleitscheine without requiring proof of origin. Simultaneously, GDR authorities 
now demanded that an IZT agreement be signed within forty-eigth hours. Later that day, 
the Allied High Commission met and informed the Berlin Commandants that, without 
meeting the GDR demands, the Germans could be authorized to resume the IZT 
negotiations. Two days later, Dengin agreed to quadripartite talks in Berlin, but asserted 
Soviet rights over Berlin’s external trade.804 
From the Truman administration’s perspective, the successful conclusion of the 
trade negotiations depended on a number of factors: First, and in many respects more 
important than the terms of the new agreement, was the signing of a new interzonal trade 
ordinance by the Federal Government, which would provide for the government’s 
complete control of practically all interzonal commodity movements, prevent the export of 
strategic and short supply goods. Without these, HICOG officials internally admitted, any 
new agreement would be essentially meaningless. No less important in light of the Berlin 
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trade crisis was that the new agreement would stipulate free access to Berlin (or if that was 
unobtainable, a subsequent exchange of letters that stipulated that the continuance of the 
IZT agreement was dependent on the uninterrupted flow of goods and persons between 
Berlin and the Federal Republic). An escape clause, the State Department insisted, would 
be necessary to provide for the possibility of voiding the agreement if the Soviets or East 
German resumed trade restrictions, such as the proof of origin requirement. Similarly, the 
State Department warned HICOG that the new IZT agreement had to reflect COCOM 
policy top prevent the export of certain categories of strategic goods and to drastically 
reduce others. The fewer strategic goods were included in the agreement, administration 
officials advised, “the less danger in the next few months of serious trade disruptions or 
other consequences of the Kem Amenment implementation.” Not convinced that past IZT 
commodity exchanges had on balance worked to the advantage of the Federal Republic 
and West Berlin, Washington threatened that it “would not be able to permit HICOG [to] 
approve [an] IZT agreement” that did not provide at least as great of an economic benefit 
to the FRG as it did to East Germany. Specifically, the Department criticized the 
understanding that had been reached between Kiefer and Miller in early June, before the 
trade crisis escalated.805 The overall commodity exchange, the Truman administration 
prescribed, should not exceed 450 million clearing units each way, with hard deliveries 
being cleared through two hard accounts which would ensure tight quid pro quo 
controls.806 
Negotiations on a new interzonal trade agreement quickly deadlocked again, when, 
on June 25, the East German representatives refused to combine the IZT agreement with 
discussion on the Berlin traffic restrictions. Orlopp, the East German negotiator informed 
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Kaumann that if agreement were not reached by July 3, “everything would collapse.”807 
With almost 8,000 WBS awaiting approval by the Soviet Control Commission by the end 
of June, Washington in turn was inclined to bring the negotiations to a halt, particularly in 
light of the “apparent failure [of the] Soviets to completely remove recently-imposed 
restrictions.” The State Department reiterated to HICOG the “need for immed[iate] 
Western countermeasures including selective embargo and breaking off IZT negot[iation]s 
if Sov[iet] restriction [had] not in fact [been] lifted.” While the administration would not 
object to an extension of the Vorgriff agreement if the talks continued productively, it 
otherwise held to the view that “the gradual decline of shipments from [the] Western 
Zones [would] appear effective form of pressure on the East Zone.”808 Once the existing 
trade agreement had lapsed and trade effectively been stopped on 3 July, the negotiations 
resumed and quickly led to a draft agreement which was initialed on 6 July. The draft 
trade agreement called for a commodity exchange of DM 482 million, covering the period 
from February to December 1951. While the overall volume and the swing accounts, 
especially those for hard goods such as hard goods and coal, had been reduced as 
compared to earlier drafts, strategic exports to the GDR exceeded critical West German 
imports by DM 100 million and would hence come under the purview of the Kem 
amendment lists. Arguing that this was the price to be paid for maintaining the Western 
position in Berlin, McCloy’s characterized the deal as “probably the best that can be 
obtained.”809 McCloy hence allowed the West German negotiators to initial the agreement 
despite the growing backlog in Warenbegleitscheine. A letter from the West Germans 
would, however, threaten that the agreement would be “deprived of effect” in the case of 
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Soviet interference with Berlin traffic, and the agreement would not be signed until 
settlement of the Berlin WBS problem.810 
The two quadripartite meetings on July 5 and 9 did not resolve the deadlock.811  To 
the dismay of the State Department, the Western Allied officials had proceeded to discuss 
legal and illegal East-West German trade, even agreed in a minute that legal trade should 
be expanded, without, as the Department had asked, resolving the WBS matter first.812 
Concerned that the Western Allies were giving a “cumulative false impression [of] 
weakness and over-eagerness,” the Americans wanted the talks limited to the 
Warenbegleitschein issue and became increasingly convinced that Karlshorst was not 
prepared to lift the restrictions.813 Two days after the failed four-power meeting, the 
Western Berlin commandants agreed that the talks would not be resumed—the Soviets had 
invited their counterparts for a third meeting at the Soviet headquarters on July 17—and 
that countermeasures, primarily a refusal to sign the IZT agreement and an embargo of 
iron, steel, mineral oil, rubber products, chemicals and machinery, hard goods critical for 
the East Zone to fulfill its five-year plan.814 On July 12, the Allied High Commission 
accepted Commandants’ recommendations, deciding to institute countermeasures by July 
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18.815 The next day, the Western Commandants sent yet another letter to their Soviet 
counterpart, demanding a resolution of the WBS issue.816 Unfazed by the possibility of 
retaliation, the Soviets remained restive as ever to stamping WBS, returning some 1,400 
WBS unstamped on July 13, and 1,500 on July 15.817 
Soviet interference, the commandants warned, was creating an “increasingly 
serious economic and polit[ical] sit[uation] in this city.”818 According to their estimates, 
some 12,000 tons of goods (at a value of DM 70 million) were held up for shipment to the 
Federal Republic by late July. By early August, over 10,000 WBS were retained by the 
Soviet authorities. The Allied Kommandatura recommended a small, largely symbolic 
commercial airlift of some 250 tons daily to encourage the West Berliners which would 
have “beneficial psychological effect and afford [a] good propaganda weapon” and signal 
the Russians that “we mean business.”819  A week after the Soviets failed to respond to 
further Western assurances that the IZT agreement would be signed as soon as the WBS 
would be cleared,820 a token airlift was launched on 27 July, flying some 2,800 tons out of 
the city within the first month, and more than 6,600 tons by mid-October.821 
Washington and the High Commission had considered the non-signature of the IZT 
agreement an “extremely strong bargaining weapon,” which “should not be sacrificed until 
all conditions we can reasonably expect to obtain have been satisfied,”822 yet by the end of 
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July it had also become clear that this alone would not force the Soviets to reverse their 
position. HICOG’s Berlin Element estimated that the Soviets could hold out the trade 
standstill for another two months “without much hurt,” and would be prepared to hold 
much longer “if the wider econ[omic] and pol[itical] results grow more likely meanwhile.” 
The mission observed that the Soviets had found the harassment of Berlin exports valuable 
beyond what may have been initial goals, such as forcing more favorable terms for an IZT 
agreement. Given the success in creating inter-allied and Allied-German tensions, it had 
become a device to prevent the tightening of East-West control, to undermine West Berlin 
and to contribute to the ongoing effort to upset the Adenauer government before the end of 
1951.823 
At the same time it became evident that a Western embargo on spare parts and 
engineering products would aggravate the inadequate supply situation in East Germany. 
The GDR had an inadequate machine production capacity to carry out major investment 
projects in the mining metallurgy and power industries. Not surprisingly, the 1951 
production plan heavily emphasized increases in heavy engineering, but even after the first 
quarter failure to achieve production targets had already been admitted. While East 
German coal and steel requirements could be obtained  from other “orbit countries,” this 
was true for machinery only to a much more limited extent. HICOG Berlin hence argued 
to extend the existing trade embargo to critical “soft” commodities such as machinery, 
chemicals and rubber products.824 Washington strongly endorsed the Berlin mission’s 
call.825 Under pressure from Washington, the Allied High Commission agreed, and the 
embargo took effect on 3 August 1951. Intelligence confirmed that as a result of the 
cessation of trade production difficulties and delays in reparation and export orders in the 
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GDR had already occurred. British intelligence estimated that the GDR economy had been 
hurt even more than the quantitative loss of trade would suggest, given the critical nature 
of imports from the West.826 Particular shortages, it was reported, included screws, chains, 
magnets, spare parts and components for machine tools and compressors rubber cables, 
cables for dredges, ball-bearing rods, boiler tubs, wheel tires and electrodes, sheets for 
motor vehicles and grinding agents.827 In light of these findings, the State Department felt 
that the Western bargaining position was sufficiently strong “so that [a] solution which 
fails [to] achieve our minimum demands unacceptable.”828 
Strong Western countermeasures were, however, undercut by internal Allied and 
Allied-West German disagreements. To be true, the British were as fed up as the 
Americans: the British Commandant complained internally that the “Russians and 
Fr[ench] have been playing us now for 6 weeks” and argued that time had come for 
decisive action.829 In the wake of the failed quadripartite meeting, the French government, 
however, warned not “to close the door to negotiations,” in fact argued that no basic 
principles were compromised by continuing interzonal trade negotiations despite the WBS 
backlog.830 French representatives doubted the effectiveness of any a trade stoppage. 
Claiming that it was essential to ensure that German public opinion was aware of the 
issues involved, the French Economic Advisor, on 16 July, disagreed with his colleagues 
that “time [was] yet ripe for any sanction to be imposed.”831 By the end of July, the French 
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were “still hesitant to apply further countermeasures.”832  Paris continued to appear “most 
anxious” to sign the new IZT agreement. In fact, the French Economic Advisor, asked by 
U.S. officials what his government would have done if free to act independently of other 
allies, gave the “[u]nhesitating reply that they would, of course, have agreed to submit 
certificates of origin.”833  The French repeatedly argued for a delay in instituting 
countermeasures, leading U.S. officials to complain about the “apparent defeatist attitude” 
and the “inescapable” impression of Soviet success in “working on Fr[ench]” to “divide 
western allies.”834 Hence HICOG warned that “if our firm stand weakened or [the] united 
western front here [is] broken by Fr[ench], we may well be faced with disastrous 
situation.”835 
West German support for a tougher policy was similarly tenuous. The Adenauer 
cabinet finally, after being pressed by Washington for a “very long time,” drafted and 
approved a new government ordinance, which would allow for a more effective control of 
interzonal trade. Convinced that the new controls would in some ways be more important 
than the trade agreement itself, McCloy had made the signing the new trade agreement 
contingent on the new ordinance coming into effect. But despite the fact that the IZT 
agreement had been initialed, the ordinance had yet to be signed by Adenauer and 
published on the Bundesanzeiger. Moreover, subsidiary regulations had not even been 
drafted by 11 July.836  Rather than tightening the trade screws on East Berlin, the 
Adenauer government had relaxed its trade restrictions within days of the initialing of the 
new IZT agreement. On 9 July, Bonn approved Warenbegleitscheine for West German 
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“soft commodities” (Vorgriff b) to the GDR—which included key commodities such as 
rubber, chemicals and machinery. The Länder Economics Ministries extended the validity 
of all WBS that had been issued prior to 3 July, when the advance agreement had lapsed. 
Though hard commodity deliveries—largely iron and steel, castings and mineral oil 
products--were still stopped at the border and the quantity of trade moving was apparently 
“negligible,” it signaled the Soviets that West Germans were eager to quick resume 
trade.837 
The Adenauer government’s attitude stemmed in part from increasing pressure 
from German businesses, which complained about the “serious repercussions” the trade 
embargo had on West German production, particularly the chemical industry.838 
Moreover, the SED regime stepped up its pressure on the Bonn government through 
organizations, such as most notoriously the GEFO in Hamburg, the Deutsche 
Handelsgesellschaft Ost/West in Düsseldorf, as well as certain lower Saxon trade circles. 
U.S. intelligence also reported that illegal trade, in particular “three-corner transactions,” 
using the Hamburg free port, were expanding. Other techniques included confiscation of 
West Berlin trucks on the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn, which, as HICOG’s Berlin Element 
suspected, in some cases occurred in possible connivance with Western firms.839 There 
were even suggestions that the Treuhandstelle was facilitating “special barter 
contracts.”840 
Confusion persisted in American eyes as to what exactly was happening “on the 
ground.” The Americans finally caught on that West Berlin firms were circumventing 
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Allied orders not to voluntarily submit certificates or origin, which explained at least in 
part why the Soviet Control Commission approved some WBS. Suggestions for an Allied 
penalty ordinance were kept “on ice,” as such a measure was bound to stir up widespread 
resentment at a crucial time when the commandants were eager to create and preserve 
public approval for the Allied stance.841 Similarly, Washington also learned that West 
Berlin firms were submitting multiple Warenbegleitschein applications to the Russians, 
hopeful that at least some would be approved. Hence it was hard to realistic assess how 
severe the backlog actually was. American officials also had to profess widespread 
“ignorance of the situation” as it existed on the GDR-West German border.  
By late July, furthermore, Kaumann was again talking to Orlopp, now proposing a 
joint investigation into questionable WBS cases as a way to resolve the dispute.842 
Washington strongly resisted any solution that legitimated Soviet claims to have a right to 
object to deliveries. Once accepted, Washington policymakers reasoned, the West would 
be at the whim of “any objections the Soviets might dream up” and give the Soviet a 
“veto” over West Berlin trade.843 By late August, however, the Allied High Commission 
had resigned itself to the fact that the East would not engage in an exchange of letters that 
made the continuation of trade contingent on unimpeded Berlin access and that the most 
that could be achieved was a unilateral West German statement to the East Germans on the 
conditions under which IZT would be carried out.844 While favoring one last attempt to 
resolve the issue through a direct approach by the High Commissioners to Chuikov, the 
U.S. commandant in Berlin, frustrated by weeks of “in vain haggling” seemed ready to 
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“[cut] the Gordian knot” and sign the agreement.845 The State Department, however, did 
not approve the High Commissioners’ proposal.846 
It is unclear whether Moscow realized how close Western Allied officials came to 
signing the agreement at that moment. What is clear is that the imposition of an 
unprecedented tax for the use of the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn, imposed the day after the 
Allied High Commission decision, tended to stiffen Western resolve. In Berlin, the 
Commandants called the new tax exorbitant and interfering with free access to Berlin, and 
demanded that the removal of the tax should be made an additional condition to signing of 
the IZT agreement. Pointing to the psychological dimension of the Soviet action, the 
Commandants also recommended Allied transport of essential foodstuffs to the city, as 
well as a retaliatory tax on East German barges using West Berlin waterways.847 HICOG 
officials also noted that the “westmark” funds that the GDR would gain would in good 
part be allocated to finance illegal procurement of goods from Western Germany!848 
Despite “French resistance to positive action on almost every point,” the High 
Commissioners and Berlin Commandants, meeting jointly, agreed a few days later to send 
a note of protest to Chuikov and to ask the West Berliners to prepare for the imposing 
taxes on East German barges passing through West Berlin.849 Additionally, Bonn was to 
consider imposing a tax on East German vehicles crossing Federal territory. U.S. Deputy 
High Commissioner George Hays “firmly rejected” a French proposal to sign the IZT 
agreement anyhow, reasoning that the vehicle tax made such an approach even more 
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untenable. His British colleague chimed in in support, arguing that signing the trade deal 
would represent a “horrible loss of faith for the West.”850 The State Department 
wholeheartedly agreed and suggested that the new countermeasure be put in effect no later 
than 17 September: “Western hesitation or vacillation has never gained anything from 
[the] Sov[iets] except more trouble.”851 
By contrast, the West Germans were now urging immediate signature. Adenauer 
and Reuter, even Heuss impressed McCloy that the agreement had to be signed 
immediately, even with a written or oral statement to the East.852 Brown coal deliveries for 
Berlin would be threatened by drawing out the negotiations, and the Soviets might suspect 
that the Americans had no intention of actually coming to an agreement. Once trade would 
resume, the Soviets would be less likely to risk its suspension through renewed 
harassment.853 “Under influence Fed[eral] Gov[ernmen]t,” Berlin city officials, moreover, 
were slow to carry out Allied orders, made in early September, to prepare a 
“comprehensive plan” to retaliate with a tax on East German barges, reflecting their 
unwillingness to engage in a new tax war.854 The Soviets were aware of the division 
within Allied ranks and not very likely to yield as long as these divisions existed.855 
Kaumann and his deputy had resumed his talks with Orlopp on September 7. Within a 
week they agreed to create a mixed committee of representatives of the Treuhandstelle and 
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the Transitstelle, which would jointly verify doubtful WBS.856 Eager not to leave the 
power of final disapproval in Russian hands, Hays insisted that any refusal to stamp the 
dubious WBS which the Treuhandstelle continued to endorse as valid after a joint review 
would be considered an obstacle to normal traffic. West German officials assured Allied 
representatives that these conditions were acceptable to the GDR officials, though it 
remained unclear what exact procedure had been agreed on.857 
A “mere verbal warning,” Hays insisted, was “entirely unacceptable.” Instead, 
Hays suggested, Kaumann was to submit a written statement to the Allied High 
Commission outlining the conditions under which he would–orally--agree to signing the 
trade agreement. The statement would note the assurances from the Eastern negotiators 
that WBS would be stamped without proof of origin, that in doubtful cases a joint 
examination would take place, but that the Treuhandstelle made the final determination; 
and that the GDR had agreed to cease other restrictions and reduce the autobahn tax to a 
reasonable level.858  Reasoning that the procedure would give the Soviets an opportunity 
to demonstrate their good faith—or show that the access restrictions really pursued larger 
political goals, Hays agreed to the signature of the IZT agreement. The agreement that 
would constitute the basic framework for trade between the two parts of Germany until 
1990 was finally signed on 20 September 1951.859 
As East and West Germans were fixing their signatures to the Berlin agreement, 
administration officials in Washington were “seriously concerned” about the course of 
action approved by the HICOG: a merely oral declaration would put the Western powers 
in a weak position in case it became necessary to suspend the agreement, and hence the 
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Department felt “strongly” that the agreement should not be signed unless the West 
German statement to Orlopp at the time of signing would be made in writing, and unless 
Orlopp’s acceptance was clear.860 Too late! By the time the cable reached McCloy, the 
agreement had been signed. All that McCloy could do was to assure Washington that U.S. 
conditions had been put in writing to the East on 6 July, had been repeated privately and 
publicly, and accepted “explicitly” by Orlopp, who McCloy added, had been “frequently 
in touch with Grotewohl.”861 Confronted with McCloy’s fait accompli, the State 
Department took until 26 September to formally agree to the action. It added to its 
concurrence that the immediate future would probably be the best time to lodge protests 
effectively—indicating that there was little faith in Soviet compliance.862 State 
Department hence officials watched warily as trade between the two German states 
resumed in early October.863 
Initially the signing of the IZT agreement seemed to work: the highway tax was 
drastically reduced, confiscations abated, and Eastern interference with parcel post 
shipments fell to a point where it was a “nuisance rather than a threat.” There was even 
some talk of a reopening of the Rothensee shiplift that had been closed since January “for 
repairs;” and no Warenbegleitscheine were returned unstamped. But within three weeks it 
became clear to Americans that the signing of the IZT agreement had not led to an 
improvement in the Berlin situation. Follow-up negotiations on sub-agreements, especially 
on the pivotal steel and iron shipments, were delayed and then proved contentious. Orlopp 
insisted upon increased deliveries of pig iron and rolled steel products within a shorter 
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period of time. More than 8,000 WBS were still being held by the Soviet Control 
Commission by early October—4,000 of them had been submitted since 20 September!864 
Rather than expediting the processing of the permits, the Soviets had “actually (…) 
intensified their delaying tactics.”865 In the third week of October some 5,356 WBS were 
returned unstamped by the Soviets without any reference to the procedure established 
when the Berlin Agreement was signed.866 Interference with Western parcel post and 
water transportation also continued. And the East German negotiators refused to discuss 
restrictions on Berlin trade and communications, arguing that these matters were 
“exclusively for consideration by the four powers.”867 
By mid-October the Truman administration was urging immediate suspension of 
the trade agreement--and any movements of goods.868  Kirkpatrick told Erhard that it was 
essential for the Federal authorities to demonstrate their solidarity with the Allies in taking 
countermeasures: “experience had proven that resolution and unity vis-a-vis the Russians 
had always produced the maximum effect.” “Doing nothing” would lead to “continued 
Soviet encroachment, the paralysis of Berlin trade and the eventual acquisition by peaceful 
means of Berlin by the Russians.”869 Though even the West German negotiators agreed 
that fulfillment of the conditions attached to the trade agreement was “less satisfactory 
than ever,” the Federal Government still refused to suspend the IZT agreement 
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immediately.870 Bonn’s position was precisely one of “doing nothing,”—that is: no efforts 
would be made to start trade under the new agreement, and Vorgriff WBS were not to be 
revalidated beyond 30 November.871 German officials proclaimed that more active 
measures would run the “considerable risk of retaliation, including the possibility of 
another blockade.”872 Rather than making a “propaganda demonstration,” most German 
officials favored simply letting trade “fade out” as revalidated WBS expired. While West 
German  IZT negotiator Leopold advised U.S. officials in Berlin that all deliveries from 
West had stopped, other Treuhandstelle officials admitted that deliveries were 
continuing.873 
At a meeting on November 7, McCloy and Adenauer, finally agreed that 
“countermeasures” would automatically take effect on November 12, and the next day the 
High Commissioners reiterated this in a letter to Adenauer: No new WBS for pig iron, 
rolling mill products, iron and steel sheets, steel and iron machinery and rubber would be 
issued, none revalidated and a substantial amount of revalidated WBS would be 
revoked.874 Yet meeting with the HICOM Economic Committee on November 13, 
Westrick, Lenz, Kroll and other German officials denied that such an agreement existed, 
and, once they had conceded this issue, claimed that they had not had sufficient time to 
prepare a list of relevant WBS. While the Germans finally agreed to instruct the Länder 
economic ministries not to issue new WBS for the commodities targeted by HICOM, they 
continued to refuse to revoke officially any outstanding WBS. U.S. officials had “serious 
doubts” about the effectiveness of this procedure but faced the “usual Fr[ench] reluctance 
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to force drastic action” and British arguments that the issue was less important because all 
WBS would expire on November 30.875 “Convinced beyond doubt” that a solution of the 
IZT disputes was being blocked by “deliberate Soviet policy of preventing the East 
Ger[man] negotiation and action to eliminate them,” Berlin commandant Taylor warned 
against any further trade with the East, arguing that this would be interpreted as yielding to 
Soviet pressure, would allow the GDR to obtain badly needed materials and abandon the 
control of East-West trade to force a cessation of Soviet interference with Berlin’s trade.876 
U.S. diplomats in Berlin also concluded that the possibilities of settling trade difficulties at 
the German level had been exhausted: without quadripartite discussions the Soviets would 
not yield to a more long-term solution. Prior to any four-power talks, however, “we must 
first demonstrate conclusively by action the firmness and solidarity of [the] west in 
opposing Soviet interference.”877 To bolster West German resolve, the High 
Commissioners agreed to try to expand the commercial airlift to 240 tons daily.878 At the 
same time, they ignored feelers advanced by the Soviets to engage in quadripartite 
discussions.879 
But U.S. efforts to stiffen Western resolve on the embargo proved in vain. 
Adenauer seemed detached from the issue, leaving it to his Economic Ministry, the 
attitude of which U.S. officials characterized as one of “concession and accommodation.” 
To American officials, the West Germans did not appear to feel that they had as much at 
stake in Berlin as the Allies.880 As expected, the Adenauer government proved slow in 
following through on the Allied High Commission instructions. A week after the restricted 
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embargo was to take effect, the economics ministry had still not issued instructions to the 
interzonal border customs posts to stop shipments; HICOG officials estimated that by now 
the ministry’s instructions would not reach the border before the end of the month, when 
all WBS would expire anyhow.881 Moreover, the Adenauer government excepted certain 
shipments from the embargo—such as DM 15 million worth of cast iron pipe, which the 
GDR claimed were needed for water mains in the area of Halle and Bitterfeld to avoid an 
outbreak of typhus; and the sale of fish surplus, despite the known “record of the fishing 
firms as illegal East-West traders.”882 
West German firms, moreover, were apparently undermining the embargo in other 
ways: Violating Allied Kommandatura and West Berlin Senate prohibitions, they were 
submitting Warenbegleitscheine directly to the Soviet Control Commission. Federal 
government officials claimed they had “no way of knowing” whether their instructions 
had been violated, and the commandants expected legal and administrative measures to 
prohibit the practice to have little effect.883 Within days of the Allied High Commission-
decreed embargo, moreover, West German negotiator Kroll and an East German official 
named “Stoof”—purportedly chief of the GDR Planning Commission and a member of the 
SED politburo--were secretly meeting again to discuss a way out of the impasse.884 U.S. 
officials were uncertain as to who had initiated the discussions—or when exactly they took 
                                                 
881 HICOG Mehlem to Department of State, 26 November 1951, NARA, RG 59, 462A.62B/11-2651 (FOIA 
release to author). 
882 HICOG Mehlem to Department of State, 26 November 1951, NARA, RG 59, 462A.62B/11-2651 (FOIA 
release to author). 
883 HICOG Mehlem to Department of State, 26 November 1951, NARA, RG 59, 462A.62B/11-2651 (FOIA 
release to author); HICOG Berlin to Department of State, 4 February 1952, NARA, RG 59, 762A.0221/2-
452. 
884 HICOG Mehlem to Department of State, 26 November 1951, NARA, RG 59, 462A.62B/11-2651 (FOIA 
release to author); HICOG Bonn to Secretary of State, 24 November 1951, NARA, RG 59, 462A.62B31/11-
2451. A few weeks later the was still considerable confusion as to the circumstances of the Kroll-Stoof talks. 
“The talks,” HIGOG reported in mid-December, “are now believed to have been requested by the East 
through an intermediary who is nameless. (We feel it is at least possible that Kroll arranged the talks 
himself, but there is of course no proof of this.) Two meetings took place in East Berlin, the first about 
November 16, the second November 21. Dr. Kroll now reports that Herr Stoof is a Staatssekretar in the 
office of the GDR premier, president of the State Planning Commission and, most importantly, a member of 
the Soviet Zone politburo. Dr. Kroll emphasizes Stoof’s high rank.” HICOG Mehlem to Department of 
State, 10 December 1951, NARA, RG 59, 462A.62B/12-1051. 
271 
place, and would only agree to allow an East-West German arrangement that would put 
the IZT agreement into operation provided that the WBS backlog would be eliminated, 
provide for a procedure would be in place for joint examination of problematic cases, and 
had the West German side declare that no certificates of origin would be submitted.885 It 
quickly became obvious, however, that Kroll had not attempted to trade a WBS solution 
for the IZT, but apparently held out additional Western concessions on “outstanding 
questions,” such as some 108 black-listed machinery (in particular rolling mill spare parts) 
shipments, which had been ordered by the GDR and partly paid under previous 
agreements, a major increase of the cast iron pipe, a speed-up of pig iron deliveries886 and 
joint examination of transit trade through FRG territory, all of which U.S. officials 
vigorously objected.887 
In their efforts to assure an effective embargo, the Truman administration was also 
hampered by British and French reluctance to enforce the required controls. British 
officials did not want to support U.S. efforts to “clamp down on” the on-going interzonal 
shipments, as it would only serve to exacerbate Allied-[West German] differences at the 
very moment Washington, London and Paris were negotiating with Bonn over the 
contractuals and a German defense contribution. Moreover, the allies had changed their 
position so often, one British foreign ministry official told the U.S., that “even the 
Sov[iet]s and East Ger[man]s do not know what the West’s policy is.” Rather than forcing 
the Germans to embargo items beyond the COCOM restrictions that the UK itself would 
ship to the East, British officials preferred to let the Germans “stew in their own juice” and 
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let the embargo issue “simmer” for a while.888 Similarly, the French government favored 
leaving the initiative in interzonal trade matters to the West Germans whose “timidity […] 
apparently suits them.”889 Neither seemed inclined to get involved in a course which might 
involve major risks. At no time, McCloy summarized the situation a few weeks later, had 
there existed Allied-German or even real allied unity: “This state of affairs must 
undoubtedly be known to [the] Sov[iet]s.”890  
Hence HICOG officials reluctantly agreed not to prevent the Adenauer government 
from extending unused WBS through 31 December 1951 up to an amount of DM 3 million 
on non-embargoed items as well as WBS for fish up to the amount of DM 10 million.891 
British and French officials were furthermore willing to a accept a West German proposal 
to sign agreements—one providing for a WBS solution in return for implementation of the 
IZT agreement, and a second one which settled “outstanding questions,” but Truman 
administration officials objected to the latter. At the same time, a COCOM meeting—over 
the objections of the U.S. delegate―endorsed the German view that spare parts for 
embargoed items were not subject to the embargo, thus opening the way for West German 
deliveries of rollers for East German rolling mills.892 Despite Washington’s urging that 
“our primary lever to bring satisfaction from East must stem now from firmness” and that 
any concessions would be taken as signs of weakness―and direct U.S. intervention in 
London and Paris―the West Germans were allowed to proceed with several of their 
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proposed deliveries to the East.893 With the trade curtailment far from complete and Allied 
support for the embargo at best questionable, McCloy argued that “we consequently have 
all the disadvantages of a trade embargo without all the advantages, and our goal has not 
[…] been attained.”894 
 By the turn of the year, in the eyes of key Truman administration officials the 
embargo on metals, machinery and chemical deliveries from West Germany had largely 
lost its effectiveness as a weapon against Soviet interference with Berlin’s lifeline. 
Reflecting once again exasperation with West German unwillingness to enforce the 
embargo—and its lack of knowing exactly what was going on on the ground, the State 
Department was “surprised to note [the] extent of trade” that had taken place in December 
despite the embargo.895  The preceding six months, U.S. officials in Berlin surmised, had 
no doubt strengthened Soviet assumptions that an embargo—and potential hardships—
would not be of sufficiently long duration to deter the Soviets given inter-Allied 
disagreements and West German refusal to follow trade restrictions that were tougher than 
those to which other Western countries were held. 896 Moreover, the GDR had made great 
strides in procuring the most needed materials from other Western orbit countries, such as 
Belgium, Austria and Sweden, thus loosening its dependence on West Germany. Channels 
for third country deals that to a considerable degree nullified the West’s refusal to 
implement the IZT agreement had been well developed.897 In early January 1952, British 
intelligence received information that barter deals between East and West Germans were 
being worked out to secure goods prohibited for trade.898 “The trade embargo, the last 
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remaining major weapon against Soviet harassment of Berlin communications has been 
lost,” HICOG officials pessimistically concluded. Time was running out as the GDR 
gained economic independence and less vulnerable to western pressures. The Soviets were 
“whittling down” the Western position in Berlin, blowing “hot and cold” and necessitating 
occasional retreats by the West which were ever harder to recover. What was needed, 
HICOG officials in Berlin demanded, was a weapon that went substantially beyond simply 
withholding strategic items and aimed at effectively hurting the self-sufficiency drive of 
East Germany.899  
McCloy himself was far more concerned about maintaining allied-German unity 
than pursuing more aggressive economic warfare: “I feel that we cannot [...] permit [the] 
present disturbing state of disunity to continue.” Hence McCloy advocated securing allied 
agreement to upholding the current strict embargo for two to three months, at which point 
its effectiveness should be reassessed.900 His concern over assuring allied unity on 
interzonal trade policy led McCloy to reverse course less than two weeks later. Arguing 
that it would be better to initiate such a course rather than having his hand forced by the 
allies, McCloy now proposed permitting the resumption of interzonal trade on the 
condition that the allies would agree to institute a complete embargo would immediately 
be in case of substantial future harassment of access to Berlin. “Substantial harassment” 
would be defined as interference with Berlin communications on a scale that would 
necessitate an airlift.901 The U.S. initiative would demonstrate that the U.S. was not out to 
restrict East-West (German) trade beyond the point needed to assure free access to Berlin. 
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Following McCloy’s proposal, the Allied High Commission formally approved the 
resumption of IZT on 1 February 1952. 902  
To be sure, in his decision to allow the resumption of IZT, McCloy could point—
as he did in his discussions with the Germans—to an improvement in the Berlin access 
situation. The excessive autobahn tax and Soviet interference with parcel post had been 
drastically reduced, the Mittelland Canal/Rothensee shiplift had been re-opened on 2 
November, and since the beginning of November the GDR Transitstelle had not returned 
any WBS unstamped and considerably reduced the backlog, though not yet to the normal 
“pipeline figure” of 3,000.903 HICOG was calling for an end to the commercial airlift—the 
“symbol of remedy for trade obstacles.”  All the specific points of objections to 
implementing the Berlin agreement had in fact been removed, putting the Soviets and East 
Germans “in quite good position to insist that compliance has been given.”904 In addition, 
the trade embargo seemed to have successfully aggravated tensions between the Soviet 
Control Commission and the East German government. Under pressure to make good on 
reparation deliveries, East Berlin was eager to resume IZT.  In “informal talks” with 
Kaumann in a Berlin café on 28 December and 2 January, GDR representative Horst 
Karsten, described as a “young (about 31 years old) extremely bright leader of the SED,” 
apparently conceded a “de facto junctim”905 between IZT and Berlin access, over which 
the Kroll-Stoof talks had broken down. West German officials suspected that besides a 
minor marketing crisis in view of a considerable stockpile of goods manufactured for 
interzonal trade, the GDR was trying to avoid a total breakdown of interzonal trade for 
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political reasons. As the official in charge, moreover, Orlopp had a personal interest in 
getting IZT moving again.906  New discussions between Orlopp and Kaumann quickly led 
to a revised WBS procedure agreeable to both.907 
Yet by mid-February, East Berlin refused to confirm the WBS procedure agreed 
upon by Kaumann and Orlopp; the Western negotiators informed their counterparts in turn 
that it would not be possible to resume the interzonal trade agreement after all.908 With 
West Berlin firms keen on maintaining the U.S.-funded airlift, the West Germans 
suggested to the Allied High Commission to keep the Berlin IZT agreement suspended 
while allowing for some interzonal trade to resume on a barter basis. Though barter 
transactions would have more easily allowed for a total trade stoppage at short notice, the 
State Department now objected to resuming trade even on a barter basis, as it would “in 
our view constitute [a] retreat from our earlier position that IZT be used as a weapon for 
protection of Berlin.”909 Foggy Bottom considered the West German proposal as largely 
motivated by pressure from business interests, not by concern for Berlin’s survival. 
McCloy in turn warned the Department that “we are losing position with both Ger[man]s 
and Russians […].” Everybody else, the high commissioner assured Washington, was 
ready to agree to the West German proposal, putting the U.S. in an “extremely bad light.” 
The British and French were “barraging us daily for a decision,” and the West Germans 
started raising doubts whether the United States wanted IZT at all, lending a certain 
credibility to the “vicious” GDR press attacks on the U.S.. “Even heretofore staunch West 
Berliners,” McCloy reported, have been affected.910 By April, McCloy agreed to maintain 
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the airlift at West German expense and to give Allied High Commission approval of over 
DM 100 million in barter transactions, even though the proposed commodity exchange 
had developed into “clearly a small-scale trade agreement.”911 The agreement was signed 
on 5 May, followed by another agreement on 2 August 1952.912  
To McCloy and others within the Truman administration, the entire experience 
demonstrated that an IZT embargo, not to speak of more aggressive economic warfare 
measures, proved to be a highly problematic countermeasure against Soviet 
encroachments on Berlin access. Not only was it uncertain to what extent the embargo had 
been effective to deter Soviet harassment of Western access to Berlin and destabilize the 
GDR. After all, as late as 5 March 1952, shortly after the Kaumann-Orlopp discussions 
had stalled, East Berlin had interrupted the supply of electricity to West Berlin. (The West 
Germans retaliated by shutting off the electricity supply from Hamburg to Mecklenburg.) 
While Western officials estimated that the IZT was important enough to the GDR to 
induce a cessation of those harassments within the competence of the GDR, few doubted 
that it had any impact on the Russian calculations on Berlin and that it lent even greater 
impetus to East German efforts to circumvent the embargo by increased trade with and via 
other Western countries.913 In fact, the IZT embargo had come at the high political price of 
allied and allied-German disunity that was not lost on the Soviets and undermined the 
economic and political impact of the embargo.  
The West Germans had vigorously resisted any attempts to shut down interzonal 
trade completely and demonstrated a degree of independence if not deceptiveness vis-à-vis 
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Washington far beyond that evident in other areas. Kaumann and Kroll personified West 
German restiveness. After failed efforts to oust Kaumann, the Truman administration 
invited Kroll to Washington in July 1952 and gave him VIP treatment in an effort to 
impress him with the administration’s “hard-core approach” in the Consultative Group, 
with Congressional and public interest in controlling East West trade, in particular in full 
implementation of the Battle Act. Kroll bemoaned Western discrimination against 
Germany, and in fact did not hesitate, as State Department officials noted, to make a 
number of “extravagant statements” about Germany’s control efforts as compared to the 
lack on cooperation by other COCOM countries. Though Kroll seemed to come away with 
a better understanding of the U.S. position in what Washington considered a “very 
successful” visit, two weeks later he informed his allied counterparts that the Federal 
Republic would more than ever strive to develop trade with the Soviet bloc “to as great 
extent [as] possible” within the COCOM and Battle act framework, fulfill existing trade 
agreements and in fact try to negotiate agreements with those it did not already have trade 
pacts.914     
American delaying tactics in the resumption of interzonal exchanges had also 
reinforced West German and Western European suspicions that the U.S. policy aimed at 
discouraging, if not opposing even legal, non-strategic East-West trade. Many in Germany 
believed that the United States was neither sufficiently aware nor sympathetic to German 
national interests in preserving trade with East Germany and Eastern Europe. The 
widespread notion that the United States sought to throttle interzonal and East-West trade 
were reinforced by Moscow which in the spring of 1952 invited European governments to 
an international economic conference that held out the promise of increased East-West 
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commerce.915 Internally, HICOG also estimated that the Western allies had undoubtedly 
lost in solidarity with the West Berliners over the WBS controversy and as a result might 
have “increased Soviet influence over the action of West Berlin firms.916 Hence the 
embargo had proved counterproductive, undermining in the minds of administration 
officials the very factor—Western Allied-West Berlin solidarity--that had forced the 
Soviets to end the 1948-1949 Berlin blockade.917 “Again today,” the State Department’s 
Policy Planning staff argued, “the most effective counterpoise to Soviet policy will be 
clear-cut evidence of Western solidarity and will to act.”918 
 
4. Conclusion 
The frustrating experience with the two interzonal trade embargos had a profound 
effect on U.S. policy in Germany. Based on the 1948-49 counter-blockade, the Truman 
administration had considered economic countermeasures against Soviet harassment and 
access restrictions to the western sectors to be the prime weapon in the Western arsenal to 
deter a strangulation of the city.  But the two embargoes of 1950 and 1951 demonstrated 
that direct Western economic leverage was limited. Washington’s European allies were 
unable to shut down the flow of trade, legal and illegal, effectively, and unwilling to carry 
on even a limited embargo for an extended period of time, and Moscow knew it. The GDR 
was expected to reach economic independence from Western Germany by the end of 
1951, and if not then, appeared to have made great strides on its way of achieving 
immunity against Western pressures within the span of a few years. Case in point was the 
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expected completion in the spring of 1952 of a canal that would by-pass the western 
sectors, depriving the West of the means to block West Berlin waterways for East bloc 
barges. The preceding months had also demonstrated that Stalin had at his disposal a 
whole spectrum of “harassments” of Berlin communications short of a full blockade which 
would make the Allied position in the city untenable and would be tantamount to a 
military attack on the city. Such a “creeping blockade” could destabilize the city 
economically and psychologically, yet it would be hard to say at any point “This is it.” 
Western officials feared that Moscow could in fact turn the tables on the West by 
leveraging interzonal trade for political purposes, using the East-West trade issue in 
combination with the Berlin access problem in its struggle against West German 
rearmament. Even gloomier were the prospects for opposing the increasingly notorious 
efforts on the part of the SED authorities to shut out Western influence from the GDR, 
such as dismissals of GDR government employees with Western contacts, the expansion 
of the railroad outer ring designed to rout freight and passenger traffic around the Western 
sector, or the construction of a powerful radio transmitter designed to jam RIAS 
broadcasts. At the very moment the administration set out to plan for new Soviet and East 
German threats against the city in the months leading up to the signing of the 
contractuals—and the “long siege (…) of fortress Berlin”— its options suddenly seemed 
precariously limited.919 
McCloy’s anxiety about the possibility of a new blockade spurred was shared by 
many in Washington and spurred a hectic effort within the Truman administration to 
develop new contingency plans.920 The result, NSC directive 132/1 set out a fairly 
complex system of contingencies and countermeasures. To deter a creeping blockade, the 
NSC called for demonstrating Western commitment to the city by public statements and 
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black and grey propaganda, maintaining a stockpile and preparing for a massive airlift. 
Significantly, NSC 132/1, adopted by the National Security Council on June 11, 1952, 
discarded the option of a military “probing action” to test Soviet intentions that had been 
advocated by Clay in 1948 and now by McCloy. Rather than sending a column through 
the GDR and likely resort to force at an early stage in the spiral of potential harassments, 
the directive prescribed emphasized economic reprisals, complemented by diplomatic and 
covert actions. Underlining the importance of Western ability to cut off West Berlin 
waterways, the State Department specifically suggested to the NSC the possibility of 
sabotaging the completion or operation of the canal built to by-pass Western Berlin.921 
The discussions in the NSC touched upon familiar measures such as strengthening and 
enforcing trade controls, but the Council charged an interdepartmental committee with 
exploring and refining the catalogue of economic countermeasures.  
Projecting firmness, the Truman administration followed much of the script: at a 
news conference on May 14, Acheson reaffirmed his government’s determination “to 
maintain our position in Berlin and assist and protect the interests of the people of Berlin.” 
As they affixed their signatures to the EDC agreement in Paris less than a fortnight later, 
the three Western powers declared that they would “treat any attack against Berlin from 
any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves.” Visiting Berlin at the end of 
June, Acheson restated the tripartite guarantee once more and assured the Germans of the 
United States’ “abiding interest in the protection of Berlin.”  To increase western staying 
power, the administration checked and accelerated the stockpiling program in cooperation 
with the Adenauer government. By June, a six-month stockpile was complete, except for a 
shortage in coal, and the achievement of a 12-month stockpile could be expected by April 
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1953.922 The Air Force confirmed that it was ready to lift 600-700 tons daily to Berlin in 
the first 30 days of a blockade, capable to more than double these figures thereafter, and 
undeterred by potential Soviet “jamming.”923    
Yet internally, the Truman administration quickly realized that there existed few 
effective economic measures adequate to counteract Soviet harassments short of a full-
fledged blockade. The State Department believed that a “trade counterblockade” by the 
Federal Republic alone would be “ineffective and inadvisable” in light of growing trade 
possibilities through third countries, and HICOG Berlin officials discounted local 
countermeasures altogether.924 Given likely British and French reservations, was 
considering unilateral actions in addition to those taken in concert with U.S. allies. 
Officials at Foggy Bottom now favored broader measures such as increased curtailment of 
overflight rights, closing or restricting the Kiel Canal or lower Elbe River to “Bloc 
vessels” or limiting East German access to the long-distance phone facilities in the U.S. 
Sector in Berlin.925 The administration eventually ruled out localized (i.e. solely West 
German or West Berlin) countermeasures against East Germany altogether. The economic 
effect of even multilaterally construed global set of countermeasures would not be “the 
major factor in determining the Kremlin’s execution of a policy to harass or blockade 
Berlin.”926   
Washington’s dilemma crystallized when,  on July 24, the Soviet Control 
Commission informed the British government that the Rothensee shiplift was in need of 
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repair and would be closed as of August 1.927 Coming on the heels of a series of Soviet 
harassments, and the kidnapping of West Berlin lawyer Walther Linse, one of the leaders 
of the staunchly anti-communist Investigative Committee of Free Jurists, XX Donnelly, 
McCloy’s newly appointed successor, sensed yet another blow at West Berlin’s 
confidence and economic survival. The Western powers immediately demanded five 
additional freight trains. If denied, Donnelly recommended “bottling up” East German 
barges within the Western sectors under the pretense of repair work on a selected bridge 
that would involve blocking of passage. This promised to be particularly effective since 
the canal by-pass had not yet been completed.928 Washington endorsed the call for a 
retaliatory response, along with a demarche in Moscow. Unless the Rothensee lock was 
reopened shortly, the Soviet harassments had reached a point at which they posed a 
“serious ultimate threat” and should set in motion a series of countermeasures.929 Yet 
preciously few such measures seemed available. Unilateral U.S. actions, the 
interdepartmental committee studying countermeasures had concluded, proved 
“impracticable.” To be effective, a program had to include the British, French, Germans 
and a number of other powers, which would be difficult at best. Many in Washington and 
HICOG were frustrated by the “softness and vacillation on the part of our French and 
British allies in Berlin;” the British government in turn had questioned the feasibility of 
working out a precise countermeasure plan in advance, preferring “to play things by 
ear.”930 The allied partners were worried that broadly defined countermeasures as 
proposed by the Truman administration would only evoke counter-reprisals and a “war of 
reprisals which was likely to turn out worse for Berlin in the long run. The State 
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Department was left to instruct the field that “in fact our possibilities in this connection 
[countermeasures] likely in practice prove not as great as has been generally supposed.”931   
The growing realization of how hollow the administration’s countermeasure 
prowess actually was subtly started to influence the American approach to East Germany. 
West Berlin and, albeit to a lesser degree, Western Germany seemed increasingly 
vulnerable to Soviet-East German pressure as the GDR’s economy became increasingly 
immune to West German influence. Deprived of any effective countermeasure against 
“creeping” Soviet or East German restrictions on access, Truman administration officials 
realized that a long-term solution would involved “dealing” with East Germany. 
Notionally this ran counter to non-recognition and certainly to any roll-back efforts, yet in 
time Washington would come closer to accepting a greater degree of control of the access 
routes, in particular by East German officials. Despite an eruption that would shake the 
GDR to its core, within little more than a year secret Western Allied contingency plans 
called for the recognizing the authority of GDR officials in access route control as “Soviet 
agents.”932  
Events in the GDR reinforced this trend in American thinking. In May 1952, the 
GDR government sealed off the border with the Federal Republic. Later that summer, the 
SED launched the final phase of transforming the Soviet Zone into a communist state, 
announced by Ulbricht at the July 1952 SED conference. The SED’s determined steps  
convinced the Truman administration to expect future problems from a further isolation of 
West Berlin from the Soviet sector and its GDR hinterland rather than direct interference 
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with the city’s communications with the West.933   In fact, following the closure of the 
Rothensee shiplift, fears that other potential harassments effectively threatening West 
Berlin’s survival, such a mass turnbacks of travelers to and from Berlin at GDR 
checkpoints or arrests of individual travelers by VOPOS, proved precipitous.934  East 
German efforts to isolate the zone, HICOG officials in Berlin wondered, “might even 
imply decision to live with us rather than to eliminate us.”935 The long-term repercussions 
for Berliners and Germans generally of shutting down contact and access to East Germany 
were no less dire than the immediate threats of access harassment and blockade, yet they 
required a very different response --  one that turned interzonal trade from a counter-
blockade weapon into an (at times subversive) tool for contact and aid. 
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V 
The United States and the 1953 Uprising 
 
 
1. The Eisenhower Administration, Stalin’s Death and the Origins of the 1953 Crisis 
On July 9, 1952, SED leader Walter Ulbricht stepped in front of the Second SED 
Party Congress and, in a seven hour speech, announced the SED leadership’s decision to 
proceed with the planned construction of socialism and with the creation of a “people’s 
army” as well as to encourage “voluntary cooperative production” in agriculture and hand 
trades.936 To American observers at the time, the dramatic, book-length speech seemed 
designed for shock effect in Western Germany, but even so signified “turning point” in 
Soviet policy, “heralding the transformation of the GDR into a people’s democracy.”937  A 
number of other East and East-Central European states had already embarked upon this 
approach a few years earlier, seeking to promote rapid short-term economic growth. By 
late 1952, however, the devastating effects of these policies--both in human and economic 
terms--had gradually become evident, even in Moscow itself. Towards the end of that 
year, officials there were receiving a growing number of reports on economic dislocations 
and popular unrest. Soviet diplomatic and intelligence sources reported a state of “near-
total chaos” in the Czechoslovak economy, “severe deficiencies” in Hungary, and 
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“extremely detrimental conditions and disruption” in Romania.938  Local communist rulers 
maintained control only through massive expansion of the largely Soviet-controlled 
security apparatus, mass terror, purges and show trials.   
By the end of 1952, forced socialization in industry and agriculture drove East 
Germany’s economy into the ground, and socio-economic conditions became critical.  
Hardest hit was the "middle class", mainly small entrepreneurs and wealthier farmers 
(“kulaks”).  In this new phase of the “class struggle”, the regime levied prohibitive taxes 
against remaining small and medium private enterprises in trade and industry. In addition, 
small business owners were, by April 1953, precluded from receiving ration cards, forcing 
them to buy food at exorbitant prices at state stores.  The general population was directly 
affected as increased output targets for heavy industry caused consumer goods production, 
and hence the living standard to lag far behind that of Western Germany.  Contrary to 
Stalin’s advice in April to entice farmers to join well-equipped and productive collectives 
voluntarily, the SED’s drive for collectivization coerced independent farmers into 
"production cooperatives," which met widespread public opposition. Those who refused to 
go along were subject to heavy, state-enforced delivery quotas.  The resulting havoc 
caused food shortages throughout the GDR and other hardships such as frequent electricity 
outages or heating cut-offs affected virtually the entire East German population. 
The regime also intensified its battles on other fronts.  A particular target were the 
churches, especially the dominant Protestant Church and its active youth organization, the 
Junge Gemeinde, viewed by many young East Germans as a preferred alternative to the 
FDJ. The combined assault on society by the authorities, notably through the compulsory 
build-up of armed forces, put additional strains on the GDR’s socio-economic fabric. 
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While prisons were filling up with the victims of socialist criminal "justice", an 
unprecedented number of East Germans fled to Western Germany. While some 166,000 
people turned their back on the regime in 1951, and 182,000 in 1952, in the first four 
months of 1953, according to internal GDR statistics, some 122,000 East Germans left.939  
As the Soviet intelligence chief could inform the CPSU Politburo, the GDR no longer held 
“any attraction to citizens of West Germany.”940  Eager to close the last escape valve—the 
still open sector crossings in Berlin—and to put the pressure on the Western powers by 
increasingly harassing the Western outpost, the SED proposed to take the drastic measure 
of virtually closing off the border between the Eastern and Western sectors early in 1953, 
thus foreshadowing the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. 
The growing crisis in East Germany coincided with a change of leadership in the 
USSR, and the dawn of a new era, in the wake of the death of Stalin on 5 March 1953. 
Even as the dictator lay dying at his dacha in the Moscow suburb of Kuntsevo, Georgii 
Malenkov and Lavrentii Beria plotted to seize the reins of power. Besides Malenkov and 
Beria, the newly-created CPSU Presidium included Vyacheslav Molotov, Nikita 
Khrushchev, Nikolai Bulganin, Kliment Voroshilov, Lazar Kaganovich, Anastas Mikoyan, 
Maksim Saburov and Mikhail Pervukhin, all of whom had held high positions under 
Stalin. The momentary pre-eminence of Malenkov in what was presented to the party and 
the outside world as the new “collective leadership” was underlined by his appointment on 
March 5 as chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers. Beria, Molotov, 
Bulganin and Kaganovich were appointed deputy chairmen.941 Seemingly ready to break 
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with the hard-line and paranoid approach that had placed the Soviet Union on the 
defensive worldwide, the new leadership immediately moved to set Soviet foreign policy 
on a more calm and flexible track. On March 15, Malenkov announced before a session of 
the Supreme Soviet that there was “no litigious or unresolved question which could not be 
settled by peaceful means on the basis of the mutual agreement of the countries concerned 
... including the United States of America.”942  
In the following weeks, the USSR signaled readiness for a truce in Korea; waived 
its long-standing claim for control of Turkish territory; and agreed to the appointment of 
Dag Hammarskjöld as new U.N. secretary general. The “hate America campaign” in the 
Soviet media was apparently called off; the Kremlin even hinted at its interest in a U.S.-
Soviet summit on disarmament and other issues. Similarly, a growing consensus within 
the Moscow leadership seemed to emerge on the need for drastic changes in Soviet 
policies toward East-Central Europe that would help stabilize the deteriorating situation in 
the region. In Germany, Moscow’s espousal of “peaceful co-existence” translated into 
steps to ease the contentious traffic problem around Berlin and calls for a resumption of 
the quadripartite negotiations on safety in the Berlin air corridors. The Soviets also opened 
the Rothensee ship lock which had been closed since August; all of a sudden, the backlog 
of trucks on Helmstedt/Marienborn autobahn was cleared, and the stamping of the 
“Warenbegleitscheine” necessary for interzonal trade transactions rapidly increased.943    
Stalin’s death and his successors’ “peace offensive” surprised the newly 
inaugurated administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Despite the fact that Stalin’s demise 
had been expected ever since the end of World War II, noone had examined the scenario 
very seriously. “Ever since 1946, I know that all the so-called experts have been yapping 
about what would happen when Stalin dies and what we as a nation should do about it,” 
                                                 
942 New York Times, 17 March 1953, p. A6. 
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Eisenhower complained at a cabinet meeting on 6 March.  “Well, he’s dead. And you can 
turn the files of our government inside out--in vain--looking for any plans laid. We have 
no plan. We are not even sure what difference his death makes.”944 In fact, contingency 
plans did exist, but the key document, PSB D-24 (1 November 1952) was largely useless 
as an operative guideline, proclaiming only the “many uncertainties in this field” and 
blandly stating that “(1) Stalin must die sometime; (2) strains must be presumed to exist 
between individuals and groups closely connected with the problem of succession; (3) ... 
there is evidence of group dissatisfaction throughout the population of the Soviet 
Union.”945  
The thinking of the president and his administration soon crystallized around the 
idea of a presidential speech. Internal disagreements, however, forestalled any immediate 
reaction to the events in Moscow. Presidential adviser C.D. Jackson, an old World War II 
psychological warfare hand and long-time editor of Time & Life magazine, favored an 
aggressive exploitation of this “first really big propaganda opportunity offered to our side 
for a long time.” Led by Jackson, the Psychological Strategy Board suggested formulating 
“A Message to the Soviet Government and the Russian Peoples” centering on a proposal 
for a four-power conference.946 By contrast, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, though 
known for his fervent anti-communism and calls for “liberation” of the “captive peoples” 
of Eastern Europe, urged a more cautious approach. Dulles was also dead-set against a 
four-power meeting, because it would entail discussing German unification. Opening the 
“Pandora’s box” of the German question, he believed, was certain to disrupt the American 
                                                 
944 Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. 2 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 67-68; see also 
“Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, March 6, 1953,” DDEL, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman file, 
Cabinet series, Box 1. 
945 PSB D-24, NARA, RG 59, PSB Files. 
946 The four powers controlling German affairs were the United States, Soviet Union, Britain and France.  
On Jackson, see H. W. Brands, Jr., Cold Warriors.  Eisenhower’s Generation and American Foreign Policy 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 117-137; and Valur Ingimundarson, “‘Der Chef des 
kalten Krieges’ C.D. Jackson psychologische Kriegführung und die deutsche Frage, 1953/54,” 
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 46:2 (1998), pp. 221-251. 
291 
high-wire act of obtaining British, French and Italian, as well as West German, ratification 
for the “European Defense Community” (EDC), just as he feared it would upset plans for 
the impending West German federal elections. To the West Europeans and Americans, the 
EDC assured West German military integration into the Western alliance, and at the same 
time precluded the resurgence of Germany as an independent military power. To many 
Germans, it held out hopes, most immediately, for the end of the occupation regime and 
West Germany’s speedier attainment of sovereignty and international acceptance, as well 
as the admittedly distant goal of fulfilling the national desire for reunification on Western 
terms. But for both West Europeans and many Germans, negotiations with the Soviets 
remained a tempting alternative to pursuing a resolution of East-West differences and 
German unity. Dulles therefore apocalyptically suggested that negotiating with the Soviets 
would be “tantamount to inviting the fall of the French, German and Italian Governments, 
and possibly even rendering Mr. Eden’s position in the British government untenable.” If 
any official proposition was made that German unity could be obtained by some other 
vehicle, Dulles warned, “then certainly the EDC would be finished.”947 
Soviet Premier Georgii Malenkov’s March 15 speech increased the pressure on the 
Eisenhower administration. Across the board, U.S. officials doubted that the speech or 
Moscow’s other conciliatory gestures indicated a basic change in Soviet policies and long-
range objectives. But Malenkov, not Eisenhower, had seized the initiative. Everything now 
seemed to be “building up towards a new offer on Germany,” as the new U.S. ambassador 
in Moscow, Charles Bohlen, predicted—-possibly even, “with Stalin gone ... a really big 
one involving Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Germany.”948 In the end, Eisenhower’s 
April 16 speech, “A Chance for Peace,” delivered before the American Society of 
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Newspaper Editors in Washington, called for a “deeds not words” test of the Soviet peace 
campaign. Eisenhower suggested, among other things, an agreement to end the Korean 
War and to address the German and Austrian problem.  He was careful, however, to avoid 
any mention of an East-West conference. The speech, as the State Department briefed its 
embassies, was designed to seize the political and psychological initiative from the USSR 
and would, as Dulles boasted to the newspaper editors after Eisenhower’s speech, turn the 
Soviet peace offensive “into a ‘peace-defensive.’” Internally, Dulles sounded more 
pessimistic: “The present course we are following is a fatal one for us and the free world. 
It is just defensive: we are always worrying about what the Soviets will take next. Unless 
we change this policy, or get some break we will lose bit by bit the free world, and break 
ourselves financially. (...) You can’t hold the world by just defensive action much 
longer.”949 
It was British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who, though initially rather 
dubious about a Soviet change of heart, was more willing to explore potential 
opportunities which seemed possible with the change of leadership, thus breaking with the 
skeptical and reserved reception which Moscow’s peace offensive had met in the West.  
On April 20, Churchill not only backed the U.S. “initiative” but also indicated that he 
favored high-level talks with the new Soviet leadership.  Following the Pravda article of 
April 25, which had signaled Russian willingness for talks on Germany, the British Prime 
Minister, in a speech in Parliament on May 16, boldly called for a “conference on the 
highest level [...] between the leading powers without delay,” holding out the possibility of 
“a generation of peace.”  
In going well beyond Eisenhower’s “deeds, not words” approach, Churchill was 
primarily motivated by his belief that a negotiated settlement was necessary to prevent 
                                                 
949 “Solarium Project: Principal Points Made by JFD,” 8 May 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL), 
Mandatory Review release.   
293 
nuclear war and that the new Soviet leadership was amenable to personal diplomacy.  
Moreover, the prime minister felt that the West could now negotiate from a position of 
strength and that Eisenhower was thus also ready for negotiations.  Indeed, Churchill was 
afraid Eisenhower would himself take advantage of the moment, thus receiving the 
political credit which Churchill sought for himself and his country.  Churchill’s speech 
was received enthusiastically in Europe, and on May 21, Churchill was able to announce 
that a Western summit would take place in Bermuda in June, a move which was widely 
perceived to be preparatory to a meeting with the Russians. 
 
It is unclear precisely when the East German leadership was informed of any 
impending changes in Kremlin policy toward the GDR. Unaware of the Kremlin’s 
intentions--or perhaps in an effort to preempt any changes--Ulbricht, in a Neues 
Deutschland article published on 8 March (the day before Stalin’s funeral), reasserted in 
the most vigorous terms his determination to proceed with the accelerated program of 
building socialism, including the creation of National Armed Forces, and he took pains to 
attribute these policies to Stalin directly.950 With the backing of General Vasily I. 
Chuikov, the commander in chief of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, and 
Semyonov, political advisor to the Soviet Control Commission. Ulbricht also renewed an 
earlier request for Moscow’s authorization to place border guards along the sectors 
between West and East Berlin, continuing his efforts to isolate the Western outpost in the 
heart of the GDR. But once back from Stalin’s funeral, however, Ulbricht fell noticeably 
silent. Grotewohl had apparently received his first inklings of the new Soviet leadership’s 
intentions at the funeral in Moscow, namely that the GDR would be left to its own devices 
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to deal with its economic difficulties.951  A few days later, Moscow denied Ulbricht a 
“green light” on any further measures of “border protection” along the sector line in 
Berlin. The Soviet Control Commission was instructed to explain “tactfully” to the SED 
that the “grossly simplistic” measures they were proposing would interrupt the 
“established order of city life,” would “create bitterness among the Berliners and produce 
economic dislocations, and, most importantly, place in doubt the sincerity of the policy of 
the Soviet government and the GDR government, which are actively and consistently 
supporting the unification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace treaty.” Closing 
borders, Moscow declared, would present a “clear disadvantage” in the USSR’s relations 
with the Western powers. Further, the Kremlin leadership wanted to be sure that any 
countermeasures against the “hostile forces” in West Berlin “aren’t hurried and aren’t 
simplistic.”952  Similarly, Moscow’s propaganda directives for the month of April 
apparently admonished the East Berlin papers to cease their vitriolic attacks against the 
Western powers and to focus their attention on Adenauer as an opponent to the peaceful 
solution of the German question.953  The Soviet Control Commission also forced a scaling 
back of the massive numbers of arrests and trials the SED regime had inaugurated under 
the pretext of enforcing a law for the protection of people’s property. A report by the GDR 
Prosecutor’s Office, ordered by Karlshorst, estimated that if the regime continued to 
convict perpetrators of economic crimes at the current rate, “more than 40,000 people will 
be in prison by the end of 1953,” a situation that would be “simply unfeasible.”954    
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By mid-April Ulbricht had somehow managed to reassure himself of Moscow’s 
support, possibly by soft-pedaling some of the harshest features of SED policy. On 10 
April, the USSR Council of Ministers reduced the level of compulsory GDR shipments 
from Soviet enterprises in East Germany, and three days later granted East Berlin further 
economic support. In his first major policy pronouncements since the March 8 statement, 
Ulbricht reiterated in two Neues Deutschland articles on April 15 and 16 that the 
construction of socialism in the GDR remained the most important contribution to peace 
and German unity, although he made no references to the creation of armed forces and to 
restrictive measures around Berlin.  U.S. observers detected “[n]oticeably more restraint in 
tone than [the] usual Ulbricht style,” including his reaffirmation of the voluntary nature of 
the production cooperatives and admission of mistakes by local courts and party officials 
in dealing with small and middle-class farmers.  But the “de-dramatized” program, they 
noted, still stressed increases in productivity, especially in heavy industry.955  The 
“striking feature” of Ulbricht’s pronouncements, U.S. officials observed, was how they 
fitted “neatly into the changed tactical position currently being followed by Moscow.”956 
Despite the elimination of some of the “frightening features”957 of SED policy, the 
party continued to put pressure on large segments of the population.  On the political level, 
the regime sharpened the battle against potential centers of opposition such as the 
churches, as well as targeting certain key individuals.  In mid-May the 13th SED Central 
Committee Plenum958 ousted Franz Dahlem, considered Ulbricht’s only serious rival 
within the party, ascribing the move to further “lessons of Slánskýism,” an allusion to the 
purged Czechoslovak Communist leader who had been executed as an “Anglo-American 
                                                 
955 HICOG Berlin to HICOG Bonn, 20 April 1953, NARA, RG, 762B.00/4-2053. 
956 HICOG Berlin to HICOG Bonn, 20 April 1953, NARA, RG, 762B.00/4-2053. 
957 HICOG Berlin to HICOG Bonn, 20 April 1953, NARA, RG, 762B.00/4-2053. 
958 The Plenum was held in Berlin from 13-14 May 1953.  
296 
spy” in December 1952.959 The SED also renewed its drive for austerity, “vigilance” 
against foreign enemies, and internal party discipline; reinforced efforts to increase 
industrial productivity and the viability of the existing LPGs; and launched new measures 
to undermine the existence of small entrepreneurs.  Ignoring the signs of growing 
dissatisfaction among the population, the Politburo had the CC adopt a 10 percent 
compulsory raise in industrial work norms, effective June 1.  The GDR Council of 
Ministers eventually decreed the norm increase “recommended” by the Central 
Committee, but changed the deadline to June 30. 
Eisenhower administration officials followed events in the GDR closely to see 
whether they gave any clue to Soviet intentions. Given how starkly Ulbricht’s March 8 
restatement of hard-line policies had contrasted with the Soviet peace campaign developed 
after Stalin’s funeral, HICOG officials surmised that Ulbricht’s emphasis on the necessity 
to develop national armed forces might have represented an “independent decision of 
Ulbricht not cleared with the new Kremlin leaders.”960 German intelligence sources 
confirmed American suspicions that Ulbricht was “strictly a Stalin man,” nor entirely liked 
by any of the other Kremlin leaders, and now facing one of the most serious trials of his 
career: establishing himself firmly with the new Moscow leadership.961  Rumors about 
Ulbricht’s volatile position persisted; information from the SPD East Bureau in Berlin 
predicted that Ulbricht “might be sacrificed by [the] Soviets.”962  There were other signs 
that suggested that “Ulbricht may have had his wings clipped somewhat by Moscow”963 
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But however much out of step with Moscow Ulbricht had been, by mid-April it appeared 
that coordination between East Berlin and Moscow had been fully reestablished: U.S. 
officials had “every indication that Moscow [was] exercising complete control of SED 
policy and actions.”964  
In fact, despite longstanding efforts to keep alive the spirit of resistance behind 
the”Iron Curtain,” American observers came to believe the SED led by Ulbricht to be in 
firm control of events—ironically precisely at the moment they started to unravel. 
Symptomatic of the degree to which Amercan analysts overestimated the stability of the 
situation in the GDR was that the fact that the vastly increasing influx of refugees into 
West Germany from the East in early 1953 was initially considered to be weakening the 
ferment of unrest in the GDR. Rather than a sign of bourgeoning unrest and deterioration, 
the growing flow of refugees pouring into Berlin was interpreted to indicate the East 
Germans’ decreasing energy to resist and morale.  HICOG Berlin’s Eastern Affairs 
Division reported to Washington in February 1953 that it could not be expected “that even 
if called upon to do so, the East Germans would be willing and capable of carrying out a 
revolution unless such a call coincided with a declaration of war and/or assurance of 
Western military support.”965  
As the stream of East Germans took on massive proportions that spring, the 
Truman administration considered the developments to be a deliberate measure by the 
SED regime rather than a reflection of the deteriorating situation in the GDR.  “It is my 
opinion that Commies have capabilities of cutting stream drastically,” the newly-appointed 
U.S. High Commissioner in Germany, former Harvard president James B. Conant, 
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reported. 966   Panic therefore marked the initial American reaction to the refugee flood.  In 
February, Conant estimated that more than 300,000 would cross the border to the West 
within the next hundred days.967   Despite a small airlift which flew about 1,000 refugees 
out of the city to West Germany every day, HICOG Berlin predicted that space in West 
Berlin was “bound to become tight” and that the “danger of epidemics as well as the 
“possibility of riots and disturbances inspired either by general discontent or Communists” 
could not be discounted.968   HICOG therefore unilaterally considered plans for a “crash 
evacuation” of refugees utilizing military aircraft and recommended a loan to the Federal 
Republic with an upper limit of $100 million.969   In addition, HICOG pressed for changes 
in the West German refugee recognition policy which had resulted in an accumulation of a 
large number of non-recognized refugees who, as unemployables, constituted an 
intolerable burden to (West) Berlin’s economy and political stability.  Faced with the 
possibility that the influx of refugees might reach “staggering numbers,” propelling the 
problem to “disaster proportions” and straining West German resources beyond their 
limits, Conant briefly considered abandoning the long-established policy of treating the 
refugee problem as an internal problem, the burden of which had to be and could be 
carried by the West Germans themselves.970   
By April, however, when Adenauer arrived in Washington for his first visit to the 
United States (and the first such visit by any German leader since the war) and pleaded for 
economic assistance in the scope of $250 million to cope with the refugee crisis, U.S. 
apprehensions had been largely alleviated. 971   West Germany seemed able to cope with 
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the influx economically.  By that time, it had also become obvious that the refugees were 
causing serious embarrassment and problems for the SED.  U.S. observers concluded that 
the Soviets had overestimated the effectiveness of propaganda and dissuasion in stemming 
the refugee flood but considered extreme and drastic measures politically unfeasible.  If 
the Western Allies exercised ingenuity, imagination, and determination to prevent the 
refugee flow from becoming a security problem in West Berlin, they could “turn potential 
danger into [a] positive asset” and “embarrass seriously and hurt Soviet-SED strategy and 
tactics in Ger[many].”972   Consequently, the Eisenhower Administration stuck to 
established policy and denied West Germany any extra aid for the refugees and discharged 
its special responsibilities for Berlin by earmarking a mere $15 million for refugee relief.   
Ulbricht’s removal from the scene and a radical change in the GDR’s internal 
make-up seemed to American observers nearly unimaginable in view of his longstanding 
relationship with the Moscow leaders. Equally unimaginable was a change in Moscow’s 
long-range objectives in Germany that Ulbricht’s ouster would suggest. In March, they 
had warned that despite a “mellowing process” there were no signs that the basic tenets of 
Stalinist communism had been abandoned, and “a reversion of aggressive expansionism 
may be anticipated at a later date.”973 Within a few weeks American officials confirmed 
their earlier impressions: the SED apparatus was implementing “what amounts to basically 
the same internal SED program as before, with some slight outward modifications."974  
 
In fact, the East Germany’s future course was under intense review within the 
Soviet leadership in Moscow in the spring of 1953. It is still unclear whether this occurred 
in reaction to the March 19 Bundestag ratification of the EDC treaty, or to mounting 
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skepticism over the efficiency of Stalinist policies in the GDR and throughout Eastern 
Europe, or as part of a fundamental policy reassessment to try to forestall further moves 
towards West Germany’s military integration, or a combination of all these factors. As 
Ivan Tugarinov, head of the Committee on Information informed the Third European 
Department of the Foreign Ministry (responsible for Germany) in mid-April, “there is a 
widespread assumption in the USA and the Western European countries that, in the near 
future, the Soviet government will come out with a proposal for convening a quadripartite 
conference to discuss the German problem.” Tugarinov surmised that “the main reason for 
the alarm” in the West was that the “apparently pending announcement by the Soviet 
Union of new proposals on the German question” could “bring about the failure of 
American plans” to include West Germany in its “aggressive bloc.”975 Rumors of a new 
Soviet initiative in Germany had been reinforced by Semyonov’s recall to Moscow in mid-
April as well as preparations for reorganizing the Soviet Control Commission as a new 
“Soviet High Commission” analogous to the Western High Commissions in West 
Germany.976 
 Interpreting the purpose, timing, and scope of the Soviet initiative on Germany has 
been controversial.977  Was it merely a propaganda move designed to forestall the further 
military integration of West Germany? Or did it reflect a new flexibility on the part of the 
post-Stalin leadership on the German Question, even to the extent of abandoning socialism 
in the GDR?  The documentary record is still too fragmentary to provide a definite 
resolution of this question at this time. The essence of the discussions within the Soviet 
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government went in the directions of boosting the prestige of the East German regime and 
resurrecting the idea of German unification. Perhaps inspired by Adenauer’s visit to 
Washington, the head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s Third European Department, 
Mikhail Gribanov, and Deputy Foreign Minister Georgii Pushkin proposed on April 18 to 
invite a GDR government delegation to Moscow headed by Grotewohl. They pointed out 
that no GDR government delegation had officially traveled to the USSR since 1949, and a 
visit would “increase the authority of the GDR.”  As a “new step” in the German question, 
Gribanov and Pushkin suggested the formation of a provisional all-German government 
composed of representatives appointed by the West and East German parliaments while 
preserving, at least for the time being, the GDR and West German governments. A 
provisional government would prepare recommendations for the unification process, and 
most importantly, would draft an all-German election law. Other Foreign Ministry 
proposals placed the formation of an all-German government at the center of the Soviet 
proposal to “retain the initiative on the German question,” arguing that such a “new 
concrete step” would “evoke a broad positive response among the German people” and 
“expose the position of the (other) three great powers on the German issue.”978 Semyonov, 
who had been urgently recalled to Moscow, similarly advised the leadership that it was 
important to “avoid the impression that the Soviet government is on this occasion limiting 
itself only to diplomatic posturing,” and to take measures to strengthen friendly relations 
between the USSR and the GDR and increase the all-German and international prestige of 
the East German state. Overestimating—in remarkable symmetry to the GDR watchers at 
HICOG—the extent to which the SED was in control of the situation in the GDR, the 
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Soviet governments foremost Germany expert added that the East German government  
had “by now grown and strengthened to a sufficient degree to govern the country 
independently.” Since the existence of the Soviet Control Commission continued to 
emphasize sharply the inequalities between the USSR and the GDR, Semyonov 
recommended the “removal of the Soviet military authorities’ control over the GDR.” He 
noted that liquidating the Control Commission would constitute “clear, practical proof of 
the sincerity of the Soviet government’s proposals on all-German questions.”979 
While the Eisenhower administration was worrying about Soviet-East German 
machinations behind the swelling refugee flow, Moscow apparently did not become aware 
of how quickly the situation in the GDR was deteriorating until May. This may have been 
partly due to Beria’s efforts after Stalin’s death to revamp the security apparatus, but also 
to the reorganizing and eventually dismantling of the Soviet Control Commission that 
spring.980  Based on a report by the KGB’s chief representative in Germany, Colonel Ivan 
Fadeikin, that spotlighted the growing refugee problem the SED had on its hands, KGB 
head Beria finally raised the issue on the CPSU Presidium on May 6.981  Beria pointed out, 
the mass flight could be not be explained “increased hostile propaganda” in the GDR 
alone, but also by concerns over the effects of the hardline socialization policies.982 The 
SED did “not conduct a sufficiently active fight against the demoralizing work carried out 
by West German authorities.”983  On May 14 the CPSU Presidium finally instructed the 
Soviet Control Commission “tactfully” to advise Ulbricht and Grotewohl that 
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“collectivization in East Germany should be halted for at least the rest of the year.”984 Two 
weeks later, the Soviet leaders decided that the policy of “forced construction of 
socialism” had to be terminated altogether in order to avert a full-blown crisis and adopted 
as an “order” the final draft resolution on a “new course” for the GDR. The June 2 order, 
“On Measures to Improve the Health of the Political Situation in the GDR,” sharply 
criticized the SED’s policy of accelerated construction of socialism. 985  The decree  
                                                 
984 Top secret draft memorandum, “Proekt ukazanii tt. Chuikovu, Yudinu,” 14 May 1953, with cover note 
from Molotov to the CPSU Presidium, AVP RF, f. 6, op. 12, p. 18, d. 278, ll. 39-40, cited in Kramer, “The 
Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle (part 1),” p. 24.-- Less tactfully, Ulbricht was also to be rebuked for 
his 5 May speech commemorating Karl Marx, which declared that the GDR had attained the status of a 
people’s democratic state in which the dictatorship of the proletariat was to be carried out. “Politically 
misguided,” the Soviet leadership termed the speech, prone to “severely damage the struggle of both the 
GDR itself and the Soviet Union for the reunification of Germany on a peace-loving and democratic basis.” 
The CPSU leadership also criticized the Soviet Control Commission’s  new Political Adviser, Pavel Yudin, 
for committing “an egregious error” by not intervening with Ulbricht and failing to consult Moscow. 
“Protokol No. 8 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 14 maya 1953 goda,” 14 May 1953 TsKhSD, f. 3, op. 
10, d. 23, ll. 41-42, cited in Kramer, “The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle (part 1),” pp. 24-25. For 
Ulbricht’s speech, see “Karl Marx--der größte Sohn der deutschen Nation: Aus der Rede des Genossen 
Walter Ulbricht auf der Gedenkkundgebung in Berlin zum 135. Geburtstag von Karl Marx am 5. Mai 1953,” 
Neues Deutschland, 7 May 1953, p.3. -- This might have been one of the reasons for Yudin’s replacement by 
Semyonov at the end of the month. 
985 The debate in Moscow apparently culminated at the May 27 session of the Presidium of the Council of 
Ministers.Since the minutes of this meeting--if they exist--have not been declassified, it remains unclear 
exactly how the German issue played out, whether the crisis in East Germany led to arguments in favor of 
pursuing all-German concerns and even abandoning of socialism in the GDR altogether (as Beria allegedly 
argued), or whether it prompted the exact opposite, moving the debate away from more all-German 
considerations to consolidation of the GDR. On the Moscow debate see in particular Zubok, “`Unverfrohren 
und grob in der Deutschlandfrage…’ Beria, der Nachfolgestreit nach Stalins Tod und die Moskauer DDR-
Debatte in April-Mai 1953,” in 1953—Krisenjahr des Kalten Krieges in Europa, edited by Christoph 
Klessmann and Bernd Stöver (Cologne: Böhlau, 1999), pp. 29-48; Scherstjanoi, “Die sowjetische 
Deutschlandpolitik nach Stalins Tod 1953,” pp. 497-549; Wettig, “Die beginnende Umorientierung der 
sowjetischen Deutschland-Politik im Frühjahr und Sommer 1953,” Deutschland Archiv 28:5 (May 1995), 
pp. 495-507; Wettig, “Zum Stand der Forschung über Berijas Deutschland-Politik im Frühjahr 1953,” in Die 
Deutschlandfrage von der staatlichen Teilung Deutschlands bis zum Tode Stalin (Studien zur 
Deutschlandfrage, vol 13) (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994), pp. 183-200; James Richter, Reexamining 
Soviet Policy Towards Germany During the Beria Interregnum, Cold War International History Project 
Working Paper No. 3.  (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1992); Lew 
Bezymenski, “Ein Exklusivbericht aus Moskau 1953: Berija will die DDR beseitigen,” Die Zeit 42 (15 
October 1993), pp. 81-83; Richter, “Reexamining Soviet Policy Towards German in 1953,” Europe-Asia 
Studies 45:3  (1993), pp. 671-691; Amy Knight, Beria: Stalin’s First Lieutenant (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1992); Wettig, “Sowjetische Widervereinigungsbemühungen im ausgehenden Frühjahr 
1953?  Neue Aufschlüsse über ein altes Problem,” Deutschland Archiv 25:9 (1992), pp. 943-958; Wettig, 
“Zum Stand der Forschung über Berijas Deutschland-Politik im Frühjahr 1953,” Deutschland Archiv 26 
(1993), pp. 674-82; Wettig, “Neue Erkenntnisse über Berijas Deutschland-Politik,” Deutschland Archiv 26 
(1993), pp. 1412; Wettig, Bereitschaft zu Einheit in Freiheit?, pp. 235-256. — Most likely the crisis in the 
GDR forestalled any decision on the overall issue of an initiative on Germany. After all, the May 27 session 
had been called to “analyze the causes which had led to the mass exodus of Germans from the GDR to West 
Germany and to discuss measures for correcting the unfavorable political and economic situation in the 
GDR.”See “Delo Beria,” 2 (1991), p. 144. According to the testimony by Malenkov, Molotov, Bulganin and 
Khrushchev at the July 1953 CPSU CC Plenum as well as later accounts by Khrushchev, Molotov, and 
Andrei Gromyko, Beria was not satisfied with merely adjusting the pace of socialization in East Germany. 
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acknowledged that the mass exodus of East Germans of all professions and backgrounds 
had created "a serious threat to the political stability of the German Democratic Republic” 
and called for a decided shift in economic policy on a broad front: an end to forced 
                                                                                                                                                   
Instead of terminating the forced construction of socialism, he allegedly shocked his colleagues with a 
proposal to abandon socialism in the GDR altogether in favor of creating a united, neutral and non-socialist 
Germany. “We asked, ‘Why?,’” Molotov later recounted. “And he [Beria] replied, ‘Because all we want is a 
peaceful Germany, and it makes no difference whether or not it is socialist.’” According to Molotov, Beria 
kept insisting on this point. A special committee, consisting of Beria, Malenkov and Molotov was apparently 
created to consider the matter, and, according to Molotov, following several discussions and a late evening 
telephone conversation, Beria finally gave in: “To hell with you! Let’s not go to another meeting. I agree 
with your stand.” Nikita Khrushchev, “Die Aktion,” in Vladimir F. Nekrassow, ed., Berija. Henker in Stalins 
Diensten. Ende einer Karriere (Berlin: edition 9, 1992), pp. 323-324; Albert Resis ed., Molotov Remembers: 
Inside Kremlin Politics. Conversations with Felix Chuev (Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1993), pp. 334-335; Resis, 
Molotov Remembers, p. 335; see also Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity (New York: 
Oxford, 1996), p. 180.-- Beria’s alleged zigzags on policy towards the GDR conform to what we know about 
his views. Much less ideologically committed than Molotov, or, as Molotov put it himself, “lacking deeper 
interest in fundamental policy decisions,” Beria would not shy away from unorthodox, “heretical” solutions. 
Beria followed German affairs closely, and with a wide-ranging intelligence apparatus at his command (even 
as he set out to revamp it), Beria was better informed about the growing crisis in the GDR than many of his 
rivals, even Molotov, and he used his unmatched sources to challenge the foreign minister in his own field--
foreign policy. It is possible that his exclusive knowledge among the leadership of the recent strides in 
Soviet nuclear weapons development (the USSR successfully tested a thermonuclear device later that year) 
might have given him less cause for concern about the wider repercussions of any radical solution in 
Germany. His shifting stance was also fully in line with what is now known about his tendency to withdraw 
proposals as soon as he faced strong opposition, such as Molotov and Khrushchev seem to have mounted 
within the Presidium. In his letters from prison, Beria later acknowledged displaying “inadmissible rudeness 
and insolence [...] toward comrades N.S. Khrushchev and N.A. Bulganin during the discussion on the 
German question.” A year-and-a-half later, at the January 1955 CC CPSU Plenum, Beria’s alleged ally in 
1953, Malenkov, now under attack by Khrushchev and Molotov, “admitted” that he had been wrong when 
he held the view that “the task of socialist development in Democratic Germany” was “incorrect.” “Today I 
admit that I essentially took a wrong position on the German Question.” Secondary figures such as KGB 
operative Pavel Sudoplatov, a close collaborator of Beria, provide additional evidence of his position. In his 
controversial memoirs, Special Tasks, Sudoplatov recounts that as early as April, “[p]rior to the May Day 
celebration in 1953, Beria ordered me to prepare  top-secret intelligence probes to test the feasibility of 
unifying Germany. He told me that the best way to strengthen our world position would be to create a 
neutral, unified Germany run by a coalition government. Germany would be the balancing factor between 
American and Soviet interests in Western Europe.... East Germany, the German Democratic Republic, would 
become an autonomous province in the new unified Germany.” According to Sudoplatov, Beria intended to 
air the idea through his intelligence contacts in Central Europe and “begin negotiations with the Western 
powers.” Similarly, Semyonov, who, as head of the responsible department within the Foreign Ministry, 
participated in the key meetings of the Soviet leadership on Germany (as well as the later meetings with the 
SED leaders), charges in his 1995 memoirs that Beria was pursuing a line on Germany which would have 
“disrupted the continuity of our policy on the German question and aimed at shocking the Soviet Union and 
eliminating the GDR.” Semyonov reports that during a Presidium meeting in the second half of May 1953, 
Beria, when asked for his views, “took a paper out of his jacket pocket, without haste, as if he was the master 
of the house, put on his glasses, and read his own draft on German policy. It differed fundamentally from the 
one which I carried in my bag.” Serious doubts, however, have been raised about the existence of a “Beria 
plan.”  Thus far, much of the evidence on Beria’s role in the decision-making process within the Kremlin 
remains fragmentary, contradictory, and very likely biased .  It is important to note that mention of Beria’s 
alleged initiative on the German question was first made by his opponents at the July 1953 CPSU Plenum 
which condemned him, following his arrest on 26 June. It is probable that the charges about Beria’s views 
on the German question, made by Khrushchev and others at the Plenum, were motivated largely by a desire 
to portray him in the most sinister manner possible--characterizing him as a traitor to the socialist cause, a 
Western agent and a provocateur. United in their fear of the brutal secret police chief and seeking to 
eliminate a powerful rival, Beria’s opponents might well have fabricated, distorted, or exaggerated any 
difference of opinion on his part, in the very best manner of the Stalinist purges. 
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collectivization and to the war on private sector in industry, trade and agriculture, for a 
revision of the Five Year Plan at the expense of heavy industry, and a relaxation of 
political-judicial controls and regimentation. It directed the termination of coercive 
measures against the Protestant Church and denounced the "cold exercise of power" by the 
Ulbricht regime. Significantly, it did not explicitly demand a reversal of the controversial 
raised work norms.986 On the issue of Deutschlandpolitik, the resolution (much like the 
preceding drafts in the Foreign Ministry), ambiguously asserted that “at the present and in 
the near future” it was necessary to “put the tasks of the political struggle to reestablish the 
national unity of Germany and to conclude a peace treaty at the center of attention of the 
broad mass of the German people both in the GDR and in West Germany.” 987  
The decree was handed to SED leaders Ulbricht and Grotewohl on 2 June, the 
same day they had been hastily ordered to Moscow.988 In their conversations at the 
Kremlin, Grotewohl noted, the Soviet leaders expressed their "grave concern about the 
situation in the GDR."989 The East German response, half-heartedly drafted the following 
night and tabled the next day, fell short of Soviet expectations. According to the memoirs 
of Rudolf Herrnstadt, editor of the SED party organ Neues Deutschland, the GDR leaders 
were subjected to a verbal beating. “Our document is [a] reversal, yours is [just] reform,” 
an exasperated Kaganovich exclaimed.990 Beria was particularly aggressive, allegedly 
throwing the documents at Ulbricht across the table with the remark: “This is a bad rewrite 
of our document!”991  According to Grotewohl’s notes, the Soviet leaders acknowledged 
that “we all have made mistakes” and that the recommendations were not meant as 
                                                 
986 AP RF, f.3, op.64, d. 802, ll. 153-161. The German version of the decree,  "Über die Maßnahmen zur 
Gesundung der politischen Lage in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik," released in 1989, was first 
published in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung 32 (1990), pp. 651-654. 
987 Rolf Stöckigt, “Ein Dokument von großer historischer Bedeutung vom Mai 1953,”  Beiträge zur 
Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung 32 (1990), p. 649. 
988 Politburo member Fred Oelssner accompanied them, serving as translator. 
989 Rolf Stöckigt, “Ein Dokument von großer historischer Bedeutung vom Mai 1953,”  Beiträge zur 
Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung 32 (1990), p. 649. 
990 Grotewohl Notes 
991 Herrnstadt 
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“accusations,” but insisted that “the starting-point for everything has to be a change in 
conditions in the GDR.” Demanding that the SED leaders should “not worry about [their] 
prestige,” Malenkov warned that “if we don’t correct [the political line] now, a catastrophe 
will happen.” The Soviet leaders appealed to the Germans to “correct fast and vigorously.” 
“Much time [has been] lost. One has to act quickly,” Molotov added, “[so] that all of 
G[ermany] can see it.”992 
The SED delegation returned to East Berlin on June 5. Even before their arrival, 
Ulbricht and Grotewohl issued orders to purge all literature on the Second Party 
Conference from libraries. Several days of intense discussion within the SED Politburo 
ensued.  Just as their colleagues had been in Moscow, many Politburo members were 
stunned and troubled by the Soviet document. During the June 6 SED Politburo session 
East Berlin Mayor and Politburo member Friedrich Ebert professed that reading the New 
Course document has pained him physically and wondered at one point “do we want 
socialism at all?”993  Semyonov, who had returned with the SED delegation from Moscow 
and participated in the sessions, warned that further deterioration would lead to virtual 
“annihilation” of “[the party’s] avant-garde role, even of the army,” and insisted that the 
SED leaders could not stop with reforms but had to reverse course: the state plants could 
                                                 
992 The June 2-4 talks with the East German leaders presaged similar consultations with other satellite 
leaders, which, in each case, resulted in the announcement of a comparable “New Course” program. The 
Hungarian leadership (13-16 June 1953) was next, followed by Albanian leader Enver Hoxha on 15 June.  
Talks with the Czechoslovaks, Romanians, Poles and Bulgarians were planned for the following month. The 
transcript of the Soviet-Hungarian talks, discovered recently in the Hungarian National Archives, are much 
fuller than the fragmentary Grotewohl notes, and show striking similarities with the SED talks. As in the 
German case, the discussions focused on the “audacious” industrialization and socialization drive and abuses 
of power (especially by the security police) in Hungary, although cadre questions received considerable 
attention, too. As with the East Germans, the Soviet leaders “urgently” demanded changes and warned that 
“a catastrophe will occur if we do not improve the situation.” Once again, Malenkov and Beria were harshest 
in their criticism, although Molotov and Bulganin did not lag far behind. Unlike their criticism of the SED, 
Moscow’s unhappiness was directed at Premier and party chief Mátyás Rákosi, the embodiment of Stalinist 
rule in Hungary.  The confrontation quickly produced changes: within days of their return from Moscow, 
Rákosi resigned the premiership which was given to the agrarian specialist and reform-minded Imre Nagy, 
although Rakosi stayed on as party leader. 
993 “Diskussionsrede auf der Sitzung des Politbüros vom 6.6.1953,” SAPMO-Barch DY30/JIV 2/2/287; and 
“Protokoll Nr 33/53 der ausserordentlichen Sitzung des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees am 6.Juni 1953,” 
ibid; see also Scherstjanoi, ed., “Wollen wir den Sozialismus?,” Beiträge zur Geschichte der 
Arbeiterbewegung 32  (1990), pp. 658-680. 
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not provide consumer and luxury goods, therefore manufacture and private business were 
to be preserved. After all, Semyonov, ambitiously proclaimed, the GDR had to be turned 
into “a magnet for Western Germany, France and Italy.”994 One SED Politburo member 
spelled out what must have been on everybody’s mind: the only way “to get out of this 
catastrophic situation and improve our position” would be for the Soviet Union to give “us 
the same help that the USA is giving Western Germany through the Marshall Plan.”995 
The Politburo finally decided to draw up a comprehensive statement on “the self-criticism 
of the work of the Politburo and the Secretariat,” and adopted public announcement of the 
New Course. Most Politburo members had agreed that the announcement warranted 
careful preparation of the party and the population at large, but Semyonov urged speedy 
implementation of Moscow’s instructions, insisting that the New Course had to be 
announced the next day while warning that “you may not have a state for much longer.”996 
Heeding Semyonov’s order, the SED published the “New Course” program in Neues 
Deutschland on June 11.997  
As expected by some of the SED leaders, the communiqué and its frank admission 
of past mistakes shocked many East Germans in and out of the party. Reports from local 
party organizations, carefully monitored by SED headquarters in Berlin, candidly 
described the widespread disappointment, disbelief, and confusion within party ranks, as 
well as among the populace. To many, the communiqué signaled the SED’s final 
bankruptcy and the beginning of its demise. Party members felt betrayed and “panicky,” 
                                                 
994 SAPMO, DY30 JIV 2/2/287. 
995 Report by KGB Berlin Resident Fadeikin, 9 July 1953, published in Uprising in East Germany, 1953, pp. 
309-313, here 310. 
996 Herrnstadt, Das Herrnstadt-Dokument, p. 74. 
997 The next day, the GDR Council of Ministers issued several new ordinances, returning the basic food 
ration cards taken away in May, and decreeing that properties would be returned to returning refugees or 
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some even called for Ulbricht’s resignation. Many thought the SED retreat from crash 
socialization resulted from pressure by the West German government under Konrad 
Adenauer and the Western powers. In the small town of Seehausen, according to a local 
SED account, “the entire village is in the bar, drinking to the health of Adenauer.” Another 
internal SED report summarized the developments: "broad segments of the population did 
... not understand the Party's New Course, viewed it as a sign of weakness or even as a 
victory by the Americans or the Church."998 To make matters worse, the only segment of 
the population which seemed to have been excluded from the New Course liberalization 
was--paradoxically--the workers: the raised production norms that had been arbitrarily 
imposed in May remained in force. Labor dissatisfaction was further fueled when the SED 
regime, groping to maintain its authority, confirmed the controversial norm increases on 
June 13.999 
 The Eisenhower administration initially doubted the seriousness of the “New 
Course” announcement. Revealing their own cognitive blinders, U.S. diplomats looked at 
the possibility of a new course in East Germany only in respect to the “dangerous extent” 
to which it would open wide “the flood-gates for widespread optimism in both East and 
West Germany” about a change in Soviet intentions.1000U.S. intelligence estimates 
concluded that the recent Soviet move in [the] GDR, coupled with [the] Korean Armistice 
and other Soviet moves on [the] world chess board, represent a tactical and not ... strategic 
shift in Germany.”1001  The CIA asserted that while the announcement of the New Course 
was designed to cope with the growing popular unrest and suggested at least an attempt at 
a basic solution of the refugee problem, the Russians' real intention was to “soften Western 
                                                 
998Abt. Leitende Organe der Partei und der Massenorganisationen, "Analyse über die Vorbereitung, den 
Ausbruch und die Niederschlagung des faschistischen Abenteuers vom 16.-22.6. 1953," 20 July 1953, 
SAPMO-BArch, 2/5/546. 
999 On the events leading up to 16-17 June, see Christian Ostermann, “New Documents on the East German 
Uprising of 1953,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 10-20.  
1000 Berlin to Secretary of State, 9 June 1953, NARA, RG 59, 762B.00/6-953. 
1001 HICOG Berlin to Secretary of State, 15 June 1953, NARA, RG 59, 762B.00/6-1553.  
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skepticism.”1002  The State Department regarded the measures taken by the Ulbricht 
regime as "part of [a] build-up for a Soviet proposal for Four Power talks, probably on 
Germany," which were designed to “convince the world that [the] Soviet Union is 
prepared to compromise on Germany and that [the] Western Powers should therefore enter 
into talks with [the] Soviet Union before proceeding with the rearmament of the Federal 
Republic through [the] EDC.”1003 
 Washington was in fact unaware of how pivotal Ulbricht’s position the the 
situation in the GDR had become.1004  As late as June2, the day Ulbricht was in Moscow 
to listen to Malenkov’s dire warnings, HICOG estimated that the economic crisis brought 
on by collectivization and socialization was not critical: "[T]here is currently no reason to 
believe the situation has reached the stage of catastrophe or that the GDR Government 
does not have the means at its disposal to prevent it from becoming such."1005 Soviet 
moves in Germany, such as the appointment of Semyonov as Soviet high commissioner on 
May 27, seemed to show more than ever that Moscow would guarantee the existence of 
the communist regime in the GDR. "Certainly no (rpt no) abandonment of East German 
Republic is indicated.”1006  If anything, the reorganization of the Soviet Control 
Commission was seen as "prompted in part by pressure from East Germany" whose 
leaders recently appeared to be in an "assertive mood."1007  As the storm of criticism 
engulfed Ulbricht within the politburo, American GDR specialists in Berlin reassured 
Washington that the SED leader’s position looked “as strong or stronger than ever.” The 
SED boss was, as one report put it, simply “in [a] class by himself among German 
                                                 
1002 CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, 11 June 1953, DDEL, C.D. Jackson Records, Box 3. 
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communists as ideal and nearly irreplaceable East German representative for Moscow’s 
purposes.”1008 Despite warning signals, therefore, neither Moscow nor Washington 
expected the unrest and dissatisfaction to develop into the popular explosion that would 
occur within days and upset their own carefully elaborated agendas.  
 
2. The Best Chance for Rollback? The Eisenhower Administration’s Reaction to the 
Unrest in the GDR 
With the SED paralyzed and weakened, workers in East Berlin--and soon a 
growing number from other segments of East German society--decided to act on their 
grievances. A few days earlier, workers on several construction sites in the 
Stalinallee/Friedrichshain area had clashed with union and party officials, instituting work 
slow-downs or protests.  On 12 June for example, six transport company workers had 
started a demonstration in front of the Brandenburg prison; by the end some 5,000 people 
had joined in.1009  At the “Stalinallee Block 40” construction site in Berlin, workers 
decided to send a delegation to Grotewohl to deliver a petition to rescind the norm 
increase.  Underestimating the explosiveness of the situation, Grotewohl ignored the 
demands of the workers, wo were further infuriated the next morning (June 16) by an 
article in the union paper Tribüne that restated the necessity of the norm increases. 1010  
Within hours several hundred 300 workers had gone on the move. Hoisting banners, the 
demonstrators soon broadened their demands beyond the social-economic issues that had 
first sparked the protests to include political changes. Via Alexanderplatz and Unter den 
Linden, the bulk of the demonstrators moved to the government seat on Leipziger Strasse; 
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311 
others went in the direction of the SED headquarters on Wilhelm-Pieck-Strasse. On the 
way, they managed to take over two sound trucks which they used to spread their calls for 
a general strike and a demonstration at the Strausberger Platz at 7 a.m. the next day. 
Following demonstration in front of the GDR House of Ministries, the workers return to 
their sites.   Throughout the night of June 16 and early morning of June 17, the news of 
events in East Berlin spread quickly throughout the GDR--by word of mouth as well as by 
Western radio broadcasts. While Soviet troops entered the outskirts of the city early in the 
morning of June 17, crowds of workers began to gather at Strausberger Platz and other 
public places, and began marching towards the city center. By 9 a.m., some 25,000 people 
gathered in front of the House of Ministries, and tens of thousands more were en route via 
Leipziger Strasse or across Potsdamer Platz. Between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m., some 80 to 100 
demonstrators apparently managed to storm the government seat, visibly demonstrating 
that the 500 members of GDR People’s Police and State Security had been overpowered. 
Only the sudden appearance of Soviet military vehicles, and then tanks, seemed to prevent 
a complete takeover. Within an hour, Soviet troops had cleared and isolated the area 
around the government headquarters. Fighting between Soviet forces (and later GDR 
police) and the demonstrators, however, continued into the afternoon and night.1011  
Developments throughout the GDR mirrored the events in East Berlin. In several 
cities, such as Dresden and Karl-Marx-Stadt, observers had noticed the workers’ 
“explosive mood” prior to 16 June, but most of the interruptions, strikes, and other actions 
had taken place at the workplace; only in rare instances had there been public 
demonstrations. Rumors about worker unrest in Berlin and impending strike actions had 
filtered to the rest of the GDR through long-distance commuters return home for the 
                                                 
1011 See first-hand accounts published by Rainer Hildebrandt, The Explosion: The Uprising Behind the Iron 
Curtain (New York: Little, Brown, and Co., 1955); Hildebrandt, Als die Fesseln fielen . . . die Geschichte 
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weekend. RIAS’ afternoon broadcast on 16 June confirmed the news about the mass 
demonstrations in the capitol and the demands for a rescission of the norm increase, the 
resignation of the government and free elections; by mid-day on 17 June, the RIAS reports 
had reached broad segments of the East German population.  Meanwhile, popular unrest 
was also spreading to the rest of the country.  Strikes and demonstrations were particularly 
strong in industrial centers in central Germany, in the Magdeburg area as well as in Jena, 
Gera, Brandenburg and Görlitz.  More than 500,000 people in over 560 East German cities 
and communities are now estimated to have participated in the first wave of protests 
between 16 and 21 June.1012 
While the East German leadership was aware of the worsening mood in the 
country, the depth of the resentment and the extent of anti-regime actions no doubt came 
as a surprise: “The signal given on 15 June for intended strikes was not fully appreciated 
by the party and the union,”1013 an internal SED analysis later declared.  It is still unclear 
how well- or poorly-informed the Politburo was about the developments in Berlin on the 
morning of 16 June, when it gathered for its regular Tuesday meeting. Under pressure 
from the demonstrators, and probably Soviet adviser Semyonov, the leadership, after 
hours of deliberations, decided to revoke the “administrative”--that is forced--norm 
increase.1014 The Politburo’s decision, however, came too late to stop the demonstrations: 
by the time the news reached crowds at the House of Ministries, the protestors’ agenda 
had expanded well beyond the issue of norm increases to include political changes. Later 
that night, the Berlin party aktiv met in the Friedrichstadtpalast. Ulbricht  conceded errors-
-“Yes, mistakes were made”--even “with regard to the development of a personality cult,” 
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but then tried to deflect blame onto the threat posed by “provocateurs from West Berlin. 
… We are now getting to the point that tomorrow morning all party organizations in the 
plants, in the residential areas, in the institutions will start to work in time and that one is 
watchful everywhere: Where are the West Berlin provocateurs?”1015 Based on the myth of 
an external provocation, the SED leadership expected that a massive propaganda drive 
would be enough to cope with the crisis.1016  
Much like the SED, the Soviets were completely surprised by the widespread 
protests that followed the demonstrations in East Berlin. Much of their initial reaction was 
therefore uncoordinated and improvised, caused not in the least by the Soviet Control 
Commission’s recent dissolution.  According to his memoirs, Semyonov and the newly 
appointed commander of Soviet occupation forces, Colonel-General Andrei Grechko, 
agreed to deploy troops from their summer training camps back to the garrisons on June 
15. Later in the evening of June 16, Semyonov met with the SED leadership and informed 
“our friends of the decision we had taken to send Soviet troops to the city of Berlin.” Early 
the next morning, Soviet tanks entered Berlin. By mid-morning, Semyonov had evacuated 
the SED Politburo to Karlshorst. At noon, the Soviet authorities terminated all tram and 
metro traffic into the Eastern sector and essentially closed the sector borders to West 
Berlin to prevent further demonstrators from reaching the city center; one hour later, they 
declared martial law in East Berlin.1017 Some of the worst violence occurred outside the 
East Berlin police headquarters, where Soviet tanks opened fire on “the insurgents.”1018  
Executions (most prominently of West Berlin worker Willi Göttling) and mass arrests 
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followed. Overnight, the Soviets (and the MfS) arrested thousands of people; by 19 June, 
some 1,744 persons had been arrested; by 23 June some 6,000 people had been detained. 
In the course of the uprising, the authorities executed at least 20, and probably 40, persons 
including Soviet soldiers who refused to obey orders.  In all some 8,000-10,000 people 
were arrested; more than 15,000 were given sentences (including 2 death penalties.) 
Elsewhere in Berlin and throughout the GDR, the Soviet military seemed to hold back and 
remain more passive; Soviet soldiers at times even displayed a friendly attitude towards 
the demonstrators.1019     
Shortly before 9 p.m. on 17 June, Soviet Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of 
Staff Marshal Vassiliy D. Sokolovsky arrived in Berlin, along with Marshal L. A. 
Govorov, another high-placed Soviet official.  Sokolovsky’s dispatch to Berlin--rather 
than Beria’s which apparently had been considered first1020--indicated that in the eyes of 
the Soviet leadership a military crisis of major proportions had developed; reports from 
East Berlin that the British has declared martial law in their sector, and that NATO forces 
had been put on alert must have confirmed this assumption in Moscow.  Cabling Moscow 
that the unrest had been “totally unexpected for the German Democratic Government as 
well as for our organs,” Sokolovsky and other top Soviet officials assumed from the very 
first moment that the demonstrations and riots as a “major planned provocation” by the 
West in response to the “recently declared measures on normalization of the political 
situation in the GDR.”1021  Late on 17 June, Grechko informed Soviet defense minister 
Nikolai Bulganin in Moscow that, “analyzing the situation, I have ... come to the 
conclusion that the provocation was prepared in advance, organized and directed from the 
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Western sectors of Berlin.”1022 A few hours later, Sokolovsky confirmed this 
interpretation, arguing that the events were “apparently a major planned uprising covering 
the whole territory of the German Democratic Republic aimed at ... a coup d’etat.”  Unable 
to fathom the widespread resentment of the regime, Sokolovskii saw “proof” of his 
conclusion in the observation that “the disorders began simultaneously” in Berlin and 
major East German cities, that “the same tactics ... were used everywhere,” and that “all 
the disorders took place under the same slogans.”1023  
 
Probably the first Western officials to take note of the demonstrations in East 
Berlin were the RIAS employees. The radio station had not lost its significance as an 
“alternative public opinion” within the GDR in the spring of 1953. Internal SED reports 
pointed to the widespread and, in fact increasing, reception of RIAS broadcasts in the 
spring of 1953.1024  RIAS had certainly highlighted labor unrest and passive resistance in 
the preceding months and weeks.1025 The radio station also cooperated with U.S. 
intelligence agencies operating in Berlin to collect information and facilitated the 
“recruitment of covert sources and agents in the Soviet Zone.”1026 After the announcement 
of the New Course, local party officials reported increasing numbers of statements from 
                                                 
1022 Situation Report from Grenchko and A. Tarasov to Bulganin, 17 June 1953, Arhicve of the Russian 
General Staff, F. 16, OP. 3139, D. 155, LL. 12-14, published in CWIHP Bulletin 10 (March 1998), p. 89.  
1023 Sokolovsky and Marshal Leonid Govorv to Defense Minister Nicolai Bulganin, 18 June 1953, Archive 
of the Russian General Staff, F. 16, OP. 3139, D. 155, LL. 4-5, CWIHP Buletin 10 (March 1998), pp. 89-90. 
1024 Abt. Leitende Organe der Partei und der Massenorganisationen, “Analyse über die Vorbereitung, den 
Ausbruch und die Niederschlagung des faschistischen Abenteuers vom 16.-22.6. 1953,” 20 July 1953, 
SAPMO-BArch, 2/5/546; Durchsage der B[ezirks] L[eitung] Leipzig,” 18 June 1953, SAPMO-BArch, NY 
90/437. 
1025 On 9 July, State Department German specialist Eleanor Dulles, who had been in Berlin in mid-June, 
reported that the head of the Berlin Red Cross had told her that “the rise of the workers against the 
Communists and their revolt against [oppressive] labor conditions was due in large measure to the broadcast 
by RIAS which had been contrasting labor conditions under Communist and Democratic regimes for some 
weeks. The information disseminated through this medium was in his opinion a major factor in stimulating 
the revolt against the Communist leaders.” Dulles added that “My conversations with these demonstrators 
bore out this statement.” Memorandum, E. Dulles to Riddleberger, 9 July 1953, NARA, RG 59, 962A.40/7-
953.  
1026 M.C. Partridge, Major General, G-2, to Allen Dulles, 3 August 1953, C.D. Jackson Papers, Box 74, 
DDEL. 
316 
the local population, such as, “All stations were lying, RIAS alone says the truth, our 
shackles are broken, we are free people again.”1027  A SED report on the situation on 17 
June in Leipzig noted that “many RIAS listeners” could be found among the workers.1028   
Labor dissatisfaction had been a central theme in RIAS broadcasts, and, based on 
information provided by workers from the Stalinallee construction site, RIAS reported on 
the afternoon of June 15 that protest strikes were being staged against the increase in work 
norms. Broadcast in the late evening and then again in the early morning of June 16, when 
reception throughout the zone peaked, these reports were based on scant evidence whose 
tenuousness initially led other radio stations not to send them. By noon (June 16), reports 
from various sources confirmed that demonstrations at the Stalinallee construction site had 
indeed taken place.  After a short announcement of the news at 1:00 p.m., RIAS gave a 
lengthy account of the day’s events in the Soviet Sector on the 4:30 p.m. news, providing 
uncensored reports of the shift in the demonstrators’ demands from rescission of the 
higher work quotas and price cuts, to shouts of: “We want free elections.”1029 
Not surprisingly, then, it was RIAS to which the East Berlin workers turned on the 
afternoon of June 16 with requests for assistance in spreading their call for a general strike 
the next day.1030  RIAS officials recognized that the rebelling workers expected the radio 
station to be their central coordinating point, since only RIAS could effectively establish a 
link between strikers and the general population. One of the worker delegates later 
recalled that they anticipated RIAS’ full support for their strike, followed by a Western 
Allied invasion to reestablish order.1031 Apparently unable to consult effectively with 
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Washington or HICOG Bonn, local RIAS officials opted for caution.  Mindful of the 
warning by HICOG’s Eastern Affairs Element Chief Charles Hulick that night—“I hope 
you know what you are doing. You could start a war this way”1032—RIAS political 
director Gordon Ewing decided that the station could not directly lend itself as a 
mouthpiece to the workers, yet would factually and fully disseminate information about 
the demonstrations. This policy decision was soon confirmed in Washington.1033 
RIAS reports on the demonstrations contributed to spreading the news quickly 
throughout the GDR.  The 7:30 p.m. broadcasts that evening featured the demonstrations, 
and reported that a delegation of construction workers had submitted a resolution for 
publication. The resolution stated that the strikers, having proved by their actions that 
“they were able to force the government to accept their justified demands,” would, “make 
use of their power at any time” if their demands for lower quotas, price cuts, free elections 
and indemnity for all demonstrators would not be fulfilled. Moreover, RIAS reported that 
the demonstrators were determined to continue their protest and convinced that “strikes 
and demonstrations would not be limited to the workers of the Stalinallee site.”1034 Later 
that night, RIAS broadcasts came close to open encouragement of the protests. In his 
nightly comment, RIAS Program Director Eberhard Schütz called the regime’s reversal on 
the norm question “a victory, which our Ostberliners share with the entire working 
population of the Soviet Zone.” The regime would have never reacted as fast as it did, 
Schütz argued, if the workers had not manifested their opposition in discussions, passive 
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resistance and strikes throughout the zone. The East Berlin workers had not limited their 
demands to the question of work quotas but had indeed called for the resignation of the 
Pankow regime and introduction of Western-style liberties.  “We would be unworldly and 
would not deserve the confidence of our listeners if we could not acknowledge the 
justification of the demands .... What the population of East Berlin and the Soviet Zone 
demands today and what it views as feasible is nothing less than the end to the totalitarian 
rule of the Kremlin’s German satellites.” Emphasizing that “everyone had to know himself 
how far he could go,” Schütz encouraged his listeners to support the demonstrators. “It is 
your task today to show the Soviet and German rulers that we do not accept ‘mistakes’ 
anymore as mistakes, that we and you expect a change of mind which is not limited to a 
rescission of the 10 percent increase in work norms but which creates conditions for free 
decisions which go way beyond the so-called ‘voluntary norm increases.’  We,” Schütz 
concluded, “would be happy to be able to report more such victories in the next days.”1035 
Following Jacob Kaiser’s admonition in a late night broadcast to his East German 
compatriots to shy away from provocations, RIAS’ late night news at 11:00 p.m.--in a 
deviation from its usual schedule, from then on in hourly intermissions--repeated the 
workers’ demand to continue the strike the next day, calling specifically for all East 
Berliners to participate in a demonstration at 7:00 the following morning at the centrally-
located Strausberger Platz.1036  In the early morning hours, West Berlin labor leader Ernst 
Scharnowski reassured the demonstrators that West German unions stood behind their 
colleagues and called upon the population for support: “Don’t leave them alone. They are 
fighting not only for the social rights of labor but for the human rights of everyone in the 
East Zone. Join the movement of East Berlin construction workers, of East Berlin tram 
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and rail employees! Every town has its Strausberger Platz!”1037  Within the Eisenhower 
administration, RIAS was later credited for the swiftness with which the strikes and 
disorders spread from East Berlin throughout the Zone, thus pushing the riots beyond a 
local crisis.  
RIAS’ cautious but increasingly supportive stance during the early hours of the 
uprising mirrored the response of local Western officials. Meeting at 11 a.m. on 17 June, 
even before the Soviet declaration of martial law, the Western Berlin Commandants 
agreed that their primary duty was “to maintain law and order in their sectors.”1038  West 
Berliners and Soviet Zone residents, they decided, “should if possible be dissuaded from 
mixing in East Berlin demonstrations where serious possibility of bloodshed existed.”1039  
Western Allied authorities were also concerned that “many demonstrators in border areas 
have been under the influence of alcohol” and pondered closing liquor stores and cafes in 
the border areas.1040 Convinced that a SPD-sponsored solidarity demonstration scheduled 
for the evening of June 17 near the sector border would appear provocative, the 
Commandants ordered a change in site and reminded Acting West Berlin Mayor 
Conrad1041 and the head of the West Berlin police Johannes Stumm “that the status of 
Berlin is Allied responsibility,” warning of the “grave consequences” of circumventing 
Allied authority.1042  Later that evening the Commandants also issued a press release 
advising Berliners to adopt “a completely calm attitude” in the face of the riots in the East. 
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Moreover, the U.S. Commandant took the unprecedented step of “dissuading” Ernst 
Reger, editor of the popular Berlin daily Tagesspiegel, “from publishing inflammatory 
editorials.”1043 Not until June 18 did the Western Commandants issue a formal letter to 
Soviet Major-General, Sergei Alexeyevich Dengin, protesting Soviet military actions in 
East Berlin.1044  But Allied concerns about militant speeches and possibly provocative 
actions on the part of the West Germans in support of their compatriots soon ebbed. 
Speaking before the Bundestag later that day, Adenauer professed sympathy with the 
demonstrators but warned of a further escalation of irresponsible violence and rioting, a 
line echoed in the following hours and days by many West German public 
representatives.1045  
U.S. officials were equally eager to avoid escalating the crisis at first, even though 
they acknowledged that the Soviet military’s brutal suppression of the uprising afforded 
Washington an “excellent propaganda opportunity.”1046  The Psychological Strategy 
Board agreed on June 17 that all possible moral support should be given to the “East 
Berliners,” both to help them achieve improvements and “to stimulate further Soviet 
repression,” which would provide “ammunition” for the future. Moreover, the 
administration should capitalize on the events propagandistically in other parts of Eastern 
Europe, especially where some resistance “had shown its head,” but also in the Far 
East.1047 The administration also quickly agreed to step up defector programs to take 
advantage of the relaxation of travel restrictions between East and West. Intent on 
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avoiding identifying the United States with the “Berlin incident” (and perhaps not quite 
sure what the U.S. role had been), Dulles advised Eisenhower to avoid questions “about 
our stimulating this.” Eisenhower agreed: he would say “just that we have always 
discouraged outbreaks unless there was a chance of their being beneficial or something 
along that line.”1048 Eager not to detract from the spontaneity of the uprising, the 
administration at first eschewed any official high-level statements on the crisis.1049  
The administration’s initial response also stemmed from the failure of U.S. 
intelligence to provide precise and timely information on the uprising. Similar lack of 
information had handicapped  American assessments of the unrest in Czechoslovakia two 
weeks earlier. A week after the events demonstrations in Plzen and other cities June 1 the 
embassy there could only report that “something serious is definitely happening but 
difficult to say exactly what.”1050 In Berlin, Allied officials in fact at first wondered 
whether the Soviets had deliberately instigated the rebellion in order to create a convenient 
pretext to remove Ulbricht after all or – of far greater concern -- to move military forces 
into East Berlin in preparation for the capture of the entire city.1051  CIA reports also 
speculated about the possibility of a ”controlled demonstration” by the regime, which had 
“flared up into near revolt.”1052  In Washington, officials initially relied on Associated 
Press reports that spoke of 50,000 demonstrators for their assessments. Meeting on June 
17, the Psychological Strategy Board members decided to launch a “special fact-finding 
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operation” through their own channels “to determine first exactly what transpired in East 
Berlin and Pilsen, what its effects are likely to be, and what lay behind the whole 
affair.”1053 As late as June 18, the Western Berlin Commandants apparently had “no 
precise information on hand” on the status of the strikes in East Berlin.1054  Later that day 
HICOG Berlin did pass on “unconfirmed reports [of] unrest and strikes” in major GDR 
cities, but the scarcity of intelligence made it “impossible [to] evaluate [the] extent” of the 
disturbances. Reflecting the continued difficulties in assessing the uprising, the CIA’s 
Office of Current Intelligence by June 26 was still passing on unsubstantiated information 
to the effect that the demonstrations had reportedly been the subject of “elaborate prior 
planning.”  CIA did feel certain that the popular unrest and anti-regime activity was not 
limited to East Germany but evident in neighboring countries such as Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, and Albania. 1055 
Discussions in the NSC in Washington on June 18 were marked by a realization 
that while the unrest was a “sign of real promise,” it also “posed a very tough problem for 
the United States to know how to handle.”1056  This was particularly true since the uprising 
coincided with unforeseen troubles in Korea. Only hours before, South Korean President 
Syngman Rhee had freed some 25,000 North Korean prisoners of war in a bid to torpedo 
armistice negotiations with Pyongyang. Despite the administration’s interest in extricating 
the United States from the Korean conflict, the NSC resolved to keep up the pressure on 
the Soviet Union by continuing the armistice talks. What Eisenhower called the “terrible 
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situation” in Korea deepened the uncertainty about what to do about East Germany. A 
four-power conference, as favored by Churchill, continued to be an option.  According to 
John Foster Dulles, the State Department was giving the idea a great deal of thought, but 
Eisenhower sharply disagreed. Anxious not to lend any semblance of moral approval to 
bloody Soviet suppression, the President declared that “he had supposed he had made it 
crystal clear that if there were to be a four-power conference he himself would not be 
present.”  If anything, the uprising “certainly had provided us with the strongest possible 
argument to give to Mr. Churchill against a four-power meeting.1057 
Much like the morning after Stalin’s death, the uprising in East Germany caught 
the Eisenhower administration entirely off guard: How far Washington was prepared to go 
“if this thing really gets cracking” was really the “64-dollar question,” as presidential 
adviser C. D. Jackson put it during the NSC meeting. Following a report by CIA director 
Allen Dulles, Eisenhower, according to the now fully declassified NSC transcript, 
“inquired whether Mr. Jackson meant that we should intervene to prevent the slaughter by 
the Soviet forces.”  Jackson replied, “not only that, but it was now quite possible that some 
of the satellite regimes were now prepared to follow the road Tito had taken.” Indeed, he 
added, “this could be the bell pealing the disintegration of the Soviet empire. Do we stand 
idly by, or do we help the disintegration? And how much responsibility are we willing to 
take for the results of helping?” With the question of intervening explicitly raised at the 
NSC meeting by Jackson, Eisenhower’s reactions show a remarkable degree of 
exaggeration in his assessment of the East German protests--and suggest what it would 
have taken for him to risk direct U.S. involvement.  The decision to intervene, he said, 
“depended on how widespread the uprising became. Would the riots spread to China, or 
even possibly to the USSR itself? If this should happen, we would probably never have a 
                                                 
1057 Ibid. 
324 
better chance to act, and we would be well-advised, for example to supply arms.”  As to 
whether “we should ship arms to the East Berliners,” as Jackson seemed to advocate, 
Eisenhower reasoned, “that if to do so was just inviting a slaughter of these people, you 
certainly didn’t supply the arms. If, on the contrary, there was a real chance of success, 
you might well do so. Our problem was to weigh the prospects of success. In his opinion, 
the President added, the revolts have to be more serious and widespread than at this 
moment before they promised real success and indicated the desirability of our 
intervening.” Jackson pressed on, asking whether U.S. actions could “help [to] make this 
movement more serious and more widespread?”  But Eisenhower thought such ideas 
premature. To him, “it was very important that the unrest spread to China, because while 
the USSR would have no great difficulty in crushing uprisings in Europe alone, they 
would find it tough to deal with trouble both in Europe and in the Far East.” For the 
moment, Eisenhower concluded that “the time to ‘roll them out for keeps’” had not “quite” 
arrived. Uncertain what could be done, Eisenhower finally asked the Psychological 
Strategy Board to devise a short-term plan on how to exploit the East German 
situation.1058 
As the administration, prodded by Jackson, searched for options for a more 
positive and active response to the uprising, the British and French remained more passive. 
This divergence among Cold War allies emerged as early as 17 June when the three 
Western Berlin Commandants drafted a joint communiqué in order to counter Communist 
allegations that the Western Allies were provoking the disorders. While the Commandants 
expressed “grave concern” and denounced the Soviets’ “irresponsible recourse to military 
force,” the British Commandant clearly preferred a softer approach than his U.S. 
counterpart, noting at one point that he had barely “succeeded in defeating the American 
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desire to insert in the statement words which would have implied that the Allies approved 
of the riots.”1059 While the French government favored a “policy of watchful waiting,”1060 
Churchill, fearing the uprising would quash his hopes for a four-power summit, wanted to 
return to business-as-usual in Berlin as quickly as possible.1061  The British prime minister 
reacted violently to the Commmandants’ June 18 statement.  Citing diplomatic reports on 
the relatively restrained Soviet behavior, he harshly reprimanded the British 
representative, stating that “if the Soviet Government, as the occupying Power, were faced 
as you have described with widespread movements of violent disorders they surely have 
the right to declare Martial Law in order to prevent anarchy and if they acted in your 
words ... ‘with marked restraint and moderation’ this is no reason for making statements 
[as contained in the Commandants’ message]. We shall not find our way out of our many 
difficulties by making for purposes of local propaganda statements which are not in 
accordance with the facts.”1062 The Anglo-American strains resurfaced when the 
Commandants decided to issue another statement on 24 June, with the Americans again 
inclined “no doubt to make it considerably stiffer” than the British wished.1063  London’s 
envoy also showed concern about the American sector, “where the propagandists do not 
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always seem to be under control.”1064 Acting Foreign Minister Lord Salisbury soon 
warned of the “new and more dangerous American tendency ... to interpret the situation 
behind the Iron Curtain as already very shaky and therefore to advocate new although 
unspecified measures to encourage and even promote an early liberation of the satellite 
countries.”1065 
The American attitude--both in Washington and Berlin--soon grew tougher. There 
were several reasons for this. U.S. intelligence was beginning to get a clearer picture of the 
scope of demonstrations and strikes as they spread throughout East Germany.  The extent 
of the unrest gave the administration grounds for greater confidence, particularly as it 
became apparent that news of the disturbances was reaching to other satellite countries 
where they would undermine communist authority even further.  A second reason was 
political in nature: Eisenhower and Dulles were sensitive to the gap between the United 
States’ markedly restrained actions during the first days of the uprising and the rhetoric of 
“liberation” and “roll-back” on which they had campaigned and on which many East 
Germans expectations rested.1066  They intended to make the most of this unexpected 
windfall.  At the same time, the uprising also threatened to upset the U.S. agenda for 
Germany.  While Washington had hoped to keep world attention focused on the FRG’s 
entry into the Western alliance, the New Course announcement and the ensuing uprising 
had thrust the issue of German reunification to the forefront, both on the international 
scene and in the West German election campaign, prompting calls for Four Power talks.  
“In addition to bringing back in increased strength the feeling that something must be done 
to unify Germany,” the U.S. High Commissioner in Bonn reported, the riots had also 
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“created the new feeling that something can be done.”1067  In East Germany, earlier SED 
actions such as publishing the June 9-11 communiqué were widely interpreted as steps 
towards unification.  Moreover, many East Germans believed that the West was 
specifically pressuring the regime in this direction.  As one report described the popular 
view: “they over there [have] finally succeeded in forcing a change of course here.”1068   
Sensing a broader shift in the Cold War balance of power, many East Germans 
apparently expected the United States and West Europeans to begin providing active 
support.  In numerous  discussions, local SED officials reported, the population believed 
that “the Soviet army, under pressure from the Western powers, was leaving the territories 
west of the Elbe, [...] the regime had fled to Russia, and American and British occupation 
forces would soon victoriously enter the area.”1069  Others felt that this was the beginning 
of a process of “slowly [...] acquiring Western conditions,” while still others were 
expressing the view that “The SED has to go, it is time, they have run the country down.  
Soon we can start learning English.”1070 As late as August, rumors that the U.S. would 
intervene led farmers to refuse further deliveries: “When the American comes, we will get 
more money for our cattle and will be able to afford more with it.”1071  Indeed, internal 
SED estimates on the population’s state of mind reflect that, until late summer, many East 
Germans believed that the West would not ignore their outcry. 
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The Eisenhower administration was well aware of these expectations—and the 
dilemma they brought about. In the aftermath of the riots in Czechoslovakia, U.S. officials 
realized that “anything less than a full voiced attack” on the regime by Radio Free Europe 
and VOA would be taken as a “betrayal” by the very people who had waved US flags as 
they went on strike or into the streets.1072 After the initial wave of riots and demonstrations 
in East Germany, HICOG noted that “whether the SED suffers [a] further, perhaps 
crippling setback or substantially recovers [its] former power position (which could 
happen within the next six months) may depend largely on US policy.”1073  There was also 
already public criticism of Western inaction, particularly of West German Chancellor 
Adenauer’s reserved response to the turmoil in East Germany.  “[U]nless some sign is 
forthcoming very soon from the United States,”  presidential adviser C.D. Jackson pointed 
out to Eisenhower in early July, “there could be a terrible letdown in both East and West 
Germany, which will seriously affect the U.S. position and even more seriously affect 
Adenauer’s position.”1074 Others argued that if the U.S. confined its response to press 
comments and statements “we risk not only to lose the confidence of the Soviet Zone 
population, but may even cause considerable antagonism.”1075  
Moreover, while Moscow’s resort to force had upset its “entire German 
gambit”1076 and impaired the Soviet negotiating position, in the U.S. administration’s eyes, 
it was still unclear how much the demonstrations and their suppression might deflect the 
Kremlin’s attempts to project an image of restraint--what the State Department called the 
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“Soviet-GDR moderation pose.”1077  Washington still warned that “the Soviets might 
nevertheless make [a] bid to capitalize on [the] current East and West German demand for 
unification by calling for [a] conference allegedly pointed at satisfying this demand.”1078  
Therefore, the administration thought it was crucial to “keep [the] Soviets as much as 
possible on [the] defensive, with [the] aim of endeavoring [to] deflate any further gestures 
they may make at conciliation.”1079  HICOG officials had noticed the “recognition and 
appreciation of the strikers and demonstrators of the fact that the Soviet soldiers 
maintained remarkable reserve, that there was no wanton shooting into the crowds.” Thus, 
they reported, many demonstrators believed that “maybe it is not impossible to negotiate 
with the Soviets.” HICOG officials concluded that if such a feeling should grow, “it could 
have a significant effect upon East German attitudes vis-à-vis the Soviets and the Western 
Allies, shifting, perhaps, their bitterness somewhat away from the former and directing it 
toward the latter, particularly if the West does nothing positive to bring about 
unification.”1080  Indeed, as High Commissioner Conant warned from Bonn, unless some 
action was taken in the near future, the “Soviet[s] might regain control of the situation and 
recoup a major part of [their] lost prestige.”1081 
Charged by the NSC to develop a response to the uprising, the Psychological 
Strategy Board, by the end of June, had drawn up an “Interim U.S. Plan for Exploitation of 
Unrest in Satellite Europe” (PSB D-45). PSB D-45 placed the East German uprising in the 
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context of signs of unrest in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and Albania. While 
resentment over excessive production quotas, food shortages and low living standards had 
triggered the revolt, these grievances were, in PSB D-45’s analysis, “overshadowed by the 
clearly expressed political objectives of the German rebels.” More than anything, the 
uprising seemed to be “a kind of spontaneous direct-action plebiscite in which the East 
German masses voted with their fists for free elections, the reunification of Germany and 
the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces.” Expecting that, with popular resentment of 
the Soviets “near the boiling point,” attempts might be revived, in different areas, to start 
local strikes, demonstrations, or other manifestations of continuing resistance, the PSB 
judged that the GDR uprising created “the greatest opportunity for initiating effective 
policies to help roll back Soviet power that has yet come to light.”1082  
As they put the finishing touches on PSB D-45, Eisenhower’s psychological 
warfare advisers were probably unaware how close Ulbricht, the strongest proponent of 
Soviet power in East Germany, came to be ousted or demoted. The day before the NSC 
decision, the three top Soviet officials in the Germany, Semyonov, Yudin and Sokolovsky, 
delivered to the Soviet leadership a 50-page report that called for a far-reaching “rollback” 
of Ulbricht’s position as East Germany’s leader. The three argued that the crisis had 
resulted from the badly-handled increase in industrial output norms. As the driving force 
behind this policy, Ulbricht came in for particularly harsh criticism.1083 Semyonov’s, 
Yudin’s and Sokolovskii’s “conclusions,” reflected the urgency of Moscow’s efforts to 
“improve the health of the situation in the GDR.” In addition to his longstanding 
arguments in favor of relieving the GDR of its reparations, occupation and other economic 
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burdens and in extenuation of the 2 June decree, the report’s authors now favored rather 
drastic structural and personnel changes.  It was necessary, the Soviet German hands 
argued, to separate government and party functions more clearly, to liquidate Ulbricht’s 
position as general secretary , and to reduce the size and responsibilities of what had been 
Ulbricht’s machine (the Central Committee secretariat).  They further recommended 
reorganizing the GDR government by integrating the Ministry for State Security into the 
Interior Ministry, elevating the role of the Volkskammer, jettisoning disliked ministers, and 
bringing in “more popular people ... with broader enlistment of representatives of other 
parties.”  Semyonov’s, Yudin’s and Sokolovskii’s demarche, which reached Moscow on 
June 25, urged upon Moscow a radical enhancement of the GDR’s image “in the eyes of 
the German population.”1084  
This was precisely what the Eisenhower administration sought to avoid. PSB D-45, 
adopted as NSC directive 158 on June 29, sought to capitalize on the East German crisis 
by keeping the Soviets and the Ulbricht regime on the defensive in order to undercut their 
“peace and unity offensive” and to strengthen the position of those who favored West 
German rearmament and joining the EDC. The policy directive prescribed actions at two 
levels: First, the administration was to re-emphasize “at the earliest possible moment” 
strong U.S. support for German unification based on free elections, thereby responding to 
the momentum for Four-Power talks. This advice coincided with the views of U.S. 
diplomats in Germany who had pointed to the opportunity given by the rebellion to wrest 
the initiative on the unity issue away from the Soviets and to exploit Moscow’s 
undermined position in Germany for “an offensive at the highest level.”1085 By early July, 
Adenauer had publicly reversed his long-standing opposition to a high-level East-West 
conference, and on 15 July the three Western allied foreign ministers, meeting in 
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Washington (in place of the cancelled Bermuda summit) called for a four-power foreign 
ministers’ meeting on Germany for the coming fall.1086  
Secondly, the PSB D-45 strategy consisted of a variety of overt, covert and 
psychological warfare measures designed “to nourish resistance to Communist oppression 
throughout satellite Europe, short of mass rebellion ... and without compromising its 
spontaneous nature, [and] to undermine satellite puppet authority.”1087  The proposed 
measures included a wide range of activities, from allocating $50 million for the 
reconstruction of West Berlin to exploiting Soviet repressive tactics at the United Nations, 
launching “black” radio intruder operations to induce defections, and encouraging the 
“elimination of key puppet officials.”1088 Beyond the list of proposals outlined in NSC 
158, the administration also considered a number of other propaganda measures such as 
urging Adenauer to announce the building of “a Bundestag” in West Berlin on the grounds 
of the destroyed Reichstag. After the September 1953 elections, “an all-out push” would 
be made for this “perpetual monument” featuring “Hall of Heroes” in which the first hero 
would be Willi Göttling, a West Berlin painter who had been shot by the Soviets during 
the riots.1089 Others within the administration suggested celebrating a “day of mourning 
for the martyrs of East Berlin” or a “‘Go home, Ivan’ Day.”1090  Despite C. D. Jackson’s 
emphasis on “the importance of vigorous implementation of PSB D-45 and its amended 
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summary,” few of the measures, as far as one can tell from the declassified documents, 
were actually carried out. By far the most visible activity which did take place was a large-
scale food program for East Germany, which the PSB approved on July 1.  Popular 
sentiment, U.S. officials believed, might “crystallize on [the] food issue as [a] showdown 
point for [a] major test of strength.”1091  Indeed, at the very time the food offer would be 
publicly announced on July 10, the CIA reported indications of a “new uprising.” 
By then, Ulbricht was walking a tight rope. Sometimes passive, seemingly even 
resigned, at other times belligerent, the besieged party leader appeared to be playing for 
time in early July.  The struggle within the SED Politburo culminated during a night 
session of the politburo on July 7-8. According to surviving notes,1092 the debate quickly 
focused on whether Ulbricht should step down. Herrnstadt refused to accept the position 
of first or general secretary, as had been proposed by MfS chief Zaisser. According to 
Zaisser, Ulbricht “was no more responsible for the wrong course (2nd Party Conference) 
than we all are.”  Nevertheless, he added the leader’s attitude had “spoiled the Party,” and 
would undermine efforts to implement the New Course: “[To leave] the apparatus in the 
hands of W.U. would be catastrophic for the New Course.” One by one, the Politburo 
members declared their opposition to Ulbricht’s continued leadership; only Free German 
Youth League chief Erich Honecker1093 and Party Control Commission Chairman 
Hermann Matern supported him. Again temporizing, Ulbricht prevented a decision by 
promising that he would make a statement at the forthcoming 15th SED CC meeting, 
scheduled for later that month. That night, he and Grotewohl left for an emergency 
meeting of the CPSU Plenum in Moscow. 
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When they reached the Soviet capital, the GDR leaders learned about dramatic 
changes.  On 26 June, Lavrentii Beria had been arrested; simultaneously, Semyonov and 
Sokolovskii had received orders to detain Beria’s aides, Goglidze and Kobulov, who were 
then in Berlin.1094 Although Beria’s arrest was not announced until July 10, the  
extraordinary CPSU Plenum accused the intelligence chief  of a variety of nefarious acts, 
including a willingness to abandon the GDR. Adding to the crisis mode in Moscow, 
reports were reaching the Soviet capital that East Germany’s neighbors were growing 
increasingly concerned about the spill-over effects from the upheaval. Large-scale strikes 
were even taking place in Soviet labor camps.1095  Rumors of renewed unrest in the GDR 
which resurfaced in early July (strikes indeed occurred in mid-July) probably only 
reinforced any disinclination in Moscow towards sweeping changes on the ground. Given 
the dramatically changing equilibrium in the Kremlin,  Moscow officials effectively 
shelved the Semyonov-Yudin-Sokolovsku report’s far-reaching and politically sensitive 
proposals, focusing instead on the less provocative issues involving occupation costs, 
exchange rates, and improvements in Soviet troop stationing. Proposals calling for a 
reorganization of the GDR government would be removed from the agenda for the USSR 
Council of Ministers altogether.  It is uncertain whether the SED presence in the Soviet 
capital had any influence on the decision-making process in Moscow; more likely, the 
Soviet leadership, preoccupied with the Beria affair and its internal (and empire-wide) 
ramifications, grew ever more inclined to maintain the status quo, to hold on to power in 
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East Germany by means of reinforcing an experienced, reliable, albeit Stalinist and 
unpopular ruler.  
With the news of Beria’s arrest and the renewed emphasis on “collective 
leadership” that Grotewohl brought back from his trip to Moscow, Ulbricht must have 
sensed the opportunity to turn the tables on his foes. Increasingly certain of his continued 
support in Moscow, Ulbricht had gone on the offensive by mid-July. On July 18, he ousted 
Zaisser as security chief, five days later Zaisser, Herrnstadt and Ackermann were expelled 
from the Politburo. At the 15th SED Plenum in late July, Ulbricht charged Herrnstadt and 
Zaisser with inner-party conspiracy and linked them to Beria’s alleged “criminal 
machinations,” including his supposed readiness to sell-out the GDR.1096 With support 
from Moscow, the SED also sought to shore up support by hurriedly launching a number 
measures to appease the resentful populace, in particular overcoming the shortages in food 
supplies. But party officials acknowledged that many East Germans “displayed a hesitant 
and in part distrustful attitude towards the [New Course] measures inaugurated by party 
and regime.”1097  They wanted to “finally see deeds follow words.”1098     
 
3. Retreat from Rollback? The Eisenhower Packages Program and the Dilemmas of 
Psychological Warfare 
The Eisenhower administration’s central response to the uprising also focused on 
the consumer goods shortages in the GDR. U.S. officials thought a program to provide the 
East German population with food ideally combined humanitarian motives with political-
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psychological objectives. The distribution of food at no cost to the East Germans would 
help to alleviate the immediate crisis “but offer no long-range change in the deteriorating 
economic condition.”1099  The food relief would demonstrate Adenauer’s sympathy for the 
East German brethren.  High Commissioner Conant emphasized that “our primary 
objective should be to put Adenauer in [a] position to take decisive action with respect to 
[the] East Zone crisis.”1100  By placing the food program officially under West German 
auspices, as Conant urged from Bonn, the U.S. could “provide [a] powerful stimulus to the 
Adenauer election victory”1101 and to Western resolve on the EDC. But the food program 
would also demonstrate continuing U.S. concern for the plight of the East Germans, yet 
keep the Soviets on the defensive and aggravate antagonisms between the SED regime and 
the populace. 
 Various schemes for implementing the program were considered.  Outlining the 
options, State Department officials recognized that “[i]f humanitarian considerations were 
to take precedence over the psychological advantages to be gained, and the amount of food 
to be offered were [was] to be reduced considerably,” thus without U.S. governmental 
intervention and by unobtrusive methods, some food could certainly get into East 
Germany.1102  But this ran precisely counter to the intention behind the program.  Another 
proposal called for Chancellor Adenauer to issue a formal request to Eisenhower, who 
would respond by making food available from the Allied Berlin stockpile and from 
agricultural surpluses in the United States, supplemented by Army C-rations.  The food 
would then be distributed through private channels, churches, and charitable 
organizations.1103  This option was soon discarded for the fear of endangering these inner-
German links which were of vital importance to political prisoners and others supported 
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by the churches in East Germany.  The CIA, the Air Force, and the influential journalist 
Drew Pearson favored a riskier scheme by which the Air Re-supply and Communications 
Service, an arm of the U.S. Air Force, would send food to the East by way of balloons, a 
plan which ran into strong opposition from High Commissioner Conant.1104  Indeed, one 
proposal envisaged U.S. and Western food convoys arriving at selected Iron Curtain 
border points in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia demanding entrance on pre-
announced days.  If denied entry, “it might be very effective to arrive at the border points 
anyway on the day and at the time announced, and permit the news cameras and reporters 
[...] to cover the event of Soviet denial.”1105   
 “From a psychological point of view,” it was finally deemed most effective if the 
offer for food for East Germany was made by a direct approach to the Soviet 
Government.1106  Thus, on July 10, the program was officially announced by publication 
of an exchange of letters between Chancellor Adenauer and President Eisenhower.  
Simultaneously, Eisenhower’s note to the Soviets, offering $15 million worth of food aid 
for the East Germans, was published.1107  Planned as a fait accompli regardless of Soviet 
reaction, rejection by the Soviets on July 11 came as little surprise.1108  Headed by Eleanor 
Dulles and Richard Strauss, an interdepartmental committee then decided to support a plan 
which placed the food packages—the so-called “Eisenhower packages”—at the disposal 
of the federal West German government for distribution to the East Germans.  Modeled 
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after a local Berlin “neighborly aid program,”1109 the food was made available to East 
Berliners and East Zoners at various distribution centers in the Western sectors of Berlin 
which were still accessible from the East, with distribution commencing on July 27. 
Coinciding with the 15th Plenum at which Ulbricht sought to reassert authority, the 
aid scheme received an “overwhelming response”1110 from the East Germans. By the end 
of the first day, HICOG could report that the number of applicants for food packages--
103,743 packages were issued--had exceeded all expectations, a success attributed mainly 
to the heavy play RIAS gave to the operation.1111  By the third day, over 200,000 parcels 
were being issued daily. By the end of the program’s first phase (15 August), 865,000 
people had come from East Germany and East Berlin to get food. Because many East 
Germans also carried identity cards belonging to friends and relatives--in order to receive 
several packages the average applicant collected about 3 apiece--altogether 2,598,202 
parcels were given out. By mid-August, 75 per cent of East Berlin’s population had 
received one. Most importantly, however, two-thirds of the food went to people living in 
the Berlin periphery and to “deep zoners.”1112 A second program, lasting from 28 August 
to early October, evoked a similar response. In total, more than 5.5 million food packages 
were distributed.1113  
 Within days of its launch, the food program’s impact was becoming evident.  
Underestimating the effectiveness of the American program, the SED initially reacted to 
the food distribution merely by intensifying propaganda.  Noting the “relatively large 
number of inhabitants from all social strata” (reports emphasized the high proportion of 
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women) and the large influx of people from outside the capital area going to Berlin to 
receive their packages, the SED ordered a massive propaganda drive (Agitationseinsätze) 
at rail stations and other strategic points.  In Potsdam alone, 150,000 leaflets denouncing 
the food program were printed.  Loudspeaker systems were installed in key spots, and the 
National Front orchestrated an intensified action of party agitators and party meetings.  
Newspapers and radio broadcasts denounced the “Bettelpakete” and named those who 
were caught receiving packages.1114  Contrary to the grand-scale propaganda drive, few 
punitive actions other than occasional package confiscations were thought necessary.  
 By the end of the month, reports reaching the SED headquarters in Berlin sounded 
alarming.  True, some East Germans believed the food relief to be “only propaganda for 
Adenauer,”1115 but many responded enthusiastically.  Party officials sent to West Berlin 
noted the rapidly increasing number of people on their way to receive packages.1116  By 
July 31, train ticket sales had multiplied, in some cases by seven.  Two-thirds of the 
passengers in trains from Berlin, the SED was informed, were carrying food packages.1117  
Party observers were obviously impressed by the patience the food recipients showed in 
waiting, often for hours, to receive their packages.  “It is remarkable,” one report from 
Berlin noted, “that entire families and house communities were heading for the 
distribution points.”1118  Others similarly noted the “starker Andrang,” or large throngs, at 
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the distribution points.1119  Pointing out that trains to Berlin had been occupied at 180-200 
percent of normal ridership, the massive number of arriving and departing package 
recipients at one railway station, according to one official observer, “gave the impression 
of a demonstration.”1120  A report from the Cottbus party district noted “vigorous 
discussions” of the U.S. food program in factories and in the entire district.  Many 
workers, according to these reports, went so far as to demand that food packages should be 
claimed for the entire factory by factory representatives.1121  On July 31, 150 employees of 
a industrial plant in Wittenberg were reported to have organized a joint trip to West Berlin.  
But not only workers deserted the party line again.  Among the food recipients, the SED 
central committee learned, were growing numbers of train personnel in uniform (taking 
advantage of their free train tickets), and mail and administrative personnel.  
 Most disconcerting to the SED, numerous party members also made the trip to 
Berlin.  Five hundred and seventy party members, sent to West Berlin to agitate against 
the food distribution, returned with only 150 packages, a remarkably small number which 
was attributed to the fact that most of them had kept their packages for themselves.1122  In 
a party meeting in Fürstenwalde, Berlin was informed, only eight of 48 SED members 
were consistently resisting the temptation.1123  The fact that “even members and 
functionaries of the [SED] party were succumbing to the provocation and hence were 
becoming party enemies” was exemplified by the events in the town of Werder, where the 
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local party secretary and his deputy as well as the chairman of the farmers’ association and 
local production cooperative, and following them a member of the mayor’s household, 
went to Berlin to receive their packages.  “Following this bad example all other residents 
one by one went to get the Amipakete.”1124 
 Furthermore, many people were carrying several identity cards which were 
required for the pick-up in order to make the trip worthwhile.  In one incident, a farm 
employee was found to be carrying 15 food packages.1125  Indeed, even the number of 
people registering their children for ID cards jumped up.  The police in the small town of 
Fürstenwalde reported to Berlin that on one of the first days of the food program alone, 80 
people had requested registration, a startling number considering that, despite 
encouragement on the part of the authorities, not a single registration had been requested 
since 1949!1126 
It was clear that East Berlin had--as during the initial phase of the uprising--
underestimated the response it would elicit among the population. In its 1 August meeting, 
the SED Politburo decided on a “shame” campaign against the food package program. To 
counter the “provocative acts of the American and British warmongers,” the Politburo also 
suspended the sale of train tickets to Berlin and declared it illegal to carry more than one’s 
own personal identification papers. Security measures were to be taken at railway stations 
in order to prevent “enemy provocations.” In addition, all freight and bus traffic to Berlin 
was halted. Party, unions and other mass organizations were mobilized to carry out 
political mass agitation against the “imperialist” aid program. “It is necessary,” the 
Politburo informed the local party organizations, “to take measures to ensure, in 
accordance with local conditions, the vigorous carrying out of the New Course. In doing 
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so, the fight against agents of the American and West German warmongers should be the 
focus of our struggle for the workers’ and peasants’ power in the German Democratic 
Republic.”1127 In addition to propagandistic threats against those easterners who 
“succumbed” to the “Ami bait,” food package recipients were registered, their names 
publicized and, in increasing numbers, their personal identification papers and food 
parcels confiscated.  Going further, the GDR State Security Service mailed out forged 
invitations to West Berlin unemployed to receive packages under the program. While 
heavily publicized in the GDR press, this effort never reached the dimensions of its 
counterpart.1128  Several thousands of agitators were sent to West Berlin to incite unrest 
among those waiting in line for their food packages under often miserable conditions.1129  
In  the midst of the crisis , in what Eisenhower administration officials called a “stunt,” the 
GDR offered to purchase food from the funds (more than $1.6 million)  of the GDR 
Central Bank (Deutsche Notenbank) blocked since 1952 in the United States.  When, 
however, Washington indicated that it would be willing to sell such food to the East 
German regime, the proposal was “dropped like a hot potato.”1130 
 While the crackdown considerably reduced their number, East Germans continued 
to reach the distribution centers in West Berlin by the thousands. The food program 
continued to remain a focus of popular attention, thus preventing the SED from internal 
stabilization and keeping the regime on “a peevish defensive.”1131  Internal SED reports 
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still indicated that “the enemy was increasingly succeeding in winning over large portions 
of the population, in particular retirees and housewives, but also workers.”1132  Leipzig 
reported “intense discussions over the food program in the plants.”1133  While the 
politburo-ordered ticket sale suspension was taking effect, the transportation ministry 
reported, “many [of its] employees were still carrying out their jobs without offensively 
exposing to the passengers the true character of the ‘American aid.’”1134  Others noted that 
the attitude of the railway officials “still varied a lot.”1135  Indeed, in some cases the 
Railways Ministry orders had been relayed only with considerable delay, enabling many 
East Germans still to acquire tickets.1136   
Furthermore, as the Americans foresaw, the imposition of restrictive measures 
served to heighten tensions in an already explosive situation.  Party officials recorded 
incidents of travelers to Berlin arguing “very aggressively” that “[t]hose in West Berlin are 
behind us. If we get in trouble, we just have to say so, then the matter will go before the 
UN.”1137 In discussions of the stoppage of all ticket sales to Berlin, some commented, 
“This must be the freedom of the East Zone.”1138  Noting the “negative discussion” among 
those who were now precluded from going to Berlin—“This way the government cannot 
win the confidence of the people!”—reports stated that “[o]ne can detect a general 
annoyance [with the measures].” 1139 In some instances, disappointed East Germans 
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resorted to what was labeled “provocative” action, coercing the authorities to allow train 
rides to Berlin or simply going by car.  In Groß-Schönebeck (Berlin), about 150 women 
forced the departure of a train by initially blocking the tracks.1140  In Angermünde, 2,000 
people awaiting returnees from West Berlin assumed what local SED officials perceived 
to be a “threatening attitude against the VP [People’s Police].” When the VP called in fire 
fighters to turn hoses on the people, riots broke out, and it took three hours for order to be 
restored.1141  Others tried to circumvent the regime’s measures by buying train tickets for 
destinations close to Berlin, completing the travel by other means.1142  In other parts of the 
country, workers went on strike to protest the regime’s measures. Repeatedly, district SED 
officials reported threats of an imminent general strike and a “second 17 June” to 
Berlin.1143  
 RIAS continued to play an important role in the implementation of U.S. policy.  Its 
broadcasts, to the agony of the SED, served as effective means for propagandizing the 
food distribution deep into the Soviet zone.1144  More importantly, many East Germans 
now openly listened to the American-sponsored radio program to show their defiance of 
the regime.  Thus, in the small town of Germershausen, “the entire population was 
listening to RIAS or the NWDR,” apparently turning their radios to such volume “that it 
could be heard in the streets.”1145 
 The food program sharply exacerbated tensions within the GDR and made it more 
difficult for the SED to regain the political offensive through the reassertion of New 
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Course policies at the 15th SED CC Plenum.  To their chagrin, internal party reports 
indicated that not only the population at large but party members at meetings were 
distracted by the ongoing Western aid deliveries.  By the end of August, Moscow felt 
constrained to stage a highly publicized meeting with a top-level GDR government 
delegation and to provide promises of aid and an end to reparations in an obvious effort to 
boost the SED regime’s standing which the food program had clearly undermined.1146  
“The main issue in the discussions today,” an internal party report of August 3 stated, 
“was again the food package program.  On the other hand, any discussion of the proposals 
of our People’s Chamber and the decision of the Fifteenth Plenum fell into the 
background.”  The party organizations were “still not able to influence the discussion in 
any decisive manner.”1147  During the next days reports reached Berlin that “the 
population is hardly discussing the [...] decisions of the Fifteenth Plenum.”  The reason for 
this, it was pointed out, was that the party’s propaganda drive was “almost exclusively 
concerned with the package program [...].”1148   Faced with train passengers outraged by 
the suspension of almost all traffic to Berlin, party officials were “still reacting 
defensively.”1149  The “fight for the enlightenment of the masses on the background of the 
food aid” was still not taken on effectively by the local party leadership.1150  In one 
representative instance, a SED-sponsored effort to bring about a factory-wide “vote of 
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condemnation” of the “Western package provocation” resulted in 60 out of 74 workers 
abstaining from the vote.1151   
 Despite substantial economic Soviet support for their beleaguered client regime, 
many East Germans questioned the “point of those food deliveries from the Soviet Union.  
Prices are too high—and you can’t buy the merchandise.  We would rather go to West 
Berlin to get our packages.”1152  The “bad Americans distribute free packages and the 
good friend makes us pay for them,” East Germans mocked at the news of Russian credits 
and aid.1153  Noting that the great majority of the population had still not recognized the 
“political and provocative background” of the package program, most people showed 
themselves “continually uninterested” in the Soviet aid program.1154  When at one Berlin 
SED party meeting it was suggested that the Soviets’ suspension of the reparations was in 
accordance with German interests whereas Adenauer was said to desire a 50-year 
occupation of Germany, “the largest part of the participants broke into laughter.”1155  As 
late as mid-September, party officials acknowledged the “lasting influence of the enemy,” 
the Versöhnlertum (conciliatory attitude) of local authorities towards food recipients, and 
the intensifying “discussions and demands at railway stations to reopen the ticket 
sales.”1156 
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As an internal SED public opinion survey stated ominously, the relationship of party and 
government to the population “has worsened recently.”1157  
At first, the aid action was hailed in Washington, Bonn, and West Berlin as a 
“highly successful operation” fitting into a larger “overall psychological strategy.”1158  
Berlin’s Lord Mayor Ernst Reuter emphasized how worried the program had made the 
Eastern authorities: It had been “like an artillery attack.”1159 Indeed, the program’s far-
reaching effects seemed to be nothing less than “a continuation of 17 June by other 
means.”1160  It had provided a substantial amount of food to undernourished East Berliners 
and East Germans and highlighted the shortages in the GDR, forcing the Soviets and SED 
to increase rations for the population and further redirect industrial policy. More 
importantly, the operation had given the East German population an opportunity to 
demonstrate their defiance of the Communist regime--to “vote with their feet”--and once 
again showed the limits of the SED apparatus. Furthermore, as Conant judged, the aid had 
“given East Germans contact with the West and ... made it once more a vital force in their 
lives. They know that the West exists, thinks about them and hopes some day that the east 
will be free.”1161  In doing so, it had squarely placed the Soviets and the SED on the 
defensive and undercut their unity propaganda. It also contributed to Adenauer’s decisive 
victory at the polls on 6 September, thereby assuring the continuation of his policy of 
integration with the West.1162 “This important project has already bettered our position in 
the cold war,” one American observer enthusiastically informed Washington.1163 
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 To the “cold warriors” within the administration the program demonstrated that 
there were means short of war to advance the liberation of Europe. Eisenhower ordered the 
PSB on 11 July--“while matters [were] still hot”--to develop food programs for all the 
other satellites.  Inspired by their success, U.S. officials also contemplated various other 
schemes, such as deliveries of medical supplies and other commodities in great popular 
demand, a clothing drive for the East, hospitality programs and the distribution of printed 
materials.  On 13 July, the CIA-funded National Committee for a Free Europe launched a 
massive balloon propaganda program for Czechoslovakia (“Operation Prospero”).  All in 
all, 6,512 balloons dropped some twelve million propaganda leaflets across the country, 
many of which cited slogans of the East German protests or showed pictures of burning 
SED posters.  Through its “Voice of Free Czechoslovakia” broadcasts, CIA-sponsored 
Radio Free Europe accompanied the leaflet dropping.1164  In August, the Western High 
Commissioners proposed putting the Soviets and the Ulbricht regime in a “tight squeeze” 
diplomatically by abolishing the Allied interzonal passes and restoring free movement 
between the Western and Soviet Zones -- a measure intended to achieve “a sort of 
democratic infection”1165 of the East German population.1166 
However, while the aid program caused headaches for East Berlin and Moscow, it 
exacerbated British and French resentment of American “cold war” tactics. Instead of a 
new cold war offensive after the uprising, the British government favored “get[ting] things 
back to normal as fast as possible perhaps by “letting the Russians save face in East 
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Germany.”1167  The food program obviously ran counter to this idea by keeping up the 
crisis atmosphere in Berlin. In addition, British officials worried that the program would 
endanger West Berlin’s security. Faced with a unilateral American fait accompli, the 
British High Commissioner expressed his concern that the “present plan might result in 
[the] city being cut and even Berlin communications with [the] West being cut off.” 
Moreover, he argued that the project had been “untidily and hastily handled.”1168  As 
Conant told Dulles, British Commandant Kirkpatrick (along with his French counterpart) 
had objected to the operation, showing himself to be “cautious,” “apprehensive” and 
“prone to delay.”  For his part, the French Commandant asked sarcastically, if the food aid 
were to result “in cutting the city would this be serving [the] best interests of [the] West 
Berliners[?]”1169   
 In the face of Communist demonstrations staged at the food centers in August, 
British officials again argued that “security considerations call for [the] termination of 
[the] distribution operation.”1170  Like the French, they favored an early end to the 
operation and strongly opposed the establishment of a permanent organization which they 
considered “too blatant a type of political warfare against the East Zone regime and the 
Soviet occupation authorities.”1171  British opposition to what had become a unilateral 
U.S. policy left the British, as a Foreign Office official termed it, “in quite bad odour with 
the Americans on cold war matters.”1172 
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 Significantly, this “sharp disagreement with the British”1173 was recognized on the 
Soviet and East German side and thus diminished the impact of the food program.  As 
early as July 7, the GDR Foreign Ministry supplied Grotewohl with a report concerning 
the “Dissension within the Camp of the Western Powers over the Question of Four-Power 
Talks” which emphasized the efforts of British and French “imperialists” to withstand 
U.S. pressure for a more aggressive policy, to retain a “last bit of political independence 
and not to close the door on four-power negotiations.”1174  Similarly, a July 20 note to the 
Western High Commissioners by Semyonov revealed that Soviets were “also aware of [a] 
certain lack of unanimity re handling of the project,” hoping, as American observers 
noted, “to drive a wedge between the allies through release of [a] note at this time.”1175  
Even in West Germany, where the food program had initially garnered widespread public 
support, signs of apprehension began to appear more frequently.1176  The U.S. note to the 
Soviets of 10 July had already caused some “adverse reaction” among the press along the 
lines of: “food yes, propaganda no.”1177  Arguing against increased “drum beating,” 
Conant had warned early on that “East and West Germans would react against obvious 
propaganda to which they are hyper-sensitive.”1178  Wary of the possibility that the 
“smoldering fire [of] East German resistance may be prematurely fanned up and stamped 
out,” Conant now pleaded for restraint.  FRG officials, too, grew more and more 
concerned about the pressures on food recipients, and in particular about the GDR’s 
interference with the normal travel of East-zoners to Berlin.  West German charitable 
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organizations, which had displayed a “highly negative”1179 attitude all along toward 
involvement in the program, feared that the American action was jeopardizing their 
regular aid channels. If further action caused the Soviets to cut off the current flow of 
private parcels from West to East, this might have “serious repercussions for Adenauer,” 
the High Commissioner cautioned from Bonn. In addition, Mayor Reuter, among the most 
enthusiastic supporters of the program, became concerned about the negative impression 
made by denying food to West Berlin’s unemployed and poor. Press reports with 
headlines such as “Don’t Gamble with Hunger” reflected the increasingly critical reaction 
in West Germany.1180 By the end of September, the Federal Government, which had only 
belatedly been consulted in the implementation of the program, was urging for a “visible 
stop” of the food distribution.1181  Confronted with U.S. efforts to continue aid to the 
Soviet Zone in one way or another later that year, Franz Thedieck, state secretary in the 
Ministry for All-German Affairs, warned Washington of the adverse impact of such 
programs on the eve of the Berlin Four-Power foreign ministers’ conference scheduled for 
early 1954.  Due to mounting counter-arguments, Conant decided to “watch for [an] 
opening after [the] Four-Power conference.”1182   
Moreover, while the United States was still carrying out the food deliveries, the 
entire concept of psychological warfare as codified in PSB D-45 began to face heavy 
criticism from within the Eisenhower administration, in particular from American 
diplomats in Europe. One gathering of senior American envoys in Luxembourg in 
September 1953, declared that psychological warfare “should never be allowed to run 
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ahead of carefully considered political objectives” because of the “danger” it might “start 
to make policy rather than serve it.” One basic long-term objective of American policy, 
however, was the “withdrawal of the Soviet Army from the eastern zone of Germany and 
from the Eastern European satellites . . . stirring up resistance or incitements of revolts--
‘keeping the pot virtually at a boiling point’--might have the long-range effect of retarding 
a Soviet military withdrawal.”1183 Rather than proposing intensified psychological 
warfare, U.S. diplomats argued for what was described in one document as an “honorable 
and defensible compromise with the Soviets, with the aim of achieving the gradual 
liberation of the oppressed people through an evolutionary rather than revolutionary 
process.”1184  From HICOG Berlin came the warning that “aggressive US follow-up 
actions on food could conceivably produce another June 17.” If the food action and 
repressive SED measures were to lead to uprisings on the same scale, Berlin officials 
believed that “[the] Soviets with KVP in forefront will put down such uprisings ruthlessly.  
End result could be severe blow to workers’ morale, since there was little likelihood [that] 
such repression this time would be accompanied by economic concessions.”1185  High 
Commissioner Conant warned that “we don’t want to do anything that will cause any more 
bloodshed.”1186  The objective of American policy with regard to the Soviet zone, he wrote 
to Secretary of State Dulles, at least insofar as he understood it, was “to keep the pot 
simmering but not to bring it to a boil.”1187 
 Keeping the pot simmering, however, could not be achieved by psychological 
warfare alone: “Without under-emphasizing the significance of [the] food program [or] 
similar efforts,” HICOG Berlin warned, “a basic requirement for maintaining [the] current 
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degree [of] anti-regime attitude and for weakening GDR and Soviet position would appear 
to be clear cut US and/or allied political pressure on Soviets, exerted on high level and in 
simple terms, in order that East Germans can continue to believe there is real purpose in 
maintaining pressure on GDR Government and SED.”1188  Emphasizing the need for a 
more “positive policy,” U.S. officials in Berlin thought that negotiations on an all-German 
Commission as proposed by the Soviets “would be a greater blow to their equilibrium than 
if we succeed in getting the entire Soviet Zone population into West Berlin for a turkey 
dinner.”1189 
Adding weight to this view, the administration’s secret “Operation Solarium” 
policy reassessment of summer-fall 1953, while endorsing intensified reliance on covert 
action, concluded that rollback in Eastern Europe was not immediately feasible.1190 At the 
end of September, the State Department outlined the U.S. position on unrest in the Soviet 
Zone, reminding missions abroad that “it is possible to maintain a psychological climate of 
resistance” but that attempts to “reduce Soviet power in the GDR should always be 
examined for their impact on our efforts to integrate the Federal Republic with the West.” 
Furthermore, the policy guideline warned that “we do not want to risk precipitating 
prematurely a mass, open rebellion” or “incur the blame for its consequences.” 
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Specifically the Department cautioned that American missions should not advise the East 
Germans “to engage in strikes and mass demonstrations,” and that continued propaganda 
“should not be used to encourage a repetition of the events of June 17, 1953.”1191  Even 
C.D. Jackson eventually had to admit that the United States did not have the power to eject 
the Soviets from East Germany through coercion: “I am all for complete, total, and 
crushing defeat if we really have the leverage to bring it about,” he wrote Dulles. “But we 
haven’t, and they know it, therefore all they have to do is to lay their ears back, and no real 
progress will have been made except raising hatred of Russia a notch or two in German 
minds.”1192  
 This realization stemmed to some degree from the experience of the uprising and 
the food program itself. Indeed, because U.S. policy throughout the program retained 
limited objectives and did not intend to tip off a second “Day X,” it could not prevent--and 
might ultimately and inadvertently have aided--the consolidation of the Ulbricht regime. 
The initial announcement of the program, on July 10, had taken place at the very height of 
the struggle within the SED leadership, when Ulbricht’s position was being challenged by 
politburo member Rudolf Herrnstadt, State Security chief Wilhelm Zaisser, and others.  
Only after Grotewohl returned from a brief visit to Moscow (July 8-9 1953) was Ulbricht 
able to overcome the rebellion within the leadership, as manifested in the accusations 
against both Herrnstadt and Zaisser before the Central Committee in mid-July.  The U.S. 
initiative might well have added to the Soviets’ sense that Ulbricht’s demotion would be 
seen as a sign of weakness inviting further Western actions. Certainly the announcement 
of what Molotov called a “propaganda maneuver” provided Ulbricht with a powerful 
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argument to assure his survival.1193  By mid-September, U.S. observers had to admit that 
the operation “may in fact have increased somewhat the strength of the regime by 
furnishing it with an opportunity to prove for the first time after 17 June that it could still 
without the active intervention of Soviet troops maintain a degree of control over a hostile 
population.”1194  
 The development of the food program itself reflected its diminishing returns as an 
anti-regime measure.  American observers noted that the stream of food recipients was 
slackening off during September, as East Zone residents reported widespread confiscation 
of food parcels and “increased Communist harassment.”1195  The East Zoners’ early 
inclination to “thumb their noses” at their communist rulers was thus decreasing; 
plebiscite-type demonstrations could not be maintained at a steady pitch over a protracted 
period of time. There were signs that East Germans, even within the Protestant Church 
(one of the strongest centers of resistance within the GDR), were getting wary of being 
used as tools of American propaganda.1196 Diminishing in scope and becoming a minor 
sideshow in the Cold War, U.S. officials knew the food program “would lose its news 
value, its psychological effect and thereby no longer give any opportunity for encouraging 
manifestation of dissatisfaction or defiance among the East Zone population.”1197   
 More importantly, the alleviation of some of the economic grievances that had 
triggered the June uprising and the implementation of the New Course helped lessen the 
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program’s effect.  So did the heavy Soviet economic aid, which, U.S. observers estimated, 
“could result in [a] significant rise in living standard even by the end of this year.”1198 
Despite the food program, Americans came to realize that the “regime [was] keeping [the] 
situation in hand without overtly greatly increasing police control.”1199  Commenting on 
the Communist reaction to the food program, HICOG pointed out that “two things stood 
out”: GDR authorities neither closed off the sector border, thus keeping the East Berliners 
from getting packages, nor inflicted severe punishments on food recipients whom they 
apprehended.1200  
 The latter point proved to be a misperception.  As the Ulbricht regime 
reestablished its grip on party and population, its repressive measures became more 
severe.  In the wake of the unrest, the SED reinforced its efforts to expand its repressive 
and disciplinary apparatus, resulting in a massive expansion of the state security system 
and barracked People’s Police.  The growing SED assertiveness reflected rising success in 
mobilizing party activists, especially in the resistant large plants, and in improving the 
discipline of police and state security to the degree where the latter were able without 
Soviet help to break up small-scale gatherings before they got out of hand.1201  Due to the 
liquidation of potential resistance and opposition, U.S. officials on the scene in Berlin 
predicted in November 1953 that a “June 17 repetition” was “at present unlikely.”1202 
Later that fall, in a number of political trials in the GDR, numerous people were 
found guilty of “nefarious activities” as “Western agents.”  Indeed, the American 
sponsorship of the food program facilitated the regime’s efforts to establish more 
persuasively the theory that the June 17 uprising did not reflect genuine popular 
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dissatisfaction but had been a Western plot as well, thus blurring the distinction between 
the two events and implicitly legitimizing harsh countermeasures.1203  By arresting 
workers for legal transgressions connected with the food packages, the GDR’s rulers used 
the food program to expand the scope of action against those active in the June 17 
uprising.  Moreover, on August 26, the SED politburo decided to make an all-out effort in 
the “fight against the reactionary broadcasts of RIAS” with the objective of effectively 
reducing the reception of the station throughout the GDR.1204  As the Ulbricht regime was 
“surviving [the] first post-June 17 test of strength caused by the US food offer”1205 and 
enlisting Soviet support, U.S. observers speculated that “the program may in fact have 
increased somewhat the strength of the regime by furnishing it with an opportunity to 
prove for the first time after June 17 that it could still without the active intervention of 
Soviet troops maintain a degree of control over a hostile population.”1206  
 Reflecting reassertion of its offensive in Germany, by August Moscow was 
reviewing its initiative on the German question.  Internal deliberations called for a Warsaw 
Pact conference on the German question in Moscow or Berlin (similar to the Prague 
conference of October 1950 which had launched the Soviet campaign for East-West 
German talks).  In early August, and again in mid-month, Moscow sent diplomatic notes 
to the Western powers proposing the convocation of a peace conference, the formation of 
an all-German provisional government and an easing of Germany’s financial-economic 
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burdens.  At the same time, the Kremlin committed itself to supporting the weakened but 
unreconstructed Ulbricht regime as the “bulwark of the struggle of the German people for 
a united, peace-loving and democratic Germany.”  However much an all-German appeal 
Moscow hoped such proposals would have in the West, its focus was on strengthening 
“the further development of the national economy” of the GDR in the aftermath of the 
disastrous uprising. At their 20-22 August meetings with Ulbricht, Grotewohl, and other 
GDR leaders, the Soviets promised much of what had been discussed internally for 
months: the transfer of Soviet joint-stock companies, a sharp reduction in occupation 
expenses and an end to reparations payments by year’s end, as well as substantial 
economic and financial aid--notwithstanding the lateness of the act, which a State 
Department cable characterized as “a literal example of locking [the] barn door after [the] 
horse [has been] stolen by Soviets.”1207  The Kremlin leadership also agreed to free 
additional prisoners of war and raise the status of its mission in Berlin to that of an 
embassy. Moscow’s moves were seen in Washington as a “serious effort to bolster the 




The impact of the East German uprising on U.S. policy towards Eastern Europe 
was most prominently reflected in National Security Council Report No. 174 of December 
1953.1209  Previous policy directives, respectively, held out hopes for further Titoist, 
national-communist regimes in the wake of the Soviet-Yugoslav split, and in effect 
advocated actively exploiting the potential for “roll-back.” NSC 174 conceded that the 
“detachment of any major European satellite from the Soviet bloc does not now appear 
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feasible except by Soviet acquiescence or by war.”1210 While the uprising had 
demonstrated that the Soviets failed fully to “subjugate” the Eastern Europeans or to 
destroy their desire for freedom, and had proved the unreliability of the satellite armed 
forces, the USSR’s ability to “exercise effective control” over Eastern Europe had  “not 
been appreciably reduced.”  East Germany posed “special and more difficult problems of 
control” than the other East European regimes, and hence could serve as a “focal point and 
example of disaffection for the rest of the Soviet satellites.” But the aggressiveness of any 
U.S. policy towards East Germany had to be tempered by the Washington’s interest in 
integrating the Federal Republic with the West and ensuring continued access to West 
Berlin. 
The U.S. approach to Eastern Europe, as reflected in NSC 174, would continue to 
rely on a host of political, economic and other measures, including covert operations, 
despite growing recognition of the mounting difficulties of conducting such operations. 
NSC 174 prescribed giving encouragement and assistance to the “satellite peoples” in 
“resistance to their Soviet-dominated regimes,” but also warned against incitement to 
“premature action,” which would only bring further terror and reprisals.  In sum, U.S. 
policymakers needed to walk a “fine line, which is not stationary, between exhortations to 
keep up morale and to maintain passive resistance, and invitations to suicide.” That 
tightrope would be difficult to tread for U.S. policymakers and operatives dealing with 
Eastern Europe; it would be even harder for the peoples of Eastern Europe to recognize, 
given the extent to which their geography, passions and misperceptions influenced how 
they viewed the role of the United States.  
                                                 
1210 However, the administration did not fully accept this lesson and integrate it into its policy and rhetoric, 






 The Cold War over Germany was central to the history of the Cold War—its 
beginnings, its prolongation, and its end. One of the central elements in America’s success 
in fighting the Cold War was its approach towards Germany: the creation of an 
economically prosperous, politically stable democracy in Western Germany that was 
closely integrated with the West. To the Americans involved, the success of this project 
was far less certain as it may seem in hindsight: West Germany’s economic prosperity and 
political stability had humble beginnings. The Soviet threat exerted pressure that 
aggravated and distorted the problems of developing a viable democracy. Most 
importantly, the division of the country and of the former capital Berlin meant that the 
forces of German nationalism, while temporarily tamed, created an undercurrent of unease 
and unrest, a latent threat to the very foundations of the Federal Republic and the 
European settlement. 
 Division, in fact, was not what neither Americans and Soviets had in mind towards 
the end of World War II when they envisioned Germany’s postwar configuration. When 
visualizing Germany’s role in the postwar period, both Americans and Soviets fretted over 
the reemergence of a powerful Germany and even more so, over its being allied with the 
other side in any confrontation. Yet the exigencies of military strategy at war’s end, 
conflicting decisions on both sides about Germany’s economic role and political 
orientation, the breakdown of quadripartite agreement and the centrifugal dynamics of 
occupation policies led to the establishment of two German governments that satisfied 
neither side fully. On both sides, maximalists who favored maintaining influence 
throughout all of Germany, through inter-allied cooperation, had wrestled with 
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minimalists, eager to preserve exclusive control over and integrate their occupation 
zones—and lost. 
      New evidence from the Russian and German archives shows how Soviet actions 
in the Soviet Zone undercut the Soviet position in eastern Germany that that of the 
German communists. What has been less understood is how developments in the Soviet 
zone affected American policies. To be sure, initially the Americans were  hesitant to 
attach too much weight to the mass of reports of rapes, looting and chaos emanating from 
the SBZ. U.S. officials were resistant to draw conclusions from a wide array of disparate 
information and downplayed German complaints about the violence and exploitation of 
Soviet occupation. Americans were willing to accept a certain amount of vengeance for 
German warfare in Russia, and the feeling was widespread that the Germans had it 
coming. Even Soviet economic exploitation and transformation of their zone in 1945-46 
came hardly as a shock to Americans. Agreements on reparations pointed the Soviets to 
their zone first, and key economic policies, above all the land reform, were in line with the 
economic postulates of the Potsdam accords. But what increasingly worried U.S. officials 
was the strains an economically devastated Soviet zone would put on the resuscitation of 
western zones’ economy perceived as critical for the economic rehabilitation of western 
Europe. 
While Soviet directives on political activities, in particular the establishment of 
political parties and the support given to the German communists early on, were well 
ahead of those in the Western occupation zones, Americans occupation officials watched 
suspiciously but without much alarm. After all, as U.S. officials in Berlin realized, Soviet 
support for the communists cut both ways, and it had little effect on the Western zones. 
This changed, however, in early 1946 when the merger Communist Party and the Social 
Democratic Party in the Soviet zone intersected with debate within the Truman 
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administration over how to understand the “conduct of Soviet foreign policy” and the 
beginning reformulation of U.S. occupation policy in Germany. To many in Washington, 
the forced KPD-SPD merger seemed to fit into a broader pattern discernible throughout 
East-Central Europe, irreversibly putting the Soviet zone on track towards becoming a 
Soviet-controlled one-party state. The socio-economic “revolution” in the Soviet zone 
seemed to preclude the feasibility of working out quadripartite, all-German solutions. 
Eastern Germany, in this view, had to be written off.  
Clay, Murphy and many others within OMGUS, aware of the complexities that 
characterized Soviet rule in Eastern Germany, were far less impressed by the success and 
significance of the merger—and the irreversibility of the “revolution” in the SBZ 
generally. Hence Clay eagerly pursued quadripartite arrangements—especially on 
reparations and central agencies, which he saw first steps in the direction of a central 
German government structures that would have the potential to yield influence in eastern 
Germany. By integrating the Soviets into a joint occupation system, Clay hoped he could 
ensure – that is, compel – the expansion of American influence right into the Soviet 
occupation zone. Evidence from the Russian and former East German archives shows that 
Stalin, Soviet occupation officials and his German communist allies seemed to have 
recognized the dangers inherent in this strategy.  
Even after the establishment of the Federal Republic, American policy in Germany 
could never be exclusively focused on the construction and integration of West Germany. 
While political and economic integration of “America’s Germany” became the primary 
preoccupation of U.S. officials in the early 1950s, fending off the specter of German 
nationalism and its exploitation by its self-proclaimed champion to the East became a 
critical part of American strategy. Fearful that the Soviet-SED’s championing of German 
unity would eventually derail the West German project, the Truman administration sought 
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to complement its integration policy in the west with political, psychological and 
economic warfare program designed to keep the Ulbricht regime off balance. By 
undermining Soviet-SED control and fostering resistance in East Germany, by “keeping 
the pot simmering,” the U.S. sought to weaken the ability of the SED to exert influence in 
Western Germany. In their intention to counter Soviet-SED control and turn East Germany 
into a strategic liability for Moscow that would lead the USSR to negotiate its 
reunification with Western Germany, these efforts can be seen in lineage to Clay’s efforts 
to project American influence in the eastern zone.  
 
Clay and Murphy had recognized the crucial role (West) Berlin played in 
projecting Western influence into the Russian zone, and after 1949 the city continued to be 
an important battleground for the Cold War in Germany. Not only did the Truman 
administration perceive the city in the heart of the GDR as a point of extreme 
vulnerability, as became evident in the May/June 1950 near-crisis over the 
Deutschlandtreffen and in the 1951 interzonal trade debacle. For the administration, the 
city also provided a base for the operation of its “counteroffensive,” its psychological and 
economic warfare efforts vis-à-vis East Germany. As the GDR increasingly shut off its 
ties to the West in 1951-1952, the city also emerged a strategic opportunity to maintain 
contact with the East Germans. U.S. efforts to exploit this potential in 1950-1951 (as it 
would in 1953) might well have inspired Ulbricht to attempt – unsuccessfully -- to isolate 
the western city sectors in 1952/53. 
 
In fighting the Cold War in Germany, however, Americans faced serious 
difficulties. Neither British nor French officials favored actively championing German 
unification, if only as a propaganda strategy. They also objected to heightening Cold War 
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tensions which, in their view, could only endanger the precarious Western position in 
Berlin and Western Germany and disturb their incipient trade relationships with the Soviet 
bloc. Many West Germans in turn were similarly skeptical in rallying to the American call 
for stepping up efforts vis-à-vis the GDR, eager not to become a pawn in the U.S.-Soviet 
confrontation and keen to preserve, particularly with regard to interzonal trade, the only 
remaining ties with the East—as well as lucrative resources and markets. U.S. integration 
policy in Germany hence placed severe limits on how far the U.S. could pursue the 
destabilizing of the GDR, and a number of the most ambitious projects fail to be 
implemented.  
 
The potential and contradictions of U.S. efforts to “keep the pot simmering” in 
East Germany culminated in the June 1953 uprising. Triggered by the half-hearted “New 
Course” liberalization program which the post-Stalin leadership forced Ulbricht to adopt, 
the mass unrest throughout the GDR in the days following initial protests on June 16  
offered the new Eisenhower administration the opportunity to derail a dreaded new Soviet-
East German “unification initiative” that would complicate the final ratification of the 
Contractuals, seize the initiative on the unity issue in the “hearts and minds” of West and 
East Germans alike, strengthen the Adenauer government and extend the destabilization of 
the Ulbricht regime following its most profound crisis. But Eisenhower and Dulles quickly 
made clear that a roll-back of Soviet power in Germany by military means was not a 
practical option, despite the liberation rhetoric of the preceding election campaign and the 
widespread expectations this had generated in East Germany (and other East European 
countries) and despite serious intentions by Cold War “hot heads” within the 
administration.  The massive popular reaction by the East Germans to the U.S.-sponsored 
food program in Berlin, in itself a far cry from the ambitious rollback rhetoric, nonetheless 
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demonstrated how easily playing with fire could bring the pot to a boil. British and French 
officials quickly grew concerned about West Berlin security as the city coped with the 
mass influx of aid-seeking East Germans, and West German officials, delighted at first by 
the ostensive support the action led to Adenauer’s reelection bid in the September polls, 
quickly soured over potential backlash of what became increasingly depicted as a 
propaganda ploy. Most significantly, U.S. actions might have actually helped Ulbricht to 
regain Moscow’s support and eliminate his domestic opponents after nearly being toppled 
in the early days of the crisis. The legacy of America’s first experience in the Cold War 
with a spontaneous anti-communist revolt in Europe which had the potential for a 
“rollback” of Soviet power—presaging crises in Poland (1956, 1970, 1980-81), Hungary 
(1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968)—is thus an ambivalent one.  The experience with 
rollback policies in the 1950s in general, and the East German uprising in particular,  
would—after the Cold War hardened with the formation of the military blocs in 1954-
1955 and the integration of the two German states—point American policymakers to 
alternative strategies, such as increasing East-West German contacts and selectively 
increased trade, strategies that formed the seeds of Ostpolitik in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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